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[1978] SLR (HC) 39High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

REPUBLIC vs. SAGOE II; EX PARTE BAFFO v. [1979] GLR 378

1 August 1978 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 17 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 39
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v SAGOE II; ex parte BAFFO v. [1979] GLR 378 [1978] SLR (HC) 39
APAREPUBLIC v SAGOE II; ex parte BAFFO v. [1979] GLR 378, [1978] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v SAGOE II; ex parte BAFFO v. [1979] GLR 378, [1978] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.

(2) Minna Craig Steamship Co. v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China [1897] 1 Q.B. 460; 66 L.J.Q.B. 339; 76 L.T. 310; 45 W.R. 338; 13 T.L.R. 241; 41 S.J. 310; 8 Asp.M.L.C.

241; 2 Com. Cas. 110, C.A.

(3) Davies v. Randall [1962] 1 G.L.R. 1.

(4) Langton, Re; Langton v. Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. [1964] P.163; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 585; [1964] 1 All E.R.

749; 108 S.J. 96, C.A.

(5) Adai v. Anane [1973] 1 G.L.R. 144.

(6) Wytcherley v. Andrews (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 327; 25 L.T. 134; 35 J.P. 552; 19 W.R. 1015.

(7) R. v. Cousins (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 216; 42 L.J.Q.B. 124; 28 L.T. 116; 37 J.P. 470.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of injunction to restrain the respondent from exercising the functions of a mankrado. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Dr. S. K. Date-Bah for the applicant.

Nyankson for the respondent.

[p.380] of [1979] GLR 378

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

The applicant moves the court for an injunction in the nature of quo warranto to restrain the respondent, Nana Kwame Sagoe II, from exercising the functions of mankrado of Agona Kwaman; acting as such mankrado or calling himself such mankrado. The motion is backed by an affidavit of very pertinent paragraphs which I quote in extenso hereunder:

“(1) That I was customarily nominated and installed as mankrado of Agona Kwaman some time in March 1975.

(2) That in compliance with custom, a request was made to the chief of Kwaman for permission for me to swear the customary oath of allegiance before him.

(3) That contrary to custom this permission was refused by the chief of Kwaman.

(4) That in consequence of the said refusal of permission for me to swear before the chief, I brought action against the said chief, Nana Opaaku Yeboah V, before the judicial committed of the Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council.

(5) That in the said action I claimed a declaration that I was the accredited mankrado of Agona Kwaman and an injunction restraining the said chief from recognising any other person as the mankrado of Kwaman.

(6) That by a majority decision of the said judicial committee judgment was entered in my favour.

(7) That a copy of the said judgment is appended hereto and marked exhibit A.

(8) That in spite of the holding in the said judgment that I should be recognised as the accredited mankrado of Agona Kwaman, when I again approached the odikro for permission to swear the oath of allegiance before him, he still refused the said permission.

(9) That thereupon I applied to the High Court, Cape Coast, for an order of mandamus to compel the said chief to perform his customary duty to swear me in as mankrado of Agona Kwaman.

(10) That the said chief opposed the application and deposed to an affidavit stating that to the best of his knowledge and information as ohene of Agona Kwaman, the mankrado there is Nana Kwame Sagoe II and that in spite of the judgment of the Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council the elders and the asafo company of Kwaman still recognise Nana Sagoe II as mankrado of Agona Kwaman.

(11) That the said Nana Sagoe II knew full well of the suit between myself and the said chief of Kwaman before the judicial committee of the Nyakrom Traditional Council but stood by and chose not to join the suit.

(12) That I am advised and verily believe that having stood by with full knowledge of the implications of that litigation the respondent cannot now challenge my status as mankrado duly adjudicated upon by the said judicial committee of the Nyakrom Traditional Council.

[p.381] of [1979] GLR 378

(13) That the respondent is not entitled by custom to occupy the mankrado stool of Agona Kwaman.

(14) That in spite of this the respondent has performed several acts as mankrado, without lawful cause.

(15) That in particular during the Akwambo festival at Agona Kwaman in 1976, he sat in state with the chief of Kwaman in the guise of mankrado.

(16) That when the chief sits in state at Kwaman the respondent occupies the position next to him customarily reserved for the mankrado.

(17) That he has held himself out to the asafo company as the mankrado.

(18) That the respondent has in diverse other ways purported to exercise the traditional functions of the mankrado of Agona Kwaman.

(19) That the Akatanase Twidan family of Kwaman, whose representative and nominee I am, has from time immemorial been recognised as the family entitled to occupy the mankrado stool of Kwaman.

(20) That as far back as 13 October 1937 the Agona State Council meeting at Swedru adjudged the Akatanase Twidan family of Kwaman as the family entitled to nominate and instal the mankrado of Kwaman and pronounced the then nominee of the said family, one I. E. Nkrumah, to be mankrado.

The said state council in the same judgment held that the respondent’s family (the Bentsinasi family) was not the family in whom lay the position of mankrado of Agona Kwaman.

(21) That the said judgment is binding on the parties to the present action and permission will be sought by my counsel during the argument of the application herein to tender a copy of the proceedings before the said Agona State Council.

(22) That it was only during the period that the chief of Agona Kwaman, contrary to custom, switched his allegiance from the Nyakrom stool to the Nsaba stool that the respondent claimed to be mankrado of Kwaman to the chief of Nsaba.

(23) But that after the passing of the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 112), which restored the traditional status quo, the Akatenase Twidan family sought the restoration of the recognition of the stool of Nyakrom as the family entitled to nominate and instal the mankrado of Agona Kwaman, which recognition was accorded it in the judgment attached hereto as exhibit A.

(24) That this matter has been finally adjudicated upon in the judgment annexed hereto as exhibit A and ought not to be re-opened.

(25) That I am advised and verily believe that interest re ipublicae ut sit finis litium.

(26) That on 21 March 1978, I was given leave by the High Court, Cape Coast, to apply for an injunction in the nature of quo warranto.”

The respondent has also filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion which runs as follows:

[p.382] of [1979] GLR 378

“I, Nana Kwame Sagoe II, mankrado of Kwaman in the Central Region of Ghana, make oath and say as follows:

(1) That I am the deponent herein, and the respondent in the present application.

(2) That the averment in the first paragraph of Nana Baafo’s affidavit in support of his present application is not true. Nana Baafo V was customarily nominated and installed as abusuahene, family chief or sub-chief and never as mankrado of Kwaman. Consequently in accordance with custom he could not and should not be sworn by the Chief of Kwaman and the asafo as mankrado of Kwaman.

(3) That to both the chief of Kwaman—Nana Opaaku Yeboah and to the Kwaman police, the applicant’s head of family Opanyin Kwame Fosu gave an undertaking that he was installing a family chief, a sub-chief, and not a mankrado. It is in this capacity as family chief—abusuahene that Nana Baafo V is recognised. That at the hearing of this application my counsel will seek leave of the court to refer to letters by Opanyin Kwame Fosu to Nana Opaaku Yeboah in connection with Nana Baafo’s installation.

(4) That the basis of this application is exhibit A the judgment of the judicial committee of Nyakrom Traditional Council. That even if the applicant herein and his family could rely on that judgment, and it is denied that they can in the light of the preceding paragraphs in this my affidavit, I and my family are not affected by this judgment since we were not a party to that suit . . . (b) That it is most revealing that though the question of mankrado of Kwaman centred around me and my family, the applicant and his family should have gone to sue some one else who is not mankrado of Kwaman or was laying any claim to it. (c) That the final say as to who is mankrado of Kwaman rests with the oman and asafo of Kwaman. It is the oman and asafo who could bring a sub-chief from the appropriate family to the chief of Kwaman and his elders to swear to the chief in presence of his elders. (d) That the judgment of the Nyakrom Traditional Council in the face of custom, history and the conduct of the applicant and his family is unenforceable.

(5) That the decision of the Bobikuma Native Tribunal could not bind the oman of Kwaman and their asafo especially in matters concerning the status of mankrado of Kwaman . . . (b) That even if that decision was a binding one, and it is not, it is strange that when Nana Kwame Sagoe II was installed mankrado of Kwaman almost 30 years ago the applicant with his family raised no protest but should in 1976 suddenly appear on the scene and claim the right to be mankrado of Kwaman. (c) That the true position is that my family has from time immemorial provided a suitable person to fill the post of mankrado of Kwaman whenever the office became vacant.

[p.383] of [1979] GLR 378

Baafo Agyin, Kweku Baah, Kweku Anyarko, Kwame Sagoe I, the last four mankrados of Kwaman before me and those before them, had all been members of my family.

(6) That it is fair to bring to the notice of this honourable court that this is the applicant’s third round of legal battle to establish his claim to the office of mankrado of Kwaman. Early this year the High Court dismissed a mandamus application by the present applicant to compel Nana Opaaku Yeboah on the basis of the famous judgment of the Nyarkrom Traditional Council to swear him as mankrado of Kwaman.

(7) That even if this honourable court found it fit to issue an injunction to restrain me from exercising the office of mankrado, this court cannot compel the chief of Kwaman, the oman and asafo of Kwaman to recognise the applicant as mankrado of Kwaman.

(8) That since a court of equity will not lend its aid to such an exercise in futility, I pray this honourable court to dismiss this application as misconceived.”

Flourishing these affidavits counsel for both parties stood in battle array.

In his argument in support of the motion the applicant’s counsel sought to show that the judicial committee of a traditional council is vested with jurisdiction to give judgment in chieftaincy matters which have the same binding force as judgments of the circuit court. The judgment contained in exhibit A is, therefore, of binding effect as there has been no appeal against it. Counsel then reminded the court that as the High Court cannot sit on appeal over the judgment of a traditional council it will be wrong for this court to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of such a decision. Any judgment of the High Court which seeks to impugn the validity of the judgment in exhibit A must, accordingly not be followed. Counsel then contended that this judgment is a judgment in rem which consequently binds the whole world and estops the respondent who chose not to intervene in the proceedings that led to the judgment even though he had notice of it. Counsel finally (in his first ground) argued to demonstrate that an injunction by way of quo warrranto is applicable.

In his argument in opposition the respondent’s counsel first challenged the applicant’s capacity as he has not disclosed under what rule he is moving the court. He then argued that as the grant of the motion rests on the discretion of the court the court is entitled to inquire into the surrounding circumstances of the application to satisfy itself whether the grant of the motion will not be futile. In this connection he invited the court to consider the judgment of my brother Okunor J. (which rejected the applicant’s motion for a mandamus directed against Nana Opaaku Yeboah V, ohene of Agona Kwaman) and also those matters deposed to in paragraph (3) of the respondent’s affidavit. Counsel contended that as the applicant’s head of family purported to have installed the applicant as mankrado, contrary to his own undertaking, that amounted to a fraud which vitiated the proceedings in exhibit A. By this fraud the applicant cannot be said to have clean hands and he must be thrown out

[p.384] of [1979] GLR 378 of court. Counsel finally submitted that it will be futile for this court to restrain the respondent from exercising the functions of mankrado as, if even the court were disposed to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant, the grant of the motion will not automatically make the applicant mankrado but that he will still face many other hurdles to surmount.

In his ex parte motion for leave to apply for an injunction in the nature of quo warranto the applicant moved the court pursuant to section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), section 9 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 of England and Order 59 r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure,) Rules, 1954. When counsel came to argue the ex parte motion before me I cut him short in the course of his argument and granted his ex parte motion. Unfortunately the applicant’s counsel did not state on his motion on notice his authority for the motion. Section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971, in conferring supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior courts in Ghana as well as over any adjudicating authority other than a military tribunal indicated the manner whereby the High Court can enforce this supervisory jurisdiction. Among those “short and sharp” remedies at its disposal is that of quo warranto. Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules provides that where no provision is made by our rules the procedure, practice and forms in force for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England shall, so far as they can be conveniently applied, be in force in our High Court. As there is no provision relating to quo warranto under our rules of court then the applicant must have recourse (as conveniently as they can apply) to those governing rules in England set out in Order 53, r. 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 which deal with an application to restrain a person from acting in an office in which he is not entitled to act. By these rules the procedure in an application under section 9 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, shall be applicable. This section 9 abolishes information in the nature of quo warranto and provides that in any case where any person acts in an office in which he is not entitled to act, and such an information would have lain against him, the High Court may grant an injunction restraining him from so acting and if necessary declare the office to be vacant. The applicant has, accordingly, properly disclosed his authority to bring this motion.

That an injunction would lie to restrain a person from exercising the functions of a chief has been fully vindicated in Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317. Although the Administration of Justice Act, 1938, abolishes by its section 9 information in the nature of quo warranto, it did not abolish the old rules of substantive law. For an injunction by way of quo warranto to issue, therefore, these essential requirements must prevail, viz (a) the office must be created by statute; (b) it must be an office of public nature; and (c) of a permanent character; (d) it must be substantive (that is, independent and not merely ministerial to another’s will) and (e) there must have been usurpation, i.e. not merely

[p.385] of [1979] GLR 378 a claim, but the defendant must have been in use and possession of the office and acting in it. As observed by Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) in Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II (supra) chieftaincy is a public institution having been guaranteed under the Constitution and an injunction under section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act will accordingly lie. The respondent makes no denial that he has assumed the office of mankrado of Agona Kwaman and has, consequently, been exercising the traditional functions attached to that office. Unless he can, therefore, satisfy the court by what authority he has so been acting an injunction will lie to restrain him. As against the authority, whether real or pretended, on which the respondent founds his claim, the applicant has put forward the judgment in his favour by the judicial committee of the Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council. He seeks by this motion that the respondent be restrained so that the judgment (having been pronounced by a competent adjudicating tribunal after a full scale trial and having not been revised by that tribunal or set aside on appeal) will remain as final and binding. As noted before, the applicant together with the head of his Twidan family sued Nana Opaaku Yeboah V, Ohene of Agona Kwaman claiming for (a) a declaration that the first plaintiff (i.e. the applicant herein) is the accredited mankrado of Agona Kwaman, and (b) an injunction restraining the defendant from recognising any other person as the mankrado of Agona Kwaman. The judicial committee that inquired into the case found for the plaintiffs and ordered that the first plaintiff should be recognised as the accredited mankrado of Agona Kwaman.

A judicial decision which declares, defines, or otherwise determines the status of a person or a thing, that is to say the jural relation of the person or thing, to the world generally is said to be a decision in rem. Such a decision is conclusive for, or against, everybody. Thus in Minna Craig Steamship Co. v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China [1897] 1 Q.B. 460, C.A. Lopes L.J. held that a German judgment which had declared the status of a ship as being liable to a lien was binding upon everybody and that no English court could impeach it. In Davies v. Randall [1962] 1 G.L.R. 1 Charles J. held that a judgment declaring the plaintiff’s status as a legitimate son was a judgment in rem. He however, acknowledged that it could not prevent the defendant who had had no opportunity for intervening in the suit from relitigating that issue. The judgment of the judicial committee of the Agona Nyarkrom Traditional Council which authoritatively and finally declared the status of the applicant as the mankrado of Agona Kwaman is therefore a judgment in rem which will bind everybody, the respondent not excepted, unless he can satisfy the court that he had no opportunity to intervene in the proceedings. In the affidavit of the applicant he deposed in his paragraph (11) that the respondent was fully aware of the suit before the Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council but that he stood by and did nothing. This was not challenged either in the affidavit of the respondent or in the argument of his counsel. Had this been challenged in any way the applicant’s counsel was ready to produce a document to show that

[p.386] of [1979] GLR 378 the respondent was summoned as a witness by the defendant in that suit. I am satisfied then that the respondent was fully in the know of the proceedings before the judicial committee where the applicant sought for a declaration that he is the accredited mankrado of Agona Kwaman. There is a rule, at first peculiar to the probate jurisdiction but now of general application, that for the purpose of estoppel per rem judicatam he is also a party who, being cognisant of proceedings, and of the fact that a party thereto is professing to act in his interest, allows the battle to be fought by that party, intending to take the benefit of his championship in the event of success: see In the Estate of Langton [1964] P. 163. As noted in Adai v. Anane [1973] 1 G.L.R. 144 the foundation of this estoppel by “standing by” was adumbrated in the dictum of Lord Penzance in Wytcherley v. Andrews (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 327 at p. 329 where he said, “if a person, knowing what was passing, was content to stand by and see his battle fought by somebody else in the same interest, he should be bound by the result, and not be allowed to re-open the case.” It is for this reason that I hold that the respondent must be bound by the judgment of the judicial committee of Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council exhibited by the applicant.

Counsel for the respondent has sought to vitiate this judgment on the ground of fraud merely because the applicant’s head of family had allegedly deceived the defendant in that case that he was installing his family head. How this can amount to fraud I cannot tell. The alleged deceit did not induce the defendant to do anything to his detriment and even if that could amount to fraud that complaint was fully ventilated before the judicial committee but it never found any favour with that body. Counsel cannot, therefore, be allowed to question the binding effect of the judgment on that ground. Counsel for the respondent has also tendered with some flourish the ruling of my brother Okunor J. which dismissed the applicant’s motion for the issue of a mandamus. In his ruling my brother questioned the validity of the judgment for the purpose of the motion before him. There is an appeal lodged against that decision (which of course does not bind this court) and it will be invidious for me to pass any comments on the ruling. There is no doubt that the remedy sought being discretionary the court is entitled to look at the conditions precedent to the application and also the conduct and motives of the applicant. Again if the grant of the discretion will be futile the court must refuse it. There is nothing before me to show that the applicant is motivated by any bad faith in bringing his application, if his anxiety to enforce the judgment in his favour and compel its obedience can be termed bad faith. Indeed, before the court would grant an injunction it must be satisfied that there was substantial grievance: see R. v Cousins (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 216. The continued usurpation of the status of mankrado in spite of the judgment which estops the respondent is sufficient grievance in the applicant which entitles him to the remedy sought. The judicial committee was well aware that the respondent had assumed the status of mankrado when it gave its judgment on the applicant’s behalf. If this judgment binds the respondent then there can be

[p.387] of [1979] GLR 378 no recourse to the objection that the judgment is futile in its effect. For all the above reasons I hold that the motion must be allowed. I accordingly order that the respondent be hereby restrained from performing the functions of mankrado of Agona Kwaman, acting as such mankrado or calling himself such mankrado. I award to the applicant ¢200 costs.

DECISION

Application granted.

D.R.K.S.

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