TUAH vs. AMOAH [1980] GLR 815
21 December 1979 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 9 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 71Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Quaye v. Mariamu [1961] G.L.R. 93, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of a district court wherein the trial magistrate failed to make any findings on the issues. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Adu Gyamfi for the appellant.
Owusu-Bempah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.
In this appeal from the judgment of the District Court Grade I, Kumasi, delivered on 13 May 1973, the appellant bases his dissatisfaction on the following grounds:
“(a) the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden on him and therefore the trial magistrate erred in entering judgment for him; and (b) the whole trial was unsatisfactory as the trial magistrate failed to make any findings on the issues joined between the plaintiff and the defendant.”
Briefly, the plaintiff’s case was that some time in December 1971, or January 1972, there arose a dispute between himself and the defendant, who is his nephew, over the management of the plaintiff’s record shop. In that dispute he threatened to take the shop away from the defendant. Friends and relatives therefore met at the shop and effected a settlement between the parties. The gist of the settlement was that the plaintiff was to allow the defendant to run the shop. It was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff from time to time would go and take stock of the business done, and that the goods (being gramophone records) which the plaintiff was leaving in the shop for the defendant were worth ¢700. He also left stock-in-trade consisting of loudspeakers, changer and an amplifier. No value was placed on these.
The defendant took over the shop and ran it up to April 1972. On 5 April 1972, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant intimating his desire to take stock with him. For three days thereafter the shop was closed and the defendant was nowhere to be found. He had opened
[p.817] of [1980] GLR 815
a shop of his own somewhere else. When the plaintiff eventually gained access to his shops, all that was left therein were eleven records, an amplifier and a changer. His loudspeakers were gone.
The plaintiff on several occasions demanded the return of his goods or their value from the defendant, but the defendant failed to comply with his demands. In the result he commenced proceedings against the defendant claiming as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for the sum of ¢818 being the value of the plaintiffs goods which the defendant removed and converted same to his own use without the consent of the plaintiff, which the defendant has refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands by the plaintiff.”
The extra ¢118 being the value of the loudspeakers.
At the trial of the action, the plaintiff called as witnesses, three of the persons who were present when the dispute between the parties was settled. They all testified that at that meeting, the plaintiff said that the value of the goods in the shop was £G700 but the defendant insisted that the value was ¢700. The plaintiff agreed to the value placed on them by the defendant and schnapps was liberally dispensed to seal the settlement. No challenge issued from the defendant that those witnesses were not present at the settlement. Instead, the defendant in his cross-examination, attempted to establish at a certain stage that at the meeting he had said that part of the goods in the shop had been obtained on personal credit by him and at another stage that all the goods in the shop were financed by him through his account with the Standard Bank Branch at Roman Hill, Kumasi. One witness at least admitted under cross-examination by the defendant that he (the defendant) mentioned that part of the goods were on personal credit to him, but this does not detract from the fact that, all the witnesses said that he agreed, no, he in fact stipulated, that the value of the goods being left by the plaintiff was ¢700 as opposed to the plaintiff’s assessment of £G700. In his own evidence, the defendant tendered 25 receipts which he alleged covered purchases of records made by him. But notwithstanding these receipts of spurious origin, he told the panel that settled the dispute that the goods left behind by the plaintiff in the shop were worth ¢700. The witnesses who gave this testimony claimed to be uncles of the defendant, and they could not be dislodged on this issue in cross-examination. The defendant himself failed to call a single member of the arbitration or settlement to testify for him. But that is unimportant, as the plaintiff must succeed, if at all, by the strength of his own case.
[p.818] of [1980] GLR 815
Order 58 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), regulates appeals from the magistrate’s court to the High Court. Rule 18 (2) of the said Order empowers the court to:
“. . . draw all inferences of fact which might have been drawn in the Court below and may give any judgment or decision or make any order which ought to have been given or made by the Court below.”
I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that the trial magistrate failed to make any findings on the issues joined between the plaintiff and the defendant, but the above-mentioned rule vests this court with the power to make such findings, where the court below has omitted to do so, provided there is evidence on record to support them. On the totality of the evidence, I find that there was agreement that the value of the records which were entrusted by the plaintiff to the defendant amounts to ¢700. Everybody knows that a record changer and an amplifier are no use to a record shop without loud-speakers. There was ample evidence on record that the plaintiff had left his loudspeakers in the shop which he gave to the defendant. The loudspeakers, according to the uncontroverted evidence, were worth ¢118. Those loudspeakers were gone when the plaintiff gained access to his shop. They were entrusted to the defendant’s care. I find that the defendant converted the said loudspeakers to his own use and is liable to pay their value of ¢118 to the plaintiff. With regard to the goods valued at ¢700, the plaintiff’s own evidence, which was not denied by the defendant, was that the defendant left behind eleven records. In my view, the trial court should have deducted the value of these records from the total value of ¢700 placed on those goods by the parties. In so far as that was not done, the plaintiff failed to prove the exact damage that he sustained and the trial court erred in entering judgment for the full amount of ¢700 claimed by the plaintiff.
Counsel for the defendant-appellant has contended before this court that in so far as the trial magistrate failed to resolve the primary facts as to title to the goods and their value, the trial was unsatisfactory and that a re-trial should be ordered. In so saying, he relies on the authority of Quaye v. Mariamu [1961] G.L.R. 93, S.C. That case was a land case on appeal from the High Court to the then Supreme Court. The judgment appealed expressed opinions without assigning any reasons therefor. It was held (as stated in the headnote) at p. 93 that:
“(1) it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve the primary facts, and having done so to state his findings and apply the law;
[p.819] of [1980] GLR 815
(2) in the absence of such findings of fact, although not debarred from reaching its own conclusions the Supreme Court cannot resolve the matters in controversy in the present case and there should therefore be a re-trial.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Counsel for the respondent also conceded that the trial was unsatisfactory and that a re-trial may be ordered.
Reading through the decision in Quaye v. Mariamu, it would appear that in that case the evidence adduced by both parties on their claim and counterclaim respectively was inconclusive, and no resolution of facts could be based on the evidence. The court of first instance took the view that if a claimant fails to lead conclusive evidence in support of his claim, he must fail. As neither party led satisfactory evidence their claims were dismissed. Had they led satisfactory evidence, the Supreme Court would itself have been able to resolve the issues between the parties as it is empowered to do. That is not so in the instant case. Here, there was sufficient evidence on which a resolution of facts could be based. I cannot understand, in any event, the decision in Quaye v. Mariamu and I refuse to apply it.
In my view, a new trial may be ordered on appeal in cases in which there has been some irregularity at the trial which amounts to a mistrial. As for example in cases of:
(a) defect of jurisdiction in respect of time, place and person; or
(b) judgments so imperfectly worded or so ambiguous or inconsistent that they are too imperfect, to amount to a verdict at all; or
(c) misconduct of the jury discovered after trial; or
(d) misdirection or improper admission of evidence or failure to observe the rules of natural justice, which occasions some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice; or
(e) where, for any other reason, the trial is a nullity.
I cannot place the Quaye case anywhere.
It is true that the judgment in the instant case suffers from the defect that it merely recites the evidence of the parties and states a conclusion without assigning reasons therefor. But this court is empowered by Order 58, r. 17 of L.N.140A to:
“. . . direct the Court below to enquire into and certify its finding on any questions which the Court thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal, and generally shall have as full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted in the Court as a Court of first instance, and may re-hear the whole case, or may remit it
[p.820] of [1980] GLR 815 to the Court below to be re-heard or to be otherwise dealt with as the Court directs.”
Exercising the powers vested in the court by this rule, I have resolved the issues between the parties upon the evidence available on the record. One issue, however, remains unresolved: the value of the eleven records which the defendant left behind. I therefore direct the court below to inquire into the value of the said records and to certify its finding on that issue. With that done, a simple subtraction of that amount from the sum of ¢700 would give us the value of the goods which the defendant converted to his own use. Add ¢118 to that amount and the plaintiff will have judgment for that amount. The judgment herein is suspended until my order to the court below has been carried out.
This order is to be carried out and a report made to this court within 28 days from the date this order is served on the trial court.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
K.A. A. M.
