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[1978] SLR (HC) 50High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

HANSEN AND ANOTHER vs. ANKRAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 668

15 August 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 19 min read

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OSCOLAHANSEN AND ANOTHER v ANKRAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 668 [1978] SLR (HC) 50
APAHANSEN AND ANOTHER v ANKRAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 668, [1978] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana).
BluebookHANSEN AND ANOTHER v ANKRAH AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 668, [1978] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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[p.669] of [1980] GLR 668

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158.

(2) Abude v. Onano V (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102.

(3) Heyman v. Attipoe (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 86.

(4) Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260.

(5) Mahmudu v. Zenuah (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172.

(6) Koran v. Dokyi (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78.

(7) Yawoga v. Yawoga (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309.

(8) Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.

(9) Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 535.

(10) Krabah v. Krakue [1963] 2 G.L.R. 122, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION against head of family by heads of two branches of the family for accounts of sums of money received on behalf of the family. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman for the plaintiffs.

J. B. Chinery for Adjetey for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The plaintiffs and the defendants are all members of the Mantse Ankrah family of Otublohum, Accra. The family comprises three sections, namely, Ankrah, Ayi and Okanta. The first defendant, Joseph Adjabeng Ankrah, also known as Nii Ayi Ankrah I, is the head of the Mantse Ankrah family as a whole; the first plaintiff, John William Hansen, is the head of the Ankrah section; the second plaintiff, Mark Kodjoe Ankrah, is the head of the Ayi section; and the second defendant, Nii Amon Okanta, is the head of the Okanta section. The plaintiffs have brought this action in their capacities as the heads of the Ankrah and Ayi sections against the first defendant as the head of the wider family and the second defendant as the head of the Okanta section for:

“(1) An account of the following sums received by the first defendant for and on behalf of the Mantse Ankrah family of Dadebease Otublohum, Accra, that is to say: (a) ¢160, 547.40, the proceeds of a cheque from the Ministry of Finance, Accra, on 13 September 1977; (b) ¢13,968.95 being part of an amount from the High Court, Accra, on 30 March 1977; and (c) ¢4,000 received by the defendants from the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street Branch, Accra, in or about August 1977.

(2) An account of all sums received by the defendants for and on behalf of the said family in respect of its land at Awudome or North Kaneshie, Accra, since 22 December 1976.

[p.670] of [1980] GLR 668 (3) An order upon the defendants to pay to the credit of the said family’s current account with the said branch bank whatever sums are found due to the said family, on the said accounts.

(4) Further or other relief as in the circumstances may be just, including in particular a declaration that the first defendant is liable to be deposed from the headship of the said family for breach of trust disclosed by the said accounting.”

In a statement of claim, which has been incorporated by reference in the affidavit sworn in support of the present application, the plaintiffs aver that:

“(3) On 30 March 1977, the first defendant received from the High Court Registrar, Accra, a sum of money in cash, whereof a balance of ¢13,968.95 belonged to the said family.

(4) About one week later the said family opened a current account with the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street Branch, Accra; into which the said ¢13,968.95 was paid. The signatories on the said current account were the plaintiffs and the defendants, any two of whom could draw on the account.

(5) On the date of payment in as aforesaid, the first plaintiff and the second defendant by cheque made the first drawing out, of the sum of ¢5,000 for use in funeral rites by the said family, leaving intact in the said bank account the credit balance of ¢8,968.95.

(6) In or about the third week of August 1977 the defendants against the express opposition of the plaintiffs withdrew more than one-half of the said credit balance from the said account and in breach of trust expended the same in Homowo festivities.

(7) On 13 September 1977 the first defendant collected from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra, for and on behalf of the said family, a cheque, from the Ministry of Finance in his name for ¢160,547.40 which was the part-payment of compensation money due to the said family under and by virtue of the compulsory acquisition of its land at Awudome, Accra, in the Industrial Estate Acquisition.

(8) The first defendant showed the said cheque to the second plaintiff who advised its prompt payment into the said bank account. The first defendant, however, has so far failed to pay the Lands Department cheque into the said bank account despite strong and persistent pressure from the plaintiffs and other elders of the said family.

[p.671] of [1980] GLR 668

(9) In January 1977 the first defendant unlawfully and in breach of trust began to re-allocate undeveloped parts of the said family’s land at North Kaneshie, Accra, notwithstanding that the same had been conveyed to various persons by a previous head of the said family. Litigation has accordingly begun by the dispossessed former owners.”

The plaintiffs have now brought this application under Order 50, rr. 5 and 7 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), for:

“(1) A mandatory injunction requiring the first defendant forthwith to pay into the Mantse Ankrah family’s current account with the headquarters or High Street, Accra, branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank the proceeds of the cheque for the sum of ¢160,547.40 from the Lands Department, Accra, in payment of the compensation money due to the said family under the Accra Industrial Estate Acquisition.

(2) A prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from drawing any cheque or order upon any bank or branch bank in Accra wherein moneys belonging to the said family have been deposited.

(3) A further prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from making any disposition of lands or any interest therein belonging to the said family.”

In an affidavit sworn by the first defendant, Joseph Adjabeng Ankrah, on his own and the second defendant’s behalf, the defendants also relied on their statement of defence in opposing the application of the plaintiffs. In the statement of defence, the defendants admitted the capacities in which the plaintiffs and they, the defendants, have been sued; they admitted paragraphs (3) and (4) of the statement of claim with the reservation that the signatories of the banking account of the Mantse Ankrah family are the first defendant and any one of the heads of the three sections or sub-families; they admitted that they, the defendants, withdrew the amount of ¢4,000, which appears to form the ground of complaint in paragraph (6) of the statement of claim, but say that they did so “entirely in accordance with the resolution of the whole Mantse Ankrah family for such withdrawals” and that the money was spent on “various rituals, customary observances and ceremonies which every head of the Mantse Ankrah family is in duty bound to perform and observe at every Homowo festival”; they admitted

[p.672] of [1980] GLR 668 paragraph (7) of the statement of claim which averred the receipt by the first defendant for and on behalf of the Mantse Ankrah family of the sum of ¢160,547.40 from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra, and that this sum was not paid by him into the banking account of the Mantse Ankrah family opened with the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra. As to this, the explanation of the defendants is two-fold. In the statement of defence, paragraph (5) they aver that:

“(5) In answer to paragraph (8) of the statement of claim the defendants say that the whole family at a general meeting agreed that the cheque received from the Lands Department be paid into a separate family account to be operated by the first defendant as head of family to enable him make prompt payments of various huge debts owed by the family to various persons as a result of the protracted litigation within the family for the financing of which the family had previously agreed that the first defendant should raise loans as he might think fit.”

And in paragraphs (5) and (6) of the affidavit sworn by the first defendant opposing the present application he deposed that:

“(5) I have always accounted to the family as a whole at general family meetings which the plaintiffs have always contemptuously refused or otherwise failed to attend.

(6) At one such general meeting of the whole family a decision was taken approving a decision of the steering committee of the family that a second family account be opened with the Korle Bu Branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank, Accra, into which the cheque from the Lands Department should be paid and that in order that certain family debts should be expeditiously paid and in order further to prevent the plaintiffs from bringing the administration of the family to a halt by their unco-operative attitude to me as head of the family which made it practically impossible to operate the family’s first account at the headquarters of the Ghana Commercial Bank, Accra, I should be the sole signatory to cheques drawn on the said account.”

The answer of the defendants to the complaint that in January 1977 the first defendant started to re-allocate undeveloped portions of the family’s land at North Kaneshie, Accra, which had already been conveyed to various persons by a previous head of the family was the evasive one that the first defendant has never “re-allocated plots of the family’s land validly conveyed to other persons.” The validity or otherwise of the earlier conveyances being a matter

[p.673] of [1980] GLR 668 in respect of which the plaintiffs and the defendants are entitled to hold divergent views, it was necessary for the defendants to deny specifically that the first defendant had re-allocated any plots at all. Finally, the defendants resist the application on the ground that they are not accountable to the plaintiffs. Says the first defendant in his affidavit, “(4) Neither in my position as overall head of the said family nor in that of the second defendant as head of one section of the said family are we accountable to the plaintiffs.”

Let me first deal with the last point. In chapter 6 of his celebrated book, Fanti Customary Laws, which was first published in 1897, Sarbah deals with the subject of alienation of property. At p. 78 of the 3rd edition he writes:

“Amid all the conflict of contradictory accounts which meet one at every turn, it is nearer the mark to say, that the head of the family has the moveable ancestral property in his absolute control; if, therefore, the family find he is misappropriating, wasting, or squandering the ancestral fund, it is to their interest to remove him at once and appoint another in his stead.”

It should be observed that the learned author was not making any categorical statements about the power of a head of family to alienate movable property of the family without the consent of members of the family; nor does he say that the head of family cannot be called to an account. At p. 90, however, while still dealing with the alienation of movable property the learned author writes:

“The head of a family has greater powers of alienation over moveable than he has over immovable ancestral property and family property. He can alienate such moveable property in gifts to any of the members of the family, for their education, support, or getting a wife for any member of the family.

If the family, therefore, find the head of the family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead; and although no junior member can claim on account from the head of the family, or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising, yet the Customary Law says they who are born and they who are still in the womb require—means of support, wherefore the family lands and possessions must not be wasted or squandered.”

Again, it should be observed that the practical approach is still predominant in the mind of the leaned author: it would indeed be

[p.674] of [1980] GLR 668 impracticable for a family meeting to be convened each time the head of family decides to use family funds in his hands in paying the school fees of a member of the family, or in acquiring a wife for a deserving member; but the statement that the only remedy the family has against a profligate head is to remove him, appears to go further than the commonsense view that in their own interest they ought to remove him and appoint another person in his place.

The law remained in this uncertain state until the judgment of Smyly C.J. in Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158 which was tried in the High Court, Accra, in 1923. In that case, a man described by the learned Chief Justice at p. 158 as “a very persistent litigant” brought an action against the head of family who had taken out letters of administration of the estate of his deceased brother claiming, among other reliefs, an account of his administration. After referring to the quotation from Sarbah at p. 90, the learned Chief Justice held that the property of the deceased having become family property, the plaintiff as a “junior” member of the family could not claim an account from the defendant or call for the appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate or income therefrom. An appeal from the judgment of Smyly C.J. came before the full court comprising Gardiner Smith Ag.J., Michelin and Hall JJ. in 1924. The judgments will be found in (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25 at pp. 160-165. In his judgment Gardiner Smith Ag.J. said at p. 161:

“The appellant does not attempt to assert that Ga law imposes on the head of the family an obligation to account which is unknown to Fanti law, but he argues that English law applies. In my opinion the learned Chief Justice was justified in finding that native law applies, and that it is a general principle of native law that the personal property of a deceased head of a family passes to his successor (subject to certain obligations to support the other members of the family), and that an action of accounting is unknown to native law. It may be asked what remedy a member of a family has if the head refuses to give him anything.

The answer would appear to be that although, in the words of Sarbah, he cannot ‘claim an account from the head of the family or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising,’ yet he has a certain claim upon the head of the family for support—the extent of support varying with the family means—and I assume that he could enforce this by action.”

[p.675] of [1980] GLR 668

Michelin J. said at p. 163:

“The onus was . . . on the Plaintiff to prove that in accordance with native customary law, he could claim such account, and no such proof having been given by him, the learned Chief Justice was in my opinion correct in holding that no cause of action had been shown and in dismissing such action accordingly.”

Hall J. also said at p. 165, “By native law the personal property of a deceased person on his death becomes family property, and no junior member of the family can claim an account from the head of the family.”

After Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) Sarbah’s cautious statement of the custom of his day acquired, by constant repetition in the courts, the posture of an inflexible rule of law. That was the position in Abude v. Onano V (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102. In that case, certain elders of the divisional stool of Labadi brought an action on behalf of their quarters claiming from the La mantse and other members of the La Divisional Council an account of stool funds deposited in a post office savings bank account. Citing Pappoe v. Kweku as authority, Korsah J., who read the judgment of the court, said at 104, “It is an accepted principle of Native Customary Law that neither a chief nor the head of a family can be sued for account either of state or family funds.” The qualification that it is only “junior” members of the family who may not bring such an action was now gone. So settled did the law appear that in Heyman v. Attipoe (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 86, a claim for an account by the head of a branch family against the head of another branch family who also happened to be the head of the wider family to which both branches belonged was dismissed by Ollennu J. at p. 88 in these words, “By native custom a member of a family cannot sue the head of the family for accounts. The authorities are many on that point; one of them is Abude v. Onano V. The plaintiff’s claim for account must therefore fail.”

The point that as the head of a branch family the plaintiff was not a “junior” member of the family was not taken by counsel or considered by the court. It appears to have been assumed that all members of the family except the head were junior members, and therefore the head of family was not accountable to any of them. The authority of Abude v. Onano V (supra) on which the court relied is questionable: In the first place, that case was concerned with stool, not family funds and therefore statements therein regarding

[p.676] of [1980] GLR 668 family funds were obiter; secondly, it purported to follow Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) which stated the law more narrowly; thirdly, the broad statement that it is an accepted principle of customary law that a head of family cannot be sued for an account is at variance with the narrower statement by the same court in Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260 where at p. 261, Foster-Sutton P. said, “It is a well settled principle of native law and custom that junior members of a family cannot call upon the head of the family for an account.” The other members of the court were Coussey J.A. and Korsah J. Both of them concurred in the judgment delivered by Foster-Sutton P.

It must be remembered that every family comprises both senior and junior members. That Sarbah recognised this is clear from his statements on immovable property which appear immediately after the two passages cited earlier. At pp. 78-79 he writes:

“The head of a family cannot, without the consent of all the principal members of the family, or the greater part thereof, that is the Ebusuafu, alienate the immovable ancestral or family property . . . Neither the head of the family acting alone, nor the senior members of a family acting alone, can make any valid alienation nor give title to any family property whatsoever.”

(The emphasis is mine.) At p. 90 he writes, “The head of a family cannot, without the consent of or notice to all the principal members of the family or the greater part thereof, alienate any part of the family immovable possessions . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) Again, at p. 91 he states that the right of the “senior or elder” members of the family to set aside a sale of ancestral or family land which has taken place without their consent was recognised by the courts. In more recent times the right so to do has been recognised not only in the case of senior members of the family, but of all other members where the interests of the family so require. Among the leading cases on this aspect of the law are Mahmudu v. Zenuah (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172; Koran v. Dokyi (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78; Yawoga v. Yawoga (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309 and Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.

Sarbah’s statement that junior members of the family cannot call upon the head of family for an account does not mean that nobody can call on him for such an account. It is worthy of note that in the course of the argument in Pappoe v. Kweku (supra) counsel for the head of family stated that the family as a whole

[p.677] of [1980] GLR 668 can call on the head to render accounts. In my view, the senior members of the family, who put the head where he is, have power to call on him to render accounts. Further, in this case, the account relates to the proceeds of the compulsory acquisition of family land. If the plaintiffs could, without first deposing the defendant, have brought an action to recover, for the family, land he had mortgaged to secure his private debts there seems to be no reason why they cannot bring an action to recover for the family the proceeds of the sale or compulsory acquisition of the family’s land.

It must also be borne in mind that the term “head of family” may be used correctly to describe either the head of the wider or the head of a branch family. Both are heads of family with capacity to sue and be sued in respect of family property; indeed, in one case, it was held that the head of the wider family had no right to intervene in a suit commenced by a customary successor: see Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 535. Ollennu J. who decided that case based his decision on the contention that upon being appointed customary successor, the successor acquires the status of a head of family vis-à-vis the deceased. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that he becomes the representative of the head of the immediate family of the deceased and as such has a superior right to litigate the family’s title to property left by the deceased. It seems to follow that if property in which the branch family has an interest is in danger of being lost, the head of the branch family has the right to take steps to protect it. In Krabah v. Krakue [1963] 2 G.L.R. 122, C.A. such a right was successfully asserted by the respondent, the head of the wider family, against a member of the family. If such a right can be asserted by the head of the wider family, so can it be by the head of a branch family. The circumstance that the delinquent member happens also to be the head of the wider family ought not to be a bar to such retrieving action.

For the above reasons, I am unable to uphold the preliminary objection taken by counsel for the defendants, which therefore fails.

On the merits, I am of the view that the plaintiffs have shown clearly and convincingly that the aid of the court is necessary to protect the interests of the family pending the final determination of this suit. The affidavit evidence shows that the large sum of ¢160,547.40 which came into the hands of the first defendant as overall head of family was not paid into the family banking account, that the defendants have withdrawn from the family banking account the sum of ¢4,000 without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, and further that the defendants have purported to re-allocate plots which have been the subject of conveyance by a previous head of

[p.678] of [1980] GLR 668 family. For, if the signatories of the family banking account are the first defendant and any one of the heads of the other sections, how could the alleged uncooperative attitude of the plaintiffs make it “Practically impossible” to operate the family’s banking account at the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street, Accra? And if the plaintiffs “have always contemp- tuously refused or otherwise failed to attend” general meetings of the family, the withdrawal of the goodly sum of ¢4,000 for the Homowo festival could not have been “entirely in accordance with the resolution of the whole Mantse Ankrah family.” The composition of the steering committee of the family has not been disclosed, but it is safe to assume that it does not include the plaintiffs or their representatives. No doubt their “contemptuous” disregard of summonses to attend general meetings of the whole family applied equally to meetings of the so-called steering committee. For my part, I do not see how a steering committee composed of persons representing only one of the three sections of the family can have authority to decide that a second family banking account be opened with the first defendant as sole signatory or that the cheque for ¢160,547.40 be paid into this second account; nor do I see how a “general meeting of the whole family” attended by only members of one section can have power to approve of such decisions.

The plaintiffs have made out their case and are entitled to the reliefs they seek. I therefore grant the several orders prayed for in the motion paper. The order for the payment of the proceeds of the Lands Department cheque into the family banking account is to be complied with forthwith.

DECISION

Orders accordingly.

K. A. A. M.

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