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[1980] SLR (HC) 27High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ENTERPRISE INSURANCE CO. LTD. vs. ABBAN [1981] GLR 440

17 April 1980 · JONES-MENSAH J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 27
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OSCOLAENTERPRISE INSURANCE CO. LTD. v ABBAN [1981] GLR 440 [1980] SLR (HC) 27
APAENTERPRISE INSURANCE CO. LTD. v ABBAN [1981] GLR 440, [1980] SLR (HC) 27 (Ghana).
BluebookENTERPRISE INSURANCE CO. LTD. v ABBAN [1981] GLR 440, [1980] SLR (HC) 27 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Armon v. Katz [1976] 2 G.L.R. 115, C.A.

(2) Bonsu v. State Insurance Corporation [1977] 1 G.L.R. 303, C.A.

(3) West Wake Price & Co. v. Ching [1957] 1 W.L.R. 45; 101 S.J. 64; [1956] 3 All E.R. 821; [1956] Lloyd’s Rep. 618.

(4) Post Office v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd. [1967] 2 W.L.R. 709; [1967] 2 Q.B. 363;

[1967] 1 All E.R. 577; [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 216; [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 499, C.A.

[p.441] of [1981] GLR 440

(5) Carpenter v. Ebblewhite [1939] 1 K.B. 347; [1938] 4 All E.R. 41; 108 L.J.K.B. 110; 159 L.T. 564;

55 T.L.R. 17; 82 S.J. 889, C.A.

(6) Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

(7) Northern Assurance Co. v. Fulani, High Court, Tamale, 28 April 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 72.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by an insurance company against its joinder as a co-defendant by the plaintiff in an action against the insured. The facts are stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Sotomey for the second defendant-applicant.

Awuah for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF JONES-MENSAH J.

The plaintiff’s suit against the defendants is for the benefit of the estate of his mother, Ama Mends (deceased), for himself and for other dependents of the deceased. Ama Mends was killed in a motor accident involving motor vehicle GM 2138 which belonged to the first defendant, the insured. The said vehicle was at the time of the accident insured by the second defendant-company. The plaintiff founded his claim on negligence against the insured and joined the second defendant as insurer of the first defendant by virtue, he says, of the obligations of the second defendant to the deceased under the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1958 (No. 42 of 1958).

The present motion which is brought by the insurer, the second defendant, prays for an order to discharge it from the action on grounds that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the insurance company and could not therefore have properly joined the insurance company in this action. Counsel’s argument was that neither at common law nor under statute could the plaintiff bring an action against the insurers of the first defendant, since qua insurers, their obligation to the plaintiff matures only after a third party judgment had been obtained against the insured. Mr. Sotomey, counsel for the second defendant, relied mainly on the case of Armon v. Katz [1976] 2 G.L.R. 115, C.A. to make this point. However, Mr. Awuah, counsel for the plaintiff, in reply, contended that the joinder was perfectly permissible and relied on Order 16, r. 4 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and on the case of Bonsu v. State Insurance Corporation [1977] 1 G.L.R. 303,C.A.

It was thought by both counsel that the Armon and Bonsu cases, which were both decided by the Court of Appeal, were in conflict and that this court was therefore at liberty to follow the better

[p.442] of [1981] GLR 440

deserving of the two. The Bonsu decision is regrettably not trouble-free because it did not confine itself to the issues raised in the appeal. English decisions like West Wake Price & Co. v. Ching [1956] 3 All E.R. 821; Post Office v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1967] 1 All E.R. 557, C.A.; Carpenter v. Ebblewhite [1939] 1 K.B. 347, C.A. and Ghanaian decisions such as Armon v. Katz (supra); Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247 and Northern Assurance Co. v. Fulani, High Court, Tamale, 28 April 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 72, do not seem to fit the glove of the Bonsu decision and tend, at first glance, to haunt the validity of the Bonsu decision.

A close examination of the Bonsu case, however, diffuses the difficulties it posed. The simple question the Court of Appeal was called upon to decide in the case was straightforward and it is only to the extent that the question was answered that the ratio decidendi formulated in the case can be valid and binding. Their lordships hit the kernel when they said at page 306, “In this appeal the legal warrant of the circuit judge to pronounce on the issue of joinder or rather misjoinder when no objection thereto had been taken is questioned. That is the nub.” That indeed is the nub. Had their lordships rested their decision on a square answer to the issues of the appeal, there would have been no bone to pick with the judgment but their lordships went further and dropped a unique pronouncement which shakes the roots of civil liability as we have always known it. They said at p. 310:

“there can … be no justification for denying a plaintiff the right to join an insurance company in one and the same action to determine both the liability of the tortfeasor to the plaintiff and that of the insurer to the insured.”

It is this aspect of the Bonsu decision that is sour but happily it can be excised as an obiter pronouncement. It was not necessary for settling the points raised in the appeal nor was such a pronouncement germane to the appeal before their lordships.

In more detail the question before the Court of Appeal was whether an insurer who had been joined as a co-defendant in an action by a third party against an insured, and who had not only objected to the joinder but had gone to the extent of also filing a counterclaim could resile from a regular judgment obtained over issues joined by him on the mere ground that no direct cause of action was originally available to the plaintiff against him. Their lordships said such an insurer could not resile in those circumstances and I think they were right.

For my part, I do not think that the Bonsu decision, in so far as it answers the issue raised on appeal, offended the obiters of the

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Armon or Yeboah cases which re-echoed trite law in re-stating that every action must be founded on a known cause of action and if no cause of action exists either at common law or under statute, no action can lie. I would accordingly excise that portion of the Bonsu judgment which I have earlier in this ruling proclaimed as pronounced obiter and therefore not binding. This having been done, I see the thirst of the Bonsu decision as satisfied when the court in effect held that an insurer, who could have been a party to an action had he been joined by the right party, i.e. the insured, by way of third party procedure and who does not object to an irregular joinder by a third party; or who does in fact advance contentious points in order to disclaim liability under the policy and who thereby causes the issue so raised to be regularly adjudicated upon, must be taken to have waived his right to avoid the misjoinder and must be held bound to a regular judgment given in the proceedings. To this extent, I think the Bonsu decision is a progressive development of the law. To allow the insurer to resile from such a judgment would leave him free to do one of two things, i.e. to settle the judgment regularly obtained against the insured or to re-litigate the same issue which he had already caused the court to adjudicate upon. Can he be worse off? No! Can any useful purpose be served in re-litigating the same issues? No! It can only be a tedious, expensive multiplicity of unnecessary actions.

But where the insurer has not implicated himself to the extent stated, the position, in my view, falls outside the circle of the Bonsu judgment. In other words, where the insurer would not be enticed by the plaintiff’s joinder, and has not swallowed the plaintiff’s bait by accepting what I call an invitation to litigate, and timeously objects to a wrong joinder, he cannot be enveloped by the Bonsu decision. Such is the case before this court for ruling. The insurer, the second defendant, who in the first place, could only have been sued, if at all, as a co-defendant, is in no way caught within the Bonsu dragnet. He has objected to the joinder for want of cause of action at common law or statute. He has, above all, done so timeously and now seeks relief from the harassment of the plaintiff. In my judgment he is entitled to such a relief and such a relief cannot, on the facts of this case be denied him. Accordingly, my response will be to grant the application by ordering that the second defendant’s name be struck off the proceedings in this suit as prayed and so be it.

DECISION

Application granted.

Co-defendant discharged.

K. A. A. M.

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