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[1980] SLR (CA) 7Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; EX PARTE AKOSAH [1980] GLR 592

15 May 1980 · ANIN JA · ≈ 28 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte AKOSAH [1980] GLR 592 [1980] SLR (CA) 7
APAREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte AKOSAH [1980] GLR 592, [1980] SLR (CA) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; ex parte AKOSAH [1980] GLR 592, [1980] SLR (CA) 7 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R 473, S.C.

(2) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;

[1969] 1 All E.R. 208; 113 S.J. 55, H.L.

(3) Republic v. Military Tribunal, Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227.

(4) Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 1 All E.R. 365; [1979] Q.B. 56;

[1978] 3 W.L.R. 736; (1978) 38 P. & C.R. 136; (1978) E.G. 1173; [1978] J.P.L. 829, C.A. (5) Company A, (In re) [1980] 1 All E.R. 284; [1980] Ch. 138; [1980] 2 W.L.R. 241. (6) Wood’s Estate, In re; Ex parte Works and Building Commissioners (1886) 31 Ch.D. 607; 55 L.J.Ch. 488; 54 L.T. 145; 34 W.R. 375, C.A.

(7) Gbedemah v. Awoonor-Williams, Supreme Court, 30 October 1969, unreported; digested in (1970)

C.C. 12; (1969) 2 G. & G. 438.

(8) Tait v. Ghana Airways Corporation, Supreme Court, 29 July 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) 2 G. & G. 527.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra, dismissing the applicant’s application for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction and sentence and order for confiscation of property entered by the special tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under A.F.R.C.D. 23.

COUNSEL

Nana Akufo-Addo (with him Dr. Prempeh and J.A. Glover) for the appellant.

J.E.K. Appiah, Principal State Attorney (with him B. Akwetey, Assistant State Attorney and Naval-Lt. Assassie-Gyimah) for the respondent.

[p.594] of [1980] GLR 592

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

Anin J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On 21 February 1980, the appellant filed in the Accra High Court a motion ex parte for leave to apply for an order of certiorari to quash the conviction and sentence of three years’ penal labour and order of confiscation of his nineteen vehicles entered and passed against him by the respondent tribunal in its judgment dated 4 February 1980, in a case intituled Republic v. James Clifford Akosah Jnr.

Grounds of Certiorari Application

The grounds of the application were fully set out in the accompanying statement and affidavit verifying the facts relied on. Briefly stated, it was contended that the respondent tribunal acted without jurisdiction and in breach of the rules of natural justice and that its procedure was contrary to the due process of law.

More particularly, it was first submitted that the special tribunal was an inferior tribunal with a limited jurisdiction defined by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23). Section 3 (1) (a) of this Decree empowered it:

“to take over and complete the trial of all cases pending before all the special courts immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana in respect of all the offences charged or which could have been charged. . .”

The applicant disclosed that there was no trial of any case involving either himself or his company (Akosah Agencies Co., Ltd.) pending on the stated date, i.e. the eve of 24 September 1979 either before any special court or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. However, the respondent tribunal purported to try, convict and sentence him for matters already investigated by the Archer Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, whose findings had already been accepted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in a white paper.

With respect to the applicant’s cocoa-buying agency and twelve other named buying agencies, paragraph 31 of the said white paper ruled:

“All local agents of foreign purchasers of cocoa resident or operating in or from Ghana are requested to repatriate all their commissions in foreign exchange to Ghana. The Bank of Ghana is hereby directed to take the necessary steps for the repatriation of these foreign earnings. All defaulting local agents will be banned from operating in Ghana in their present business or any other commercial ventures.”

[p.595] of [1980] GLR 592

Rounding up his argument on the principal ground, the applicant averred in the statement that since the government of the day (A.F.R.C.) had exercised its statutory powers under the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71), the very enactment under which the respondent purported to try and convict him, the tribunal was functus officio and acted without jurisdiction throughout the trial.

The second ground canvassed by the appellant in his statement in support of his motion for certiorari deals with section 3(b) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the respondent tribunal to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports of the committees of inquiry described in section 3 (2) of the Decree. The argument here seems to be that this section 3(1) (b) is inapplicable to the appellant; since the only paragraph of the government white paper on the Archer Committee Report dealing with his cocoa buying agency (as well as twelve other cocoa buying agencies) in fact, made no adverse finding against him but merely recommended the setting up of a machinery by the Bank of Ghana to monitor and ensure the repatriation of foreign exchange commissions by the named agencies to Ghana and prescribed a penalty for any violation of this specific order, that is, “all defaulting in local agents will be banned from operating in Ghana in their present business or any other commercial ventures.” It was further contended that nowhere in the white paper or the main Archer Report was it stated that either the applicant or his firm had committed any criminal offence. It was therefore concluded that the respondent tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the charges preferred by the special prosecutor against the appellant; and his conviction and sentence were bad in law.

A third ground pleaded in the statement in further support of the application for certiorari alleged bias and prejudice shown against the appellant during the trial; and the supporting affidavit contained depositions in confirmation of the allegation of bias and prejudice on the part of the trial respondent tribunal, which was stated to be in violation of section 5 (3) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, enacting that the tribunal shall in the exercise of its statutory functions “not be bound by the decisions of any court or tribunal but shall be guided by the rules of natural justice.”

A fourth and final ground alleged an error of law apparent on the face of the record, in that the respondent tribunal erred in law in assuming jurisdiction to try the applicant under one enactment, i.e. the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and then trying, convicting and sentencing him under another, i.e. the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71), contrary to the requirements of law.

[p.596] of [1980] GLR 592

Respondent’s Preliminary Objections

On being served with the pursuant motion on notice after leave granted, learned counsel for the respondent tribunal, Mr. J. E. K. Appiah, filed on 5 March 1980, a notice of intention to raise preliminary points of law, to wit:

“(1) That in view of the provisions of section 7 (2) of the A.F.R.C.D. 23 which have been incorporated in the 1979 Constitution by virtue of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the said Constitution, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application;

(2) That in the alternative, the application raises a matter of question of law (namely, whether in view of the provisions referred to above the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application) and that in the event the High Court should stay the present proceedings and refer the said question of law to the Supreme Court for determination.”

Section 7 (2) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 A.F.R.C.D. 23, is in the following terms:

“(2) It shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any action or proceedings whatsoever for the purpose of questioning any decision, judgment, finding, ruling, order or proceeding of the Special Tribunal; and for the removal of doubt, it shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any application for an order or writ in the nature, of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto injunction or declaration in respect of any decision, judgment, finding, ruling, order or proceeding of the Special Tribunal.”

And section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, provides:

“(7) The provisions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters)

Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary.”

Dismissal of the Second Preliminary Objection

The record of proceedings in the court below for 10 March 1980, shows that at the start of his argument in support of the motion for certiorari, Nana Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the applicant-appellant, drew the court’s attention to the two grounds of preliminary objections that had been filed and served on his client,

[p.597] of [1980] GLR 592 quoted above. The learned judge then cut in and made the following ruling even before the respondent’s counsel could be heard on his preliminary objections:

“By court: The point I am to decide has no reference to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is contained in A.F.R.C.D. 23. I therefore dismiss the second ground as misconceived.”

Having peremptorily overruled the second preliminary objection, the learned judge nevertheless proceeded to hear full arguments from both counsel on the two grounds of preliminary objection filed. In his ruling dated 17 March 1980, he again referred to his earlier summary dismissal of the second ground as follows:

“I summarily dismissed the second ground of objection as misconceived. What I am being called upon to interpret is A.F.R.C.D. 23, that is, a piece of legislation, and not an article of the 1979 Constitution, section 17 (7) of the Constitution notwithstanding . . .

Apart from that, it is not every question of interpretation of an article of the Constitution that should be referred to the Supreme Court. Where no difficulty of interpretation exists there is no need for the High Court to refer the article or any other matter contained therein to the Supreme Court for interpretation.”

And the judge cited in support, the well-known dictum of Bannerman C.J. in Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473 at p. 478, S.C.

Ruling on the First Preliminary Objection

The learned judge next turned his attention to the arguments of counsel on the first ground of preliminary objection. While agreeing with virtually all the legal submissions made by Nana Akufo-Addo in opposition to the first preliminary objection, the learned judge surprisingly and somewhat inconsistently finally ruled in favour of the respondent tribunal and held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application and struck it out with ¢300 costs against the applicant.

Main Appeal

Arguing the instant appeal, Nana Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the ruling of the court below should be set aside and the application be remitted to the court below for hearing de novo before another judge. Counsel further contended that since the learned judge ruled that the respondent is an inferior tribunal amenable to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction; and reached the proper conclusion that the ouster clause contained

[p.598] of [1980] GLR 592 in section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 is only partial and not complete, he erred in dismissing the application without allowing it to be heard on the merits.

In reply, Mr. Appiah, agreed that if, in fact, the learned judge found he had jurisdiction to entertain the application.

The should have gone further to order that the case be heard on the merits; but he ruled that he did not because he relied on section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23. Mr. Appiah, however, conceded in this court that the respondent tribunal is in law an inferior tribunal, even though he maintained in the court below the contrary position.

In our considered view, once the learned judge agreed with the appellant’s counsel that the respondent is an inferior tribunal and that the ouster clause in section 7(2) of A.F.R.C.D 23 is only partial and does not protect a decision of the respondent given without or in excess of jurisdiction or else in breach of natural justice or due process of law, he should have proceeded to hear and determine the merits of the application. His dismissal of the action in limine was wrong and amounted to a denial of justice to the parties, who were not heard on the merits. We shall accordingly make appropriate orders at the end of our judgment.

Cross-Appeal

Mr. J. E. K. Appiah, learned counsel for the respondent tribunal, filed two notices of contention that the ruling appealed from should be varied because:

“(a) the special tribunal, although an inferior court is not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, by virtue of section 17(7) of the transitional provisions and section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23; and (b) that in particular the High Court has no jurisdiction by reason of section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 and section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the 1979 Constitution to issue an order of certiorari to the special tribunal on the specific ground of a want or an excess of jurisdiction.

In effect, Mr. Appiah contends that section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, read together with section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the 1979 Constitution, operates as a complete ouster of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Nana Akufo-Addo, on the other hand, maintains the position he adopted in the court below that the preclusive clause contained in section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 constitutes only a partial ouster, leaving the special tribunal amenable to the Supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court whenever it acts either

[p.599] of [1980] GLR 592 without or in excess of jurisdiction or else in breach of natural justice or contrary to the due process of law.

Arguments on the Interpretation Issue

The second bone of contention between the parties relates to the question whether an issue of enforcement or interpretation of any constitutional provision within the meaning and intendment of article 118 of the 1979 Constitution has been raised by the preliminary objections filed by both counsel so as to necessitate a reference to the Supreme Court by virtue of article 118 (2) of the 1979 Constitution.

In support of his argument for reference to the Supreme Court, Mr. Appiah first submitted that section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions gave A.F.R.C.D. 23 a constitutional position by incorporating the Decree in the constitution by reference and by giving the entrenched enactment, especially section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 primacy over article 126 (the general provision conferring supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior tribunals, e.g. the special tribunal) on the High Court. Since, in his submission, article 126 is inconsistent with section 7 (2) as read together with section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions; and since two rival meanings have been placed on the said enactment and section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions, an issue of interpretation within the meaning of article 118 has arisen and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ought to be invoked and proceedings stayed in all subordinate courts.

In answer to the court’s question “when is an issue of interpretation raised within the meaning and scope of article 118 of the 1979 Constitution?” Mr. Appiah suggested a four-fold test: Firstly, it arises when there is an ambiguity in the provisions in question. Secondly, where the issue raised is one of conflict between provisions in various parts of the constitution and the question is which provision shall prevail. Thirdly, where the matter raised is of such public importance that to avoid the possibility of various interpretations by lower courts, the matter ought in the public interest be referred to the Supreme Court for the guidance of the lower courts. Fourthly, where legislation has been incorporated into the constitution by specific reference and should be read along with the constitution; and the issue raised is whether the legislative provisions tend to override the provisions in the other parts of the constitution which are inconsistent. On closer examination, Mr. Appiah’s second and fourth tests appear to be one and the same thing; both refer to a [p.600] of [1980] GLR 592 conflict situation created by two contradictory or inconsistent articles of the constitution. While his third factor may influence a subordinate court in reaching a decision, we doubt whether it is a valid test having regard to the language of article 118 (1), and the matters of “enforcement” “interpretation” and enactments made ultra vires specifically mentioned therein.

To a similar question about when an issue of interpretation or enforcement is raised, Nana Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the appellant, answered succinctly that such an issue is raised when on the face of the particular article there would appear to be a conflict between the operation of particular institutions under the constitution, or if there is an ambiguity. But where the matter is clear there is no ambiguity.

Mr. Appiah’s “cross-appeal” or more accurately, notices of contention that the ruling be varied, amount to an invitation to this court to refer the constitutional matters raised by section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, and section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions to the Supreme Court on account of the alleged conflict between those enactments and article 126, which confers supervisory powers on the High Court over inferior courts and tribunals.

Nana Akufo-Addo for his part submitted that there was no constitutional question of the sort envisaged by article 118 (2) calling for interpretation by the Supreme Court. The two questions set down in the two notices of contention that the judgment be varied did not warrant a reference to the Supreme Court; since they do not raise issues of interpretation or enforcement within the meaning of article 118. There was no ambiguity in either section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 or section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions or article 126 of the 1979 Constitution; the language of each enactment was clear, precise and free from doubt. The trial court ought not to shirk its primary duty of applying the clearly stated law to the preliminary objections. Whether the ouster clause in section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 constituted a complete or a partial ouster of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction depended on the state of the common law as exemplified in such well-known decisions as Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L. which was cited and locally followed by Abban J. in the High Court judgment in Republic v. Military Tribunal, Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227 at p. 237 thus:

“It is therefore well established that it is only by an exceptionally strongly worded formula that the legislature can effectively deprive the High Court of its supervisory jurisdiction

[p.601] of [1980] GLR 592 over inferior tribunals. Thus if section 4 (7) of N.R.C.D. 90 had gone further and provided that no decision of the said military tribunal shall, by means of prerogative writs or other process issuing out of court, be removed, or subjected to review or consideration on any ground whether arising out of absence of jurisdiction or nullity, defect or irregularity of proceedings, or if words of similar nature had been added to that section, the High Court would certainly have been incompetent to entertain the present application; and the authorities cited supra would also have had no application.”

Among a number of similar common law authorities filed by Nana Akufo-Addo were the recent cases of Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1979] 1 All E.R. 265, C.A. and Re A Company [1980] 1 All E.R. 284, C.A. Since we are not presently concerned with the merits of the case, it is unnecessary to express our opinion on the case law on the issue of ouster or preclusive clauses.

Nana Akufo-Addo further submitted that section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions does not incorporate A.F.R.C.D. 23 into the constitution; the former merely preserved intact the efficacy of the latter. In the alternative, if we should hold that there was a case of incorporation of A.F.R.C.D. 23 by reference in section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions, then he reiterates that there was no ambiguity in its language to warrant a reference to the Supreme Court. The interpretation of article 126 had not been raised; the question at stake was whether having regard to the language of section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23, article 126 had been displaced. It is to the common law that reference should be made as to when the general supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court entrenched in article 126 may be deemed to have been either completely or partially ousted. He stressed that there is ample case law authority to the effect that section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 does not constitute a complete ouster; and the learned trial judge was right in his refusal to refer the matter to the Supreme Court since no case for interpretation had arisen, and his ratio was sound and unassailable. The “cross-appeal” ought therefore to be dismissed.

The Issue of Incorporation by Reference

An important question raised by the cross-appeal and counsel’s arguments is whether section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 has been incorporated by reference into the Constitution. When a document is

[p.602] of [1980] GLR 592 declared to be incorporated by reference in another document, it means that one document shall be taken as part of another document in which the declaration is made just as if it were set out at length therein. The effect of bringing into a later Act, by reference, sections of an earlier Act is to introduce the incorporated sections of the earlier Act into the later Act as if they had been enacted in it for the first time. Referring to an instance when certain sections of an Act of 1840 were incorporated by reference in an Act of 1855, Lord Esher M.R. in In re Wood’s Estate (1886) 31 Ch.D. 607 at pp. 615-616 said:

“If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all. For all practical purposes, therefore, those sections of the Act of 1840 are to be dealt with as if they were actually in the Act of 1855.”

Section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions has already been reproduced verbatim. That subsection may be contrasted with the earlier section 17 (1), (2) and (3) which are but verbatim reproductions of subsection 3 (1) (a), (b) and (c) respectively of A.F.R.C.D. 23: while section 17 (6) of the transitional provisions finds its counterpart in section 9 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23. Section 17 (7) states simply that all the provisions of A.F.R.C.D. 23 “shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this constitution to the contrary.”

The Case Law on the Issue of Enforcement or Interpretation

The second important legal question raised by the “cross-appeal” is whether or not an issue of enforcement or interpretation within the meaning of article 118 of the Constitution, 1979, has been raised by this litigation. Article 118 enacts that:

“118. (1) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 35 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, (a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution; and (b) where a question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.

[p.603] of [1980] GLR 592

(2) Where a question relating to a matter or question as is referred to in clause (1) of this article arises in any proceedings in any Court, other than the Supreme Court, that Court shall stay the proceedings and refer the question of law involved to the Supreme Court for determination; and the Court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.”

Article 118 of the Constitution, 1979, is in pari materia with article 106 of the Constitution, 1969. And in the case of Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473 at p. 478, the former Supreme Court gave useful guidelines on when an issue of interpretation of the Constitution under Article 106 of the Constitution, 1969, may be referred to the Supreme Court; and it would be appropriate to refer to the oft-quoted statement of Bannerman C.J. in that case:

“We wish to comment that a lower court is not bound to refer to the Supreme Court every submission alleging as an issue the determination of a question of interpretation of the Constitution or of any other matter contained in article 106 (1) (a) or (b). If in the opinion of the lower court the answer to a submission is clear and unambiguous on the face of the provisions of the Constitution or laws of Ghana, no reference need be made since no question of interpretation arises and a person who disagrees with or is aggrieved by the ruling of the lower court has his remedy by the normal way of appeal, if he so chooses. To interpret the provisions of article 106 (2) of the Constitution in any other way may entail and encourage references to the Supreme Court of frivolous submissions, some of which may be intended to stultify proceedings or the due process of law and may lead to delays such as may in fact amount to denial of justice. In this connection we fully endorse the decision of the Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in the case of Awoonor-Williams v. Gbedemah, Supreme Court, 8 December 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 18 and of Tait v. Ghana Airways Corporation, Supreme Court, 29 July 1970, unreported.”

In Gbedemah v. Awoonor-Williams, the full Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court in its ruling of 30 October 1969, made the following pertinent pronouncement per Azu Crabbe J.A. (as stated in (1969) 2 G. &. G. 438 at pp. 439-440):

“In our view, unless the words of a statute are imprecise and ambiguous the court does not apply the rules and presumptions of construction.

[p.604] of [1980] GLR 592

The words of article 71 (2) (b) (ii) and (d) are plain, and they mean what they say, and are to be expounded in their ordinary and natural sense. Until the primary, or popular or literal meaning of those words is disputed, the interpretation of the words is unnecessary. In this case the plaintiff is not asking the court to declare that the words of the article … mean something different from or more than what they say. Just to ask the court to say that the words of the provisions of the Constitution mean what they say is not asking the court to interpret the Constitution. In our opinion, the contention that the plaintiff’s claim raises an issue of the interpretation of the Constitution is, with all due respect, untenable.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

And in Tait v. Ghana Airways Corporation, Supreme Court, 29 July 1970, unreported, where I had the privilege of delivering the judgment of the court, a similar pronouncement was made (as stated in (1970) 2 G. &. G. 527 at p. 528):

“The crux of the matter is whether the plaintiff’s action raises any issue of either interpretation or enforcement of any provisions of the Constitution. From the pleadings and issues settled in this case, we hold that no issue of interpretation is herein raised for determination. As Maxwell states in the opening paragraph of his treaties on the Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed.), ‘A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it’ . . . If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. The object of all interpretation of a statute is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or impliedly by the language used, so far as is necessary for determining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it . . . Where the language of the Constitution is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The mere fact that a party invokes in support of his case, a provision of the Constitution which is couched in plain, unambiguous language, does not turn an action the true nature of which is one for wrongful dismissal, into one relating to the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution within the meaning of article 106 (1) (a). In our opinion, the task of interpretation does not

[p.605] of [1980] GLR 592 arise where, as in this case, from the pleadings filed and issues settled between the parties, it is manifestly clear that the dispute is not about the true meaning of ambiguous or vague words in the Constitution, but rather about issues of facts in a claim for wrongful dismissal. The parties to this action are not inviting the court to uphold rival or diametrically opposed interpretations of provisions of the Constitution.”

Summary of the Case Law on Enforcement or Interpretation

From the foregoing dicta, we would conclude that an issue of enforcement or interpretation of a provision of the Constitution under article 118 (1) (a) arises in any of the following eventualities:

(a) where the words of the provision are imprecise or unclear or ambiguous. Put in another way, it arises if one party invites the court to declare that the words of the article have a double-meaning or are obscure or else mean something different from or more than what they say;

(b) where rival meanings have been placed by the litigants on the words of any provision of the Constitution;

(c) where there is a conflict in the meaning and effect of two or more articles of the Constitution, and the question is raised as to which provision shall prevail;

(d) where on the face of the provisions, there is a conflict between the operation of particular institutions set up under the Constitution, and thereby raising problems of enforcement and of interpretation.

On the other hand, there is no case of “enforcement or interpretation” where the language of the article of the Constitution is clear, precise and unambiguous. In such an eventuality, the aggrieved party may appeal in the usual way to a higher court against what he may consider to be an erroneous construction of those words; and he should certainly not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under article 118. Again, where the submission made relates to no more than a proper application of the provisions of the Constitution to the facts in issue, this is a matter for the trial court to deal with; and no case for interpretation arises.

The Fundamental Question in Issue

Put in a nutshell, the whole controversy between the parties boils down to this question: Has the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals (the respondent tribunal included), entrenched in article 126 of the 1979 Constitution, been ousted

[p.606] of [1980] GLR 592 completely by virtue of section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 which has been preserved intact by section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution to the contrary, or has it been ousted only partially, leaving intact the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to quash by certiorari any .trial or adjudication by an inferior tribunal conducted or made either in the absence or excess of jurisdiction or in breach of the rules of natural justice or in contravention of the due process of law?

Mr. Appiah, learned counsel for the respondent tribunal, in arguing his notices of contention that the court below’s judgment should be varied, has relied on the plain, literal meaning of the enactments in question (i.e., section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 read together with section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions and contrasted with article 126) for his submission that those enactments import a complete ouster of the High Court’s jurisdiction in the present case.

On the other hand, Nana Akufo-Addo, learned counsel for the appellant, canvassed the rival point of view and submitted that only a partial ouster of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction has been introduced by the said enactments, having regard to what he contended was the settled common law meaning of the language used in section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23.

In our view the determination of the salient issues raised in the respondent’s notices of contention that the court below’s ruling should be varied necessitates the interpretation of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions itself. The need for such an interpretation has been highlighted or necessitated by the opposing stands taken on whether section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 has been incorporated by reference into the constitution by virtue of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions; and by the divergent meanings and legal effect placed on section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 itself. If section 7 (2) of the Decree has indeed been incorporated into the transitional provisions, then it automatically becomes an integral part of the Constitution and therefore falls within the ambit and scope of article 118 as “a provision of the Constitution.”

The further question raised as to whether section 7 (2) assuming it is a constitutional provision — operates as a complete or partial ouster of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction also properly falls for determination by the Supreme Court, the only competent court under article 118 to deal with it — see categories (b) and (d) of our summary of the judicial definition of occasions calling for interpretation under the identically worded article 106 of the Constitution, 1969. On the one hand, Mr. Appiah relies on the plain,

[p.607] of [1980] GLR 592 literal meaning of section 7 (2) for his submission that it constitutes a complete ouster, while Nana Akufo-Addo contends that it must be understood in its common law sense to connote only a partial ouster. In effect, a double-meaning is being claimed by the parties for section 7 (2); and this alleged ambiguity can only be resolved by the Supreme Court, assuming it first holds, after the interpretation of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions, that section 7 (2) has been duly incorporated into the Constitution by reference.

Alternatively, the rival arguments on ouster show the existence of an inherent conflict in an important area of the operation of two institutions, i.e. the High Court and the special tribunal under the Constitution, again assuming that after due interpretation of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions, the Supreme Court rules that section 7(2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 has been legally incorporated into the Constitution.

Case Stated

We accordingly certify under article 118 (2) of the Constitution and rule 54 (2) (g) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I.13), that the determination of the constitutional matters or questions set out below is necessary to a decision of the action herein. Furthermore, acting under article 118 (2) of the Constitution, we hereby stay the proceedings and refer the said questions of law to the Supreme Court for determination and such directions as to the court may seem meet.

“(a) Matters or questions referred to the Supreme Court for determination are:

(i) On a true interpretation of section 17 (7) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, has section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23 been incorporated into the Constitution by reference or otherwise?

(ii) If yes, has the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals (the respondent special tribunal included) under article 126 of the Constitution been ousted by virtue of section 7 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 23?

(iii) If the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the respondent tribunal has been ousted, then to what extent? In particular, has it been ousted completely or only partially, leaving intact the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to quash by certiorari any trial or proceedings or conviction or sentence of an inferior tribunal conducted or imposed either in the absence, or excess, of jurisdiction or in breach

[p.608] of [1980] GLR 592 of the rules of natural justice or in contravention of the due process of law?

(b) The facts of the action in the court below are summarised at pp. 1-5 supra.

(c) Arguments of counsel are summarised above at pp. 5-10 and 14-15.”

In conclusion, the appeal of the appellant is hereby allowed; and we hereby quash and set aside the decision of the court below dated 17 March 1980, dismissing the application for certiorari together with the consequential orders made. If the costs awarded have been paid, they should be refunded to the appellant.

Acting under article 118 (2) of the Constitution, we hereby refer the questions of law raised in the action and set out in the case stated to the Supreme Court for determination and such directions as to the court may seem meet. We further order stay of proceedings pending the hearing and determination by the Supreme Court of the case stated.

The respondent tribunal and its agents, the Confiscated Assets (Recovery & Disposal) Committee are hereby restrained from disposing of or in any way dealing with the appellant’s said vehicles pending the determination of the case stated by the Supreme Court.

Each party having partially succeeded, we make no order as to costs in this court. The appellant is however entitled to his costs in the court below assessed at ¢300.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Decision of the High Court set aside.

Order for stay of proceedings pending hearing and determination by the Supreme Court of the case stated.

S. O. K. O.

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