NARTEY vs. THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 788
9 September 1981 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 15 min read
[1981] SLR (CA) 16Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellant from a conviction for murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Edward Wiredu J.A.
COUNSEL
T. K. Agadzi for the appellant.
J. O. Amui, Chief State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
Edward Wiredu J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal from a conviction of the appellant on 28 July 1980 on a charge of murder of one Amadu Fulani at a farm situate on the Afienya Dawhenya road by Amate-Kisseih J. with a jury at a criminal session of the High Court, Accra.
The facts of this case reveal that the harm which resulted in the death of the late Amadu Fulani was at the instance of the appellant and the main issue of fact of the consideration of the jury was whether the act of the appellant amounted in law to murder or whether the plea of self-defence as put up by the appellant was made out or failing which whether the crime of murder on the available evidence could be reduced to manslaughter by extreme provocation.
[p.790] of [1982-83] GLR 788
The appellant was the only eye-witness to the events resulting in the death of the deceased. No one apart from him knew the circumstances surrounding the killing of the deceased. The case for the prosecution depended solely and entirely on the cautioned statement which the appellant made on 19 December 1978 when he was in custody some three days after the incident. The material part of this statement reads:
“On Sunday, 17 December 1978, at about 3.30 p.m. I went to the garden to water the seedlings I planted from a small stream which passed through my garden. I was watering the seedlings when a certain man whom I suspected to be a Hausa man came with a cutlass and a stick in his hands. He inquired from me as to who gave me the portion of the land on which I cultivated the garden.
I replied him that I did not obtain it from anybody. He repeated his question for two consecutive times but I did not give him any further reply. The man whom I did not know insisted that I should give hit a reply, then became offended and him my right ribs with the stick he was holding. The deceased attempted to hit me the second time with the stick and I seized it from his hand and threw it away.
The deceased attempted to wound me with the cutlass and it cut my right hand when I tried to seize it. I saw that the deceased had become aggressive and I therefore went to pick my own cutlass. That when I raised up my head the deceased struck my forehead with his cutlass and I sustained serious wounds. I started bleeding from the wound and I retaliated by inflicting wounds on him with my cutlass. The deceased fell down as a result of the wounds and I left him and went home to make a report.
I became unconscious on my arrival at the house but I later gained consciousness at Tema General Hospital, the following day. I was informed at the hospital by the police that the Hausa man with whom I fought was dead. I was later brought to the Afienya Police Station where I made the above statement to that effect. I used to drink but on that day in question I only took a drink in the morning but I was not drunk when I went to the garden. Nobody was present in the bush when the fight took place. We were there alone. I do not know the deceased in the town as I do not stay in the town permanently.”
In his evidence at the trial however, the appellant elaborated on his statement to the police and the passage in the evidence material to the case goes as follows:
“What happened on the farm was that I was going to water the crops at about 3.30 p.m. whilst I was there a certain man came to me and asked me whom I asked before I farmed there; I said
[p.791] of [1982-83] GLR 788
the farm is under the care of my father; then he was trying to speak the Dangbe language but he couldn’t and started speaking Hausa and I don’t understand Hausa so I couldn’t reply him.
Q. When you were going to this farm what were you carrying?
A. was carrying a bucket, a cutlass and a hoe.
Q. Now tell us what happened whilst you were on the farm.
A. Whilst I was on the farm watering the crops, a certain man came and questioned me as to how I came to farm there and I said the land is for my father and my father takes care of it and that I told my father before I came to farm there; he was speaking in another language; I don’t know whether he understood Prampram language properly so he changed it and started speaking Hausa; I also don’t understand the Hausa language so I didn’t mind him again and I bent down to water the things again and before I realised he had hit my back with a stick.
Q. Is that stick here?
A. Yes, my lord.
Q. So he hit you with a stick.
A. Yes my lord, so when I stood straight I asked him why and he raised it the second time when he threw it like that I held the edge (shown to court) and withdrew it from his hand and threw it to my back as I was standing, then he drew a cutlass from under his armpit.
A. When he drew the cutlass he threw it and I covered it with my hand like that (forehead shown to court) and he drew his hand again and threw it and it hit my hand and I tried to seize it and he raised his hand and how he held the cutlass like that I gripped his hand in the air and threw him on the ground and held one of his thumbs and then the cutlass fell on the ground and I took it with my left hand.
Q. And then what happened?
A. I was about to run and I saw that he bent down and took this my cutlass from where it was lying at the place we were struggling and wanted to come again.
Q. At that time what was the condition of your wounds?
A. By then I was bleeding from the cuts and I was covered with the blood and how I saw that this man was coming I sensed that this man would kill me so I had to defend myself. Also I was throwing the cutlass about and I heard that it touched him and then he fell and I saw that he was no more coming then I ran away from the farm.
[p.792] of [1982-83] GLR 788
Q. When you ran away from the farm what did you intend doing?
A. I was about to go to the police station but before I reached the house I fell.
Q. You fell down and you were lying conscious or unconscious?
A. I was lying down without doing anything.
Q. Could you hear?
A. I could not hear anybody speak.
Q. You yourself did not speak?
A. I did not speak.
Q. After falling unconscious where and when did you gain consciousness?
A. Before I woke I saw that I was in bed at the Tema General Hospital in the mid-night.”
It would seem that the evidence as a whole, particularly the point as to the appellant having been attacked first with a stick the deceased was holding which the appellant tried to take away from him; resulting in a struggle between him; followed immediately by the use of a cutlass on the appellant by the deceased; then the appellant’s success in taking the cutlass from the deceased and freeing himself from the struggle and attempting to run, followed later by the deceased endeavouring and succeeding to collect the appellant’s own cutlass which was lying at the place of struggle on the ground in the manner described by the appellant, gave ground for the appellant killing in self-defence or, at least, killing under provocation.
The above facts therefore placed on the learned judge the obligation of directing the jury on the justifiable defence of self-defence as a complete answer to the charge of murder and also the question of provocation as would in law be sufficient to reduce the crime of murder to that of manslaughter. A consideration of the question of provocation also enjoined the learned judge as a matter of law to have drawn a clear distinction between the offences of murder and manslaughter. He was under a further obligation to make it clear to the jury, a distinction between what he lays down as a matter of law, which the jury were obliged to take from him, and what the jury had to decide as a matter of fact on the particular facts of the case under consideration.
Had the learned judge followed this judicial duty required of him in this case, little objection, if any, could have been taken against his summing-up. But the way he approached the matter made his summing-up open to attack from several angles.
[p.793] of [1982-83] GLR 788
The first ground argued against the summing-up was misdirection by non-direction of what in law amounts to self-defence. In order to appreciate the full significance of the attack argued against the summing-up on this ground, it may be necessary to have a look at the relevant portion of the summing-up on the possible defence opened to the accused on which the learned trial judge addressed the jury. The relevant passage reveals:
“Provocation: In the instant case, three defences have been put up. These are provocation, self-defence, and defence of property. I will now deal with these defences in that order.
Matters which amount to provocation under our law are set out in section 53 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). That section says – (a) (b) [Read].
In cases of such extreme provocation the charge of murder shall be reduced to manslaughter. But I must here quickly refer to section 54 of Act 29 which shows that it is not in all cases of extreme provocation that murder should be reduced to manslaughter. That section excludes the benefits of provocation in certain cases thus – [Read].
Self-Defence: I must now turn to the question of self-defence. And this we find in sections 30 and 37 of Act 29 – [Read].
Here a person is justified in defending himself with an equal force matching the attack on his person. And in such cases, even when death occurs out of the violence against violence, it is said to be justified.
Defence of Property or Possession: The third defence which I must finally bring to your notice is the defence of property or possession. This is found in section 39 of Act 29 – [Read].
In the defence I have dealt with, i.e. provocation, self-defence, and defence of property and possession, where an accused person is justified in the use of force or harm then he shall not be found guilty and must as of right be acquitted and discharged. But I must stress, and stress again, that the force used must be reasonable and must be within limits. The force must not be excessive.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
Elaborating on the first ground above learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned judge misdirected the jury on the law of provocation and self-defence. He argued that the direction on provocation as given in the summing-up as well as on self-defence did not represent the true state of the law. Learned counsel referred to sections 52 and 53 of Act 29 and submitted that the gravamen of the provocation must be of an extreme nature as to deprive a person of the
[p.794] of [1982-83] GLR 788
appellant’s stand the power of self-control. He contended that the direction given by the learned judge was likely to confuse the jury who were not given any guidance as to how to apply the law to the particular facts of the case before them.
On the question of self-defence, learned counsel submitted that the law did not place any limit on the extent of the force required for self-defence. He argued that any force, provided it was reasonably necessary to save one’s own life in defence of an attack resulting in death, was excusable. He submitted that the direction in the summing-up which tended to limit the force required for self-defence, equated same with death resulting from a harm caused under extreme provocation.
He contended that the dumping together of the defence of self-defence and provocation in the closing remarks of the summing-up equated the two and that this must have confused the jury. He submitted that on the undisputed facts if the jury had been properly directed on self-defence, which the appellant put up, an acquittal would have been the only proper verdict that a reasonable jury would have returned. He concluded that the way the learned judge put the prosecution’s case prejudiced the minds of the jury because no evidence on record could be found to support the claim by the judge that in the course of the struggle the appellant succeeded in disarming the deceased and yet continued to butcher him to death.
In his reply Mr. Amui, Chief State Attorney, appearing for the Republic, conceded that there was no evidence to support the claim in the summing-up that the appellant at any stage in the course of the struggle overpowered and disarmed the deceased. He, however, argued that the harm inflicted on the deceased was in excess of self-defence and submitted that if the jury, on the evidence, had been properly directed, a verdict of guilty of manslaughter would have been returned by the jury. Learned chief state attorney, however, conceded that that direction to the jury was not reflected by the evidence.
We have carefully considered the submissions by learned counsel and studied the summing-up and the evidence in the case and, in addition to the passage in the summing-up quoted above, refer to the following passage also.
“The story from the prosecution’s side is that on the fateful day, that is, 17 December 1978, Amadu Fulani (now deceased) went to his vegetable farm on the Afienya-Dawhenya road, and whilst weeding the said farm the accused person, Robert Nartey, went and challenged his ownership of the land; with the accused claiming that the farm belonged to him. This resulted in a scuffle, with each person slashing the other. The accused person, Robert Nartey who gained the upper hand, was able to overpower the late Amadu Fulani and yet continued to butcher
[p.795] of [1982-83] GLR 788
Amadu Fulani until he became unconscious. The accused person then left the deceased to die in the farm.
The deceased, however, was rushed to the Tema Hospital by the police, where he died that same night.
The accused person, Robert Nartey, therefore stands charged before you with the murder of the late Amadu Fulani for callously continuing to butcher him, even after he had overpowered him, until he became unconscious and died later.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
We think that by the foregoing passages in the summing-up, especially the latter, the learned judge must have left the jury with the impression that there was no opportunity open to them to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter or an acquittal on a plea of self-defence. The latter passage which is not borne by any evidence on record cuts across the roots of the issues of provocation and the plea of self-defence and when the learned chief state attorney in his submission said the summing-up was favourable to the appellant but later had to concede that the above passage was not reflected in the evidence we could see that he advocated for a verdict of manslaughter with half of his tongue in his cheek.
We are of the opinion that on the undisputed facts of this case and on the not too seriously challenged evidence of the appellant, had the jury been properly directed on the issue of self-defence, the very core of the appellant’s defence which the trial judge confused with the issue of provocation to which a limit is set by law in its extent, they would inevitably have returned a verdict of acquittal. The crucial issue set out for consideration in the case was whether on the available facts the appellant at the time he inflicted the wounds had the intention to kill the deceased?
The available evidence indicates that the appellant at the time he started throwing the cutlass about did so to prevent the deceased from following him at a time he reasonably felt he was in danger of losing his own life, having regard to the aggressive behaviour of the deceased. His unchallenged evidence availed him a plea of self-defence and had the jury been properly directed he would have been a free man.
But before we are done, we will take the opportunity to comment on the unhelpful nature of his summing-up. A cursory glance through the summing-up reveals such apparent defects which must not be glossed over. The most glaring one is that the summing-up appears to be a model one with no reference to the particular facts of the case under consideration. It also gives no guidance to the jury as to how to relate the facts of the case to the law as was directed in it. There is no
[p.796] of [1982-83] GLR 788
indication as to which witness said what and how the jury was to treat the evidence as testified by them. It should be remembered that juror’s have no training as to how to resolve rival issues. It is therefore the judge’s duty in a summing-up not only to give introductory directions on the law but also to review the evidence in the case and assist them to resolve the factual issues involved in the case, and then to direct them on the relevant law to the facts as they find and accept. To leave the jury to themselves without any guide as to how they should go about their duty, as was done in this case, has the tendency of throwing them into the wilderness like sheep without a shepherd and this may often result in the return of a verdict not fully appreciated.
In the instant case, the summing-up is found wanting in many respects, with due respect to the learned trial judge, and we have no doubt that the verdict of the jury was greatly influenced by the passage in the summing-up which was very damaging to the appellant’s cause especially so when not an iota of evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution to support that passage.
We feel constrained to allow the appeal in this case. We would quash the conviction and sentence of death and set aside the finding that the appellant is guilty of murder and substitute a finding of not guilty of murder. A verdict of acquittal is substituted on a plea of self-defence. The appellant is acquitted and discharged.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Appellant acquitted and discharged
D. R. K. S.
