AMEYIBOR vs. KOMLA [1980] GLR 820
10 January 1980 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 8 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Attoh-Quarshie v. Okpote [1973] 1 G.L.R. 59.
(2) Fofie v. Pomaa [1974] 2 G.L.R. 6.
(3) Kwasi v. Dunkwa Goldfields [1975] 1 G.L.R. 10.
(4) Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 De G.M. & G. 328; 2 Eq. Rep. 1047; 26 L.J.Ch. 682; 24 L.T. 29; 43 E.R.
534.
(5) Pritchard; In re [1963] Ch. 502; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 685; [1963] 1 All E.R. 873, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from an order of the High Court that a default judgment be set aside on the ground that the writ was not indorsed by the serving bailiff. The facts are adequately stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom for the appellant.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
The suit which culminated in this appeal was an application by the respondent to set aside a judgment obtained against
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him by default. His professed ground for seeking this relief was that neither the writ of summons nor the default judgment was served on him. The appellant disputed this and issue was joined on the facts.
The judgment sought to be vacated was delivered some time in 1967. Evidence was produced by both sides and the resolution of the issue raised a simple question of fact. The learned judge said he “had no hesitation whatsoever in disbelieving the applicant’s (meaning the respondent’s) assertion that he was not served with the writ of summons and with the 1967 default judgment.” In other words, the judge was satisfied with the appellant’s evidence that the respondent was served not only with the writ of summons but with the default judgment as well. By this finding, the pedestal on which the respondent sought to vacate the judgment was gone and ordinarily, his application would have failed. The learned judge said as much.
However, in the course of the argument, it was pointed out that the writ of summons by which the suit was commenced, was not indorsed in the manner required by Order 9, r. 17 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and that therefore the judgment was a nullity and should be set aside. The learned judge acceded to this submission. He said he had himself examined the writ of summons and was in a position to agree that it was not indorsed in the manner required by the rule. He said he found it difficult to appreciate the rationale behind the rule but inasmuch as default was made in complying with it, the court had no power to grant leave for the signing of the default judgment and that it must be set aside notwithstanding the fact that the respondent delayed in bringing the application for three years. The judge accordingly proceeded to set the judgment aside. It is this order that the appellant seeks by this appeal to reverse.
Order 9, r. 17—the rule admittedly infringed, provides:
“17. The person serving a writ of summons shall, within three days at most after such service, indorse on the writ the day of the month and week of the service thereof, otherwise the plaintiff shall not be at liberty, in case of non-appearance, the proceed by default; and every affidavit of service of such writ shall mention the day on which such endorsement was made. This rule shall apply to substituted as well as other service.”
The true effect of non-compliance with this procedural rule has come before the courts on a number of occasions and two divergent views have been expressed. In Attoh-Quarshie v. Okpote [1973] 1 G.L.R. 59, Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) held that failure to comply with this rule was not a mere irregularity which could be waived but
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a matter which prevented any further proceedings from being taken. He accordingly held that the court had an inherent power to set aside a judgment signed in breach of the rule and proceeded to set the judgment aside. That is precisely the way the judge reasoned and acted in the case at issue. In the later case of Fofie v. Pomaa [1974] 2 G.L.R. 6 at p. 10, Osei-Hwere J. refused to follow Attoh-Quarshie v. Okpote (supra). He thought failure to comply with the rule in question was a mere irregularity which could be waived or cured under Order 70, r. 1 of the High Court Rules. Again in Kwasi v. Dunkwa Goldfields [1975] 1 G.L.R. 10, Koranteng-Addow J. followed Osei-Hwere J. and regarded non-compliance with Order 9, r. 17 as a mere irregularity which could be cured by amendment. He thought in the circumstances of this country, the rule was pointless and suggested that it be scrapped. Indeed, the judge expressed himself in strong terms on the purposelessness of this rule.
The question for decision is: Which of these conflicting holdings should be preferred? An attractive case could be made for accepting either view as the correct one. For the approach that seems to have appealed to Hayfron-Benjamin J. and the circuit judge in this case, it could be argued simply that the rules provide clearly for indorsement in a certain form and by a named date and prescribed in equally clear language the sanction for its breach—namely, that in case of non-appearance by the defendant the plaintiff shall not proceed to obtain default judgment. That is what the law says and any plaintiff who breaches it must face the consequences. Obedience to the law, it may be argued, demands no less.
The second view which found favour with Osei-Hwere and Koranteng-Addow JJ. can be supported on broader grounds. If a defendant has, in fact, been served with the writ and there is satisfactory evidence of it, then it can be said that failure to “indorse on the writ the day of the month and week” within three days as required by Order 9, r. 17 would be a technicality which would injure no one, much less invalidate any proceedings taken to obtain judgment. And afterall as was stated in Hope v. Hope (1854) 4 De G.M. & G. 328 at p. 342:
“the object of all service is of course only to give notice to the party on whom it is made, so that he may be aware of, and may be able to resist that which is sought against him, and when that has been substantially done, so that the court may feel perfectly confident that service has reached him, everything has been done that is required.”
In the instant case, the judge found, notwithstanding the respondent’s denial, that he had been served not only with the writ but
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also with the default judgment. He had every opportunity to resist the claim which was being made against him, or indeed move timeously to set the default judgment aside. He waited for three years and then sought the invalidation of the judgment on a ground which the judge found to be false. The judge said he could not discover the rationale of Order 9, r. 17 but he felt bound by its letter; and the letter, pointless as it seems, obliged him to invalidate the proceedings taken in disobedience of it.
The rule seems to have been lifted verbatim from Order 9, r. 15 of the English Rules. In England, service of the writ is the responsibility of the plaintiff or his legal representative and they are obliged to satisfy the court of its service. The indorsement required by the rule provides reliable evidence of the service. The disability imposed by the rule in obtaining default judgment appears to be the sanction for the plaintiff’s violation of the rule. In this country, Order 9, r. 18 (1) requires service to be made by an officer employed by the court called a bailiff. It is he who has the duty of making the indorsement required by the rule. It seems odd that the plaintiff should be made to suffer for any default committed by a court officer over whom he has no control. In the context and known practice of this country, Order 9. r. 17 serves no purpose. The failure by the bailiff to make the indorsement required by the rule resulted in no injury or prejudice to the defendant. It cannot reasonably have done so. It certainly did not occasion any failure of justice. In the circumstances, I would defer to the advice given by Upjohn L.J. in In re Pritchard [1963] 1 All E.R. 873, C.A. and decline to treat this irregularity as a fundamental defect which makes the default judgment a nullity. I would regard it as a mere irregularity curable under Order 70, r. 1. Accordingly, I would disapprove Hayfron-Benjamin’s holding in Attoh-Quarshie v. Okpote (supra) and concur in the reasoning of Osei-Hwere and Koranteng-Addow JJ. In Fofie v. Pomaa (supra) and Kwasi v. Dunkwa Goldfields (supra). It follows that the learned judge ought not to have treated the irregularity as a nullity and proceeded to dispose of the matter on that basis. He should have brought the failure to make the endorsement required by Order 9, r. 17 as an irregularity within the true intendment of Order 70, r. 1 and done justice as a matter of discretion between the parties.
The final question is: Which of the parties is deserving of the exercise of the court’s discretion? On the facts of this case, there can be no doubt about this. The appellant set on foot a regular action. His claim was duly served on the respondent. He elected to do nothing about it. The appellant then took steps to obtain default judgment. When he obtained this, he again caused it to be served on the respondent. The respondent again chose to do nothing about it.
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Nearly three years afterwards, he rose from his slumber and sought to impeach the judgment on grounds which the judge found to be the reverse of the truth. In the meantime, steps were taken to enforce the judgment and the respondent’s property was sold in execution of that judgment. The non-compliance by the bailiff of Order 9, r. 17 in no way prejudiced the respondent. Invalidation of the judgment would prejudice the rights of blameless third parties who in the mean-time had obtained rights under the sale.
I think in these circumstances, the court should exercise its discretion against interfering with the default judgment. It ought to regard that harmless irregularity as waived and deny the respondent relief. As the learned judge held otherwise, I think he slipped. Accordingly, I would set aside the judgment appealed from. In lieu of it, I would dismiss the respondent’s motion with costs here and below. Perhaps it may be no consolation for the respondent to be informed that Order 9, r. 17 is being scrapped in a proposed amendment to the rules.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal allowed. K. A. A. M.
