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[1981] SLR (HC) 8High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

HACKMAN AND OTHERS vs. OBRESI V AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 658

25 September 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 8
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAHACKMAN AND OTHERS v OBRESI v AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 658 [1981] SLR (HC) 8
APAHACKMAN AND OTHERS v OBRESI v AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 658, [1981] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookHACKMAN AND OTHERS v OBRESI v AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 658, [1981] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Tobah v. Kwekumah [1981] G.L.R. 648, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an interim injunction in the nature of quo warranto, restraining the respondents from celebrating a traditional festival wherein an objection was raised that the matter pertained to a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to hear the application.

COUNSEL

Ewusi-Wilson for the applicant.

A. H. Sackeyfio for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

This is an application for an order of interim injunction in the nature of quo warrant to restrain the defendants from celebrating an annual festival at Otuam. The major burden of this proceeding, is to inquire whether or not there is a chief at Otuam in the Ekumfi Otuam Traditional Area. The plaintiff in this case contends that there has been no chief at Otuam since the death of Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII, the former occupant of the Otuam stool. The defendants deny this allegation. Pending the final determination of the suit, the plaintiff seeks an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from celebrating the annual festival of Otuam known as the Akwambo festival. One fact which is judicially noticed is that in the traditional set-up of this country. the celebration of a festival is an important customary function in which the chief of the area concerned plays a vital and an indispensable role. He has a very sacred role to play in the performance of customary rites. The plaintiff’s case is that since there is no chief at Otuam, the annual Akwambo festival cannot be celebrated by the defendants who contend that there is a chief at Otuam; and that he is Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII who is competent to authorise the celebration of the said festival. The defendants say that the latter has been nominated, elected and installed as the chief of Otuam and the application being made by the plaintiff is incompetent. The defendants also submit that inasmuch as the applicant did not seek leave of the court by an ex parte motion, the application is incompetent. I, however, overruled the latter submission on the ground that failure to seek prior leave of the court was

[p.661] of [1981] GLR 658

not such a serious irregularity as to vitiate the proceedings if the court felt that there was a certain degree of urgency about the application and also if the application was in the court’s view not frivolous and vexatious.

With regard to the main issue, it has been submitted on behalf of the defendants that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain it. The argument is that it is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy in which the traditional council or the Central Regional House of Chiefs has exclusive jurisdiction. I do not venture to quarrel or refute the argument that the High Court or, for that matter, the ordinary courts lack jurisdiction to entertain causes and matters affecting chieftaincy. This question has been settled by the Court of Appeal in the case of Tobah v. Kwekumah [1981] G.L.R. 648, C.A. Section 15 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), grants to traditional councils this exclusive jurisdiction. But section 66 of the Act defines cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, among other things, as:

“. . . any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to any of the following:

(a) the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a Chief or the claim of any person to be nominated, elected, appointed or installed as a Chief.”

This definition is quite clear and unambiguous. But sight should not be lost of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Nor should it be forgotten that chieftaincy affairs are governed by statute and that the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, has power to issue injunction to prevent any person from exercising functions which he is not entitled to exercise under a statute. Every jurisdiction is prescribed by statute. The Chieftaincy Act, 1971, is an Act of Parliament which creates the office of a chief and defines who is a chief. Section 48 (1) of the Act defines a chief as:

“ . . . an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a Chief on the National Register of Chiefs:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a Chief for the purposes of the exercise by him of any function under this Act or under any other enactment, unless he has been recognised as such by the Minister by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin.”

[p.662] of [1981] GLR 658

I need per force point out that the proviso to section 48 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971, inasmuch as it is patently inconsistent with article 177 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, is void to the extent of the inconsistency. The latter article provides that Parliament shall not enact any legislation which empowers any authority to accord or withdraw recognition of a chief. But the first limb of section 48 is still operative. Section 48 therefore lays down the essential conditions or elements which qualify a person to exercise the functions of a chief under the Act. It follows that a person who does not so qualify but nevertheless assumes the functions of a chief infringes the provisions of the Act because he cannot claim any jurisdiction under the Act. And the High Court has power to prevent him from exercising jurisdiction which he does not have. But the High Court must of necessity make an inquiry as to whether the person concerned does not, in fact, satisfy the conditions prescribed by the Act. In my view, the High Court cannot be accused of acting outside the orbit of its supervisory jurisdiction if it embarks upon a fact-finding inquiry as to whether a particular individual satisfies these statutory conditions, provided the court does not go further to hear and determine a question or dispute as to whether the nomination, election or appointment of any individual was right or wrong. For example, the court can take the national register of chiefs or oral evidence to find out as a fact whether Mr. X or Mr. Y has been nominated, elected, appointed and installed as a chief and that he has been registered in the register of chiefs. In doing this, the court will be exercising its supervisory functions over the operation of the Act. Therefore a line should be drawn between the hearing and determination of a dispute relating to chieftaincy and the mere inquiry as to whether any person has wrongly assumed jurisdiction under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971. The fact that a particular person has or has not been nominated, elected, appointed and installed as a chief or that his name does not appear in the National Register of Chiefs is entirely different from the fact of whether the nomination, election, appointment and installation is proper or wrong. The High Court has power to inquire into the former but has no power to inquire into the latter.

Under what power does the High Court do this? Article 126 of the Constitution, 1979, gives the High Court the prerogative power to issue injunctions in the nature of quo warranto. No Ghana statute lays down the scope of quo warranto. It is therefore assumed that the High Court of Ghana shall have to follow English law on the subject (see Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A)). It is provided by section 9 (2) of the

[p.663] of [1981] GLR 658 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 (1 and 2 Geo. 6 c. 63), that:

“9. (2) In any case where any person acts in an office in which he is not entitled to act and an information in the nature of quo warranto would, but for the provisions of the last foregoing subsection, have lain against him, the High Court may grant an injunction restraining him from

so acting and may (if the case so requires) declare the office to be vacant.”

If the argument that the High Court has no jurisdiction over chieftaincy matters means that it cannot even make an inquiry under the Act, how can the court exercise its supervisory powers with regard to complaints or information or motions in the nature of quo warranto? Can the High Court sit down mute and allow persons who are not entitled to exercise the functions of a chief under the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act to flout with impunity the law of the land? No! I think it would be a pessimi exempli for the High Court to allow its powers to be hamstrung by untenable interpretations of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971. How can a High Court grant an injunction restraining any person from acting as a chief (an office created by statute) if the court is denied the power to find out as a fact whether the particular person is a chief or not? In my opinion, the argument that this court cannot inquire into the question as to whether there is a chief at Otuam is not tenable and it is overruled.

The pleadings and affidavits in this case disclose that Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII, known in private life as Kobina Abaka, is the person upon whom all the controversies converge. They further show that it is upon his purported exercise of the functions of the chief of Otuam that the defendants herein are to celebrate the festival. But the evidence before this court satisfies me that Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII has not been registered as the chief of Otuam for obvious reasons. He cannot therefore exercise the functions of a chief at Otuam. The exhibits tendered by the defence do not help them. It follows that the police permit which was issued upon the authority of Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII, in his purported capacity as Chief of Otuam, is legally inoperative and the defendants who derive their right from the said Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII cannot do anything on the latter’s authority because he who has no power to do some act, cannot authorise another person to exercise that power. It is for these reasons that I grant the injunction sought by the plaintiff. I would further order, in exercise of the powers conferred on this court by Order 15, r. 2 of

[p.664] of [1981] GLR 658

L.N. 140A that Nana Ewusi Kwansa XIII be joined as a party to this suit because it is my view that the joinder is necessary for the settlement once and for all, what appears to be a dispute corrosive of the energies and financial resources of the people of Otuam and bedevils peace and tranquility in the area. The motion is granted.

DECISION

Application granted.

J.K. E. E.

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