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[1978] SLR (HC) 21High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

HARRISON vs. GRAY, JNR [1979] GLR 330

9 October 1978 · EDWARD WIREDU J · ≈ 26 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 21
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OSCOLAHARRISON v GRAY, JNR [1979] GLR 330 [1978] SLR (HC) 21
APAHARRISON v GRAY, JNR [1979] GLR 330, [1978] SLR (HC) 21 (Ghana).
BluebookHARRISON v GRAY, JNR [1979] GLR 330, [1978] SLR (HC) 21 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Asare v. Donkor [1962] 2 G.L.R. 176, S.C.

(2) Quartey v. Armar [1971] 2 G.L.R. 231.

(3) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for declaration of title to property. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Abayie for the plaintiff.

Nyanor for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.

The plaintiff who describes herself as a widow and a trader by her writ of summons issued out of this court claims against the defendant:

“(a) A declaration of title to the premises at New Abossey Okai (at Sakwei South Winneba Road) with registration numbers 3541/ 1977, AC. 4372/1977 and 32000/1043/77 on the title deeds, the said land having been bought by the plaintiff, developed by her and now being occupied by the defendant.

(b) Recovery of possession of the premises and damages for trespass thereto.”

Her complaint against the defendant who on the facts established is in occupation of the disputed premises with his family (namely his wife and children) is that she met the defendant in the course of her business and agreed to a promise to be married to him. The evidence shows that the two stayed on this promise for some time when the defendant became faced with an ejectment order from the court to vacate his rented premises. The plaintiff testified that in this predicament the defendant approached her with his problem and because of the promise given her by the defendant she decided to put up the disputed house so that they would both go and stay in it when they got married.

She testified that she acquired a building plot and on her own instructions caused all documents on the disputed house to be made in the name of the defendant. She gave her reasons for doing so as to secure the interest of the defendant who might face the threat of ejectment from her children should she predecease the defendant. She called evidence by herself and seven other witnesses to show how she negotiated for the purchase of a building plot, got a plan to be prepared and engaged masons and carpenters to put up the disputed house, had it formally opened and handed over the keys to the defendant to go into occupation to beat the time limit set for leaving his former house which had barely two weeks to go. In a nutshell her case is that she financed the construction of the disputed house single-handed out of her own resources without a pesewa contribution from the defendant or any other person.

The events which seem to have provoked the present action according to her evidence are that some time after the defendant had gone into occupation he began finding faults with her, denied her sex and used profane words to her. She complained that the defendant’s attitude towards her had changed. She began to realise that there was no longer any love for her in the heart of the defendant. She therefore complained to her father who called the defendant and asked him to invite his father down. The plaintiff’s complaint according to her evidence resulted in a meeting which the parties describe as an arbitration in the house of the plaintiff.

Present at the meeting were the parties, the fathers of the parties and other friends of the families in the persons of Mr. Oppong (the plaintiff’s fourth witness), a Major Ayensu (the plaintiff’s sixth witness) as invitees of the plaintiff’s father; then Opanyin Kwame Nyantakyi (the defendant’s third witness) and a younger brother of the defendant (the

[p.332] of [1979] GLR 330 defendant’s fourth witness) as invitees of the defendant’s father. Part of the plaintiff’s present case is in effect to enforce her claim arising as a result of this meeting. Her evidence in this regard reveals that at the meeting she laid claim to the disputed house as her own property and demanded that the defendant vacate the premises, which was set at an agreed time limit of four months from the date of the meeting. She testified that when the four months’ deadline was approaching she caused a letter to be written to the defendant a copy of which was tendered as exhibit B. In his reply to exhibit B the defendant laid an adverse claim of title to the disputed house and hence her present action for title.

The defence case in a nutshell is that faced with an ejectment order to vacate his former place which he was renting, he approached the plaintiff who was his paramour and had a discussion with her about his problem and told her that he was desirous of getting his own house. According to the defendant the plaintiff then promised that if he (the defendant) were able to raise a loan for that purpose she would be able to help him build. He said the plaintiff said she had her own masons and labourers and could get building materials at controlled prices for him. The defendant’s evidence shows that he discussed this news with his wife, who testified as his fifth witness that she also approached the plaintiff who had then been known to her as her husband’s girl friend and obtained confirmation of all that the husband had told her about his plans to build.

The defendant testified that he provided a total sum of ¢21,500 to finance the construction of the disputed house which was supervised and managed by the plaintiff throughout the period of construction. He said he raised this amount as a loan on two occasions from his uncle Nana Poku who testified as his first witness. The defendant testified that he handed the first amount of ¢11,500 to the plaintiff in the presence of his wife and his bosom friend a Mr. Cobbina, his second witness. The second amount of ¢10,000 was collected at Dompoase by the defendant and the plaintiff from his uncle.

The defendant testified that the loan of ¢21,500 was to be repaid six months from the date of receipt. He further testified that the plaintiff asked him to resign from his work and to team up with her to enable him pay off the debt with some of the profits from their joint trade venture. He testified that even though he did resign the plaintiff failed to take him on her job. He denied having promised to marry the plaintiff and contended that the plaintiff was laying claim to the disputed house because she was aggrieved firstly by his opposition to her association with one Mr. Addo, secondly because he refused to divorce his own wife as suggested by the plaintiff to marry her and finally because of the contents of exhibit C which was written by the defendant to the plaintiff’s mother severing all connections with her.

The defendant’s version of the meeting in the house of the plaintiff is that it was convened at his instance to settle a purely marriage dispute, namely the issue of the plaintiff’s association with the said Mr. Addo. He testified that the meeting adjudged the plaintiff to be wrong and that he was pacified by her. He denied that the issue of the disputed house was raised by the plaintiff at that meeting. The defendant’s case in a nutshell

[p.333] of [1979] GLR 330 is that even though the plaintiff supervised the actual construction of the disputed house the moneys used were made available to her by him with funds raised as loan from his uncle, his first witness. He says that the truth of his version is borne out by the fact that all documents on the house are in his name.

The plaintiff as said above provided evidence by herself and seven other witnesses. Her first witness was a Rev. Swaniker of the Presbyterian Church. His evidence shows that he came to the scene when he was first approached by the defendant with a complaint against the plaintiff, a member of his church. He said the complaint was an allegation by the defendant protesting against the plaintiff’s association with a Mr. Addo which he the defendant as a paramour of the plaintiff had already protested unsuccessfully. This witness testified that the defendant showed him a letter allegedly written on the instructions of the plaintiff (exhibit B) asking him, the defendant, to vacate the disputed house which the defendant himself admitted to him was put up by the plaintiff. He also testified about subsequent meetings he held with the parties in the presence of a senior presbyter in the person of a Mr. Bannerman.

The second witness for the plaintiff was a Mr. Nunoo. He is the man from whom the land on which the disputed house stands was bought. His evidence shows that negotiations for the purchase of the land were done by the plaintiff alone but in the presence of a Mr. Nartey Mensah. He testified that the purchase price agreed was ¢2,800 which was paid by two instalments of ¢1,400 each. The witness testified that on the instructions of the plaintiff he issued the two receipts in the name of the defendant. He also testified that when the building was completed he was invited to the opening ceremony where he met the parties and Mr. Nartey who later assisted him to slaughter the sheep provided for the ceremony. He further testified that the keys to the house were first given to him by the plaintiff to be handed over to the defendant with the instructions that whenever he the defendant divorced her the building would be taken away from him.

The third witness for the plaintiff was the draughtsman who prepared the plan of the disputed house. He testified that on the instructions of the plaintiff he sketched out the plan in the name of the defendant and submitted same to the City Council and Town Planning for approval. He denied a suggestion that he was paid any remuneration by the defendant. The fifth witness is the headmason engaged to work on the disputed house and the fourth and fifth were the invitees to the meeting held in the house of the plaintiff. The two latter supported the plaintiff’s version as to what happened at the meeting and confirmed that the plaintiff demanded that the defendant be made to vacate the disputed house and that a four-month deadline from the date of the meeting was agreed upon.

The last witness for the plaintiff was the Odorkor manche. This witness came to the scene when he got information that some preparatory works for construction of a building were going on on a portion of his stool land. He therefore dispatched some men to go and stop the workers who were given a message to invite their employer to see him the

[p.334] of [1979] GLR 330 manche. His testimony reveals that the parties later appeared before him and his elders and they charged an amount of ¢1,000 which was paid with moneys brought out by the plaintiff from her bag. He testified that before him and his elders the defendant said it was the plaintiff who was financing the construction of the building.

The defence also provided evidence by the defendant himself and other five witnesses including his uncle Nana Poku as his first witness. This witness testified about the arrival of the parties first at his village when the plaintiff was introduced to him as the paramour of the defendant. He testified that he welcomed the plaintiff with a sheep. The witness said further that as a result of some discussion his nephew had with him he travelled down to Accra and discussed the matter with the plaintiff who confirmed having promised to help the defendant put up his own house if he were able to raise a loan and also promised to secure him a more lucrative job to enable him to earn better wages to pay off any loan he might raise. He testified that following his visit to Accra he first gave an amount of ¢11,500 to the defendant and later ¢10,000 to the defendant in the presence of the plaintiff at his village.

The second witness for the defendant is a Mr. Cobbina, the man the defendant describes as his bosom friend. He testified that he had personal knowledge of the events leading to the construction of the disputed house. He testified and supported the defendant’s case that the plaintiff promised to help the defendant to build and to get him a new job. He said he was present when the amount of ¢11,500 was given to the plaintiff by the defendant. He testified that the plaintiff counted nine bundles out of 23 bundles of ¢500 each in ¢10 denominations in his presence as well as in the presence of the defendant and his wife. The third and fourth witnesses for the defendant were the invitees of the defendant’s father to the meeting in the house of the plaintiff. Their version of the story cuts across the version brought on behalf of the plaintiff.

They both contended that the meeting was at the instance of a complaint by the defendant and that the plaintiff was adjudged to be wrong and she pacified the defendant. They both also contended that at that meeting no issue on the building was discussed. The last witness for the defendant was Vivian Quaye the wife of the defendant. She testified that following what her husband told her about his discussions with the plaintiff whom she had accepted as a girl friend of her husband, she went to see the plaintiff who confirmed having promised her husband all the help he would need to put up his own house if he were able to raise a loan for that purpose. She testified that the plaintiff confirmed having promised to get her husband a new and better paid job to earn more wages to pay off the loan. She further testified that in her presence and in the presence of Mr. Cobbina, her husband gave an amount of ¢11,500 in 23 bundles of ¢500 each in ¢10 denominations all tied in black thread to the plaintiff to construct the disputed house. She testified that the plaintiff counted one out of the 23 and said she was satisfied with the total amount given her.

A careful examination of the evidence reveals that the more serious issues for determination include (1) whether there was a promise of

[p.335] of [1979] GLR 330 marriage by the defendant to plaintiff and (2) who on the available evidence financed the construction of the disputed house. If it were the plaintiff, then having caused all available documents to be made in the name of the defendant, what interest in law has she in the building thus constructed with finance provided by her; (3) what was the outcome of the meeting of 29 November 1977 in the plaintiff’s house and whether the issue of the disputed house was discussed. Of course we need not mention that the burden is on the plaintiff to succeed on the strength of the case presented by her and not on the weakness of the defendant’s.

On the available evidence I have no difficulty in finding that the financial capability of the plaintiff to put up the disputed house by herself out of her own resources is beyond dispute. The evidence before me which I accept is that she is an affluent Makola trader. She said in answer to a question in crossexamination by the defendant that, “It is correct I am a big and successful trader.” The unchallenged evidence shows that she owns a number of houses in Accra, owns a personal private car and had set up a number of women as successful trading women, most of whom followed her to the court throughout the hearing of this case.

The fact that the defendant himself and his uncle on their evidence became satisfied with her bare assertion that she was capable of engaging the defendant to enable him to earn more wages and on the same assertions the uncle was prepared to part with as much as ¢21,000 confirm her affluence and financial capability to finance the construction of the disputed house. The plaintiff’s testimony about her association with the defendant and the events leading to the construction of the disputed house is straightforward and convinces me as the truth and I prefer her version of the story to that of the defendant. I therefore reject as untenable any contention that the financial position of the plaintiff was unproved.

The plaintiff’s testimony is strengthened by the evidence of Rev. Swaniker and Mr. Nunoo, her first and second witnesses, and the Odorkor manche, her seventh witness. These three witnesses can be safely described as independent disinterested persons who have nothing to gain in this action but more to lose by telling lies to the court. They impressed me as witnesses of truth. In fact no falsehood is apparent in their testimony, neither has anything been successfully urged on me not to accept their testimony: see Asare v. Donkor [1962] 2 G.L.R. 176 S.C. The sum total of their testimony shows that they all have personal knowledge of the defendant’s acknowledgement that the moneys provided for the construction of the disputed house were provided by the plaintiff and that the defendant’s now adverse claim of having financed the construction was false and an afterthought.

On the issue as to the meeting in the plaintiff’s house, I prefer the plaintiff’s version as supported by her two witnesses. That version appears to me to be more in accord with both custom and normal practice. First the very fact that the meeting was held in the plaintiff’s house lends support to her version that it was her father who sent for the defendant’s father on her complaint. The complaint the defendant claimed to have made to his father did not sound convincing and would not under normal

[p.336] of [1979] GLR 330 practice have persuaded any serious minded father to travel a distance of 170 miles to settle a purely concubine dispute. The question here is, what control did the defendant have over the plaintiff, his mere concubine, so as to bring his father down to Accra to settle the issue of plaintiff’s association with another man which the defendant was protesting?

The true position of the relationship as I see it is that the parties assembled at the meeting on the invitation of the plaintiff’s father and that the defendant’s father attended the meeting with some of his close friends because the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant had gone beyond the stage of mere concubinage. This is also strengthened by the fact that the defendant himself in exhibit C describes his association with the plaintiff as being a “marriage” and describes the plaintiff’s mother as his “mother-in-law.” There is also the admission by the defendant’s fifth witness, his wife, that she shares the nights equally with the plaintiff.

I find in my judgment that the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant did promise to marry her is the true account of their association and find also that at the meeting in her house the issue of the disputed house was discussed, that the plaintiff asserted her title to it and that it was agreed the defendant did vacate the disputed house four months from the date of the meeting, i.e. 29 November 1977. The plaintiff’s fourth witness in particular impressed me as a witness of truth on this aspect of the meeting and I reject as untrue the defence version that at that meeting the plaintiff was adjudged to be wrong and that she did pacify the defendant. I also accept the evidence of the plaintiff’s fourth witness that on the morning of the second day of the meeting the defendant and his father went to seek his assistance to claim the disputed house.

The defence case is riddled with serious material conflicts and inconsistencies which make it difficult for me to accept it.

In the first place there is the story of the visit by the defendant’s uncle, his first witness, to Accra to ascertain from the plaintiff her promise to help the defendant about his plans to put up his own house. The defendant’s first witness testified that when he arrived at Accra he first went to the defendant’s place of work and after work they both came down to the house, contrary to what the defendant himself said which was that he came home to find that his uncle had already arrived.

Secondly the loan episode: Whilst not making capital out of the unsubstantiated self-supporting evidence on the wealth of the defendant’s first witness, the circumstance and the manner in which the alleged loan was said to have been granted is highly inconceivable. There is in the first place the bare assertion by the plaintiff to assist the defendant to get a more lucrative job to enable him pay the loan. This was taken to be so serious an undertaking as to convince the defendant’s first witness to part with as much as ¢21,500 without a witness or a written document. Quite apart from the absence of a witness or a document it is highly inconceivable to see how any person can part with his hard-earned money to the tune of ¢21,500 as a loan without any condition as to payment but relying solely on the goodwill of the borrower to repay the loan on an

[p.337] of [1979] GLR 330 instalment basis.

No time limit and no specified amount was set to be paid monthly; contrary to what the defendant’s first witness said the defendant stated that the loan was to be repaid in six month’s time in unspecified instalments. Next the defendant was positive that he was not aware that his own father knew about the loan whilst the uncle testified that the three of them discussed the loan and that the defendant’s father gave him the go ahead. We now turn to the handing over of the first amount of ¢11,500 to the plaintiff. Here we see a sharp conflict between the defendant witnesses Cobbina and his wife as to the number of bundles each alleged was counted by the plaintiff.

Other flaws in the defence case which made it incredible include the following: (a) his version about negotiating for the purchase of the building plot which was not supported by Mr. Nunoo, the vendor; (b) acceptance of verbal accounts from the plaintiff after collecting the ¢10,000 even though defendant was not happy and was doubtful about how the first ¢11,500 was spent whilst he himself was so careful and meticulous and collected receipts for every item he bought after going into occupation; (c) the defendant’s inconsistent story about whether the building was discussed at any of the meetings he attended with the plaintiff; (d) failure on the part of the defendant to have called Mr. Bannerman when he challenged the evidence of Rev. Swaniker as being untrue; (e) expenditure on the plot totalling ¢3,800 was not taken into consideration in assessing the cost of the building and (f) even though the defendant claimed to have had plans for putting up his own house and claimed to have bought the plot and raised the loan he left the plan of the proposed building at the option of the plaintiff, an illiterate. In fact the defendant and his witnesses did not impress me as truthful witnesses.

It was urged on me that the defendant’s wife, his fifth witness, was in court when the plaintiff was testifying and that being an interested person I should view her testimony with some caution. I think this contention is well founded, and I must also say that I am not unaware of the conflicts in her evidence and that of Mr. Cobbina on the alleged handing over of the ¢11,500 to the plaintiff and her open denial that the defendant’s third witness was in court when the plaintiff was testifying contrary to what the defendant’s third witness himself said.

The defendant and his witnesses were unimpressive and I reject their testimony that the defendant raised any loan from the defendant’s first witness and in the presence of Mr. Cobbina and his wife he handed over the sum of ¢11,500 to the plaintiff. I also reject as untrue the evidence of the defendant and his uncle that on another occasion the uncle handed over the sum of ¢10,000 to the plaintiff in the presence of the defendant. I prefer the evidence of the plaintiff that she does not know the defendant’s first witness who did not even find it necessary to ask where the plaintiff came from on her first introduction to him. I also accept the evidence that at the two meetings called to settle the parties’ differences, the defendant acknowledged the plaintiff’s ownership of the disputed house.

Having made all the crucial findings in favour of the plaintiff I now proceed to consider the legal position since all available documents of

[p.338] of [1979] GLR 330 title to the disputed house are in the name of the defendant.

The practice whereby individuals acquire properties in the name of either their relatives or friends is not peculiar to the present case. The common law, unlike the law of equity, makes no provision in this regard and had no remedy for redressing a situation such as has arisen in the instant case. Our own local cases are not without examples where our courts have endeavoured to redress wrongs done where the justice of the case deserves. Local cases of this type which come to mind instantly are Quartey v. Armar [1971] 2 G.L.R 231 and more recently the case of Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

All these cases were decided on equitable trusts. The law of equity was developed in the Court of Chancery to supplement the common law where the latter was found wanting under circumstances where it would be harsh, unjust and unconscionable for one person to take advantage of his legal position against another. Equity therefore developed a number of maxims; the relevant one for the purpose of this case is the maxim “equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.” Writing under this maxim in Snell’s Principles of Equity (27th ed.), the learned authors at pp. 27-28 have this to say:

“The idea expressed in this maxim is that no wrong should be allowed to go unredressed if it is capable of being remedied by courts of justice, and this really underlies the whole jurisdiction of equity. As already explained, the common law courts failed to remedy many undoubted wrongs, and this failure led to the establishment of the Court of Chancery. But it must not be supposed that every moral wrong was redressed by the Court of Chancery. The maxim must be taken as referring to rights which are suitable for judicial enforcement, but were not enforced at common law owing to some technical defect. Its meaning can be best explained by taking a few examples of the cases in which the court has acted upon it.

(a) The enforcement of trusts. It was on this maxim that the Court of Chancery based its interference to enforce uses and trusts. Where A conveyed land to B to hold to the use of, or on trust for, C, and B claimed to keep the benefit of the land for himself, C had no remedy at law. Yet such an abuse of confidence was most distinctly a wrong, and a wrong capable of easy redress in a court of justice.”

This maxim came to recognise a distinction between one in whose name a property has been acquired merely for the purposes of documentation and the one who really acquired such property as the equitable beneficial owner. But within certain confines a presumption exists that property acquired by one person in the name of another raises an advancement in the absence of admissible rebuttable evidence in favour of the person in whose name the property was acquired. Such situations appear to be circumscribed and include where (a) a parent acquires property in the name of his child or person for whom he or she stands in loco parentis and (b) husband acquires property in the name of the wife.

It is not certain whether having regard to present developments in the status of women there will be no justification for extending this principle to situations

[p.339] of [1979] GLR 330 where a wife acquires property in the name of her husband. The doctrine of advancement as discussed above has no application in the present case. The facts presented here present a straightforward case of ownership of the disputed house as put up by the rival stories of the parties. The facts in Ussher v. Darko (supra) which look similar to the present case are stated as follows in the headnote at pp. 476-477:

“Some time after contracting a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.), E., a barrister of great eminence and repute, took as his paramour M., with whom he had six children. In 1946, E. bought a piece of land and had the conveyance prepared in the name of M. who retained the document of title in her possession. In 1957, E. built a house on the land and let it to tenants and enjoyed the rents and profits accruing therefrom and exercised over the property the rights of an owner in possession. He treated the property as his own and gave such portion of the rents to M. as he thought fit. In 1970, however, M., without the consent and knowledge of E., purported in reliance on the 1946 conveyance, to sell the house to the plaintiff, assuring him legal title.

The sale was evidenced by a deed of conveyance which not only described the property but also stated the price. Before the sale was effected, the plaintiff inspected the property and met the defendants on the premises as rent-paying tenants. M. told the plaintiff that the defendants were not known to her as tenants of the premises and that she did not put them on the premises, neither were they trespassers. The plaintiff failed to inquire from the defendants who put them on the premises as tenants or to whom they had been paying rents. But he was prepared to keep them on as tenants provided they attorned tenant to him and paid him rents as the landlord. The defendants refused to do so, contending that E. was still their landlord.

The plaintiff therefore sued, qua landlord, in the circuit court, for an order for possession and mesne profits. He sought to tender the 1970 deed of conveyance executed in his favour by M. but it was rejected as inadmissible by the trial judge because it bore no revenue stamp and it was not registered as required by section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122). When E. learnt of the proceedings after the plaintiff had closed his case, he applied to join the suit as a co-defendant, alleging that he was the equitable owner of the property sold to the plaintiff and that M., the vendor, was a bare trustee of the house with no beneficial interest. The trial judge, in exercise of his discretion under Order 16, r. 11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), refused the application for joinder because it would not only delay the trial unnecessarily and embarrass the plaintiff but it was also belated. The defendants offered no evidence. The trial judge found for the plaintiff, ordering, inter alia, the ejectment of the defendants. He held further that in purchasing the property in the name of M., E. as a lawyer of long standing, could not have meant the creation of resulting trust in his favour and that E. intended to make an advancement

[p.340] of [1979] GLR 330 to M. and that the presumption of advancement raised by that circumstance was not rebutted. On appeal by the defendants,” on these facts, it was held:

“(2) The plaintiff’s vendor, M., in whose name the property was purchased by E., had legal title to the property, but she held that title as a bare trustee, i.e. on a resulting trust for the purchaser, E., in whom resided the beneficial interest. The equitable presumption of resulting trust was rebuttable by the equitable presumption of advancement and such cases were strictly circumscribed: it was applicable where the purchase was made in the name of a legitimate or illegitimate child, a grandchild whose father was dead or in the name of a wife of the purchaser. On the facts of the case there was no presumption of advancement in favour of M., the plaintiff’s vendor, and the trial judge erred in holding otherwise . . .

(3) Since E., the owner of the equitable title was sui juris, he was absolutely entitled to compel M., his trustee in whom was vested the legal estate, to convey the legal estate as he directed. If M. refused, E. might apply to the court to constrain her to do so and M. would have to pay the costs of the application unless she could show reasonable grounds for her refusal. If E. were to sell his equitable interest in the property, the purchaser might also call for a conveyance from M. on the same terms.”

In applying the legal position as discussed above to the facts found in this case, I hold in my judgment that the true owner of the house in dispute is the plaintiff. She is in my judgment entitled to a declaration to that effect. The bare title in the defendant does not give him ownership. He holds such title as a trustee for the plaintiff who is entitled to compel him to convey the legal estate in the property according to her directions. The plaintiff on the facts of this case is also entitled to succeed on her claim for recovery of possession. The significance of the meeting of 29 November 1977 was the assertion by the plaintiff of her title and the acknowledgement of her ownership of the disputed house by the defendant. The notice given to him by the plaintiff to vacate the house which was agreed at four months was a proper notice to revoke the defendant’s licence to remain in occupation. The relief for the recovery of possession of the disputed house from the defendant is hereby upheld. The defendant is adjudged a trespasser from the date of expiration of the four months agreed upon at the meeting of 29 November 1977.

Judgment is therefore entered in favour of the plaintiff who is declared (a) the true owner of the disputed house; (b) entitled to recover possession and (c) awarded ¢500 damages for trespass against the defendant. Costs in this action are assessed at ¢750.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff, J. D.

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