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[1979] SLR (HC) 34High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

GYASI vs. STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 456

19 July 1979 · OWUSU-ADDO J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 34
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OSCOLAGYASI v STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 456 [1979] SLR (HC) 34
APAGYASI v STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 456, [1979] SLR (HC) 34 (Ghana).
BluebookGYASI v STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 456, [1979] SLR (HC) 34 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Merrington v. Ironbridge Metal Works, Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 1101; 117 J.P. 23.

(2) White v. Blackmore [1972] 2 Q.B. 651; [1972] 3 All E.R. 158; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 296; 116 S.J. 547, C.A.

(3) Evans v. Walkden [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1019; [1956] 3 All E.R. 64; 100 S.J. 587; 120 J.P. 495; 54 L.G.R. 467.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for damages for injuries sustained as a result of a motor accident. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. C. Kharsa for the plaintiff.

J. B. O. Pobee for the first defendants.

[p.457] of [1980] GLR 456

JUDGMENT OF OWUSU-ADDO J.

The plaintiff is claiming unspecified general damages and ¢66 special damages against the defendants jointly and severally for the injuries sustained by him as a result of a motor accident. On 21 October 1973 the plaintiff and his second witness, Francis Mintah, rode in vehicle No. GJ 4818, belonging to their employers the first defendants, from Konongo to Obenemase. They were being driven by one Kingsley Tawiah, also, an employee of the first defendants. The had travelled to Obenemase in the course of their duty and were returning to Konongo when the accident occurred. How it happened was this: Whilst negotiating a sharp curve, Tawiah deviated from his proper lane into the lane of vehicle No. GJ 4064 approaching from the opposite direction, and thereby caused a collision of both vehicles. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries resulting in the amputation of his right arm. The second defendant is the owner of the vehicle No. GJ 4064 which was at the time of the accident in charge of his undisclosed servant or agent.

Perhaps, unsure which of the drivers was solely to blame for the accident, the plaintiff’s action is against the owners of both vehicles, who acting by different solicitors, filed statements of defence in which they denied liability for negligence and blamed each other’s driver for the accident. In their statement of defence filed on 1 April 1976, the first defendants averred in paragraph (6):

“(6) If, which is denied, Kingsley Tawiah was negligent, the first defendants say that the plaintiff had failed to take reasonable care for his own safety: the plaintiff had the control of vehicle No. GJ 4814 and had allowed, permitted or acquiesced in the manner in which Kingsley Tawiah drove on that day.”

The second defendant not only denied liability but blamed the accident on the first defendant’s driver, Kingsley Tawiah. He had this to say in paragraphs (4) and (5) of his statement of defence:

“(4) Further to these paragraphs the second defendant says that at all times material to this case his driver drove with due care and attention; rather it was the first defendant’s driver and agent who drove speedily and without due care and attention thereby causing damage to it.

(5) The second defendant said that the State Insurance Corporation, insurers of the first defendant on being informed of the accident, conducted a private investigation into the circumstances leading to the accident and they have on behalf of the first defendants and with their consent admitted liability and they proceeded to pay full value of the second defendants’ vehicle that was negligently damaged by the first defendants.”

[p.458] of [1980] GLR 456

It is significant to note that the plaintiffs’ reply was restricted to the first defendants’ statement of defence only.

The first issue is whether on the pleadings and evidence the first defendants are entitled to avail themselves of this kind of defence, namely, volenti non fit injuria. It must be pointed out that no evidence was given either by or on behalf of both defendants. But by their pleadings and the defence established through cross-examination, the first defendants are contending that the plaintiff is not entitled to his claim because he had allowed, permitted or acquiesced in the manner in which Kingsley Tawiah had driven on that day. I shall later discuss this principle in detail but I would say at this stage that the evidence of the plaintiff and his third witness failed to prove not even one of the particulars of negligence averred against the second defendant’s servant or agent. Without much ado, I shall dismiss the plaintiff ‘s claim against the second defendant and enter judgment against the plaintiff in his favour. I do not, however, feel inclined to award any costs in his favour since he and his counsel were absent throughout the hearing of this suit.

The next question is: Has the plaintiff succeeded to prove negligence against the first defendants’ driver who is admitted to have driven vehicle No. GJ 4814 in the course of his duty? In the uncontroverted evidence before this court, Kingsley Tawiah, before negotiating a sharp curve drove in the middle of the road, at a speed between 50-60 miles per hour. Then whilst in the curve, he deviated from his proper lane and went into the lane of the approaching vehicle and collided with it. What more evidence is required to prove negligence? I think none. I must, however, commend the stand taken by the learned defence counsel by conceding negligence in his submission filed on behalf of the first defendants. On the principle of vicarious liability the first defendants can be legally held responsible for the negligence of their driver, Kingsley Tawiah, unless, of course, their defence of volenti non fit injuria succeeds.

In my view the crucial question is this: Does the defence of volenti non fit injuria apply to the facts of this case? It is a complete defence and before the first defendants can succeed they must show that the plaintiff with full knowledge of the nature of the risk involved impliedly agreed to incur or permitted it. In other words, they must prove both knowledge and consent on the part of the plaintiff. In the English case of Merrington v. Ironbridge Metal Works, Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 1101, Hallett J. held (as stated in the headnote) that:

“(i) the maxim volenti non fit injuria applied only if the plaintiff was both (a) sciens, i.e., he fully appreciated the dangerous character of the physical condition brought about by the negligence of the defendants, and (b) volens, i.e., he had consented

[p.459] of [1980] GLR 456

to assume the risk without compensation; a man could not be said to be volens unless he was in a position to choose freely, and if he was acting under the compulsion of a duty his consent should rarely, if ever, be inferred…”

See also White v. Blackmore [1972] 2 Q.B. 651, C.A. where the plaintiff was injured by falling on steps leading to the platform of a railway station, the steps of which had been covered with snow, trodden down and frozen over. Even though the plaintiff admitted they were dangerous in that condition, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to succeed and the maxim volenti non fit injuria held inapplicable to the facts of the case.

There is no evidence whatsoever to support the contention that the plaintiff having full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk involved consented to it. Neither can it be said that the plaintiff was guilty of conduct which permitted the negligent manner in which Tawiah drove the vehicle on that day, nor is there any evidence for acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff.

As to the question whether the plaintiff had any control over Tawiah, I have this to say: The plaintiff ‘s admission that he could have requested Tawiah to slow down or even stop the vehicle is not conclusive evidence of control. From the plaintiff ‘s evidence, he did not know how to drive and therefore he did not think the speed of 50-60 miles per hour in a curve was excessive. Both the plaintiff and Tawiah were employees of the defendant company; the only difference being that the plaintiff was a senior officer whereas Tawiah was not. But there is no evidence that the plaintiff ‘s position was such that he could give instructions to Tawiah as to how he should drive. He was neither the owner of the car nor was their relationship likened to that of a master and servant. Being in control of a driver in charge of a vehicle on which one is travelling requires more than merely being able to tell him to reduce his speed. There must be evidence of the driver being under the complete dominion of the passenger, which was not the case here. Supposing a passenger on a public transport found the speed of the driver rather excessive he would be perfectly entitled to request him to reduce it but that does not mean that he is in control of the driver.

I find on the evidence that Tawiah was in exclusive control of the vehicle and was not subject to instruction or direction of the plaintiff in so far as the driving of the vehicle was concerned. One useful case on this point is Evans v. Walkden [1956] 3 All E.R. 64. The facts were: A fifteen-year old son who was unlicensed sat in the driver’s seat and his father was seated with him. The car was being driven in bottom gear. The father was in a position to control

[p.460] of [1980] GLR 456

the driving of the son and would have stopped the car immediately, as the steering wheel, the brake, clutch pedals and ignition key and the gear handle were all within the father’s reach. But the handbrake was on the right hand side of the driver and was not accessible to the father. The justices found that the father was the driver of the car but on appeal, it was held that there was no evidence to support the finding that the father was in control of the car or that he was the driver of the car.

Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I find that the plaintiff did not permit or acquiesce in the negligent driving of Tawiah, the first defendants’ driver in due course of his employment. Furthermore, the maxim volenti non fit injuria is not applicable to the facts of this case. Accordingly, I find the first defendants vicariously liable to the plaintiff ‘s claim.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

S. O. K. O.

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