SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1987] SLR (HC) 7High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1992 (VOL I)

QUARSHIE vs. BOSSO [1992] 1 GLR 77

4 December 1987 · OMARI SASU J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1987] SLR (HC) 7
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAQUARSHIE v BOSSO [1992] 1 GLR 77 [1987] SLR (HC) 7
APAQUARSHIE v BOSSO [1992] 1 GLR 77, [1987] SLR (HC) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookQUARSHIE v BOSSO [1992] 1 GLR 77, [1987] SLR (HC) 7 (Ghana High Ct. 1987).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. [1962] A.C. 152; [1961] 3 W.L.R. 1405; [1961] 3 All E.R. 1169, P.C.

(2) Neizer v. Dontoh (1874) Sar. F.L.R. 109.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the defendant-appellant against the decision of the family tribunal ordering him to maintain his child. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Edwin Opoku for the defendant-appellant.

M. Evans Quayson (Mrs.) for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OMARI SASU J.

This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant against the decision of the Family Tribunal, Accra dated 17 December 1986 which decision was entered in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.

The substance of the decision of the said family tribunal is that the appellant is the father of the respondent’s child named Kwesi Nyan Quarshie and since the appellant has failed to maintain his said son since December 1983 he, the appellant, is liable to the respondent’s claim.

From the records the facts that gave rise to the original suit before the Family Tribunal, Accra are in the main not in dispute and may be stated briefly as follows: Towards the end of 1980 the parties were married under customary law and they cohabited in the matrimonial home provided by the appellant in Accra.

On 11 October 1981 the respondent delivered a baby boy and the

[p.79] of [1992] 1 GLR 77

appellant performed the naming ceremony of the child who was named Kwesi Nyan Quarshie after the appellant’s grandfather. The appellant followed the child’s naming with formal registration of the birth of the child. In December 1983, however, the appellant ceased to maintain the respondent and the child and he managed to get customary divorce of the respondent because he, the appellant, claimed he had come to realise that the child was not his child.

When the child Kwesi was growing up the appellant said the child bore resemblance to the respondent but not to him. Furthermore, a Mr. Ababio who was a former friend of the respondent prior to the respondent’s marriage had been seen paying visits to the respondent in suspicious circumstances during the marriage and finally blood tests conducted on the parties and the child had shown that the child could not possibly be the child of the appellant.

When the respondent instituted the original action against the appellant before the Family Tribunal, Accra the said tribunal ordered the parties and the child to submit themselves to blood tests. These were done and the results, according to exhibit Z, also showed that the appellant could not be said to be the father of the child. Notwithstanding this, the family tribunal held finally that it was wrong in law that the blood tests were ordered to be taken as the family tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the order for the blood tests of the parties and the child and judgment was therefore entered in favour of the respondent with consequential orders for payment of maintenance allowances and costs to the respondent.

In this court, learned counsel for the parties have argued on the merits and defects of the said blood tests either in support of or against the decision of the family tribunal.

Once the facts which gave rise to this case and also to this appeal are not in dispute the issues to be examined and a decision based thereon appear to be (a) the law applicable in deciding on paternity suits before the family tribunal; and (b) the value of blood tests in deciding on paternity suits before the family tribunal.

On the question of the choice of law, section 19(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) permits, inter alia, the use of “. . . any memorandum published by authority in reference to the enactment . . .” as an aid to the construction of the enactment. At Part IV of the Memorandum to the Maintenance of Children Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 133) it is stated, inter alia, in relation to section 18 of the Decree that: “Under the section, a Tribunal [family tribunal] is to observe the

[p.80] of [1992] 1 GLR 77

procedure and retain the powers that a District Court observes and exercises in its civil jurisdiction.” (The emphasis is mine.) Section 18 (4) of S.M.C.D. 133 emphatically states, inter alia: “a . . . [Family] Tribunal shall exercise all the powers of a District Court.”

The next question that must be answered is what jurisdiction has a district court in paternity suits? The answer to this is to be found in the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 37(1) (f) which states: “A District Court (Grade 1) shall have civil jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial causes or matters and actions for paternity and custody of children where the law applicable is exclusively customary law.”

It follows naturally from the foregoing that the law which a family tribunal is empowered by statute to apply in paternity suits is exclusively customary law. I should therefore like to observe that the Family Tribunal, Accra had no jurisdiction to order the parties herein and the infant to submit themselves to blood tests since the device of blood tests in determining paternity of a person is foreign to Ghanaian customary law. The said order is void and a nullity and it is incurably bad; and every proceeding which is founded on it is equally null and void and incurably bad.

The admission into evidence of exhibit Z is a nullity and the appellant is wrong if he thinks that he has been proved not to be the father of the infant whose paternity he disputes. This is so because the Family Tribunal, Accra had no jurisdiction in making the order for the blood tests. As Denning L.J. (as he then was) said when delivering the advice judgment of the Privy Council in the case of MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. [1961] 3 All E.R. 1169 at 1172, P.C:

“If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad . . . every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.”

How then is the paternity of a child proved at Ghanaian customary law? It should be noted that for the ascertainment of customary law a court is directed under section 50 (2) and (3) of Act 372 to consult “reported cases”, “text books”, “house of chiefs”, “traditional councils” or “other bodies possessing knowledge of the customary law in question.”

With the above as guides, I propose to look for a few illustrations.

[p.81] of [1992] 1 GLR 77

In the case of Neizer v. Dontoh (1874) Sar F.L.R. 109 at 110 before James Marshall (Judicial Assessor), Chiefs Chiboo of Assin, Thompson and Robertson as assessors it is reported, inter alia, as follows: “If the man denies her (the woman) being pregnant by him, the parent support her until after delivery, when the matter is decided by the appearance of the child. This is decided by the ‘the midwives.’”

(The emphasis is mine.) See Sarbah J.M., Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed, 1968) at p. 130. In his Akan Laws and Customs at pp 185-186, Dr. J.B. Danquah is of the view that where a man commits adultery with another’s wife who subsequently becomes pregnant and bears a child, the child is by Akan custom the child of the husband and not the child of the adulterer. Thus if Danquah’s view were to be applied to the case of the appellant, the appellant who says he is both Akan and Ewe cannot be heard to say that the child Kwesi is not his child, once Kwesi was born during the marriage of the appellant and the respondent.

Field in his book Social Organisation of the Ga People states at p. 24 as follows:

“The kpodziemo or naming ceremony of a child, necessitates a ‘father’, but this father need not be the child’s progenitor. The man in whose name the ceremony is done claims the child as his lawful issue.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Ollennu in his book, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana states at p. 206 as follows:

“To become recognised as the father of a child, a man must perform the naming ceremony on the eighth day of its birth or on a subsequent day, and give the child a name . . .

The naming of the child by the father, even without marriage to its mother, is legal acknowledgment by the father of the paternity of the child; that ceremony identifies the child with the father and his paternal family, his Ntoro, and makes it his lawful child.”

The above illustrations culled from the works of Sarbah, Danquah, Field and Ollennu cover different cases of disputed paternity in Ghanaian customary law.

The instant case is one in which the appellant married the respondent at customary law towards the end of 1980. Both parties cohabited together and the disputed child was born to the parties on 11 October 1981. The appellant named the disputed child and followed the naming

[p.82] of [1992] 1 GLR 77

ceremony with the official registration of the birth of the child at the Births Registry: see exhibit A.

According to the view of Danquah (referred to supra) where a married woman becomes pregnant and bears a child, that child belongs to her husband. Here the fact or status of marriage raises a presumption that the child is the child of the husband of the woman. From the views of Field and Ollennu (referred to supra), a naming ceremony is an acknowledgment of fatherhood or paternity of the husband and I shall venture to hold that it makes the presumption of paternity irrebuttable as against a husband who has performed the naming ceremony.

It follows that in this case the appellant is estopped by his own conduct from denying paternity of the child, Kwesi Nyan Quarshie, and I further hold that the family tribunal was right in the final conclusion it came to, i.e. that the appellant is the father of the child whose paternity he disputes and I do hereby indorse, support and uphold that conclusion. In the result, the appeal fails and judgment is entered for the respondent against the appellant. The appellant is accordingly ordered to satisfy the judgment debt and consequential orders of the court/family tribunal below plus costs in the present appeal.

This appeal has been pending before the High Court since March 1987 and both parties have made several court appearances. Further, since the judgment of the family tribunal the appellant has paid nothing to the respondent for the upkeep of the infant son Kwesi Nyan Quarshie. The appellant is thus ordered to pay ¢10,000 as costs in the present appeal to the respondent.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

M.C.N.-N.

Scroll to Top