ESSON vs. OPPONG AND ANOTHER [1992] 2 GLR 36
4 August 1987 · KPEGAH J · ≈ 11 min read
[1987] SLR (HC) 5Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Nahum v. O. Wolley & Co. and K. Wolley & Sons [1961] G.L.R. 241.
(2) Amakom Sawmill & Co. v. Mansah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 368, S.C.
(3) Ghana Commercial Bank v. Kofie [1963] 2 G.L.R. 235, S.C.
(4) Yonge v. Toynbee [1910] 1 K.B. 215; 102 L.T. 57; 26 T.L.R. 211, C.A.
(5) Simmons v. Liberal Opinion Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 966; 104 L.T. 264; 27 T.L.R. 278, C.A.
(6) Windsor v. Chalcraft [1939] 1 K.B. 279; [1938] 2 All E.R. 751; 159 L.T. 104, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by counsel for the defendants for leave to withdraw or amend an entry of appearance he made on behalf of the first defendant without his consent. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Asiam for the plaintiff.
E. F. Short for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF KPEGAH J.
I deem it necessary to decorate this ruling of mine with a pertinent statement of Holt C.J. in an anonymous case reported in Salkeld Reports (Anon I SALK 86). His lordship said:
“The course of this Court is, where an attorney takes upon himself to appear, the Court looks no further, but proceeds as if the attorney has sufficient authority.”
On 23 July 1987 the plaintiff issued a writ of summons against the two defendants claiming general and special damages suffered as a result of the negligent driving of the first defendant who is the insured of the second defendant — an insurance company. The writ was accompanied with a statement of claim. Both documents were served on the second defendant. There is however a certificate of non-service in respect of the first defendant. On 13 August 1987 however, Mr. Emile Francis Short
[p.39] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 entered appearance for both defendants. In the memorandum of appearance accompanying the entry of appearance, it was specifically stated that the entry of appearance was in respect of. “1. Stephens Oppong, 2. State Insurance Corporation, the defendants in this action.” Thereafter, no step was taken by the solicitor for the defendants to file a statement of defence. Subsequently, though not timeously, the plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory judgment against both defendants in default of defence. The motion was fixed for hearing on 8 June 1987. At 9.25 am of the said date, Mr. Short filed a “notice of amendment” in which he seeks:
“Leave of the court to amend the entry of appearance by inserting the word “second” in front of the word “defendants” where it so appears and for the name Stephen Oppong to be deleted from the duplicate of memorandum of appearance.”
The solicitor in effect is not only seeking leave to withdraw his representation in respect of the first defendant, but also to withdraw the entry of appearance filed on his behalf.
The procedure was queried and learned counsel said the procedure adopted by him could be brought under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 28, r. 12. The said Order states:
“12. The Court or a Judge may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court or Judge may think just, amend any defect or error in any proceedings, and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on the proceedings.”
Order 28, r.1 of L.N. 140A is designed to enable the court effect amendment at any time so as to be able to settle the real issues in controversy between the parties once and for all. The Order then provides for specific situations and later grants the court general powers under rule 12 as quoted above. Learned counsel contended that since there was an application for judgment in default, there was “proceedings” within the contemplation of the rule so as to enable the court amend the entry of appearance to reflect that the first defendant has in fact not entered appearance.
With much respect to learned counsel, I do not think Order 28, r.12 of L.N. 140A was intended to cover such situations. The cases I have read in which this rule was applied indicate that the rule is intended to effect the settlement of the real issues raised between the parties and not the
[p.40] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 type of amendment being sought. In the case of Nahum v. O. Wolley & Co. and K. Wolley & Sons [1961] G.L.R. 241 the plaintiff ‘s claim was amended to take care of the appropriate reliefs he was entitled to on the evidence; also in Amakom Sawmill & Co. v. Mansah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 368, S.C. where the evidence showed the plaintiff to have been entitled to a higher amount than claimed, and was awarded the lesser amount, the Supreme Court moaned that the ends of justice would have been much better served if the trial court had exercised its power under this rule. And lastly, in Ghana Commercial Bank v. Kofie [1963] 2 G.L.R. 235, S.C. the plaintiffs claimed £G5,592 6s 9d as money had and received. The plaintiffs later filed a notice of their intention to amend to include in their claim, a claim for accounts. At the trial it was obvious the main issue was one of account between the parties. Referees were appointed who found £G6,786 5s due from the defendants to the plaintiffs. The court gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £G5,592 6s 9d. On appeal by the defendants, the trial court was chastised for not considering the amendment under Order 28, r.12 of L.N. 140A before delivering its judgment. It does not therefore appear that an entry of appearance can be amended under this rule.
There is no provision under our rules which provide for this type of situation, i.e. a solicitor who enters appearance without authority seeking leave to amend the entry of appearance and the memorandum of appearance. One may therefore have to fall upon the saving provision of Order 74 of L.N. 140A which permits the adoption and application of the procedure for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England. The practice there is that an appearance entered under mistake, without authority, may, before any subsequent step has been taken, and with the consent of the plaintiff’s solicitor, be withdrawn by leave of the master. The plaintiff himself may have such an appearance struck out by leave obtained on summons: see note in The Supreme Court Practice (1967), Vol.1, p. 86.
In the case of Yonge v. Toynbee [1910] 1 K.B. 215, C.A. the application was by summons; and in Simmons v. Liberal Opinion Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 966, C.A. it was an application in court at the conclusion of trial. In the present case, the solicitor for the plaintiff raises no objection to the request to withdraw or amend the entry of appearance. No new steps had been taken by Mr. Short. I will therefore permit the amendment being sought. The entry of appearance in respect of the first defendant is hereby struck out. It is only proper that the consequential proceedings against the first defendant for an interlocutory judgment in default of
[p.41] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 defence also be struck out and it is hereby struck out.
There is one aspect of the case which to me is more important and ought not to be ignored, i.e. the responsibility of a solicitor who enters appearance for a defendant when he has no authority to do so. In this country, it is not uncommon for insurance companies to engage solicitors for their insureds. In fact there is always a clause in the insurance policy asking the insured not to take any steps in case of an action against him without reference to the insurance company.
In querying the procedure adopted by learned counsel to extricate himself from appearing for the first defendant, I was of course thinking of Order 7, r.4(1) of L.N. 140A which regulates the procedure to be adopted by a solicitor who ceases to act for a party in a case. This rule requires that the solicitor serves notice of withdrawal on the party for whom he has been acting. It was when the issue was raised by me as why he did not adopt that procedure that it came to light that Mr. Short in fact had no authority to enter appearance in respect of the first defendant. This gave a different dimension to the matter.
In considering the effect of the entry of appearance by Mr. Short on behalf of the first defendant, its subsequent withdrawal by him at this stage and its possible ramifications for the fortunes of the plaintiff, the case of Simmons v. Liberal Opinion Ltd. (supra) readily comes to mind. This was an appeal from an order of Darling J. which raised the question as to the personal liability of a solicitor for the costs of an action defended by him in the name of a non-existent client. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in his judgment at 971-972 said:
“The consequence is that we must treat this as an action brought against a company. That company was non-existent, and therefore Mr. Dunn had no authority from any one to enter an appearance on behalf of a company. The proceedings were entirely abortive, and the judgment was against a non-existent company. It has always been held that a solicitor who enters an appearance warrants that he has authority from the client to enter that appearance.”
His lordship then proceeded to give the rationale behind this principle at 972 thus:
“This is a principle which has not only long been recognized, but it is a principle which is almost a necessity to the procedure in our Courts. A plaintiff cannot challenge the acts of the
[p.42] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 defendant’s solicitor in the action. He is bound to treat them as acts authorized by the defendant himself, and if it were not held that the solicitor warrants that he has authority from his client to do all the things necessary for the action the gravest injustice might often be done.”
The same sentiments were expressed by Swinfen Eady J. in the case of Yonge v. Toynbee [1910] 1 K.B. 215 at 233, C.A. as follows:
“I wish to add that in the conduct of litigation the Court places much reliance upon solicitors, who are its officers; it issues writs at their instance, and accepts appearances for defendants which they enter, as a matter of course, and without questioning their authority; the other parties to the litigation also act upon the same footing, without questioning or investigating the authority of the solicitor on the opposite side; and much confusion and uncertainty would be introduced if a solicitor were not to be under any liability to the opposite party for continuing to act without authority… At one time the Common Law Courts acted very firmly upon the view that, if an attorney took upon himself to sue or defend, the Courts would presume his authority and not inquire into it; so much so that, if an attorney . . . without authority instituted or defended proceedings, the Court would not interfere, but left the party injured to his remedy in damages against the attorney.”
In concluding his judgment, his lordship had this to say at 234:
“The manner in which business is ordinarily conducted requires that each party should be able to rely upon the solicitor of the other party having obtained a proper authority before assuming to act. It is always open to a solicitor to communicate as best as he can with his own client, and obtain from time to time such authority and instructions as may be necessary. But the solicitor on the other side does not communicate with his opponent’s client, and, speaking generally, it is not proper for him to do so… It is in my opinion essential to the proper conduct of legal business that a solicitor should be held to warrant the authority which he claims of representing the client; if it were not so, no one would be safe in assuming that his opponent’s solicitor was duly authorized in what he said or did, and it would be impossible to conduct legal business upon the footing now existing; and,
[p.43] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 whatever the legal liability may be, the Court, in exercising the authority which it possesses over its own officers, ought to proceed upon the footing that a solicitor assuming to act, in an action, for one of the parties to the action warrants his authority.”
The principle which emerges or can be deduced from all these statements is that a solicitor is an agent of a special kind with a definite obligation towards his client to take all necessary steps on his behalf in the action. In this view, where a solicitor issues a writ or enters an appearance, neither the adversary of his client nor the court has a duty to inquire or investigate whether he in fact had the authority to take the step he took. It is presumed that such an authority exists. The rationale behind this presumption is that the solicitor, by issuing the writ or entering an appearance, impliedly warrants his authority to so act. And where the authority does not exist, the solicitor is often held liable to a party who acts upon his representation to his detriment.
In the present case, by entering an appearance for the first defendant, Mr. Short was in effect informing the court and the plaintiff that he had the authority of the first defendant to act on his behalf. I have said it is not uncommon in this country for insurance companies to instruct solicitors to enter appearance and defend actions on behalf of their insureds. The practice has long been stated in the case of Windsor v. Chalcraft [1939] 1 K.B. 279 at 280, C.A. as follows:
“The underwriters shall be entitled to take absolute control of all proceedings and negotiations and have full discretion to settle prosecute or defend any claim in the name of the insured.”
If counsel is now telling the court and the plaintiff that he in fact has no such authority to defend the action on behalf of the first defendant then he has clearly misled the plaintiff who acted upon the said representation. When the plaintiff realised no defence was being filed on behalf of the first defendant he took out a motion for judgment in default of defence only to realise that there had been no appearance to his writ.
The position as a result is that the plaintiff may now have to apply for a renewal of the writ, since it is due to expire very soon, and then attempt further services before applying for an order for substituted service if the first defendant cannot be traced or evades service. It cannot be denied that the plaintiff has been put to some needless expenses as a result.
On the authorities, it is proper to ask counsel to pay the costs so far
[p.44] of [1992] 2 GLR 36 occasioned to the plaintiff as a result; therefore, while allowing Mr. Short to withdraw his representation, I will assess nominal costs against him personally. I will award ¢5,000 costs against counsel.
DECISION
Application granted with costs.
G.A.
