DADSON vs. RANA MOTORS & METAL WORKS ENGINEERING CO. LTD. [1992] 1 GLR 345
10 November 1987 · BROBBEY J · ≈ 11 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Barko v. Mustapha [1964] G.L.R. 78, S.C.
(2) Adu v. Clegg [1981] G.L.R. 173, C.A.
(3) Kofi (Oppong) v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a judgment of the district court wherein the appellant’s claim for recovery of possession in respect of a dwelling house against the defendant-respondent company was dismissed. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Lilian Quayson Angyei for the plaintiff-appellant.
O. Aboagye (for Bugyei) for the defendant-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF BROBBEY J.
The appellant is the owner of H/No. 359, North Kaneshie. He rented it to the respondent-company (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) in 1981 for without doubt, residential purposes only. The respondents occupied the house through their directors. In November 1984 the appellant wrote to the respondents to terminate the agreement by December 1984. The respondents, through their solicitors, replied in writing on 2 February 1985 asking for “a reasonable time to hunt for alternative dwelling house.” The appellant gave the respondents up to the end of May 1985 for their said hunt for alternative house and to quit. Thereafter, the respondents did not quit but further correspondence on similar lines ensued with the appellant writing to give more time and insisting on the respondents vacating the premises while the respondents
[p.348] of [1992] 1 GLR 345 kept asking for more time to look for another place.
The appellant finally issued a writ in the district court in which he claimed recovery of possession and replacement of a dividing wall between two bedrooms allegedly demolished by the respondents. The appellant grounded his claim for recovery originally on the sole fact that he required the premises for his own occupation. During the trial he added that he also needed it for the occupation of his son. The respondents resisted the claims and judgment was entered in their favour.
It was against that judgment that the appellant appealed to this court. In this appeal a number of grounds have been argued and these will be considered seriatim. In entering judgment for the respondents, the trial magistrate found that greater hardship would be caused to the respondents than the appellant. This was because he stated, inter alia, that the appellant is an Anglican bishop based in Tamale but comes to Accra occasionally in his capacity as the Presiding Bishop of the Anglican Church. The magistrate concluded that the Anglican Church has to accommodate him or pay for his accommodation. That finding was clearly not borne out by the evidence. It is not a fact in respect of which judicial notice could even be taken. Against that finding the appellant in the course of the trial stated that whenever he is in Accra the church provides him with no accommodation and so he has to squat with relatives and friends. This was confirmed by his son who testified as the first plaintiff witness. In fact, some of the families on whom the appellant squats were mentioned. It was not even suggested to the appellant in cross-examination that the Anglican Church has accommodation in Accra for its bishops working outside Accra. This finding of the trial magistrate was totally extraneous to the facts on record and unwarrantable.
Having made this hollow finding of fact, the trial magistrate proceeded to deduce that even if the church did not furnish him with accommodation, “it is easier for the plaintiff to find alternative place to lodge—hotels, friends, for the short period he is in Accra.” That was the very antithesis of the case the appellant put before the magistrate. When a bishop of a recognised church insists that he cannot continue living on the bounty or hospitality of other people, how can it at the same time be said that it is “easier” to stay with the very people the bishop does not want to inconvenience by forcing himself on them? If the appellant was to stay in a hotel as the magistrate concluded, one fact which the trial magistrate should have adverted his mind to was the cost of staying in the hotel. Who would pay for the appellant’s hotel accommodation? The
[p.349] of [1992] 1 GLR 345 respondents pay ¢500 for a month’s occupation of the plaintiff ‘s house. But one may well ask: In this day and age where in Accra will anyone obtain a hotel accommodation for one night at ¢500, and if the appellant has to pay more to stay in a hotel would it really be fair to expect the appellant to do that when he has his own house in Accra?
All these points should have been raised during the trial so that such incidental issues could have been canvassed before the propriety or otherwise of staying in a hotel could have been decided upon. As it turned out, the trial magistrate raised it for the first time in his judgment without giving the appellant or the respondents the opportunity to react to that line of thinking. That finding is wrong in law and cannot be allowed to stand on the authority of Barko v. Mustapha [1964] G.L.R. 78, S.C. in which the Supreme Court held that: “A court is not entitled to rely upon facts which have not been recorded in evidence, unless they are notorious facts of public interest of which judicial notice may be taken.” As stated already, none of the situations about the Anglican Church providing accommodation or the appellant staying in a hotel was a fact in respect of which judicial notice could have been taken. If anything at all, judicial notice could only be taken, as I do, of the fact that the present day cost of living is such that it is not easy to get a hotel accommodation for one night for a paltry sum like ¢500. Therefore to insist on the appellant living in a hotel will result in his subsidising the respondents, which will be gross injustice.
Another faulty finding made in the judgment of the trial magistrate was that while the appellant was asking for the house for himself and his son the respondents were in occupation through one of their directors, his wife, six children in the main house and another worker and his family in the outhouse, thus making a total of not less than ten people. He therefore concluded that more hardship would be caused to the respondents, if they had to vacate and to look for accommodation for two families, than the appellant and his son. That line of reasoning underlines a fundamental misapprehension of the relationship between the appellant and the respondents. The appellant let his house to the respondents. It is one house comprising a main house and an outhouse. Ordinarily, one would have expected one family to be living in the main house with those in the outhouse as appendages to his own family, like housemaid, houseboys, etc. This is how houses are known to be occupied in this country and I believe I can take judicial notice of that. If the respondents decide to opt out of the ordinary by accommodating two separate families in one house for their own convenience, that cannot
[p.350] of [1992] 1 GLR 345 be translated to the misfortune of the landlord because that is not contemplated by the laws on occupation of houses in this country for the landlord to be held constructively bound by the respondent’s conduct. In any case, plurality of the occupants of a house has never been a criterion for determining the relative hardship which will be caused in an action for ejectment. A significant point to be noted is that the agreement on the house is between the appellant on the one hand as landlord and the respondents as a legal personality on the other hand as a tenant, not the appellant’s single family vis-à-vis the two families who occupy the house per the respondents.
In the lower court, the appellant filed Form 14 to indicate that he required the house for his occupation. It was during the trial that he shifted his grounds to add that he required the place for use of himself and his son. The trial magistrate’s finding that only the application for use by the appellant could be considered was in order. Having filed Form 14 in respect of himself alone, the appellant pegged his claim under Act. 220, s. 17(1) (g) to the exclusion of the other categories of people mentioned in that section. If the appellant wanted his case to include the occupation of the son, section 17(4) of Act 220 enjoined him to have specified the particulars of the son in yet another Form 14 but that he failed to do. The argument of counsel for the appellant that occupation of the appellant could be extended to cover his son is untenable because the son is not even a minor to be considered as part of the family of the appellant. Throughout the trial, it came out that the son was married and needed the place for himself and his wife and child. An adult son with a wife and child cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said to form part of the family of his father within the meaning of section 17(1)(g) of Act. 220.
What seems to be the locus classicus on the issue of hardship is the Court of Appeal case of Adu v. Clegg [1981] G.L.R. 173 at 174, C.A. where it was stated that:
“On a true construction of the provisions of section 17(1)(g)(ii) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) the onus of proving ‘greater hardship’ was on the tenants and not on the landlord. Once the landlord had been able to satisfy the court that the premises were reasonably required by him for the occupation of himself or any member of his family then the court was entitled to draw the inference that some hardship would be caused to the landlord if refused possession. At that stage, the burden was then shifted to the tenant to prove that he would suffer greater hardship if
[p.351] of [1992] 1 GLR 345 possession was granted than refused.”
The facts disclose that the appellant comes to Accra quite often on official duties. He is not provided with any accommodation by the church. It is unreasonable to expect a whole bishop to be continually scrounging at the doors of benefactors supplicating for a place to lay his head while he himself has a house in Accra. The appellant may be priest all right but it has not been established that he maintains a charitable family to sacrifice his own convenience for the sake of the respondents. Even the Bible enjoins Christians to “love thy neighbour as thyself” but not “more than thyself.”
The case of the respondents since May 1984 has been that they should be given time to look for alternative accommodation. Letters written on behalf of the respondents in 1985 and 1986 repeated the same requests. One may well ask; how long does the appellant have to wait to enable the respondents to look for alternative accommodation? It is now three years since the demand for the house was first made and the respondents maintain that they are still looking for alternative houses.
When one examines this critically, it becomes apparent that the respondents have not obtained a place because they have either not looked for any place at all or if they have, they have not done so seriously. No evidence was put before the trial court of the efforts made by the respondents themselves or on their behalf to look for a house even when the appellant’s counsel sought to probe into their alleged searches for a house through cross-examination.
On the totality of the evidence on record, the appellant showed in the trial court that greater hardship would be caused to him than the respondents. The order of the trial magistrate to the contrary was abundantly counter to the evidence before him and is reversed accordingly.
The part of the judgment of the trial magistrate based on the credibility of the second plaintiff witness, was irrelevant in view of his own finding that the plaintiff could not found his claim for ejectment on the needs of the son in respect of whom no Form 14 has been filed. In the main, the trial magistrate purported to have based his judgment on the evidence before him. This appeal was against the deductions on the evidence. The rule of law applicable to such appeals is that:
“Where a judgment has been appealed from on the ground of the weight of evidence, the appellate court is not debarred from making its own decisions on matters of fact if it can be shown that
[p.352] of [1992] 1 GLR 345 the reasons for the judgment were unsatisfactory.”.3
That was the decision in Kofi (Oppong) v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174, S.C. in which the Supreme Court held that it was not prevented from arriving at its own conclusions on the facts found by the trial judge because his judgment could not be supported. In the instant case, the unwarranted findings and faulty deductions of the trial magistrate provide, a fortiori concrete grounds for arriving at conclusions totally different from his. The respondents are hereby ordered to give vacant possession to the appellant on or before 1 January 1988. The nonchalant attitude of the respondents in their so-called search for a house which the evidence depicted really warrants an immediate order of ejectment. It is however hoped that they will take advantage of the period given and surrender vacant possession of the house to the appellant by the deadline set herein.
The second claim of the appellant in the lower court was that the respondents should construct a wall dividing the house which was pulled down by the first person to have occupied the house on behalf of the respondents. Although the respondents denied that the wall was pulled down the person who testified on behalf of the respondents had no idea of the real state of the house when it was first occupied and the first occupant was not called to testify in court. The trial magistrate’s finding that the representative was in no position to challenge the appellant because of want of knowledge was well-founded. He went on to conclude that the wall was pulled down for the convenience of the occupant and should be reconstructed when the respondents quit the house. That is also a legitimate deduction from the facts and is accordingly indorsed. Since the respondents have been ordered to vacate the premises by 1 January 1988, it follows logically that they should reconstruct the demolished wall before handing over vacant possession of the house to the appellant and I so order accordingly.
In view of the fact that the respondents will now have to spend money to reconstruct the wall, ¢5,000 as costs is fair. There will be costs of ¢5,000 for the appellant.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J.N.N.O.
