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[1986] SLR (CA) 12Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

NTI AND ANOTHER vs. ANIMA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

5 June 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 25 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 12
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OSCOLANTI AND ANOTHER v ANIMA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 [1986] SLR (CA) 12
APANTI AND ANOTHER v ANIMA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 134, [1986] SLR (CA) 12 (Ghana).
BluebookNTI AND ANOTHER v ANIMA AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 134, [1986] SLR (CA) 12 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Davy v. Garrett (1878) 7 Ch.D 473.

(2) Russell v. Martin (1900) 1 Ren. 193; Grif Dig 85.

(3) African & Colonial Co. Ltd v. Blemir Syndicate (1923) F.C. ‘23-’25, 40; (1924) P.C. ‘74-’28, 76;

Grif Dig 72, 85.

(4) Larbi v. Cato [1960] G.L.R. 146, C.A.

(5) Cudjoe v. Kwatchey (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Koforidua wherein the plaintiffs’ claim that the house in dispute was family property and not

[p.136] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 the self-acquired property of the builder was dismissed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

K. Ohene-Ampofo for the plaintiffs-appellants.

E. D. Kom (with him K. W. Mensah) for the defendants-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The appellants sought two reliefs in the High Court, Koforidua. First, for a declaration that house No. C/71 situate at Asamankese and bearing the name of Kwame Kuma (now deceased) was the property of the appellants’ family; and secondly, an order to set aside the sale of the said house by the second respondent to the first respondent. On 13 October 1983, the learned High Court judge gave a judgment in which he refused to grant the appellants any of the reliefs they had asked for and dismissed the action.

It is essential for a better understanding of the case to state fully the rival stories canvassed by the parties before the trial court. The appellants (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) by their pleadings and in their evidence contended that the house in dispute had been their family property on the basis that one Amma Odum, a member of the plaintiffs’ family, originally owned the land on which the house now stands. They alleged that this Amma Odum in her lifetime put up a house on a portion of the land. But during the construction of a road from Asamankese to Suhum, part of the building was damaged; and only about four rooms in the house were not affected: So the whole house had to be demolished; and since the said Amma Odum had no money to rebuild a new house on the same site, she appealed to members of her maternal family who agreed to contribute ¢400 each towards the cost of the reconstruction. The principal members contributed and the total amount of ¢4000 which was realised was given to Amma Odum who in turn gave it to one Kwame Kuma also a member of the family, with instructions that he, Kwame Kuma, should see to the reconstruction of the house.

Apart from the ¢4,000, the plaintiffs said Amma Odum gave one of her cocoa farms to Kwame Kuma to utilise the income therefrom to supplement the cost of the building project. According to the plaintiffs, Kwame Kuma put up the building as directed by Amma Odum with the funds as provided by members of the family. The new house on its completion was numbered C/71, Asamankese. The rebuilding took place about 34 years ago and Amma Odum died in December 1972 or thereabout and Kwame Kuma also passed away about April or May 1974. The first plaintiff, who gave evidence for himself and on behalf of the other plaintiff, concluded his evidence-in-chief in the manner as follows:

[p.137] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

“House No. C/71 is a family house. The family never gave Kwame Kuma any authority to deal with the building as he liked. Kwame Kuma was involved in a lorry accident in about 1974, he recovered but he fell sick and was taken to Akwatia Hospital. At the time we did not know that Kwame Kuma had taken any loan from the second defendant; at the time the first defendant was living in the house in dispute. The first defendant came to Kwame Kuma at the hospital in the presence of his wives and myself and told us that the second defendant had come to collect the loan he had taken from them and the first defendant said she had collected rents from the tenants in the house, and that she wanted the passbook to go and pay the money to the second defendant. I was sent to go and take the passbook to the hospital and he gave it to the first defendant to go and pay the money to the second defendants. Kwame Kuma instructed the first defendant to keep the passbook to pay the loan until he got well. Kwame Kuma died after three months and I went to the first defendant to ask her whether she had paid the loan so that she might return the passbook to us but the first defendant told us that she had bought the house. We went to the second defendants to ask and I was told by their counsel that they themselves had bought the building and they had resold the building to the first defendant. We therefore brought this action . . .”

The respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) denied that the house was the plaintiffs’ family property. The defendants gave detailed evidence, supported by documents, as to how the second defendant (hereinafter referred to as the Building Society) came to sell the house in dispute to the first defendant. Their case was that the land on which the house in dispute stands as well as the house itself was the self-acquired property of Kwame Kuma who in 1957 mortgaged same to the Ghana Commercial Bank for a loan. The mortgage transaction was evidenced in writing and registered as Deeds Registry No. 165/1958, exhibit 14. Kwame Kuma defaulted in the repayment of the loan. Ghana Commercial Bank therefore decided to sell the house to realise the mortgage debt.

But before the bank could carry out its intentions, one Yaw Addo, a native of Kwahu Abetifi who was then residing at Asamankese, approached Kwame Kuma and offered to buy the house. Kwame Kuma readily agreed. The purchase price agreed upon was £3,750. Yaw Addo made down payment of £750 to Kwame Kuma. Yaw Addo then approached the Building Society (the second defendant herein) for a loan of £3,000 to pay off the purchase price. The Building Society agreed to pay the £3,000 to Kwame Kuma on behalf of Yaw Addo.

[p.138] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

At that time the outstanding debt of Kwame Kuma due to the Ghana Commercial Bank stood at £2,845 19s. The Building Society, instead of paying the whole £3,000 to Kwame Kuma on behalf of Yaw Addo, paid the said £2,845 19s out of it to Ghana Commercial Bank with the consent of Kwame Kuma to discharge the mortgage which the bank held on the house. The Building Society then paid the balance of £154 18s direct to Kwame Kuma.

Kwame Kuma having received the full purchase price of the house from Yaw Addo through the Building Society, conveyed the ownership and possession of the house to Yaw Addo by a deed of conveyance dated 6 August 1959 and registered as Deeds Registry No. 2382/1959, exhibit 17. Thus from August 1959 the house, according to the defendants, became the absolute property of Yaw Addo. The defendants further contended that this Yaw Addo, because of the loan of £3,000 which he obtained from the Building Society to purchase the house, also mortgaged the house to the Building Society to secure the repayment of the £3,000 at stated instalments. The said mortgage was dated 29 March 1960 and registered as Deeds Registry No 519/1962.

The defendants said Yaw Addo could not pay the agreed instalments to the Building Society and so by 20 April 1965, Yaw Addo was in arrears of £684. The Building Society (the second defendant) therefore caused the house to be attached for sale by public auction in accordance with the terms of the mortgage deed. Auction notices were posted on the house. But before the sale took place, Yaw Addo pleaded for time to pay the debt. The Building Society acceded to Addo’s request, and the house was released from attachment. Addo could not honour his promise and so on 19 January 1966, the house was again attached and again auction notices were posted on the house. When the house was under attachment for the second time, the Building Society received a letter from one Kwadwo Boamah an elder brother and head of family of Yaw Addo, informing the Building Society that Yaw Addo had died and that efforts were being made to obtain letters of administration and then pay the whole outstanding debt of Yaw Addo (deceased). The public auction sale was, the circumstances, suspended indefinitely.

In the long run Yaw Addo’s brother and head of family could not pay the debt; and the Building Society had to attach the house for the third time and auction notices were posted on the house as usual. But the auction sale had to be cancelled as the auctioneer could not get the reserved price. After some time, the Building Society attempted for the fourth time to sell the house again by public auction; and since on this fourth occasion, as on the other previous occasions, the reserved price could not be realised, the Building Society on 5 April 1971 exercised its powers under the deed of mortgage and bought the mortgaged

[p.139] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 property, as is shown by the auction account sales filed by the licensed auctioneer, exhibit 6.

The defendants said in May 1975 the Building Society sold the house to the first defendant and by an indenture dated 30 May 1975, exhibit 29, made between the first defendant and the Building Society (the second defendant) the latter conveyed the house to the first defendant. The defendants therefore contended that the plaintiffs were estopped by conduct and by the various transactions covering the house from denying that the house was the self-acquired property of Kwame Kuma.

The issues agreed upon were: (1) whether the building was the family property of the plaintiffs; (2) whether the original building put up by the late Amma Odum was demolished in 1948 and rebuilt by the family from contributions; (3) whether or not the plaintiffs were estopped from laying claim to the property in dispute; and (4) whether or not the transactions were tainted with fraud and irregularities. On all the issues the learned trial judge found against the plaintiffs.

The main ground of appeal argued before this court was that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. On this ground learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the learned trial judge failed to make a finding as to whether the house was a family property or a self-acquired property which was the most important issue in the case. Counsel argued that the learned trial judge relied only on statutory documents tendered in the case and ignored the positive oral evidence of the plaintiffs which clearly showed that the house in dispute was the plaintiffs’ family property.

Learned counsel contended further that the plaintiffs gave sufficient evidence to establish their claim but the defendants failed to adduce evidence in rebuttal. Counsel submitted that the mortgage deed between Kwame Kuma as the mortgagor and Ghana Commercial Bank as the mortgagee, and dated 21 June 1957 with Deeds Registry No. 165/1958, exhibit 14, could not by itself be sufficient to rebut the evidence of the plaintiffs, since no member of the family gave evidence for the defendants and no member of the family signed that document. As regards the attempted public auction sales of the house by the second defendant, learned counsel submitted that they were all fictitious and no such notices were ever posted on the house and that the court’s findings based on the auction notices were utterly misplaced.

The complaints which were levelled against the judgment, in my view, had no legal justification. In the first place, it is not correct to say that no findings were made in respect of the crucial matters raised before the learned trial judge. On the contrary, the learned trial judge

[p.140] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 adverted to the issues agreed upon, and he kept those issues in mind throughout his judgment. Indeed, he made positive findings on all the issues. On the vital issue of whether or not the house was the family property of the plaintiffs, the learned trial judge after he had reviewed, appraised and evaluated the evidence as a whole, and at great length, made the following positive findings:

“As stated at the beginning of this judgment even though the defendants need not prove their case to be able to be successful, they have been able to prove their case more than the plaintiffs. I hold therefore that the sale was not done by the second defendants to the first defendant secretly as contended by counsel for the plaintiffs. It was done openly by an open contract. In view of the various reasons given above, I am of the view that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case that house No. C/71, Asamankese is the family property of Amma Odum. I hold that it is a self-acquired property of Kwame Kuma which was purchased by Yaw Addo and eventually sold to the first defendant.”

These findings implied that the learned trial judge did not believe the evidence of the plaintiffs and his witnesses. In fact, there were very good and tangible reasons for rejecting the evidence proffered by the plaintiffs. Take for example, the evidence of the plaintiffs about the origin of the land, that is as to how Amma Odum came by the land in the first place. The first plaintiff who was the head of family admitted that building plots at Asamankese were granted only by the chief of Asamankese, and that he himself (the first plaintiff) had once obtained a building plot from the Asamankese chief. Yet he could not tell the trial court the person from whom the said Amma Odum got her grant of the building plot, except to say that, “The house in dispute was originally put up by one late Aberewa Amma Odum … The building which the late Amma Odum put up has been rebuilt.”

Kwabena Apeatu, the first plaintiffs witness, made the situation worse when he revealed that the land was not granted to the said Amma Odum, the supposed original owner thereof, but that it was granted to one Yeboah by the chief of Asamankese and it was this Yeboah and not Amma Odum who put up the first building. This is contrary to the evidence of the other witnesses. In his evidence-in-chief this witness, Kwabena Apeatu, said:

“Kofi Asante, Yeboah and Yaw Kyere went to the chief of Asamankese and requested for the land. It was given to them by the chief of Asamankese. Amma Odum’s brother is Yeboah who went to the chief of asamankese to obtain the land. Amma Odum inherited Yeboah, the building that Yeboah built.”

[p.141] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

(The emphasis is mine.)

When it came to the turn of the second plaintiffs witness, Sophia Ampoma, she contradicted the first witness by stating that the land was granted to Amma Odum and not to Yeboah. When she was questioned as to the person who made the said grant to Amma Odum she said it was made by a certain old man whose name she did not know. As for the third plaintiffs witness, Kwadwo Kwakye, he could not tell whether or not Amma Odum acquired the land from the chief of Asamankese.

In the midst of this confusion in the plaintiffs’ camp as to the origin of the land, the defendants tendered without objection, the deed of conveyance dated 15 March 1957 with the Deeds Registry No. 1403/1957, exhibit 14. This document indicated in no uncertain terms that the land was the self-acquired property of Kwame Kuma. The conveyance was executed in favour of the said Kwame Kuma by the chief of Asamankese and Nana Ofori Atta II the Okyenhene who were the acknowledged owners of Asamankese lands.

In the body of the conveyance, exhibit 14, there was a clause showing that the land in dispute was customarily granted by the said chiefs to Kwame Kuma years ago and long before 1957, and that the said deed of conveyance was executed only to evidence the earlier customary grant. It is necessary to make it clear that the making of customary grant of a portion of stool land by the stool to its subject, and for that matter to a stranger, and the drawing up of a formal deed of conveyance at a later date to evidence the said grant has been a common practice in this country. Indeed, it has been in vogue for many years; and so Kwame Kuma’s case could not be an exception, neither could it be looked upon with suspicion.

The first plaintiff said he had personally acquired a plot of land from the chief of Asamankese but the deed of conveyance had not yet been executed to evidence the grant. If some years later one was executed in his favour to confirm this earlier grant, it would not lie in the mouth of members of his family to contend that the said deed of conveyance was fraudulent. I should also point out that it came out in the evidence of some of the witnesses for the plaintiffs that in practice the chief of Asamankese and the Okyenhene would not execute a deed of conveyance in respect of any building plot to confirm a grant in favour of any person if that person was not the one to whom the earlier customary grant was originally made. The evidence of the first plaintiffs witness, Kwabena Apeatu, a man of about 80 years and a native of Asamankese, was very positive about this when, under cross-examination, he said:

“Q You have a house at Asamankese on Accra Road.

A Yes.

Q You obtained a conveyance from the chief of Asamankese.

[p.142] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

A Yes.

Q Okyenhene gave his concurrence.

A Yes.

Q If the land had been acquired previously by any other person would you have obtained a conveyance?

A No.

Q You used the document covering your house to obtain a loan from the First Ghana Building Society [the second defendant].

A Yes.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It would not therefore be right, in the absence of convincing proof, for the plaintiffs to contend as they did in paragraphs 2 and 3 of their reply and by their counsel that the said deed of conveyance, exhibit 14, covered a plot of land which had already been acquired by Amma Odum from the chief of Asamankese and that the said deed of conveyance “was a fraudulent design by the parties concerned to make it possible for the late Kwame Kuma to mortgage the property in dispute. . . “

Incidentally, the plaintiffs did not give particulars of the “fraudulent design by the parties concerned.” Not only that, they failed to lead any evidence on the so-called “fraudulent design”; and yet they expected the learned trial judge to make a finding of fraud against the defendants. I think the plaintiffs and their counsel demanded too much from the learned trial judge and it is appropriate that they should be reminded of the oft-cited dictum of Thesiger L.J. in Davy v. Garrett (1878) 7 Ch.D. 473 at 489 where the learned lord said:

“In the Common Law Courts no rule was more clearly settled than that fraud must be distinctly alleged and as distinctly proved, and that it was not allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts.”

Then coming to the construction of the house, the plaintiffs and their witnesses could not agree as to who originally built the house which was later demolished as a result of the construction of the road from Asamankese to Suhum. To be specific, the plaintiffs said it was Amma Odum who put up that first house. But the first plaintiffs said it was rather one Yeboah, a brother of Amma Odum who obtained the land and built the house and that Amma Odum only inherited the house on the death of that Yeboah. This witness pointed out that the demolition of the first house took place after the death of Amma Odum and not during her lifetime. He gave the following answers under cross-examination:

[p.143] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

“Q Was the four rooms remaining after the construction of the road demolished during the lifetime of Amma Odum?

A No. She was dead when it was demolished Q Was the building rebuilt after the death of Amma Odum?

A Yes.

Q Do you know who rebuilt the house?

A Yes, his name is Kwame Kuma and he was the elder brother of the first plaintiff.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

This evidence in particular made the story of the plaintiffs that after the demolition of the old house, Amma Odum called on the principal members of the family for financial contribution to enable her to rebuild the house palpably false.

In any case, the plaintiffs and their witnesses conflicted very badly as to those persons in the family who were supposed to have made the so-called financial contributions towards the rebuilding of the house; and the only reasonable thing for the trial court to do was to reject as false the evidence of the plaintiffs on the issue of financial contributions by the family. The plaintiffs did not even know how much it cost altogether to rebuild the house. Surprisingly, the plaintiffs and their witnesses up to the time they gave their evidence, did not know the number of rooms in the disputed house built 34 years ago. They had no idea of the number of tenants staying in the house. The third plaintiffs witness Kwadwo Kwakye, who was a member of the plaintiffs’ family and who gave his age as 60 years gave the following answers under cross-examination:

“Q How much did the building cost?

A I do not know.

Q How many rooms are in the house?

A I do not know.

Q How many of the rooms are rented?

A I do not know.

Q Were any rents collected before it was sold?

A Yes.

Q By whom?

A Kwame Kuma.”

It was undisputed by the plaintiffs themselves that the house in dispute was built by Kwame Kuma. But they alleged that the land on which Kuma built belonged to a member of the family and Kwame Kuma built with moneys provided by certain principal members of the family; and so the house was stamped with the character of family property. However, as already stated above, the learned trial judge

[p.144] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 rightly found that the land was personally acquired by Kwame Kuma and he built the house himself without any financial assistance of any kind from members of his family.

It is important to note that the plaintiffs failed to give any satisfactory explanation as to why a house which they considered as their family property should be in the exclusive possession and control of Kwame Kuma alone for over 34 years. No member of the family ever lived in the house; and for that period of 34 years, Kwame Kuma rented out the rooms in the house to tenants, collected rents from them and never rendered accounts to members of his family. What was more, one would have expected that on the death of Amma Odum, the supposed owner of the house in 1972, her customary successor, the second plaintiff, would take over the house. Yet this did not happen; and according to the plaintiffs themselves Kwame Kuma who was not the head of family continued to be in control until his death in 1974. The first plaintiff was asked:

“Q What steps did you take when Amma Odum died?

A Her property was handed over to the second plaintiff.

Q What did the second plaintiff do about the house in dispute when Amma Odum died?

A It was in charge of Kwame Kuma.

Q For 34 years Kwame Kuma looked after the house?

A Yes.

Q Did Kwame Kuma render account to any one?

A No.

Q How long has the first defendant been living in the house?

A Over ten years.

Q Has she ever rendered account to any member of the family?

A No. “ (The emphasis is mine.)

Furthermore, the plaintiffs made unsuccessful attempt to feign ignorance of the several public auction notices which were posted on the house by the Building Society (the second defendant) in an attempt to auction the house to realise the mortgage debt owed by Yaw Addo to whom Kwame Kuma sold the house. The plaintiffs were natives of Asamankese, and had lived in Asamankese all their lives and yet they said they never became aware of any of those auction notices. But it is interesting to observe that one Kwadwo Boamah, a native of Abetifi who was the head of family of Yaw Addo and who was not living in Asamankese, became aware of, at least, one of such auction notices, which were posted on the house and at a time Yaw Addo had died, and he took steps to have the public auction sale suspended by writing the

[p.145] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 following letter exhibit 23 to the Building Society (the second defendant).

“Kwadwo Boamah P. O. Box 4333, Accra.

Dear Sir, Re: Indebtedness of Yaw Addo (Deceased)

I respectfully implore to submit this for your information that, the above named deceased during his lifetime became indebted to the society for which now the property owned by him has been attached with order to dispose of the said property by public auction.

That I am the head of the family and wish to declare my stand, that the funeral of the deceased has been fixed for final performance … Owing to the present circumstance and urgency as referred to the attachment, I write to solicit for extension of time for one month after which the final obsequies would be completed and thereby the whole amount involved will be settled without delay…

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) Kwadwo Boamah Head of Family.”

The question then is, if all those public auction notices were fictitious and were never at any time posted on the disputed house and consequently the plaintiffs did not see them as they contended, then how did it come about that the head of Yaw Addo’s family who, as I have said, did not live in Asamankese and who at the material time was residing in Accra (according to his address) become aware that such a notice had, in fact, been posted on the disputed house and promptly reacted as disclosed in the letter exhibit 23 referred to above? Obviously, the plaintiffs were not truthful. They saw the said public auction notices but they did not bother because they knew that their family had no interest in the house and that the house was the sole property of Kwame Kuma. I could not therefore agree more with the learned trial judge when he said:

“The auction notices were put on four occasions stretching from 1969-1975 … The auction notices at Asamankese would spread like a wild fire and for four occasions, if the family of Amma Odum was claiming the ownership of it, they would have been put

[p.146] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134 on an inquiry to find out why it was being sold; they did not protest because they knew that the house was not theirs.”

In my view, this conduct on the part of the plaintiffs was sufficient to estop them from disputing that the ownership of the house was vested in Kwame Kuma. As already stated, Kwame Kuma throughout his lifetime was in full control of the house, which was occupied by his tenants from whom he collected rents and never accounted for the rents to members of his family. He could mortgage the house at will without any interference whatsoever from members of his family. Quite apart from the fact that the defendants were able to show that Kwame Kuma was the owner of the house, I would go further and hold that this is a case in which Kwame Kuma, a member of the plaintiffs’ family, had held himself out as the owner and was allowed by the family to so hold himself out, and that very satisfactory evidence was required from the plaintiffs to establish that the house was not the sole property of Kwame Kuma: see Russell v. Martin (1900) 1 Ren. 193, where Griffith C.J. reading the judgment of the Full Court said at 193:

“On the other hand, there was the evidence of Maria Smith which was strongly in favour of the view that the land was sold to the judgment debtor alone. In this case the judgment debtor held out himself as the owner of the land and house and the family made no objection. In every case in which a member of a family holds himself out as owner and is allowed by the family to so hold himself out, very satisfactory evidence is required to prove that the land or house is not his sole property.”

And see also African & Colonial Co. Ltd. v. Blemir Syndicate (1923) F.C. ‘23-’25, 40, P.C. where the decision in Russell v. Martin (supra) was followed and affirmed by the Privy Council. Another instructive case on this subject is Larbi v. Cato [1960] G.L.R. 146, C.A. where at 154 of the report Granville Sharp J.A. reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal cited with approval the Russell case and said:

“While it is true that customary law requires that the presumption in favour of family property should be rebutted by evidence, and that the onus is upon the one who asserts sole ownership, that onus shifts once it is shown that the person has been dealing with the property as his own, or that it came to him by gift or by testamentary disposition from one who dealt with it as his own.”

Redwar put it in a slightly different form in his Comments on Some of the Ordinances of the Gold Coast where at 79-80 he stated:

[p.147] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

“According to Native Law there is a presumption in favour of all land being jointly held by a Family or other Community, which presumption may, however, be rebutted by evidence that it has been acquired by an individual through his own personal exertions in trade or otherwise, without any assistance from the Community of whom he is a member, or by gift to the individual apart from the rest of the Community … It is also clear that he has an unfettered right to dispose of his Individual Property either during his life time, or by Will.”

It may be pointed out that in these days the presumption in favour of family property does not appear to be very strong. In Codjoe v. Kwatchey (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371, Webber C.J. (Sierra Leone) who read the judgment of the court said the presumption is not so strong as it was 30 years before. But it seems to me that in modern Ghana the said presumption should not be a strong one and the burden of proof on the one who asserts sole ownership should be very light and that any slight but reliable evidence should be sufficient to rebut that presumption. However, in the present case, the defendants adduced ample evidence which satisfactorily rebutted the presumption in favour of family property; but the plaintiffs rather failed woefully to discharge the burden which was shifted to them. I therefore hold that Kwame Kuma being the lawful owner of the house in dispute could dispose of it or sell it without any reference whatsoever to members of his family. Consequently, the sale to the said Yaw Addo as evidenced by the deed of conveyance dated 6 August 1959, exhibit 17, was valid and could not be impeached by the plaintiffs.

Similarly, the purchase of the house by the second defendant after the auctioneer had failed to obtain a reserved price was proper and so was the sale by the second defendant to the first defendant. The transaction was in accordance with the provisions of section 23 (1) (a) and (b) of the Building Society’s Ordinance, 1955 (No. 30 of 1955) which provided as follows:

“23. (1) It shall be lawful for a building society— (a) to acquire and hold any land which the society requires for its business premises or for the housing of its staff; and

(b) acquire by foreclosure or surrender any land mortgaged to the society:

Provided that any land acquired by a building society under paragraph (b) of this subsection shall as soon afterwards as may be conveniently practicable be sold and converted into money.”

[p.148] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 134

(The emphasis is mine.)

It was within the spirit of these provisions that the second defendant bought the house and “as soon afterwards” as was practicable and convenient, “converted” same “into money” by selling it to the first defendant; and there was nothing clandestine or secret about the said sale to the first defendant. In short, the sale to the first defendant by the second defendant was valid and that the first defendant is now the true and lawful owner of the house.

As I said earlier on, the learned trial judge made a thorough and critical analysis of the evidence in the light of the issues raised before him, and the decision he arrived at was correct and should not be disturbed.

Consequently, I am of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed. J. A. A.

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