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[1986] SLR (CA) 8Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

DUAGBOR AND OTHERS vs. AKYEA-DJAMSON [1984-86] 1 GLR 697

29 May 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 21 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 8
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OSCOLADUAGBOR AND OTHERS v AKYEA-DJAMSON [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 [1986] SLR (CA) 8
APADUAGBOR AND OTHERS v AKYEA-DJAMSON [1984-86] 1 GLR 697, [1986] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookDUAGBOR AND OTHERS v AKYEA-DJAMSON [1984-86] 1 GLR 697, [1986] SLR (CA) 8 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Nkyi XI v Kumah [1959] GLR 281, CA.

(2) Nelson v Ammah (1940) 6 WACA 134.

(3) Dam v Addo [1962] 2 GLR 200, SC.

(4) Oshodi v Kaliatu Imoru (1936) 3 WACA 93.

(5) Oshodi v Balogun (1936) 4 WACA 1, PC.

(6) Frempong II v Brempong II (1952) 14 WACA 13.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of a circuit court in favour of the plaintiff in an action for declaration of title to land and damages for trespass. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban JA.

COUNSEL

George Darko for the appellants.

Aduama-Osei for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The appeal is from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Koforidua delivered on 19 October 1978. It concerned a piece or parcel of land situate at a place called Fintey Dorfor in the Eastern Region. The description of the land as to its boundaries were set out in the writ of summons.

By the said judgment the learned trial judge decreed title in favour of the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to simply as the plaintiff). He further awarded the plaintiff damages of ¢400 for trespass. The plaintiff was also granted perpetual injunction restraining the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants and co-defendant, respectively), their servants, agents and privies from entering the said land and/or from interfering with the land in any manner whatsoever.

[p.700] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 The plaintiff is a legal practitioner and his case was that he purchased the disputed land from one Togbe Kuma Asilevi, head of the Asilevi family of Fintey Dorfor. The land measured 2,024 feet on the north-east, on the south-east 1,029.2 feet, on the south-west 2,024 feet and on the north-west 945.20 feet and covered an area of 46.10 acres. The purchase price was ¢400. A deed of conveyance dated 14 May 1970 was executed by the vendor, Togbe Kuma Asilevi, to evidence the said sale; the deed was duly registered in the Lands Department as No 1630/1970.

The plaintiff is not a native of Fintey Dorfor and he said he got to know of this land through a cousin of his and it was through this cousin that the vendor, Togbe Kuma Asilevi, invited the plaintiff to Fintey Dorfor where he met the vendor and his elders. They informed the plaintiff that they needed money to buy materials for the roofing of a school block and that the elders had decided to sell a portion of their land. The plaintiff having agreed to buy, a surveyor was employed who demarcated the land in dispute for the plaintiff. The plaintiff entered possession after the execution of the deed of conveyance by placing his into caretaker, one Ayisi, on the land. In 1973 this Ayisi reported to the plaintiff about acts of trespass which the defendants had committed on the land. On the receipt of the report, the plaintiff said he visited the land and found that the defendants had unlawfully felled a number of trees which were used in making charcoal for their own benefit.

It must be observed that the action was originally brought against the two defendants but their father Aaron Kodey, who was also the chief of the area, applied to be made a co-defendant on the basis that he was the owner of the land in the area of which the disputed land formed part and that the defendants entered the land with his permission and consent. Indeed, the defendants in their statement of defence averred that it was their father, the co-defendant, who authorised them to enter the disputed land.

It is interesting to note that the plaintiff’s vendor, Togbe Kuma Asilevi, never joined the suit, even though his representative was brought to give evidence for the plaintiff. Thus it was a straight fight between the plaintiff and the co-defendant. The co-defendant put in a counterclaim which reads as follows, “The co-defendant repeats his entire statement of defence and counterclaims for the land in dispute.” The co-defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim, contending that the disputed land “formed part of a larger area” belonging to his ancestors and which had descended to him as the head of family. In short the co-defendant claimed the disputed land as part of his ancestral property. He further contended that the family of the plaintiff ‘s vendor, the Asilevi family, was an integral part of the co-defendant’s family and that the Asilevi family by itself did not own any land in the area

[p.701] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 and that without the consent and concurrence of the co-defendant the plaintiff’s vendor could not dispose of or alienate the land in dispute.

In his statement of defence and in his evidence the co-defendant outlined the cases in which he had to defend his title to a large area of land of which the disputed land formed part. In his evidence-in-chief, the co-defendant described this larger area as follows:

“The land in dispute is part of a big family land. I am the head of the family. The family has on one side, ie the east Anum Nkwakubew land. Kwame Gyew is the chief of that area. On the west I form boundary with Ofei Ayebiew, he is the chief of Anyensu. On the north I form boundary with Volta River, the South with Alaboe River.”

The co-defendant tendered exhibits 1 and 2 to support his contention that he, as the owner of the land, had been through the courts defending his title to the land over the years to the knowledge of the plaintiff’s vendor and without any financial support from the said vendor. However, at the end of the day, the learned trial judge declared the plaintiff the owner of the land.

In this appeal counsel for the defendants and the co-defendant argued together the two additional grounds of appeal. First, that the learned trial judge erred in holding that although the land in dispute belonged to the co-defendant’s family, yet the co-defendant was estopped “by laches and acquiescence from interfering with any dealings” of the land by the plaintiff’s vendor; and secondly, the learned trial judge misdirected himself on what would amount to estoppel by laches and acquiescence.

Counsel argued that the learned trial judge based the estoppel on the ground that even though the co-defendant had judgments affecting the land in his favour, he, the co-defendant, failed to drive the family of the plaintiff’s vendor from the land; and that failure on the part of the co-defendant, according to the learned trial judge, amounted to acquiescing in the right of the family of the vendor to occupy the land. Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge was in error about what constituted estoppel by acquiescence, because the co-defendant, by allowing the family of the plaintiff’s vendor to stay on the land, could only make the Asilevi family licensees and not owners.

Counsel further submitted that there was no evidence from the plaintiff that the co-defendant sat down and watched the plaintiff’s vendor exercising acts of ownership over the land without interference from the co-defendant. Counsel again contended that there was also no evidence from the plaintiff to show that the co-defendant did anything to encourage the family of the plaintiff ‘s vendor to defend their title to this land. Counsel therefore submitted that it was wrong for the learned

[p.702] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 trial judge to grant a declaration of title to the plaintiff on the basis of laches and acquiescence.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand contended that the judgment should be upheld, even though counsel conceded that there were few instances where it would appear that the learned trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the evidence. I may remark that counsel for the plaintiff argued in a way which clearly indicated that he could not wholeheartedly support some of the findings made by the learned trial judge. Nevertheless, counsel urged this court to look at the evidence as a whole and make proper findings and then substitute the findings so made for the wrong ones made by the learned trial judge.

I was left in no doubt that learned counsel for the plaintiff did not have much confidence in the reasoning of the learned trial judge, even though counsel seemed to be happy with the ultimate decision which declared the plaintiff the owner of the land. I think the decision of the learned trial judge proceeded on many wrong premises and that probably led him into a situation where he seemed to have ignored the issues before him.

The plaintiff having sought a declaration of title to the land in dispute, could only succeed upon the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the co-defendant’s case. It is true that the co-defendant also counterclaimed for a declaration of title but that is beside the point. For the co-defendant’s counterclaim could not in any way lighten the weight of the burden on the plaintiff to establish his title to the land by preponderance of admissible evidence. The defence having denied the plaintiff’s title and then counterclaimed for title, a burden was placed on the plaintiff to prove his title satisfactorily or else he must fail: see Nkyi XI v Kumah [1959] GLR 281,CA and Nelson v Ammah (1940) 6 WACA 134.

The question then is whether the evidence which the plaintiff adduced was such as to discharge the burden of proof which lay on him? The question can only be answered after a critical examination of the evidence as a whole. The plaintiff traced his root of title to his vendor, Togbe Asilevi, head of the Asilevi family of Fintey Dorfor and, as I have already indicated, no steps were taken by the plaintiff to join his vendor.

The plaintiff could only succeed if he was able to prove that his vendor Togbe Kuma Asilevi had title to the land. The plaintiff was a total stranger to Fintey Dorfor and could not pretend to have personal knowledge as to how his vendor came by the land in dispute. The plaintiff’s evidence therefore consisted mainly of how he got to know that his vendor wanted to sell the land in dispute and the eventual sale of the land to him and the execution of the deed of conveyance, exhibit

[p.703] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697

A Of course, the plaintiff in the course of his evidence attempted to give evidence as to how his vendor came by the land in dispute. But he could not go further than stating as follows. “I am told that the ancestors of my vendor had settled on this land from time immemorial.” This piece of evidence was obviously hearsay evidence and could not also be admissible as traditional evidence. For the plaintiff, as I have said, was a total stranger to his vendor’s family and, in fact, to Fintey Dorfor and could not be said to be someone who was competent to give traditional evidence as to the mode of acquisition of his vendor. The plaintiff here was basing the mode of acquisition on knowledge he acquired from someone whose identity was not even disclosed. Thus, at best, it could only amount to an assertion which called for proof. The plaintiff ended up under cross-examination as follows:

“I did not seek the concurrence of the co-defendant when the land was sold to me. I was informed that the co-defendant mooted the idea that if the Fintey people did not have money they were to sell the land to raise money. It was Mr Dango who gave me this information and this was confirmed by my vendor. At the time of buying this land I did not know any of the members of the family of the co-defendant.”

It was plain that at the end of the plaintiff’s own evidence, the quality of evidence which he had so far given was nowhere near the standard of proof normally required of a plaintiff who assumes the burden of proving title to land. Instead of the plaintiff calling his vendor, Togbe Kuma Asilevi, to testify on his behalf, he rather called one Simon Tonyi Asilevi who happened to be his only witness. The reason for not calling his vendor as disclosed in the power of attorney, exhibit B, was that the vendor was old and infirm.

However, the first plaintiff witness was the nephew and the secretary of the plaintiff’s vendor and he had the authority of the plaintiff’s vendor to speak on the vendor’s behalf. Indeed the plaintiff’s vendor in the power of attorney, exhibit B, described the first plaintiff witness as “heir to my stool.” The evidence of this witness could not therefore be treated lightly. But alas, his evidence rather weakened the plaintiff’s case considerably. This witness ended up by admitting that the co-defendant had on a previous occasion defended his title to the disputed land successfully against the chief of Nkwakubew and the chief of Anyensu. This is what the first plaintiff witness said under cross-examination:

“Yes, my ancestors bought some land from Anyensuhene. Yes, chief of Nkwakubew and Anyensuhene sued the co-defendant, Dawer and Larwer. The subject matter of that suit is a land that

[p.704] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 includes that portion Anyensuhene sold to my ancestors. I am aware that that matter went to the High Court, Accra. Yes, the co-defendant had judgment. Yes, the judgment was in respect of the land in dispute. When the co-defendant had judgment he did not drive us away from the land. Yes, the land in dispute is part of the land the subject matter between Nkwakubew and another versus co-defendant and two others.”

Under further cross-examination the first plaintiff witness again admitted another occasion when it became necessary for the co-defendant to defend his title to the disputed land. He said:

“Yes, the late Opanyin Akrobeto sued Kuma Asilevi [the plaintiff ‘s vendor] and others in respect of this land in dispute and others. Yes, Kuma Asilevi [the plaintiff ‘s vendor] asked the co-defendant to join him to fight the case. Yes, the co-defendant conducted the case to the end. Yes, the co-defendant had judgment.”

These pieces of evidence coming from the plaintiff’s own witness confirmed the evidence of the co-defendant that he, the co-defendant, had been defending his title to the disputed land over the years. The titles of the suits referred to in the evidence of the first plaintiff witness could be seen in exhibits 1 and 2. It is significant to note that exhibit 1 was a transferred suit to the High Court, described as TRL 1/1947 as pleaded by the co-defendant in paragraph 2 of his statement of defence. In exhibit 2, the present co-defendant was made a co-defendant to defend the action which eventually came on appeal to the High Court as LA 756/63; and on 4 May 1967 the High Court constituted by Anterkyi J allowed the appeal of the co-defendant on the ground that the case was:

“one of a boundary dispute and the plaintiff did not discharge the onus of proving the boundary line—also it appears that an inspection of the locus in quo was made, fresh evidence emanating from this inspection, necessary as it was for arriving at a finding, was not embodied in the proceedings … I allow the appeal with costs of ¢40 for the appellant against the respondent. Case to be sent back to be tried de novo by the district court grade II of the area by a different magistrate.”

As regards the suit referred to in exhibit 1 it ought to be observed that the co-defendant was the first defendant in that suit and the plaintiffs in that case could not pursue their claim when the case was transferred to the High Court, Accra. So on 10 May 1957, the following was recorded by Benson J:

[p.705] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697

“Akufo-Addo for the plaintiffs.

Amorin for the defendants .

Court: Action struck out under Order 62, r 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).

No order as to costs.”

Perhaps the more significant point to be noted about these proceedings is that they were of evidential value in the sense that they were clear evidence of acts of possession and the exercise of acts of ownership over the disputed land by the co-defendant. Furthermore, they clearly showed that the plaintiff’s vendor was aware of the efforts made by the co-defendant over the years in protecting his ownership of the disputed land and that the plaintiff’s vendor had accepted the co-defendant’s ownership by calling upon the co-defendant to defend suits brought against him (the plaintiff’s vendor) in respect of the land.

In his judgment the learned trial judge posed the right question when he said:

“The co-defendant says the land is his family property, that being so what the court has to decide is whether this land in question is the property of the Asilevi family or that of the co-defendant’s family.”

The learned trial judge then reviewed the evidence and made certain findings and held: “Thus in short title was and is vested in the ancestors of the co-defendant . . . It is clear from the above that the land in question belongs to the co-defendant’s family.”

In fact in the face of the overwhelming evidence establishing the ownership of the co-defendant, the learned trial judge could not have come to any other conclusion than the one he arrived at and referred to above. This finding meant that the learned trial judge did not believe or accept the evidence of the plaintiff and his only witness that the plaintiff’s vendor was the owner of the land in dispute. In other words, those findings implied that the plaintiff had failed to prove his title to the disputed land. Thus under normal circumstances the plaintiff’s claim would have been dismissed and judgment entered for the co-defendant on his counterclaim.

But that was not to be the fate of the co-defendant in the present case. The learned trial judge made a very curious somersault and held:

“The co-defendant’s family by allowing the Asilevi family to stay on this land for all that long must be deemed to have acquiesced on their occupation… The evidence is that the Asilevi family did not buy the land from the co-defendant’s family, no tenement was attorned and is being attorned to the co-defendant’s family. That

[p.706] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 being so the long occupation by the Asilevi family of the land without any tenement being attorned to the co-defendant’s family amounts to laches and acquiescence. That being so the co-defendant and his family are estopped from interfering in any dealing of the land so occupied by the Asilevi family … In view of the observation made above, I hold the view that the plaintiff should have judgment. All the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff should accordingly succeed except that the damages of ¢1,000 for trespass be scaled down to ¢400.”

In the first place, as learned counsel for the co-defendant pointed out, allowing the family of the plaintiff’s vendor to stay on the land could, at the very best, make the Asilevi family licensees only and not owners, with rights to alienate portions of the land without reference to or the concurrence of the co-defendant. But more importantly, it was not the case of the plaintiff either by his pleadings or in his evidence that the land belonged to the co-defendant’s family but that the co-defendant’s family had behaved in such a manner as to lead the Asilevi family (the plaintiff’s vendor) to believe that the Asilevi family were the owners and so the co-defendant should be estopped by acquiescence. In other words, the plaintiff did not plead confession and avoidance. No estoppel by acquiescence or laches was pleaded by the plaintiff. The type of estoppel pleaded by the plaintiff had nothing to do with estoppel by “laches and acquiescence”, and that could be found in paragraphs 6-8 of the plaintiff’s reply to the co-defendant’s statement of defence. They read as follows:

“6. The plaintiff says that the purchase price of the land granted to him was required to purchase roofing materials for a school block being built in Fintey.

7. The plaintiff avers that the co-defendant as a person interested in the property recommended that the land should be sold to him and that the co-defendant went further to suggest that the plaintiff should be given a good portion.

8. The plaintiff wherefore contends that the co-defendant is estopped from challenging the grant to him [the plaintiff].”

Thus one of the issues agreed upon in the additional issues was, “whether or not the co-defendant is estopped from challenging the plaintiff ‘s title.” The co-defendant in his evidence denied any knowledge of the averments as contained in the plaintiff’s reply as quoted in paragraphs 6-8 above. He said he did not attend any meeting where he agreed that the land in dispute should be sold. Under cross-examination he said: “I did not hear that money was needed to roof the middle

[p.707] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697 school. No I have never suggested that any part of the Fintey land be sold to roof the school building.” So that the only question of estoppel the learned trial judge was called upon to decide was whether the co-defendant agreed to the sale of the land to the plaintiff, and if so whether the co-defendant should be estopped from challenging the plaintiff’s title. The learned trial judge did not specifically pronounce on this issue. But having regard to the findings he made it can safely be said that the learned judge rejected the plaintiff’s version on this issue also; and I hold that the co-defendant could not be estopped from challenging the sale to the plaintiff.

Since, as I have said, the plaintiff did not plead estoppel by laches and acquiescence in any form or shape and since no evidence was given by the plaintiff to support that kind of estoppel, it was wrong for the learned trial judge to have founded his judgment on the so-called estoppel by laches and acquiescence to defeat the co-defendant’s counterclaim.

At the trial the question of the Asilevi family not having been called upon to attorn tenant to the co-defendant did not arise. Nobody raised the question of long occupation of the Asilevi family on the disputed land; and the plaintiff himself did not claim title on the ground that title was originally in the co-defendant but that the co-defendant, by his conduct, had divested himself of that title to the Asilevi family (the plaintiff’s vendor). In the circumstances, what the learned judge did amounted simply to a substitution by him “proprio motu of a case substantially different from and inconsistent with, the case put forward by the [plaintiff] and the ultimate acceptance by him of that substituted case which was not the [plaintiff’s] case at all”: see Dam v Addo [1962] 2 GLR 200 at 203, SC. At the same page Adumua-Bossman JSC reading the judgment of the Supreme Court said:

“This acceptance in favour of a party of a case different from and inconsistent with that which he himself has put forward in and by his pleadings, has been consistently held to be unjustifiable and fundamentally wrong both by the English superior courts and our local superior courts.”

There was no doubt that the plaintiff failed to prove that the land was owned by his vendor, the Asilevi family; and the learned trial judge having found that the co-defendant was the owner thereof should not have gone further to find some avenue through which the plaintiff could escape in order to avoid the consequences of his inability to establish his title. Since the plaintiff’s vendor had no title to the disputed land, the said vendor could not pass any title in the land to the plaintiff, the deed of conveyance, exhibit A, notwithstanding; the principle being nemo dat quod non habet.

[p.708] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697

The co-defendant counterclaimed for a bare declaration and not for ejectment or recovery of possession; consequently he should not have been met suddenly with this type of estoppel which ought to have been supported by evidence of a considerable number or series of ostensible and glaring acts which were adverse and challenging to the title claimed and in which the co-defendant had acquiesced for a relatively long period of years: see Oshodi v Kaliatu Imoru (1936) 3 WACA 93. In that case the West African Court of Appeal composed of Kingdon, Petrides and Webber CJJ held that the finding of acquiescence against the plaintiff was wrong and the plaintiff was entitled as against the first defendant to have the sale set aside. Kingdon CJ (Nigeria) reading the judgment of the court at 95-96 had this to say:

“It seems to me that in these cases there are two things which must be distinguished. The first is acquiescence in occupation over a period, which would bar the original overlord from bringing an action for ejectment as in the case of Akpan Awo v. Cookey Gam (2 N.L.R. 67). And the second is such acquiescence as would serve to pass the original rights of the overlord to the occupier. Very much more is required to establish the second than the first.

In the present case the respondents’ counsel admitted that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff or his family knew of the conveyance executed in 1902 until, when he did hear of it, he instituted these proceedings. This being so, even though it be admitted that the family acquiesced in the first defendant’s occupation, how can it be argued that the plaintiff or his family acquiesced in the alienation from them of their reversionary rights when they had no knowledge that such rights were being challenged or interfered with? . . . [T]he evidence is quite insufficient to justify a finding that the family acquiesced . . .which would have the effect of abrogating the family’s reversionary interest.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

In Oshodi v Balogun (1936) 4 WACA 1 at 6 the Privy Council held that the defendant relying on acquiescence has to “establish a knowledge and a long continued acquiescence”, before the court can hold that the plaintiff’s title has been completely destroyed or extinguished and therefore a declaration cannot be made in his favour.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the learned judge to hold that the co-defendant’s family had been guilty of “laches and acquiescence” and that that family was estopped from claiming a bare declaration of title to the disputed land.

[p.709] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 697

As I have already said, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff himself to support the title of his vendor was most unsatisfactory; and that the evidence of his only witness was not only weak but also tended to support the contention of the co-defendant in certain respects as was found by the learned trial judge who in the course of his judgment said, “The first plaintiff witness from the above has amply supported the contention of the co-defendant. This came out from answers given in cross-examination.” The learned trial judge in the circumstances ought to have applied the well-established principle, namely where “the evidence is unsatisfactory the judgment should be in the defendant’s favour on the ground that it is the plaintiff who seeks relief but has failed to prove that he is entitled to what he claims “: see Frempong II v Brempong II (1952) 14 WACA 13.

In the result, I am of the opinion that the appeal ought to be allowed and the judgment appealed from set aside. In substitution therefore, I would dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the co-defendant on his counterclaim for a declaration of title to the land the boundaries of which the co-defendant spelt out in his evidence and which were also set out earlier on in this judgment.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH JA.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

M C N-N

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