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[1979] SLR (HC) 39High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

IN RE ENNIN ALIAS BODOM (DECD.); NTI vs. SERWAAH [1980] GLR 809

18 December 1979 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 39
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAIN RE ENNIN ALIAS BODOM (DECD.); NTI v SERWAAH [1980] GLR 809 [1979] SLR (HC) 39
APAIN RE ENNIN ALIAS BODOM (DECD.); NTI v SERWAAH [1980] GLR 809, [1979] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana).
BluebookIN RE ENNIN ALIAS BODOM (DECD.); NTI v SERWAAH [1980] GLR 809, [1979] SLR (HC) 39 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Nimoh v. Acheampong [1959] G.L.R. 49, S.C.

(2) Arthur (Decd.), In re; Abakah v. Attah-Hagan [1972] 1 G.L.R. 435, C.A.

(3) Julius v. Oxford (Bishop of) (1880) 5 App.Cas. 214; 49 L.J.Q.B. 577; 42 L.T. 546; 44 J.P. 600; 28 W.R. 726, H.L.

(4) Sheffield Corporation v. Luxford [1929] 2 K.B. 180; 98 L.J.K.B. 512; 141 L.T. 265; 93 J.P. 235;

45 T.L.R. 491; 73 S.J. 367.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION to determine the person who was entitled to the grant of letters of administration with will annexed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Hayfron-Benjamin for the applicant.

Asiedu-Basua for the caveatrix.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

The applicant’s father died about fifteen years ago. By his will dated 12 April 1947 he appointed one Emmanuel Kofi

[p.811] of [1980] GLR 809

Agyepong of Abuakwa Kumasi, as his sole executor, and devised the whole of his estate to the applicant. The executor entered upon the estate and managed it without taking out probate. With his neglect of the farms comprising part of the estate, the said farms reverted to fallow land. Emmanuel Kofi Agyepong, the executor, died in or around 1976, and on 19 August 1977 the applicant filed an ex parte application for the grant of letters of administration with the will of Paul Ennin annexed. Notices pending the grant were duly filed in compliance with the orders of this court.

On 20 June 1979, before any grant could be made by the court, two persons: Opanin Kwabena Mmire and Madam Amma Serwaah both of Abuakwa, Kumasi, jointly caveated the grant of letters to the applicant. The caveator and caveatrix filed their separate affidavits of interest in response to the warning issued by the applicant.

The caveator claims that he is the head of family and the present successor to late Paul Ennin and that the applicant should at least have joined him in the application for the grant of letters of administration. But his claim was not pressed to conclusion when it was pointed out that, unlike the case of a death intestate, a grant of letters of administration with will annexed may be made to a devisee of the whole estate without the concurrence or the joinder of the head of family, particularly as he has no interest whatsoever in the estate.

The claim of the caveatrix was another matter. Her claim was that a building which was devised by the late Paul Ennin and the plot of land around it were the ancestral properties of her family and that Paul Ennin had no legal estate in them to clothe anyone with.

The applicant moved the court to grant letters of administration with will annexed to him. He, the applicant, and the caveatrix failed to come to an agreement as to the person or persons to whom a grant should be made. The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 60, r. 21 (2) provides:

“(2) Failing the parties coming to such an agreement, however the Court may order that the applicant do issue a writ of summons against the caveator within a specified period from the date of such order, to determine the issue as to who is entitled to a grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be.”

(The emphasis is mine.) This rule received interpretation in Nimoh v. Acheampong [1959] G.L.R. 49, S.C. In that case, two caveators failed to come to agreement with the appellant for letters of administration as to the person or persons to whom a grant should be made. When the applicant’s motion came on, the judge, pronouncing

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that on the affidavits, it was clear that the first caveator had no locus standi and that his intervention was “a bare-faced try-on,” ordered that joint letters of administration should issue to the applicant and the second caveator. On appeal by the first caveator, them Supreme Court per van Lare Ag.C.J. said at p. 50:

“The Court was therefore bound under the provision of Order 60, Rule 21 (2) of L.N. 140A to order the applicant to issue a writ of summons against the caveators within a specified period. Instead of proceeding as required by the Rules the learned judge ordered Letters of Administration to issue jointly to the applicant and the second caveator.”

The court therefore set aside the order appealed from.

This decision means that whenever a caveat is filed and the caveator fails to come to an agreement with the applicant, even though it may be clear from the affidavit of interest that the caveator has no interest in the estate, the court must order the applicant to issue a writ of summons against the caveator. Thus “the court may order” in Order 60, r. 21 (2) was interpreted to mean “the court shall order.” Unfortunately, the judgment is very short and does not contain the reasoning by which the decision was arrived at, that the word “may” should be interpreted as “shall.” This interpretation has been the subject of justifiable criticism by Archer J.A. in the case of In re Arthur (Decd.); Abakah v. Attah-Hagan [1972] 1 G.L.R. 435 at p. 447, C.A. Admittedly, the word “may” is permissive and empowering but has sometimes been construed as obligatory. As Lord Selborne said in Julius v. Oxford (Bishop of) (1880) 5 App.Cas. 214 at p. 235. H.L.:

“The question whether a Judge, or a public officer, to whom a power is given by such words, is bound to use it upon any particular occasion, or in any particular manner, must be solved aliunde, and, in general, it is to be solved from the context, from the particular provisions, or from the general scope and objects, of the enactment conferring the power.”

In fact, the whole scope and intention of the provision must be considered and there is no cut and dried rule by which the distinction between discretion and obligation can be drawn. So in Sheffield Corporation v. Luxford [1929] 2 K.B. 180 it was held that by section 138 of the English County Courts Act, 1888, “may order” are enabling words, but where a legal right to possession has been established on the part of the landlord, it is the duty of the judge to make an order for possession.

[p.813] of [1980] GLR 809

What then is the general scope of the objects of the rules in relation to caveats? The first sentence in Order 60, r. 17 states that “A caveat may be entered by any person having an interest in the estate of a deceased . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) If a person who has no interest whatsoever in the estate of a deceased person were to file a caveat, would a judge be bound to order the applicant for a letters to issue a writ of summons merely because the caveator refuses to agree that he has no interest? Again Order 60, r. 19 enjoins the caveator to file an affidavit of interest. What is the purpose of filing an affidavit of interest if the court, even though the affidavit discloses no interest in the estate of the deceased, is bound to order the applicant to issue a writ of summons against the caveator? In my view, an affidavit of interest is filed to enable the court to determine whether the caveator has any interest in the estate. And the court may make an order dependent upon whether or not the caveator has disclosed in his affidavit an interest in the property of the deceased.

Finally, under Order 60, r. 21 (2) the writ of summons is issued against the caveator for the resolution of only one issue: “to determine the issue as to who is entitled to a grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be.” If by the affidavit of interest it can be ascertained that the caveator has no interest, is it reasonable to expect a court to make an order which will lead to a protracted trial the conclusion of which is already known? As in Sheffield Corporation v. Luxford (supra), it is only when the caveator has established an interest in the estate of the deceased, that it becomes obligatory for a judge to order that a writ of summons be issued by the applicant against the caveator. In my view, the ends of justice cannot be met by putting such a restrictive interpretation on Order 60, r. 21 (2) as was done in the Nimoh case.

As Archer J.A. said in the In re Arthur case at p. 447 after giving good and substantial reasons:

“I do not think that the word ‘may’ in the rule [i.e. Order 60, r. 21 (2)] should be strictly construed as conferring an unfettered discretion on the court. In my view, it means that the court has power to order or not to order the applicant to issue a writ of summons. It does not mean that in all cases, the court should order the issue of a writ. It is this transformation of the word ‘may’ into a mandatory command which has resulted in unnecessary litigation in the past.”

The decisions in both the Nimoh case and In re Arthur, I am happy to say, are decisions of courts of co-equal jurisdiction. As a result,

[p.814] of [1980] GLR 809

I am free to follow the one I favour. And I choose the view of the law as expressed by Archer J.A.

Counsel conceded that the first caveator had no interest in the property of the deceased devised under the will, but he maintained that as the caveatrix claimed one of several properties devised by the will to be her ancestral property, she has established a sufficient interest in the estate, and the court is bound to order that the plaintiff do issue a writ of summons against the caveatrix on the authority of the decision in the Nimoh case. In the first place if the property she claims did not belong to the testator, then the devise in the will does not confer any interest in respect of that property on the beneficiary. Her legal interest in that property is therefore not affected by the grant of letters to the applicant. Secondly, since her claim is in respect of one small property out of several others devised to the applicant, she cannot claim to have the better right to the grant of letters of administration. Thirdly, since she says that the legal title to the property she claims rests in her, the only issue: “the determination of who is entitled to a grant of letters,” does not arise between her and the applicant. The issue which arises between her and the applicant is who is entitled to the legal title to the property she claims. As this issue cannot be determined in an action for letters of administration, I order that the caveats filed by both caveator and caveatrix be removed and that letters of administration with will annexed be issued to the applicant. I award costs of ¢200 in favour of the applicant against both caveators.

DECISION

Caveat removed.

Application for letters of administration with will annexed granted.

D. F. L.

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