DUNCAN vs. KAWOACO LTD. [1981] GLR 476
17 May 1980 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 8 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 24Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) McLardy v. Slateum (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 504; 59 L.J.Q.B. 154; 62 L.T. 151; 38 W.R. 349; 6 T.L.R.
184, C.A.
(2) Wing v. Thurlow (1893) 10 T.L.R. 53, C.A.
(3) Carter v. Countess of Warwich, Court of Appeal, 2 June 1910, unreported.
(4) Millard v. Baddeley [1884] W.N. 96; Bitt. Rep. in Ch. 125.
(5) Tatam v. Haslar (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 345; 58 L.J.Q.B. 432; 38 W.R. 109.
(6) Fuller v. Alexander Bros. (1882) 52 L.J.Q.B. 103.
(7) Jacobs v. Booth’s Distillery Co. (1901) 85 L.T. 262; 50 W.R. 49, H.L.
(8) Runnacles v. Mesquita (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 416; 45 L.J.Q.B. 407; 24 W.R. 553;2 Char. Pr.Cas. 247.
(9) Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880) 5 App.Cas. 685; 50 L.J.Q.B. 49; 43 L.T. 258; 29 W.R. 81, H.L.
(10) Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells (1878) 38 L.T. 197, C.A.
(11) Blaiberg v. Abrams (1910) 77 L.T.J. 255, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to sign summary judgment under Order 14 of L.N. 140A in an action on a bill of exchange. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Essah for the plaintiff.
Amesimeku for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
In his statement of claim accompanying a specially indorsed writ filed on 31 January 1980, the plaintiff is claiming that the defendants issued a cheque of ¢8,000 to him in payment of goods, namely electric switches, which he supplied to the defendants. He avers that the cheque was dishonoured on presentation and although the defendants have had notice of the dishonour, they have nevertheless neglected to pay. He therefore claims ¢8,000. The defendants entered appearance on 10 March 1980 to the writ and filed a defence on 18 March 1980.
On 21 March 1980, after the said defence had been filed, the plaintiff proceeding under Order 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), took out summons for judgment and filed an affidavit in support of his application for final judgment on the ground that the defendants have no defence to the action. The defendants have filed an affidavit in opposition in which they denied that the plaintiff supplied them with goods against the cheque which they had issued. They explained the circumstances leading to the issue of the cheque in paragraph 5 as:
“The defendants issued to the plaintiff the said cheque with the express understanding that the plaintiff was not to present it to his bankers since the defendants explained that they did not have any such amount to his credit with their credit (sic).”
(The emphasis is mine). Probably by the phrase “with their credit,” the defendants meant “with their bankers” for this was the meaning which counsel attached to it in his argument. Clearly this explanation would seem to indicate that the plaintiff and the defendants were engaged in a fraudulent intrigue to deceive “somebody from whom the plaintiff was buying certain goods.” And apparently the plaintiff has turned round to swindle the defendants. In spite of this defence, counsel has made a passionate appeal to this court to ignore the affidavit in opposition and give final judgment for the plaintiff.
I think courts of law operate in order to dispense justice and where in this case, one party to the proceedings before the court, has sworn to facts showing that an applicant for an order for summary judgment under Order 14 is proposing to utilise the process of the courts to advance his fraudulent intentions, it is my firm view that the court is prima facie in duty bound to take a stand as will frustrate the intended fraud. On this ground alone I will give leave to defend so as to advance the interests of justice and thwart the designs of fraudulent litigants. But there are also other reasons based on principles governing the practice of the courts in Order 14 applications and I intend to examine them.
In this respect I shall first examine the defence of the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiff says I can look at it and counsel for the defendants urges that since it was filed without leave, I need not look at it. I am inclined to agree with the plaintiff’s counsel that I can look at the defence on the authority of McLardy v. Slateum (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 504, C.A. I think that case, inter alia, demonstrates that the fact that a bona fide defence has been delivered may very well be sufficient to enable a defendant to get leave to defend although if it could be shown that the defence was a sham, leave to defend may be refused and the plaintiff would be given summary judgment as happened, in fact, in McLardy v. Slateum (supra).
Now to the statement of defence filed on 18 March 1980 without leave. The defendants denied that the cheque was issued in payment of electric switches. They admitted that electric switches were kept with them. They alleged that some of the switches got lost, but they did not know the quantity or the value. In effect they denied any sale transaction. In his submission counsel for the plaintiff maintained that this is merely an action on a bill of exchange and therefore since the defendants gave the plaintiff the cheque which has been dishonoured, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. I think the case of Wing v. Thurlow (1893) 10 T.L.R. 53, C.A. is here pertinent. In that case on a summons for judgment under Order 14 of the English Rules in a claim on a bill of exchange, leave to sign final judgment was refused on the defendant showing that the bill of exchange sued on was obtained as payment for shares which had been falsely described.
Again in Carter v. Countess of Warwich, Court of Appeal, 2 June 1910, unreported. (See 1956 Annual Practice at p. 171) in an action on bills of exchange, the defendant stated that the bills were given as part of a series of stock exchange transactions and asked for an account. An application by the plaintiff for summary judgment failed and the defendant was given unconditional leave to defend. It seems to me therefore that the argument of counsel for the plaintiff that because this is an action on a bill of exchange and so ipso facto leave to defend should be refused is erroneous in law.
The modern practice with regard to actions on a bill of exchange is that where there is fraud in the inception of a bill, then the usual presumption that value has been given will be ignored and the plaintiff will be obliged to prove this strictly in the action. Clearly in such a situation application for summary judgment under Order 14 is ill-suited to test the claims of the parties and leave to the defendant in order to canvass the fraud is always given: see Millard v. Baddeley [1884] W.N. 96; Tatam v. Haslar (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 345 and Fuller v. Alexander Bros. (1882) 52 L.J.Q.B. 103.
Here the defendants have deposed that the cheque was obtained on promise that it was not to be presented but in breach of the agreement, the plaintiff apparently presented the cheque in order to defraud the defendants. I think the principle is the same and leave to sign final judgment ought to be refused even though the action is founded on a bill of exchange.
The principle which the courts have for years applied in dealing with summons under Order 14 is well known. It is exemplified in cases like Jacobs v. Booth’s Distillery Co. (1901) 85 L.T. 262, H.L.; Runnacles v. Mesquita (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 416 and in the judgment of Lord Blackburn in Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880) 5 App. Cas. 685 at p. 704, H.L. The principle is stated in a note to Order 14, r.1, in the 1956 Annual Practice under “Disclose such facts” as:
“The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue; and leave to defend ought to be given unless there is clearly no defence in law . . . and no possibility of a real defence on the question of fact . . .”
Having regard to the affidavit of the defendants in opposition and in particular to the defence filed, I think Order 14 procedure for summary judgment is uncalled for in this case. As Jessel M.R. said in Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells (1878) 38 L.T. 197 at p. 199, C.A. Order 14, “is intended to prevent a man, clearly entitled to money from being delayed, where there is no fairly arguable defence to be brought forward.”
In his passionate plea for summary judgment, counsel for the plaintiff urged me to look at the defence filed and the affidavit. Whilst the defence filed admitted a transaction involving switches, the affidavit is silent on the matter and counsel therefore suggested that this is an admission. I am afraid I am unable to accede to this proposition. The transaction the plaintiff is suing on involving the electric switches is a sale transaction. The transaction which the defendant admits is not a sale transaction. It is a custody transaction if one may call it so. As Bowen L.J. said in Blaiberg v. Abrams (1910) 77 L.T.J. 255, C.A., “In deciding whether the defence, set up is a real defence or not, all the circumstances must be looked at.”
When all the circumstances are looked at, what emerges is that the defendant has put forward a defence, which if it can be proved, the action against him must fail. It may be that he will not be able to prove it at the trial, that is not the question. The question is the outcome of the action on the assumption that he is able to substantiate his defence, I am firmly of the view that summary judgment must be refused and the defendants given unconditional leave to defend.
The summons for summary judgment is in the circumstances dismissed and the defendants are given unconditional leave to defend. Costs of ¢100 is awarded the defendants against the plaintiff.
DECISION
Summons for summary judgment dismissed.
D. F. L.
