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[1980] SLR (HC) 28High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

GYIMAH AND OTHERS vs. AGYEMAN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 427

14 April 1980 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 20 min read

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OSCOLAGYIMAH AND OTHERS v AGYEMAN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 427 [1980] SLR (HC) 28
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mason v. Schuppisser (1899) 81 L.T. 147.

(2) Siasuom v. Kyi [1971] 1 G.L.R. 483, C.A.

(3) Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206; [1939] 4 All E.R. 464; 109 L.J.P.C. 38; 162 L.T . 1; 56 T.L.R.

154; 84 S.J. 131, H.L.

(4) West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society [1897] A.C. 647; 66 L.J.Ch. 726; 77 L.T. 284; 61 J.P. 820; 13 T.L.R. 536, H.L.

(5) Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473, S.C.

(6) Republic v. Asiamah [1971] 2 G.L.R. 478, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by an originating summons for construction of the Local Government Act, 1971 (Act 359), as amended, in relation to the duration of office of the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council. The facts are adequately stated in the judgment.

COUNCIL Hayfron-Benjamin for the applicants.

A.A. Adomako for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

By this originating summons, fourteen councillors of the Kumasi City Council, request a construction of the statutes relating to the office of an executive chairman of a local council, and in particular, the application of those statutes to determine the duration of the term of office of the first respondent as the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council.

The applicants herein claim that upon a proper construction or application or both of the said enactments they are entitled to the following declarations:

(a) that the term of office of the first respondent is one year;

(b) that the term of office of the first respondent has expired;

(c) that the right resides in the councillors to appoint one of their number as the Chairman of the Kumasi City Council; and (d) that section 8A of the Local Government Act, 1971 (Act 359), contravenes article 182 (4) of the Constitution, 1979.

Put in a nutshell, the events leading up to this application are that, the first respondent was on 2 December 1977, appointed the [p.430] of [1981] GLR 427 Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council under and by virtue of section 8 of the Local Administration Act, 1971 (Act 359), as amended by sections 8 and 8A of the Local Administration (Amendment) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 258). The first respondent occupied the said office until 18 January 1979. On 19 January 1979, the Supreme Military Council re-appointed him as the executive chairman of the said city council with effect from the date of the instrument of appointment, i.e. 19 January 1979. And he has held that office from that date up to the present moment.

In both letters informing him of his appointment, the last paragraph reads:

“Your salary and other conditions of service will be communicated to you in due course. In the meantime, I am to request you to inform me, without delay, whether you accept this offer of appointment.”

Both letters were exhibited by the first respondent, but he claims to have received no communication regarding other conditions of service except a letter addressed to the Executive Chairman of the three city councils of Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi and Kumasi, which reads:

“APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN I wish to refer you to my letter No. CC/A/70 SF.VII dated 19th January, 1979, in relation to the above-mentioned subject and to inform you that the Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Military Council has approved that the Executive Chairman of Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi City Councils be paid a salary of ¢10,466 per annum (Consolidated) plus a non-taxable duty allowance of ¢2,000 per annum.

2. A copy of letter No. SCR-04/29/TJ dated 27th March is attached hereto, for your information.”

This letter dated 6 April 1979, fixing the salary of an executive chairman was also exhibited by the first respondent, but without the attachment dated 27 March. In neither the letter informing him of his appointment nor the communication fixing the salary, was the duration of the term of office of an executive chairman spelt out. There is no other correspondence, at any rate before me, on this issue.

The section which created the office of executive chairman has been the subject of several amendments, the last of which is contained in the Local Government (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 219), which inserted a new section 8 A as:

[p.431] of [1981] GLR 427

“8 A. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8 of this Act or any other enactment, the Supreme Military Council may appoint any person to be the Executive Chairman of any of the District Councils specified in subsection (3) of this section whether such person is a member of the District Council or not.

(2) An Executive Chairman shall— (a) hold office upon such terms and conditions as may be specified in his instrument of appointment;

(b) subject to the directions of the Supreme Military Council, perform the functions of

Chairman of the District Council under this Act; and

(c) perform such other functions as may be specified, in his instrument of appointment.

(3) The District Councils referred to in subsection (1) of the section are—

(a) Accra City Council, (b) Kumasi City Council, and (c) Sekondi/Takoradi City Council.

(4) While an Executive Chairman has been appointed in respect of a District Council no Chairman shall be elected for the Council under section 8 of this Act, and where a Chairman has already been elected he shall cease to hold such office.”

The original enactment creating the office of executive chairman did not stipulate the duration of the office. In none of the several amendments, repeals and re-enactments of the section was the office limited to any period. And the law now governing the office, as can be gleaned from the above-quoted section, is equally silent on the period of tenure. In neither statute nor letters informing him of his appointment therefore, was the tenure of office of an executive chairman limited to any period.

Before I embark on an interpretation of the section, I think it apt to consider first a challenge, by the respondents, to the capacity of the applicants to initiate these proceedings. They say that the applicants failed to disclose their interest in the subject-matter of the instrument of appointment and the various sections of the Local Government Act, 1971. This objection is based on the false premise that every person who initiates proceedings by originating summons may do so only when he claims to be interested under the deed, will or other written instrument of which he seeks the

[p.432] of [1981] GLR 427 determination of a question of construction. But an originating summons may also be employed under Order 54A, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), by: “Any person claiming any legal or equitable right in a case where the determination of the question whether he is entitled to the right depends upon a question of construction of a statute…” The claim of the applicants, as I understand it, is that they are entitled under the various enactments, to the right to appoint one of their number as the Chairman of the Kumasi City Council. The applicants are therefore claiming a legal right and it is permissible for them to proceed by way of an originating summons.

The respondents contended that in so far as the instruments of appointment and the letter fixing the salary of the executive chairman are instruments, for the applicants to succeed in proceedings under Order 54A, they must disclose that they derive an interest under the said instruments. The applicants having failed to disclose the interest they derive under those two instruments, their application is misconceived. This argument fails to impress me.

The letter informing the first respondent of his appointment and the letter fixing his salary are instruments made under and by virtue of the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1971. They are therefore subsidiary to that Act. If the applicants claim a legal right under the Act as amended by N.R.C.D. 258 and S.M.C.D. 219, they need not disclose as well an interest under the first respondent’s letter of appointment in order to succeed. The letter of appointment is only an extension of the Act. It is sufficient if the applicants can establish a claim to a legal or equitable right under the parent Act. Even if a disclosure of interest were necessary to found proceedings by way of originating summons, in my view, a claim to a right to vote is an interest sufficient to enable a person to initiate proceedings by this means. For in Mason v. Schuppisser (1899) 81 L.T. 147 quoted with approval in Siasuom v. Kyi [1971] 1 G.L.R. 483 at p. 486, C.A., both of which are cases founded on the first rule of Order 54A, Stirling J. ascribed to the word “interested” a meaning which commended itself to our Court of Appeal. He said:

“Next, as to the meaning of the word ‘interested.’ The words are, ‘any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument,’ & c. The word is a wide one, and ought to extend, as it seems to me, to the claim of any person who has an interest of any sort, whether vested or

[p.433] of [1981] GLR 427 contingent, whether absolute or defeasible, whether in possession or reversion, under an instrument within the meaning of the rule.”

Section 8A (4) of the parent Act, i.e. S.M.C.D. 219 takes away the right of the councillors to appoint one of their number as a chairman of a district council, if an executive chairman has been appointed. If, therefore, for any reason, the post of an executive chairman becomes vacant and no appointment is made, the right to appoint one of their number as chairman re-vests in the councillors. It is clear to me that the councillors have a contingent right to the appointment of a chairman of the council. The question is: having regard to the instrument of appointment dated 19 January 1979, has that contingency arisen?

The respondents argue that the post of an executive chairman is a public office, and as it is not the practice to fix any period for the duration of a public office, the tenure of office of the first respondent was not limited to any period either in the parent Act or the instrument of appointment. The first respondent, they conclude, holds his office at the pleasure of the government, and not for any specified period.

The term “public officer” by the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), means:

“a member of any of the Public services, namely, the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, the Police Service, the Local Government Service, and such other services as may, pursuant to Article 51 of the Constitution [now Article 154], be constituted by Act of Parliament as Public Services of Ghana, and any other person declared by any enactment to be a public officer.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Now section 8A of the Local Government Act, 1971, as inserted by S.M.C.D. 219, which created the office of executive chairman did not declare the holder of the office to be a public officer. No other enactment has done so. The reason may be that, except as directed, the office was to be within the normal framework of local government.

It is worthy of note that although members of both central and local government are public officers, yet they do not hold their office at the pleasure of the government. They hold their offices for specified periods under the Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1971, respectively. They must then go to the polls where a supervening event of losing an election or, in the case of some councillors, not being re-chosen, may unseat them. It is clear to me that members of central and local government, as public officers,

[p.434] of [1981] GLR 427 do not hold their office at the pleasure of the government, and that in certain spheres of the public services, the duration of office is necessarily limited to a period which is specific.

What transpired after the appointment of the first respondent as executive chairman is, perhaps, indicative of the thinking of the appointing authority on the duration of his office. He was appointed as executive chairman on 2 December 1977. On 19 January 1979—just over one year later—he was re-appointed executive chairman by the government. If the understanding of the appointing authority was that he held office not from year to year, but at the pleasure of the government, then why the necessity of re-appointment when the former appointment had not been revoked? Such re-appointment can only be explained if the appointment lapsed in accordance with some provision either in the instrument of appointment or the parent Act.

Now, section 8 of Act 359 (as amended by N.R.C.D. 258) provides for the composition of district councils and the tenure of office of the chairman and members. Section 8 (3) reads, “Every District Council shall have a Chairman, who shall be elected for a term of one year by the Council from among the members thereof.” And section 8 A (1) which recites that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8 of this Act or any other enactment, the Supreme Military Council may appoint any person to be the Executive Chairman . ..” is, in reality, a condition annexed to the right of councillors to appoint a chairman, by virtue of which that right may be defeated upon the appointment of an executive chairman by the government. The section has all the attributes of a proviso although it has not been drafted as such. The rule of interpretation, as I understand it, has always been that unless it is absolutely necessary, a proviso is not to be construed as enlarging the scope of the enacting words. It must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended, and as subordinate to the main clauses of the Act. As Lord Wright observed in Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206 at p. 229, H.L.:

“The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. I do not think that there is any other rule even in the case of a proviso in the strictest or narrowest sense.”

And as Lord Watson put it in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society [1897] A.C. 647 at p. 652, H.L.:

“…I am perfectly clear that if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are

[p.435] of [1981] GLR 427 said to occur in it, you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso.”

Reading sections 8 and 8A of Act 359 as amended by N.R.C.D. 258 and S.M.C.D. 219 as a whole, it seems to me that a chairman, whether appointed by councillors or by the government, and whether he is described as “ordinary” or “executive,” is appointed for a term of not more than one year. It would be doing violence to the language of the statute if I were to imply from the provisions of section 8A that any period of time, other than one year, was intended for the duration of office of a chairman prefixed by the euphemism “executive.”

Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin, counsel for the applicants, in a supreme effort to carry the day, almost succeeded in putting himself out of court. He argued that the first respondent’s appointment of 2 December 1977, was terminated by the Local Government (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D.194), which repealed section 8A of the principal enactment. Thus doing away with the office of executive chairman. The Local Government (Amendment) (No. 3) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 210), however, enabled the holders of that office to continue in office until the Supreme Military Council should otherwise direct. He contended that the Supreme Military Council further directed by passing the Local Government (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 219), which restored section 8A to the principal Act. Within a week of S.M.C.D. 219 becoming law, the first respondent was re-appointed Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council. Before this last appointment was made, the Supreme Military Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 168), had become law. Section 10 (1) of this Decree reads:

“10. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the exercise of any of the executive powers of the State, or of any functions vested in the Supreme Military Council by any enactment may be signified under the hand of a Commissioner, if not signified by the Chairman.”

The instrument of appointment dated 19 January 1979, was not signed by any commissioner or the chairman and so concludes counsel, the instrument of appointment did not achieve its purpose of re-appointing the first respondent.

I find myself in agreement with counsel for the respondents, Mr. Adomako’s submission that if ever there was an interruption in the appointment of the first respondent on the repeal of section 8A by section 7 of S.M.C.D. 194, any such breach was repaired by S.M.C.D. 210, which restored the executive chairman to the legal

[p.436] of [1981] GLR 427 position he occupied before the repeal and enabled him to remain in office for the period designated by section 8 (3) of the principal enactment, i.e. one year. There was thus, in reality, no interruption whatsoever. To the argument that the letter dated 19 January 1979, was invalid and did not affect the appointment of the first respondent as executive chairman, Mr. Adomako replied that if counsel meant that because of S.M.C.D. 168, the said letter was not an instrument, then there was no instrument before the court for interpretation and the applicants’ action should be dismissed.

The first paragraph of the said letter dated 19 January 1979, reads, “I have the honour to inform you that the Supreme Military Council has approved your appointment as Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council with effect from 19th January, 1979.” In my view, this was a letter from the Senior Principal Secretary, communicating to the first respondent information regarding his appointment, and not the original instrument of appointment. The real instrument of appointment was never submitted for examination.

I think it ought conclusively to be presumed, whenever the contrary does not plainly and expressly appear, that executive powers were regularly exercised in accordance with the rules and statutes governing their exercise. And as the original instrument of appointment has not been exhibited to demonstrate the absence of the requisite signature, I am bound to presume that the original instrument of appointment was regularly executed. Ingenious though Mr. Hayfron-Benjamin’s argument is, in this respect, I am not swayed by it.

Finally, I was invited by counsel for the applicants to apply the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, to the facts of this case and to declare that the continuance in office of the first respondent as the executive chairman is not supported by the Constitution. Counsel for the respondents denied that any part of the Local Government Act, 1971, is in contravention of the Constitution. He submitted that where one person alleges that a thing contravenes the Constitution, and another disagrees, a dispute arises as to the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Constitution, which dispute must be submitted to the Supreme Court for resolution.

Article 118 of the Constitution, 1979, which confers original and exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of the Constitution on the Supreme Court, is identical with article 106 of the Constitution, 1969, of the Republic of Ghana. And in so far as article 106 has been the subject of any pronouncement by the Supreme Court, I feel bound to dispose of similar questions arising under article 118 of the present Constitution in accordance with those decisions. In Republic v. Maikankan

[p.437] of [1981] GLR 427

[1971] 2 G.L.R. 473, S.C. where the High Court stated a case for the Supreme Court to interpret articles 20 (2) and 112 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, Bannerman C.J., delivering the judgment of the court, said at p. 478:

“We wish to comment that a lower court is not bound to refer to the Supreme Court every submission alleging as an issue the determination of a question of interpretation of the Constitution or of any other matter contained in article 106 (1) (a) or (b). If in the opinion of the lower court the answer to a submission is clear and unambiguous on the face of the provisions of the Constitution or laws of Ghana, no reference need be made since no question of interpretation arises and a person who disagrees with or is aggrieved by the ruling of the lower court has his remedy by the normal way of appeal, if he so chooses. To interpret the provisions of article 106 (2) of the Constitution in any other way may entail and encourage references to the Supreme Court of frivolous submissions, some of which may be intended to stultify proceedings or the due process of law and may lead to delays such as may in fact amount to denial of justice.”

The Supreme Court reiterated these same sentiments in Republic v. Asiamah [1971] 2 G.L.R. 478 when it stated at pp. 481-482:

“We wish to stress that it is not every submission in a trial that an issue is a question or matter relating to the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution that has to be referred to this court for determination under article 106 of the Constitution. Where the language of the article in question is clear and unambiguous no question of interpretation arises to warrant a reference. The submission may well relate to no more than a proper application of the provision to the facts or issues, and this is a matter which the trial court has jurisdiction to determine.”

It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that when article 35 (1) which reads:

“35. (1) Where a person alleges that a provision of articles 19 to 34 inclusive of this Constitution has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court of Justice for redress.” is read together with article 118, it becomes clear that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain matters only in relation to articles

[p.438] of [1981] GLR 427

19 to 34 of the Constitution. But article 35 (1) of our present Constitution is no different from article 28 (1) of the Constitution, 1969, which also reads:

“28. (1) Where any person alleges that any provision of articles 12 to 27 inclusive of this Constitution has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court of Justice for redress.”

And, notwithstanding, the striking similarity of article 28 (1) of the Constitution, 1969, to article 35 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that where it is a matter of a mere application of clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution which involves no interpretation, the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the issue without a reference to the Supreme Court. What then are the provisions of the Constitution which the applicants require the court to apply to the facts of this case?

The transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, s. 7 (1) provides:

“7. (1) A person who immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution held or was acting in an office in existence immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall be deemed to have been appointed as far as is consistent with the provisions of this Constitution to hold or to act in the equivalent office under this Constitution.”

Without attempting any interpretation of this paragraph, the object clearly was to provide for continuity. And when it is applied to the first respondent, it is this paragraph that enabled him to remain in office and discharge his functions upon the coming into force of this Constitution. However, section 7 (2) of the transitional provisions provides:

“7. (2) A person who before the coming into force of this Constitution would have been required under the law in force to vacate his office at the expiration of a period of service shall, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, vacate his office at the expiration of that period.”

This subsection is clear and unambiguous and requires no comment. Applying the subsection to the first respondent, the first respondent was appointed on 19 January 1979, his appointment was for one year; the year elapsed on 18 January 1980; he should have vacated his office by the said 18 January 1980. His continued occupation of the office of executive chairman is without legal justification.

[p.439] of [1981] GLR 427

Article 182 (1) of the Constitution provides, “For the purposes of local government in Ghana there shall be established by an Act of Parliament district and other local government councils.” Clause 4 (1) (c) of this article provides, “(4) An Act enacted pursuant to clause (1) of the article shall provide…

(c) for the election by a council, of a chairman and a vice-chairman from among the members of the council.”

By this clause it appears there is an absence of power in Parliament to enact any legislation providing for the appointment of chairman of district and local councils other than as stipulated by article 182 (4) (c). But there is equally a lack of jurisdiction in this court to declare an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment as being in contravention of the Constitution. For article 2 (1) declares:

“2. (1) A person who alleges— (a) that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment, or (b) that any act or omission of any person, is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

I shall, therefore, refrain from pronouncing on whether or not section 8A of the Local Government Act, 1971, contravenes article 182 of the Constitution, 1979.

For the reasons stated above, I hereby enter judgment for the applicants for the following declarations: (a) that the term of office of an executive chairman is one year;

(b) that the term of office of the first respondent, as the Executive Chairman of the Kumasi City Council has expired; and (c) that the right resides in the councillors to appoint one of their number as the Chairman of the Kumasi City Council.

I award costs of ¢500 to the applicants.

DECISION Judgment for the applicants in part.

K. A. A. M.

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