BOHAM vs. EVONNA [1992] 1 GLR 287
10 August 1987 · KPEGAH J · ≈ 14 min read
[1987] SLR (HC) 2Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Stroms Bruks Aktie Bolag v. Hutchison [1905] A.C. 515; 2 T.L.R.
[p.289] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 718; 63 L.T. 562, H.L.
(2) Ahenkora v. Moubarak [1972] 2 G.L.R. 429.
(3) Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd. (1948) 64 T.L.R. 117; [1948] WN 89; 92 S.J. 154. (4) West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A.
(5) Ansah v. Baiden [1976] 1 G.L.R. 494, C.A. (full bench).
(6) Borketey v. Achinivu [1966] G.L.R. 92, S.C; reversing [1960] G.L.R. 73.
(7) Zacca v. CFAO, Court of Appeal, 15 August 1969; digested in (1969) C.C.156.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the plaintiff for general and special damages for damage to his income earning vehicle caused by the negligent driving of the defendant’s servant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
J. P. K. Mensa-Bonsu for the plaintiff.
E. F. Short for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF KPEGAH J.
The plaintiff in a writ he issued on 28 September 1983 claims from the defendant general and special damages as a result of the negligence of the defendant’s servant who was then in charge of the defendant’s vehicle No G.J. 9578. The accident occurred on 28 January 1981. The particulars of the special damages were given as: (a) cost of repairs on the plaintiff ‘s vehicle—¢22,850; and (b) loss of use—¢500 per diem from 28 July 1981 to date of judgment.
On 26 May 1986 the plaintiff obtained an interlocutory judgment in default of appearance after a long lull in the proceedings. The proceedings before me relate only to the assessment of damages. The plaintiff admits that the vehicle has still not been repaired up to date and rather tendered in evidence an estimate from Messrs Bartholomew (Gh.) Ltd., the accredited representatives who work on Ford cars—the type of car being used by the plaintiff. The estimated cost of repairs is ¢22,850. This forms the basis for the special damages being claimed for repairs. The estimate was tendered as exhibit B. The plaintiff called no witness.
The defendant called a witness from the State Insurance Corporation who are his insurers. This witness testified that there had been settlement with the plaintiff’s solicitor for the payment to the plaintiff of an amount of ¢7,500 in full satisfaction of all claims by the plaintiff who then signed a discharge form in favour of the insurance company. It was later that the plaintiff resiled from the settlement and the cheque could not be
[p.290] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 issued to him. He said the estimate submitted by the plaintiff from Bartholomew was rejected because certain items were not covered by the police report as having been directly caused by the accident, e.g. battery which was costed at ¢2,500.
This case is devoid of both factual and legal problems of any serious dimensions since the facts which tend to erect legal obstacles in the path of the plaintiff were admitted by himself. The plaintiff, as already pointed out, is claiming special damages in the nature of cost of repairs of his vehicle, and loss of use.
As is pointed out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, p. 218, special damages are compensation for special damage which is not presumed by law to be the natural and probable or direct consequence of the act or omission complained of but which does in fact result in the circumstances of the particular case and of the injured party’s claim to be compensated. In the case of Stroms Bruks Aktie Bolag v. Hutchison [1905] A.C. 515 at 525-526, H.L. (S.C.) Lord Macnaghten said:
‘“. . . Special damages’ . . . are such as the law will not infer from the nature of the act. They do not follow in ordinary course. They are exceptional in their character, and, therefore, they must be claimed specially and proved strictly.”
(The emphasis is mine.) It does appear, therefore, that before a plaintiff can succeed where he is claiming special damages he must as a first step specifically claim the said damages and give warning of it in his pleadings so that there may be no surprise at the trial. The plaintiff must then at the trial strictly prove that particular damage. In proving the special damages, the plaintiff must need prove that it goes beyond the general damage which flows from the tortious act of the defendant. Unless a plaintiff approaches his claim for special damage with such seriousness he cannot succeed.
In the present case, the special damages being claimed by the plaintiff relate to cost of repairs of his vehicle. This was specially pleaded by him. That is about the only thing done positively by the plaintiff towards his claim for special damages. The only evidence led by him is to tender an estimate for the repairs prepared by Bartholomew (Ghana) Ltd. I have already indicated that this estimate was disputed by the insurance company because some of the items included could not be attributed to the accident. Although the plaintiff can be said to have properly pleaded the special damages he considered himself entitled to, he has failed to prove same strictly to entitle him to an award under this [p.291] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 head. A case in point, and which can be said to be on all fours with the instant case, is the case of Ahenkora v. Moubarak [1972] 2 G.L.R. 429. The second part of the headnote states that the estimated cost of repairs which the plaintiff claimed smacks of special damages and special damages must be an amount actually spent. What the plaintiff did was to ask the court to give him money which he impliedly spent but which in fact he had not. It was for the plaintiff to prove his damages and in the absence of such proof of special damages only nominal damages could be awarded.
In the said case, Ahenkora (supra) the plaintiff claimed a specific amount as the reasonable cost of repairing his taxi-cab allegedly damaged by the defendant’s house. The only evidence of the special damages led was the tendering by a mechanic of an estimated cost prepared by S.C.O.A. Motors. In rejecting the claim of the plaintiff for special damages, Edusei J. (as he then was) said of the claim at 436: “The plaintiff is claiming the sum of ¢1,640.45 as the reasonable cost of repairing his taxi-cab No. W.R. 6511. The plaintiff has up to the time he gave evidence not repaired his taxi-cab for lack of funds. My view of the amount claimed is in the nature of special damages which of course must be pleaded and strictly proved.
The plaintiff’s third witness, a motor mechanic of S.C.O.A. Motors Takoradi, tendered in evidence an estimated cost of repairs to the taxi-cab and this is the amount the plaintiff is claiming … As I have stated earlier on in this judgment the estimated cost of repairs which the plaintiff is claiming smacks of special damages and special damages must be an amount actually spent, but an estimate could be more or less when the repairs are completed. What the plaintiff has done is to ask the court to give him money which he impliedly says he has spent but which in fact he has not.”
Emphasising that special damages must be cogently or strictly proved by a plaintiff before he can succeed, Edusei J. (as he then was) added at 437:
“The only way to prove it in this case is to show that the amount claimed has been spent and that the expenditure flows directly from the accident. It must also be supported by credible evidence such as a receipt.”
[p.292] of [1992] 1 GLR 287
His lordship was echoing the views expressed by Lord Goddard C.J. in the case of Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd. (1948) 64 T.L.R. 117 at 118 thus:
“Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damages; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the Court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost; I ask you to give me these damages.’ They have to prove it.”
The evidence, as we have seen from the officer from the State insurance Corporation is that the estimate of the plaintiff covered certain items not damaged as a result of the accident. I would like to quote the relevant portion of the evidence. He said:
“The policy on which the plaintiff is claiming is one of indemnity. This means he should not profit or gain out of his misfortune. When our motor surveyor came out with a report, he said the claimant would have to make a contribution if the vehicle was to be completely repaired. There were certain items not affected by the accident but the estimate covered them so they were deleted. Some of the deleted items were a battery (the estimate was ¢2,500); there was no indication from the police report that the battery was affected.”
I think the relevant law can be stated to be that: where a person claims from another special damages based on damages caused to his vehicle as a result of the negligence of that other, he does not prove his claim by merely claiming before the court the estimated cost of repairs saying: “this is what I need to effect repair on my vehicle and it must be given to me to do so.” In such circumstances, the claim becomes premature, for a claim for special damages implies that the money had actually been spent to effect the repairs which resulted directly from the accident.
The relief of special damages is not concerned with expenses yet to be made or expenses in futuro, or with expenses which can be described, so to say, to be in posse. By its very nature and intended purpose as a claim for consequential loss, the relief of special damages concerns itself with expenses actually incurred in effecting the repairs of the damage suffered as a result of the tortious act. It is a relief which lives in the present and not in the future, and gives no recognition to expenses yet to
[p.293] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 be made in repairing an alleged damage.
In the case before me, in so far as the plaintiff’s claim for ¢22,850 is not based on expenses actually made by him in effecting the repairs on his vehicle, but is rather a claim based on an estimate of what he intends to spend in repairing his vehicle, he cannot succeed in a claim for special damages. To grant his relief will be a speculative venture.
The next issue to consider is the plaintiff’s claim for loss of use. He is claiming ¢500 per diem from 28 July 1981 up to the date of judgment. Here also, like his claim for cost of repairs, the legal obstacles in his path are equally formidable. I was referred to the case of West African Bakery v. Miezah [1972] 1 G.L.R. 78, C.A. but I do not find it to be of much assistance within this context. I will, however, refer to it later in another sphere. I say so because in that case the Court of Appeal was concerned with fixing the time limit for a claim for loss of use where the chattel had been completely damaged beyond repairs. In this case, I have to determine the time limit within which a claim for loss of use can be entertained when the chattel can be put back to use. The case of Ansah v. Baiden [1976] 1 G.L.R. 494, C.A. (full bench) to which I have also been referred, appears to be more relevant. In that case, the full bench of the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the period of loss of use extends beyond the date repairs are completed. Part of the headnote in that case at 495 states:
“In quantifying damages for the loss of use of a vehicle, the period of loss of use should not extend beyond the date the repairs were completed. Damages for the plaintiff’s loss of use should be calculated from the date of the accident for six days in a week at the appropriate rate per diem up to the date the repairs were completed.”
Here again, the evidence from the plaintiff himself that the vehicle has not been repaired up to date, stands out between him and success as a legal Rock of Gibraltar. The reason given by the plaintiff for his failure to repair the vehicle for the past six years is that he did not know if he or the defendant was to pay for the repairs. Although he did not directly plead lack of funds as the cause of his delay, I think the view expressed in the Miezah case (supra) is relevant. It was held by Azu Crabbe J.S.C. and Sowah J.A. (as they then were) that the consequences of a plaintiff’s poverty are not damages from the defendant’s tort; they are too remote and are to be disregarded in the calculation of damages. And, the fact that the respondent in that case was unable, through lack of means, to [p.294] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 replace his vehicle within a reasonable time and to earn profits was irrelevant. Their lordships did not follow but distinguished the cases of Borketey v. Achinivu [1966] G.L.R. 92, S.C. and that of Zacca v. C.F.A.O., Court of Appeal, 15 August 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 156. In the latter case, it was held that the trial court erred in placing on the third party a duty to mitigate his losses because having accepted the fact of his impecuniosity, he should have been held to be incapable of hiring another tractor to carry on his timber trade to mitigate his losses.
This should bring me to a consideration of whether it is proper to claim loss of use of a vehicle until the date of judgment as is being claimed in this case. The position here is that the vehicle is still out of use on the date of judgment and will possibly remain so for some time, or, and this appears more likely, permanently.
The current view appears to be that where the vehicle damaged is capable of being repaired, the plaintiff has a duty to minimise his own loss and not wait until the day of judgment which may be long in coming. The case of West African Bakery v. Miezah (supra) was concerned with a situation where the vehicle was damaged beyond repairs; and the court held that where an income earning vehicle was damaged beyond economic repairs, the period for which loss of profit was recoverable was a reasonable time depending on the circumstances of each case. What was a reasonable time was a question of discretion for the court.
It is the Borketey case (supra) which appears to be the pace-setter in stating the principle applicable to the measure of damages in a claim for consequential loss. This case was followed by the case of Zacca v. C.F.A.O. (supra). In the Borketey case (supra), Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) stated that a plaintiff could recover from the defendant, who had in an accident destroyed his chattel, his loss of earning from the date of accident until the date of judgment. The Zacca case (supra) however, offered him an opportunity to explain the Borketey case (supra) and he limited it to its own facts. This is what Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) said:
“I do not know that the principle of that case, namely, the wrongdoer must pay the full value of a chattel irreparably damaged by his wrong together with any consequential loss suffered thereby has ever been doubted. It would seem that the Borketey case (supra) was taken to lay down that in the case of a car which is totally damaged, the tortfeasor must pay not only its pre-accident value but the loss of earnings till the date of judgment, or until an offer of reparation was made. I entirely
[p.295] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 disaffirm any such principle.”
He then continued to explain the Borketey (supra) decision thus:
“In the Borketey case (supra) the plaint was disposed of in the comparatively short time of just over three months from the date of the accident. It was, in the circumstances not unreasonable to use that period as a yardstick for computing the loss of earning. It would have been unreasonable to use it as a measuring rod, if the time lag between the date of the accident and judgment had been, say, three years. So, in the end, the question: For what length of time loss of earnings should be paid. must depend on the circumstances of each particular case. It would, I think, be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down an objective criterion a priori.”
These cases I have referred to—Borketey and Zacca cases (supra) and the case of West African Bakery v.
Miezah (supra)—were all concerned with situations where the chattel has been irreparably damaged by the tortfeasor. I have no doubt that the principle considered will be applicable in cases where the chattel can be put back to use. In such a case it may be computed from the date of accident to the date of repairs; always bearing in mind that the court has a discretion in the matter and no objective criterion can be laid down to be applied in all cases.
The plaintiff in this case has not even repaired the vehicle and is still waiting. The loss of use continues and will definitely stretch beyond the date of judgment. Moreover, such a claim is in the nature of special damages and must be strictly proved. The plaintiff does not prove his claim by merely mounting the witness stand to repeat his statement of claim. In situations like this the tendering of tax returns will be of tremendous assistance in assessing the level of earning by the plaintiff prior to the accident. My view of the claim under this head is that it has not been congently proved and more so when the claim for loss of use till the date of judgment is a loss likely to continue ad infinitum; I do not think a claim for loss of use until the date of judgment is a safe claim to make in the circumstances.
The view I have expressed so far should naturally lead me into disallowing the plaintiff’s claim for special damages. One fact, however, is certain; he has suffered some damage to his vehicle and is entitled to general damages. I will therefore adopt the prudent approach of Edusei J. (as he then was) in Ansah v. Baiden (supra) and award the plaintiff some
[p.296] of [1992] 1 GLR 287 nominal damages only. I will under this head award the plaintiff ¢15,000 considering the rate of inflation.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
L.K.A.
