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[1979] SLR (HC) 46High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

LUGUTERAH vs. MENSA-ETSI [1980] GLR 856

18 July 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 46
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OSCOLALUGUTERAH v MENSA-ETSI [1980] GLR 856 [1979] SLR (HC) 46
APALUGUTERAH v MENSA-ETSI [1980] GLR 856, [1979] SLR (HC) 46 (Ghana).
BluebookLUGUTERAH v MENSA-ETSI [1980] GLR 856, [1979] SLR (HC) 46 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Petty v. Daniel (1887) 34 Ch.D. 172; 56 L.J.Ch. 192; 55 L.T. 745; 35 W.R. 151.
(2) Seyire v. Anemana [1971] 2 G.L.R. 32, C.A.

(3) Clerk v. Clerk [1976] 1 G.L.R. 123, C.A.

(4) Armar v. Armar, Court of Appeal, 21 April 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 73. (5) Omane v. Poku [1973] 2 G.L.R. 66, C.A.

(6) Buako Stool v. Suhenso Stool (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 79.

(7) Republic v. James Town Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Whiteside [1977] 1 G.L.R. 99.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to set aside a writ of summons in an action for libel on the ground that the writ was served accompanied by the statement of claim in breach of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 3, r. 6 (4). The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

A. A. Luguterah for himself as the plaintiff.

G. K. Mensa-Etsi for himself as the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.

This is an action for libel. It is not necessary to give the facts of the claim endorsed on the writ of summons. The plaintiff [p.858] of [1980] GLR 856 had his writ of summons issued on 17 January 1979. On the same date he also filed a statement of his claim and the writ accompanied by the statement of claim was served on the defendant on the same date. On 22 January 1979, the defendant entered appearance conditionally without prejudice to an application to set aside the writ of summons and on 26 January 1979, he filed a motion on notice praying for an order to set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim on the ground that by serving him with a writ of summons accompanied by a statement of claim, the plaintiff has breached the provisions of Order 3, r. 6 (4) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The defendant’s motion on notice following the formula which is now too familiar in our court was in the following form:

“Please take notice that this honourable court will be moved by the defendant herein praying for an order to set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim in this suit on the ground contained in the accompanying affidavit:

And for any other order or orders as to this honourable court may seem meet.”

It is in the aforementioned affidavit in support that the objection was spelled out shortly that the plaintiff had breached “the mandatory provisions of Order 3, r. 6 (4) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and is therefore in default.”

In arguing the motion, the defendant, a barrister-at-law appearing for himself drew my attention to the said Order 3, r. 6 (4) of L.N. 140A which provides:

“(4) In all other actions in the Supreme [High] Court (except matrimonial causes, probate and admiralty actions, actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage, and actions in which fraud is alleged by the plaintiff); the writ of summons may, at the option of the plaintiff, be specially endorsed with or accompanied by a statement of his claim, or of the remedy or relief to which he claims to be entitled.”

His argument, simple to understand is, that on a true construction of the rule, a statement of claim ought not to accompany a writ of summons in a libel suit and he submitted therefore that the service of the writ and the statement of claim should be set aside. Before considering the answer which the plaintiff, a lawyer in his own right, and who also appeared as counsel for himself, gave to the defendant’s contention, I think one aspect of the argument needs to

[p.859] of [1980] GLR 856

be looked into. There is clearly no argument whatsoever advanced to show any irregularity or defect in the writ of summons. The main objection seems to be the circumstance that in serving it, a statement of claim was also at the same time served, thus giving an impression, admittedly not unreasonable in the circumstance, that the writ be considered in the nature of a specially endorsed writ under Order 3, r. 6 (4) of L.N. 140A. Even if the argument is a sound one, since the overriding motivation of the court is an anxiety that cases be dealt with on their merit for the purpose of dispensing justice to litigants, I would have thought the plaintiff would be inclined to ask for the statement of claim and not the writ of summons to be set aside if his argument is accepted. By the argument advanced on this motion on notice, however, the defendant is asking that the writ of summons and the statement of claim be considered as null and void. I do not think that is permissible having regard to the provisions of Order 70, r. 1 of L.N. 140A.

Order 70, r. 1 of L.N. 140A is clearly meant to inhibit the court and to prevent proceedings being unnecessarily stultified by technical objections of the nature under consideration. The Order states:

“I. Non-compliance with any of these Rules, or with any rule of practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedings void unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct, but such proceedings may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular, or amended, or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court or Judge shall think fit.”

Commenting on the scope of the corresponding English provision in Petty v. Daniel (1886) 34 Ch.D. 172 at p. 180, Kay J. said:

“I have no doubt that the meaning of the rule is—that the Court or Judge may, after an irregular proceeding has been taken, as in this case, either set it aside for irregularity or amend it, or otherwise deal with it as the Court shall think fit; but it is not to be treated as void.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

This view of Kay J. was quoted with approval by Azu Crabbe J.A. as he then was, in Seyire v. Anemana [1971] 2 G.L.R. 32 at p. 44, C.A. The principle is supported by a long line of our local authorities: see Clerk v. Clerk [1976] 1 G.L.R. 123 at p. 124, C.A. where Francois J.A. reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to Armar v. Armar, Court of Appeal, 21 April 1969, unreported;digested in (1969) C.C. 73 and Omane v. Poku [1973] 2 G.L.R. 66, C.A. in support of the principle.

[p.860] of [1980] GLR 856

Now to the argument in reply canvassed by the plaintiff: The plaintiff raised a preliminary objection to the notice. He submitted that the notice was misconceived because of the provisions of Order 70, r. 3 of L.N. 140A. The rule provides:

“3. Where an application is made to set aside proceedings for irregularity, the several objections intended to be insisted upon shall be stated in the summons or notice of motion.”

The argument advanced by counsel is that the particulars of irregularity said to make the writ of summons and statement of claim null and void were not set down in the notice of motion. They were rather set down in the affidavit in support and so the application according to this argument is misconceived. I recall that an argument not unlike this one was once pressed upon Windsor-Aubrey J. in Buako Stool v. Suhenso Stool (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 79 at pp. 81-82 and a somewhat similar contention was advanced before me in Republic v. James Town Circuit Court Judge; Ex parte Whiteside [1977] 1 G.L.R. 99 at p. 102. In such a situation I think the advice of Windsor-Aubrey in the Suhenso Stool case (supra) is very relevant. He said at pp. 81-82, “In my opinion the motion and the affidavit should be read together as both form the application.” I accept this advice and I therefore consider the preliminary objection of the plaintiff as misconceived.

On the main issue counsel argued in effect that on a true interpretation of the rules, it cannot be said that every generally endorsed writ accompanied by a statement of claim is necessarily to be considered as a specially endorsed writ. Apart from merely asserting this proposition no attempt was made to substantiate it by reference to the rules, statute or any case law. I think, however, that counsel is right and the correctness of the proposition can be tested by a close look, at the rules. In doing so, it must be appreciated that Order 3, r. 6 (4) of L.N. 140A by taking out of its general provision matrimonial cases, probate and admiralty actions, action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage and actions in which fraud is alleged by the plaintiff, make these excepted actions to be actions not subject to the special advantages which actions commenced by specially endorsed writs have. In other words, the excepted cases cannot be the subject of special endorsement. But can a writ issued in the excepted cases be accompanied by a statement of claim, Order 3, r. 6 (4) notwithstanding? I think the answer to this must be in the affirmative in view of the provisions of Order 20, r. 1 of L.N. 140A. The rule states:

“1. The delivery of statements of claim shall be regulated as follows:—

[p.861] of [1980] GLR 856

(a) Where the writ is specially indorsed with or accompanied by a statement of claim under Order 3, Rule 6, no further statement of claim shall be delivered unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise order.

(b) Subject to the provisions of Order 13, Rule 12, as to filing a statement of claim when there is no appearance, the plaintiff shall (unless he has delivered a statement of claim under Order 3, Rule 6, or the Court or a Judge otherwise orders) deliver a statement of claim either with the writ of summons, or notice in lieu of writ of summons, or within ten days after appearance, provided that the times prescribed by this paragraph may be enlarged by consent in writing or by the Court or Judge.”

It is therefore clear that under Order 20, r. (1) (b) the plaintiff in an action has the option of accompanying the writ of summons with the statement of claim. The only drawback, if drawback it is, is that in cases excluded from the provisions of Order 3, r.6 (4) of L.N. 140A, a plaintiff cannot avail himself of new Order 14 procedure for summary judgment as provided in the schedule to the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (L.I. 1129).

In view of the provisions in Order 20, r. (1) (b), it seems clear to me that the plaintiff was justified in serving a writ of summons accompanied by a statement of claim and therefore the application by the defendant to set aside the service on him of the writ of summons and statement of claim is misconceived and I therefore dismiss the application.

The application is accordingly dismissed with costs of ¢75 awarded the plaintiff against the defendant.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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