ANNOUS vs. APPOH [1980] GLR 883
10 January 1980 · ANIN JA · ≈ 55 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench).
(2) Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.
(3) Briscoe (R.T.) (Ghana) Ltd. v. Amponsah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 16 June 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 100.
(4) West African Express Ltd. v. Beger, Court of Appeal, Accra, 3 February 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 55.
(5) Asor II v. Amegboe [1978] G.L.R. 153, C.A. (full bench).
(6) Holtby v. Hodgson (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 103; 59 L.J.Q.B. 46; 62 L.T. 145; 38 W.R. 68; 6 T.L.R. 24, C.A.
(7) Capital and Suburban Properties Ltd. v. Swycher [1976] 1 All E.R. 881, C.A.
(8) R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim [1970] 2 Q.B. 417; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009;
[1970] 2 All E.R. 528, C.A.
(9) Au Pui-Kuen v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1979] 2 W.L.R. 274; [1979] 1 All E.R. 769, P.C. (10) Ababio v. Turkson [1950] 13 W.A.C.A. 35.
(11) Awoonor-Renner v. Thensu (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 77.
(12) C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A.
(13) Ababio v. Tsia (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 24.
(14) Sudgen v. Leonards (1876) 1 P.D. 209.
(15) Hukm Chand C.P.C. 108.
(16) Egbe v. R. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 105.
(17) Moore v. Tayee (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242; affirmed (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C. (18) Abdilmasih v. Amarh [1972] 2 G.L.R. 144, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to an application for an order for extension of time within which to apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal for a review of a judgment of the ordinary bench. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Anin J.A.
COUNSEL
T. A. Tagoe for the applicant.
E. K. Gbeho for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
When a court announces its decision on one date and hands down its reasons for the decision on a later date, what, for the purpose of calculating the time limited for appeal or review, is the date [p.887] of [1980] GLR 883 of the court’s decision? This in a nutshell is the important question raised by this unpretentious motion for extension of time within which to apply for a review.
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial Circuit Court, Accra, on 22 November 1977 for recovery of possession to a plot of land at Korle-Bu Nmenmete and for other ancillary reliefs. The aggrieved defendant thereupon appealed to this court; and after a full hearing, the ordinary bench of this court (coram Apaloo C.J. Sowah and Anin JJ.A.) on 13 February 1979 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the court below, while reserving its reasons for a later date. The decision of the ordinary bench dated 13 February 1979 was in the following terms:
“We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from together with the order for costs. The costs, if paid, should be refunded to the appellant. In lieu of the judgment, we dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant. We award the defendant costs in the court below assessed at ¢600 and costs in this court fixed at ¢700. We hereby discharge the order of interim injunction made by the court below on 29 October 1975. We will set out full reasons for our judgment later.”
On 29 March 1979, the ordinary bench handed down its reasons for the judgment in open court after due notice to the parties. The final paragraph reads:
“In our opinion, on the totality of the evidence given to the court, the learned judge ought to have found in the appellant’s favour both on the issue of title and the consequential question of trespass. As he found otherwise, we thought his judgment was wrong and we accordingly set it aside on 13 February last.”
By a motion on notice filed on 27 September 1979, the plaintiff-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) sought an order for extension of time within which to apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal for review of the ordinary bench’s judgment “dated 29 March 1979,” on a stated ground of alleged miscarriage of justice.
For the defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) learned counsel took a preliminary objection to the competency of the motion. He first submitted that the operative date of the decision of the ordinary bench was 13 February 1979 and not 29 March 1979 (the date of the reasons for the decision). He next contended that the relevant enactments, i.e. section 6 of the Courts
[p.888] of [1980] GLR 883
(Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), and the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), r. 8 prescribe a maximum period of six months for the lodging of appeals or applications for review from a final decision; consequently, time ran out for the application on 13 August 1979; and that this court was incompetent to entertain same.
In reply, learned counsel for the applicant maintained that the operative date of the judgment of the ordinary bench was 29 March 1979, the date of delivery of the reasoned judgment. While agreeing that the total maximum period of time allowed by the relevant enactments for the lodging of the instant application was six months, he contended that that period started to run from 29 March and expired on 29 September 1979; in the event his application had been filed within time, that is, two days before the expiry of the statutory time.
For Mr. Tagoe, counsel for the applicant, a judgment which is not supported by reasons is loosely termed a judgment; it is only when it is supported by reasons that it deserves the accolade of judgment. The contrary argument of Mr. Gbeho, counsel for the respondent, is that a judgment is the pronouncement by the court on the rights of the parties which have come up for a decision. Once that decision is given, the fact that reasons for the decision are given later, does not change the position at all. The judgment takes effect as and when it is pronounced; and the instant appeal was decided on 13 February 1979 when the appeal was allowed and the necessary consequential orders were made and not on 29 March 1979 when reasons for the judgment were given.
The Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972, s. 6 adopted the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, as the procedural rules for the review (and other) jurisdiction of the full bench of the Court of Appeal created by section 3 of that Decree. Section 6 of N.R.C.D. 101 enacted:
“6. The Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) shall with such modifications as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree, apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 3 of this Decree.”
The time limits for lodging civil appeals (both interlocutory and final) were prescribed by rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, as:
“8. (1) Subject to the provisions of any enactment governing the same a civil appeal shall be lodged within,
(a) fourteen days, in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, or
(b) three months, in the case of an appeal against a final decision, unless in the case of an appeal against a final decision, the Court extends the period within which an appeal may be lodged.
[p.889] of [1980] GLR 883
(2) The periods specified in the preceding subrule shall (a) in the case of an appeal as of right, be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against, and
(b) in any other case, be calculated from the date on which leave is granted.
(3) A civil appeal shall be deemed to have been lodged when the notice of appeal has been filed.
(4) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal in respect of a final decision shall not be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the period prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be lodged.”
Applying the above rules mutatis mutandis, it is clear that an application for review shall be lodged within three months of the final decision. On the expiration of this initial three months period, an application for extension of time within which to apply for a review may be filed within a further grace period of three months. In other words, the application for extension of time, must be filed not later than six months from the date of the final decision in respect of which a review is sought.
For comparison, reference may be made to the time limits prescribed for civil appeals to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), r. 10 as amended by Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), which provides for an initial period of three months for lodging an appeal against a final decision and provides also for a further grace period of three months within which an application for enlargement of time in which to appeal may be made. Prior to the amendments introduced by L.I. 618, the total maximum period allowed for lodging an application for the enlargement of time within which to appeal from a final decision was four months, made up of an initial period of three months from date of the decision plus an extra grace period of one month. Hence after the expiration of four months from the date of decision, this court was incompetent to entertain an application for the enlargement of time in which to appeal from a final decision under the unamended L.I. 218: see Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench); Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.; R.T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. v. Amponsah, Court of Appeal, Accra, 16 June 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C.
100, C.A. and West African Express Ltd. v. Beger, Court of Appeal, Accra, 3 February 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 55.
[p.890] of [1980] GLR 883
The policy reason underlying these cases is aptly stated by Akufo-Addo C.J. in Nye v. Nye (supra) at pp. 82-83:
“It must be appreciated that there is no inherent right of appeal in a litigant; nor indeed is there an inherent power in any court to hear appeals. Both the right and the power are creatures of statute, and unless the enactment creating the right of appeal and the power to hear an appeal is explicit, clear and unambiguous in its language, no such right and no such power can ever materialise. When however the right and power do materialise they are exercisable only within the framework of the conditions imposed for their exercise.”
Having regard to the clear and unambiguous language of C.I. 13, r. 8 (1) (b), (2) (a) and (4), I conclude that an application for the extension of time within which to appeal (or to apply for a review, by virtue of N.R.C.D. 101, s. 6) in respect of a final decision shall not be made, after the expiration of six months from the date of the final decision; and if made outside that time limit, it shall not be entertained.
This conclusion leads me to the crucial question posed at the outset—what is the relevant date of the decision of the ordinary bench? Is it 13 February 1979 when the court announced its decision or judgment? In the first place “decision” is defined in The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (3rd ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 464 as:
“1. The action of deciding a (contest, question, etc.); settlement determination; . . . a conclusion; judgment: esp. one formally pronounced in a court of law.
2. The making up of one’s mind; a resolution . . .”
Both Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law and Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th ed.) at pp. 586 and 305 define “decision” respectively simply as “a judgment”; And Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law further defines judgment at p. 1021 as “a judicial determi- nation; the decision of the court.”
In Asor II v. Amegboe [1978] G.L.R. 153 at p. 161, C.A. (full bench), Azu Crabbe C.J., reading the unanimous judgment of the full bench of this court, held:
‘“Decision’ is a popular, and not a technical word and means little more than a concluded opinion, and on reading sections 5, 6 (1), 8 (1) and 11 (1), I form the opinion that the word ‘determine’ in sections 5 and 6 (1) [of the State Councils (Southern Ghana and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, 1952, Ordinance No. 8 of 1952] means no more than to decide.”
[p.891] of [1980] GLR 883
In Spencer Bower and Turner’s The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd ed.) at p. 29 a judicial decision is defined as:
“determination or adjudication of some question of law or fact, whether such decision takes the form of an express judicial declaration, or is necessarily involved in the command or prohibition which constitutes the judgment or judicial act in its coercive or operative aspect.”
The learned authors also explain at p. 147 that:
“The term ‘decision’ imports a twofold function of judicature . . . It may, with equal propriety, be used to denote either the judicial act, or the judicial declaration, of the tribunal—either the grant (or refusal) of the relief and remedy prayed—or on the other hand the determination of a question of law, or issue of fact, in contest between the parties.”
Applying these definitions to the instant case, I have no doubt in my mind that the relevant date of the decision of the ordinary bench in this suit is 13 February 1979, when the court decided the appeal, in the sense that it adjudicated upon or came to a conclusion on the rival arguments of counsel and pronounced finally on the rights of the contesting parties. The court’s determination of the appeal in favour of the respondent took the form of express judicial declarations and commands:
“We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from together with the order for costs . . . In lieu of the judgment we dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant. We award the defendant costs . . . We hereby discharge the order of interim injunction.”
The court’s decision of 13 February 1979, until reversed, operates as res judicata. The dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, in my view, amounts to a finding of the non-existence of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The fact that the court at the same time reserved the reasons for its decision does not alter or derogate from the legal quality and consequences of the decision qua decision. The decision or judgment took effect as and when it was announced. Under Order 41, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A):
“3. Where any judgment is pronounced by the Court or a Judge in Court, the entry of the judgment shall be dated as of the day on which such judgment is pronounced, unless the Court or Judge shall otherwise order, and the judgment shall take effect from that date: provided that by special leave of the Court or a Judge a judgment may be ante-dated or post-dated.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
[p.892] of [1980] GLR 883
In Holtby v. Hodgson (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 103 at p. 107, C.A. Lord Esher M.R. commenting on the identically-worded English Order X.L.I., r. 3 held that:
“The expression ‘where any judgment is pronounced by the Court or a judge in court’ is intended to contrast with the well-known expression ‘the Court or a judge’ in many other rules, that is to say, to exclude the case of a judge sitting in chambers; and the intention of the rule clearly is that, from the moment when the judge has pronounced judgment, and entry of the judgment has been made, the judgment is to take effect, not from the date of the entry, but from the date of its being pronounced; it is an effective judgment from the day when it is pronounced by the judge in court.”
See also this court’s judgment in R. T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. v. Amponsah (supra) especially the fourth holding (as stated in (1969) C.C. 100):
“The time limited within which an appeal may be brought as provided in rule 10 of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1962, is reckoned from the date a decision is pronounced by the judge, and not from the date entry of judgment is made by the proper officer . . .”
In this case, the court’s decision was pronounced on 13 February 1979 and the judgment was operative from that date.
Does the fact that the decision of 13 February 1979 was not supported by reasons derogate from its intrinsic quality as a decision, as Mr. Tagoe contended? I think not. First, it has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for a decision; and reasons are not commonly given for findings of fact made by juries. While the need for giving reasons as an important element of administrative justice is recognised, yet it has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions. One may compare the dictum of Buckley L.J. in Capital and Suburban Properties Ltd. v. Swycher [1976] 1 All E.R. 881 at p. 884, C.A. on the desirability of reasons to be given for orders made except in some interlocutory applications, with Lord Denning M.R.’s statement on the absence of a general rule requiring magistrates to give reasons for their decisions in R v. Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, C.A. In the latter case Lord Denning M.R. held at pp. 534-535:
“Accepting that the board ought to do all this, when they come to give their decision the question arises, are they bound to give their reasons? I think not. Magistrates are not bound
[p.893] of [1980] GLR 883 to give reasons for their decisions: see R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 All E.R. 122 at pp. 130-131]. Nor should the board be bound. Afterall, the only thing that they have to give is their opinion as to the capability and diligence of the applicant. If they were asked by the applicant to give their reasons, they could answer quite sufficiently: ‘In our opinion, you are not likely to be capable of or diligent in the respects required of you.’ Their opinion would be an end of the matter.”
By contrast, the modern tendency especially in the field of administrative law and in cases involving issues of law or of mixed fact and law or of some complexity is to insist on reasons being given for decisions. In Capital and Suburban Properties case (supra), where the trial judge ordered the re-sale of land but gave no reasons for his decision, Buckley L.J. held at p. 884, C.A.:
“This I consider a most unsatisfactory practice. There are some sorts of interlocutory applications, mainly of a purely procedural kind, on which a judge exercising his discretion on some such question as whether a matter should be expedited or adjourned or extra time should be allowed for a party to take some procedural step, or possibly whether relief by way of injunction should have been granted or refused, can properly make an order without giving reasons. This, being an application involving questions of law, is in my opinion clearly not such a case. Litigants are entitled to know on what grounds their cases are decided. It is of importance that the legal profession should know on what grounds cases are decided, particularly when questions of law are involved. And this court is entitled to the assistance of the judge of first instance by an explicit statement of his reasons for deciding as he did.”
With respect, I agree and would endorse the dictum of Buckley L.J. on the desirability that reasons be given for decisions made even if in strict legal theory there has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should in every case be given for decisions. A litigant who has lost his case and is desirous of appealing deserves to know the reasons for the decision so that he can appeal where a right of appeal exists. Even where he cannot appeal, his confidence in the judicial process and acceptance of the result of the litigation would be largely dependent on the quality of the reasons given for the decision. “Reasoned decisions” according to Professor Wade in Administrative law (4th ed.) at p. 772 “are not only vital for the
[p.894] of [1980] GLR 883 purpose of showing the citizen that he is receiving justice: they are also a valuable discipline for the tribunal itself.”
Granted then, the desirability for reasons to be given for the court’s decisions in most cases, there is nevertheless no practice rule that decisions and reasons should be given on the same date. On the contrary, it is not uncommon for the decision in a case to be announced first and reasons for the decision to be handed down later, as happened in this case. This practice, commonly followed by this court, has the obvious merit of apprising the litigants quickly of the court’s verdict or judgment especially in uncomplicated or straightforward cases.
In the recent case of Au Pui-kuen v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1979] 2 W.L.R. 274, P.C. the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong gave its oral decision in a murder appeal and later placed its reasoned judgment in the court file and a copy of it was supplied to the librarian of the colony’s Supreme Court Library for filing there. It appeared that the contents of the document were never read out in open court nor were the parties supplied with copies or even informed of its existence which, in fact, they only discovered by chance. On appeal, the Privy Council per Lord Diplock held at p. 277, P.C.:
“Their Lordships appreciate that, particularly in criminal cases, it may be desirable, in order to avoid delay, that a court should announce its decision orally at the conclusion of the hearing and state that reasons for the decision will be rendered in writing later. This is a common practice in criminal appeals and an analogous procedure is often adopted by this Board. It is, however, in their Lordships’ view, important if the court proposes to provide written reasons for its decision later (1) that it should announce in open court that such is its intention; (2) that the written reasons when prepared should be ‘handed down’ to the parties or otherwise formally communicated to them; and, if they relate to proceedings that have taken place in open court; (3) that the written reasons should be available for public inspection.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
Presumably, it is partly on account of the delay that may be encountered by the would-be appellant in obtaining a copy of the written reasons, especially where they are handed down after the oral decision, that the various practice rules make provision for the insertion of the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence in the notice of appeal; and for supplementary grounds of appeal to be filed later upon due receipt and consideration of the written reasons. The party aggrieved by the oral
[p.895] of [1980] GLR 883 decision can file his notice of appeal timeously without having to wait for the written reasons and risking being time-barred for lodging the appeal.
In the instant case, time began to run from the date of the final decision of the ordinary bench, that is from 13 February 1979, notwithstanding the fact that the written reasons were delivered subsequently on 29 March 1979. The total maximum time limit allowed in this case for filing an application for extension of time within which to apply for a review is six months; and it expired on 13 August 1979.
It must be stressed in passing that the term “final decision” is used in the above-cited rules in contra-distinction to interlocutory decision; and the test for “finality” in this context is whether the judgment or decision determined the rights of the parties finally. “Final” in this context does not mean the “last” judgment but the judgment determining rights finally such as a preliminary judgment establishing the liability to account and directing accounts to be taken: see Ababio v. Turkson (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 35. In the instant case, it was the “first” decision of 13 February 1979 which finally disposed of the rights of the parties and not the “last” reasoned judgment handed down on 29 March 1979.
The present application for extension of time, having been filed about six weeks belatedly, is statute-barred. The last permissible date was 13 August 1979, i.e. six months from the final decision of 13 February 1979. In my opinion, the applicant has no statutory right to file, and this court lacks statutory power to entertain, an application filed out of time on 27 September 1979, about six weeks late.
The arguments of counsel and the ruling so far have proceeded on the assumption of the existence of the review jurisdiction of the full bench of this court under N.R.C.D. 101, s. 3 at the date of filing of the instant motion, i.e. on 27 September 1979; for it was in the exercise of that special review jurisdiction that N.R.C.D. 101, s. 6 prescribed the procedure contained in C.I. 13. However, the fact is that when this motion was filed on 27 September 1979, the Constitution, 1979, had been promulgated three days earlier, i.e. on 24 September 1979.
The Constitution, 1979, spells out the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in article 122: it is wholly appellate. Thus article 122 (1) vests the Court of Appeal with jurisdiction in “appeals from a judgment, decree or order of the High Court of Justice or a Justice thereof and such other appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by this Constitution or any other law.” (The emphasis is mine.) Again article 121 (2), provides that, “The Court of Appeal shall be
[p.896] of [1980] GLR 883 duly constituted by any three Justices thereof . . .” No mention is made in either article 121 or 122 or elsewhere in the Constitution, 1979, of a review jurisdiction of this court. Neither is provision made by the Constitution for the Court of Appeal to sit as a full bench in the exercise of any review jurisdiction such as was enacted by N.R.C.D. 101, s. 3.
To me the inference is clear: both the court’s review jurisdiction under N.R.C.D. 101 and its corollary power to sit as a full bench have been abolished by the Constitution, 1979. The Constitution is now the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be void and of no effect: see article 1 (2).
The Constitution, 1979, Sched. 1 (transitional provisions), s. 5, however, made a saving for “Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution . . .” and provided that such pending review “shall, subject to section 3 of this Schedule, be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”
As has already been demonstrated, time ran out for the taking of the last possible legal proceedings for a review, namely, an application for extension of time within which to apply for leave, on 13 August 1979. Hence on the date of promulgation of the Constitution, 1979, i.e. 24 September 1979, there were no review proceedings “pending”—actual or potential—whether the word “pending” is given a narrow meaning to connote review proceedings filed and remaining undecided or the broader construction adopted in Awoonor-Renner v. Thensu (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 77 at p. 78, where it was held that “A cause is said to be pending in a Court of Justice when any proceedings can be taken in it”—a test which was applied by the majority of this court in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A. In Ababio v. Tsia (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 24, where under the prevailing rule final leave had to be obtained before lodging an appeal, it was held that “an appeal is not ‘pending’ merely because an application for leave to appeal has been filed. An appeal does not become ‘pending’ until after the final leave has been granted and the appeal itself actually brought.” In that case, the court adopted the test laid down by Mellish L.J. in Sugden v. Leonards (1876) 1 P.D. 209, “Until an appeal is brought there is nothing ‘pending’ before the Court of Appeal.” And also by the Indian case of Hukm Chand C.P.C. 108 in which it was held that:
“The mere applying however for, or obtaining, leave to appeal to the Privy Council cannot of itself amount to the pending of
[p.897] of [1980] GLR 883 an appeal till such appeal is actually filed, for it may happen that the parties who obtain such leave may never appeal at all.”
Whether one applies the narrow or broader meaning of the word “pending,” i.e. “actual” or “potential” review proceedings, it seems to me that there were no “pending” review proceedings on 24 September 1979, the promulgation date of the Constitution, 1979. The six months maximum time limit for the lodging of proceedings for review from the final decision had already lapsed; the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an a application after 13 August 1979 right up to the period immediately before the promulgation of the Constitution, 1979. Both in law and fact there were no review proceedings of any description either filed or capable of being filed within the jurisdiction of the court. That being so, the saving provisions of the Transitional Provisions, ss. 4 and 5, cannot now be invoked to save non-existent or legally incompetent review proceedings. For want of jurisdiction, I would uphold the preliminary objection of the respondent.
In the event, I would dismiss the motion in limine as being incompetent or filed without jurisdiction; and I would award costs in favour of the respondent assessed at ¢500.
JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A.
While I entirely agree with, and fully support, the judgment of my lord, the president; while I also unreservedly affirm the reasoning upon which that judgment is founded; and supporting, furthermore, the result that the learned president proposes, I would like to express my agreement and support with these few general observations of my own, skirting the facts of the case, and going straight on to the issue before this court. That question is this: From which of the two different dates upon which the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal made judicial pronouncements, ought the reckoning of time, for the purposes of an application for enlargement of time for a review, to begin: as from 13 February 1979, when the judgment was delivered and that court’s reasons for its judgment were reserved; or should time be computed to commence to run as from the day on which those reserved reasons were declared, namely, 29 March 1979?
Whenever contesting litigants, before whatever court they appear, throw the object of their controversy into the laps of the judge or magistrate presiding, it is always their prime intention and desire not only that their conflicting interests shall be so thoroughly adjudicated upon as to rightly and properly apportion to each one of them what, in the peculiar circumstances of their dispute, and having due and necessary regard to the law relevant and applicable thereto, must
[p.898] of [1980] GLR 883 be his own; but also equally important to them, that they should be expeditiously informed, by the court, of the decision.
When, therefore, after due investigation and necessary inquiry into all the material incidents, and the pertinent law, the court has judicially considered all the material issues, that court is bound, in law, and at the end of the day, to make known by some pronouncement, either orally or in writing, what its answer is, touching and concerning the matters materially in controversy between the feuding parties. That answer is the court’s judgment, an award, or decision, arrived at by the indispensable mental procedures of the true judicial process.
It is at that point of time that all the silent previous mental debates the learned judge goes through, after his researches, of stance and counter-stance on the res litigosa; of acceptance and rejection of some submission; of doubt and certainty, of assessment and reappraisal, analysis and evaluation; of a shifting of mental postures; of which side to favour, and which side not to; of sifting the evidence and separating the true metal from the dross. It is at that moment in time that the judicial mind and thinking on the essentials of the case, and the determination of the rights and entitlements of the parties, breaks surface and is made known to the whole wide world in the form of his verdict, or judgment. If the declaration of that award aggrieves or dissatisfies one, or other, of the litigating parties, and they accordingly wish to take the matter further by way of an appeal or petition, then it must stand to reason that it is from that moment of truth, when the court puts the sovereign impress of its authoritative declaration upon the relevant issues regarding the rights, entitlements and interests of the parties, that time must certainly begin to run, if and when limits have been set, either procedurally, or in accordance with some statute relevant and applicable to the circumstances of the particular case. Apropos of this, it becomes apposite to make reference to, and to place reliance upon Order 41, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) which states:
“3. Where any judgment is pronounced by the Court or a Judge in Court, the entry of the judgment shall be dated as of the day on which such judgment is pronounced, unless the Court or Judge shall otherwise order, and the judgment shall take effect from that date: provided that by special leave of the Court or a Judge a judgment may be ante-dated or post-dated.”
(The emphasis is mine.) To my mind, therefore, all the practical and legal indications here point irresistibly to this conclusion, namely, that a judgment, with or without reasons, shall be effective from the
[p.899] of [1980] GLR 883 moment of time that it is pronounced, read, taken as read, or handed down.
It is not for nothing, but for sound, practical reasons, that consequential matters and processes flowing from the main judgment, or decision, such as the entry of judgment, the notification to the parties of the said decision, applications for extension of time, have been held to be of prime, earth-shaking importance, having regard to the vital question as to when time begins to run: see Holtby v. Hogdson (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 103, C.A.
Presented by the parties herein with both legal and factual data (as contained in the cold, impersonal print of the record of appeal), from which must be drawn reasonable inferences, such necessary data having been further supplemented by the articulate submissions of learned counsel touching and concerning the matter in controversy before them, their lordships on the ordinary bench were called upon, in accordance with the dictates of natural justice, not only to make up their mind one way or another for or against, the issues before them; but also, and most importantly, the court was expected, at the end of the day and out of a sheer indebtedness to justice, to make known, openly, their thinking upon those issues. This, in my opinion, the ordinary bench did in their judgment of 13 February 1979, when they declared thus:
“We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from together with the order for costs. The costs, if paid, should be refunded to the appellant. In lieu of the judgment we dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant. We award the defendant costs in this court fixed at ¢700. We hereby discharge the order of interim injunction made by the court below on 29 October 1975. We will set out full reasons for our judgment later.”
The cogent and reasonable inference I draw from this judgment is that the plaintiff failed to put forward such an affirmative and inherently strong case as should have won him the day. It is my judgment, therefore, that with the allowance of the appeal before the ordinary bench on 13 February 1979, by that court, the matters in dispute before their lordships, as originated from the pleadings, stood firmly and finally determined. Armed with that final process, therefore, the victorious party could, with bold confidence, move into execution against his vanquished opponent, without waiting to hear, and know, the written and delivered reasons for the ordinary bench’s decision to dismiss his opponent’s case.
When an appeal comes on before a court, and it is heard to finality, the petition either succeeds or fails, that eventuality being
[p.900] of [1980] GLR 883 communicated, almost invariably, to the parties in open court, and time beginning to run as from the date on which the success or failure of the petition is made known publicly, whether the answer the court makes on that day goes with reasons or not. It is a fact defying contradiction, that from time immemorial, it has been the continuing practice of, and in, this court (and, indeed, throughout all the other courts in the land), that the essentials of a judgment are sometimes pronounced first, while the reasons for the decision are then given at a much later date. It is all a matter at once of convenience and expedience. While practice has supported it down the years custom sanctions it without demur. There is no hard and fast law of the Medes and Persians anywhere against the reserving and delivering of reasons long after the judgment itself has been promulgated.
Every judgment can, reasonably conveniently, therefore, be fragmented into two parts: the decision or verdict itself, the crux and kernel of it, and then the reasons for, and in support of, or against, the answer to that inevitable question which always faces every adjudicating body of men, namely: Which of the rival contentions has been so reasonably well made out, having pertinent regard to all the peculiar facts, circumstances or the law or both as to merit and justify success? Reasons, certainly, are a necessary part of a good judgment. But they need not be always given together with, and at the same time as, the “Yes” or the “No,” of the adjudicating court’s thinking on the issues before it.
As Lord Denning lucidly puts it (he was then Sir Alfred) in The Road to Justice (1955) at p. 29:
“. . . in order that a trial should be fair, it is necessary, not only that a correct decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen to be based on reason; and that can be seen, if the judge himself states his reasons.
Furthermore if his reasons are at fault, then they afford a basis on which the party aggrieved by his decision can appeal to a higher court. No judge is infallible, and every system of justice must provide for an appeal to a higher court to correct the errors of the judge below. The cry of Paul ‘I appeal unto Caesar’ represents a deep-seated human response. But no appeal can properly be determined unless the appellate court knows the reason for the decision of the lower court. For that purpose, if for no other, the judge who tries the case must give his reasons.”
[p.901] of [1980] GLR 883
And in Egbe v. R. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 105, the West African Court of Appeal, on this question of reasons for a decision, said, inter alia, at pp. 105-106 that, the judge should express clearly and in detail the conclusions reached, that it must be shown “that the reasoning and mental processes by which the judge reached his conclusions were such as to conform with the requirements of the law.” And that is precisely what the ordinary bench did. It gave a judgment with reasons, on 13 February 1979, adequate enough to have no one in any doubt as to why it had decided, after its necessary excogitative judicial exercise, to “allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from.” It is because the ordinary bench stood convinced, at the end of the day, that the judgment of the trial circuit judge was wrong, not according with the justice of the case, that they vacated that judgment. That, in essence, was the outcome of their contemplation. When, therefore, the judgment of 13 February 1979, fell from the lips of His Lordship the Chief Justice (as being the decision of the court of three), their lordships’ mind had been made up as to the rights, interests and entitlements of the parties before them. And that thinking was made manifest on, and as from that day.
Whatever they later and subsequently said by way of their “full reasons,” on 29 March 1979, was to my mind, to be looked at and taken merely as the whys and wherefores of their united decisions to upset the judgment of the trial court. It is my opinion, therefore, that since the main and essential decision was declared on 13 February 1979, that is the date wherefrom time for any subsequent or consequential applications or both must be reckoned; certainly not from 29 March 1979, the day on which the ordinary bench’s decision was more fully expatiated upon to point to “the reasoning and mental processes” whereby their lordships’ decision was reached.
As I see it, while the immediate motive of their lordships in the Court of Appeal on 13 February 1979, was to inform both the applicant and the respondent herein of what their mind and answer were, concerning the issues submitted for appellate scrutiny and investigation; the ulterior or succeeding intent was, subsequently on 29 March 1979, to provide an insight into the mechanics they employed to arrive at their decision to throw out and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, and damages for trespass.
Added to all this, I am fully persuaded to the view, having carefully read and considered the affidavits of both parties herein for and against the application seeking for extension of time, that not enough good faith has been shown by the applicant, or at all. She has failed to put forward a sufficiently strong answer, or at all, to the
[p.902] of [1980] GLR 883 respondent’s sworn allegation that she has come thus far to this upper court, and intends to go further, simply to frustrate and render nugatory the sweets of his well-deserved victory over her.
It is for these reasons therefore, coupled with those valid ones so competently set forth by my brother Anin, that I firmly and unreservedly cast my vote in favour of the respondent herein declaring, in the process, that time be not enlarged to enable the applicant to seek a review of the ordinary bench’s competent and conclusive judgment. There must be an end, a decisive finality, to litigation.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.
On 22 November 1977, the Circuit Court, Accra, gave a judgment in favour of the plaintiff-applicant (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) for the recovery of possession of a piece of land, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass.
The defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal gave its judgment or decision on 13 February 1979 reserving its reasons therefor. The court delivered the reasons for the judgment or decision on 29 March 1979. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered judgment in favour of the respondent.
The applicant claims to be aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Appeal. She now applies to the Court of Appeal for extension of time within which to apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal for a review of that judgment. That is the application now before this court. In her affidavit the applicant claims:
“(5) That the circuit court by its judgment dated 22 November 1977 held that I had proved the customary grant made to me by the Sempe stool.
(6) The Court of Appeal itself held that “It was common ground that the area verged green is part of the Lartebiokorshie land the allodial title of which was adjudged in the Yao Duade Crabbe case to be vested in the Sempe stool. This judgment was given on 31 July 1970. The respondent gave evidence accepted by the judge that that stool made a customary grant of the area edged green to her in the ‘early sixties.’ (7) That the respondent never pleaded any title from the Sempe stool.
(8) That the Court of Appeal, in the face of the above, however, held that ‘the only inference apparent to commonsense, is that either that stool or anyone with authority to alienate made the original grant to J.
B. Quartey in 1899.’
[p.903] of [1980] GLR 883
(9) That the judgment of the Court of Appeal has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
(10) That after obtaining a copy of the judgment, I found it difficult to locate the counsel who conducted the case for me both in the trial court and the Court of Appeal because he was a candidate in the last general elections held in June 1979 and therefore I could not file my application for review within time.
(11) That I have now engaged the services of another counsel.”
In his affidavit in opposition to the application the respondent stated:
“(3) That the application is not made in good faith as much as it is time-barred.
(4) That I am advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that by virtue of N.R.C.D. 101, s.
6 the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 3 of the said N.R.C.D. 101.
(5) That I am again advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that by virtue of C.I. 13 the time limit within which to bring an application for leave for extension of time is three months after the expiry of the initial three months from the date of the judgment.
(6) That judgment in the substantive appeal was given on 13 February 1979 and the applicant had up to 13 August 1979 to bring the application herein.
(7) That I am advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that by virtue of the order aforesaid the judgment of the court becomes operative from 13 February 1979 regardless of whether the reasons for judgment were read later.
(8) That the applicant only brought the application because I have instituted an action against her at the High Court claiming damages as a result of her having obtained an injunction against myself at the lower court thus inconveniencing me unnecessarily as far as my completion of my building is concerned.
(9) That if the applicant ‘found it difficult to locate the counsel who conducted the case for [her] both in the trial court and the Court of Appeal because he was a candidate in the last general elections held in June 1979’ as she alleges, she could have contacted other lawyers
[p.904] of [1980] GLR 883 as she did her present lawyer soon after I served her with the writ and statement of claim.
(10) That the applicant has not given sufficient reason for her delay in bringing the application.”
Counsel for the applicant argued that the “order given on 13 February, 1979, was yet to be perfected. A court should not give a judgment without reasons in a civil matter.” He would go on to say that assuming a High Court judge gave an order and reserved judgment and he died, the judgment would be without reasons and therefore an appellant would not have anything on which to go by on appeal except, perhaps, to file a notice of appeal. The position here, he contended, was that decisions were given and judgments later read. That practice, he said, was not common. He thought there was a vast difference between an appeal and a review.
He contended that when the Constitution, 1969, came into force, the Court of Appeal issued a Practice Note which said that reviews were not appeals. And one would not ask for a review without knowing the grounds of the decision. “In other words the effectiveness of what could be done would depend on the judgment,” he said, relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England (2nd ed.), Vol. 19, para. 553 at p. 246:
“Where on an appeal to the House of Lords the decision of the Court of first instance and of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and judgment is, for the first time, directed to be entered in favour of any litigant party by the House of Lords, the date which that judgment bears is, in the absence of any direction by the House, the date when the order is made.”
Counsel for the respondent argued that a judgment is a pronouncement on the rights of the parties to an action which had come up before the court for decision. Once that decision had been given, then that was a judgment and the fact that reasons were given later did not affect the position at all. In his view, a final decision, for the purposes of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), r. 8 would be 13 February 1979 and not 29 March 1979. The decision of the court given on 13 February 1979, set aside the judgment appealed from and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The court entered judgment for the defendant. The injunction was also discharged. But those, he thought, were consequential matters.
In support of his arguments counsel for the respondent relied on Order 41, r. 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), The English Annual Practice, 1970 p. 567, Holtby v. Hodgson (1890), 24 Q.B.D. 103 at p. 107. Those were in respect of when a
[p.905] of [1980] GLR 883 judgment takes effect. On the question of the limitations imposed on courts in respect of applications for extension of time counsel for the respondent relied on Loga v. Davordzi [1966] G.L.R. 530, S.C.; Nye v. Nye [1967] G.L.R. 76, C.A. (full bench); West African Express Ltd. v. Beger, Court of Appeal, 3 February 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 55 and R. T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. v. Amponsah, Court of Appeal, 16 June 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 100. On the question of non-compliance with rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, counsel relied on Moore v. Tayee (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242 at p. 242 and on appeal reported in (1943) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C.
The point at issue in this case is a simple one: For the purposes of C.I. 13, r. 8 (4), when does time begin to run? And not one of the authorities cited is of any assistance at all to me. In its application to the instant case, does time begin to run from 13 February 1979, or does time begin to run from 29 March 1979?
On 13 February 1979, after the hearing of the appeal, the following statement was made in the record book as the judgment of this court:
“We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from together with the order for costs. The costs, if paid should be refunded to the appellant. In lieu of the judgment we dismiss the plaintiff’s claim and enter judgment for the defendant. We award the defendant costs in the court below assessed at ¢600 and costs in this court fixed at ¢700.
We hereby discharge the order of interim injunction . . . made by the court below on 29 October 1975. We will set out full reasons for our judgment later.”
On 29 March 1979, this court read the judgment, or the reasons for the judgment, of the court, the last paragraph of which states:
“In our opinion, on the totality of the evidence given to the court, the learned judge ought to have found in the appellant’s favour both on the issue of title and the consequential question of trespass. As he found otherwise, we thought his judgment was wrong and we accordingly set it aside on 13 February last.”
I have deliberately used the expression “or the reasons for the judgment” because the word “Judgment” appears at the head of the reasons for the judgment. We did not allow counsel for the applicant to make an issue of this.
To all intents and purposes, one would have thought that that would be the end of the matter. It did not so end. The applicant before this court—who was the plaintiff in the original suit—is:
“praying for an order for extension of time within which to apply to the full bench of the Court of Appeal for review of
[p.906] of [1980] GLR 883 the judgment of the Court of Appeal in this appeal dated 29 March 1979 . . .”
There are two issues raised on the affidavit in support of the application: The one relates to the crux of the whole application as already indicated, the issue as to when time begins to run. The other relates to the issue of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in its capacity as a review court.
Rule 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment)
Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), states:
“(1) Subject to any enactment for the time being in force, no appeal shall be brought after the expiration of fourteen days in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, or of three months in the case of an appeal against a final decision unless, in the case of an appeal against a final decision, the Court below or the Court enlarges the time.
(2) The prescribed period within which an appeal may be brought shall, in the case of an appeal as of right, be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against, and, in a case where there is no appeal as of right, be calculated from the date on which special leave to appeal is granted.
(3) An appeal shall be deemed to have been brought when the notice of the appeal has been filed in the Registry of the Court below.
(4) No application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the time prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be brought.
Every such application (whether made within the time prescribed within which an appeal may be brought or not) must be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application and by grounds of appeal which prima facie, show good cause for leave to be granted; and when time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 28 of these rules, no application shall be made to the Court for extension of time within which to appeal at any time later than six months after the date of the decision appealed against, in the case of an appeal as of right or, in a case where there is no appeal as of right, later than six months after the date on which special leave to appeal is granted.
(6) For the purpose of sub-rule (4) of this rule and of the said rule 28, where a person has applied to the
Court below for enlargement of time in which to appeal and a period of not less
[p.907] of [1980] GLR 883 than one month has passed since the time when the said application was made without the court below having granted or refused the application the court below shall be deemed to have refused to grant the application and the applicant shall thereupon, subject to sub-rule (5) of this rule, be entitled to have the application determined by the Court.”
Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), relied upon by both counsel states:
“8. (1) subject to the provisions of any enactment governing the same a civil appeal shall be lodged within,
(a) fourteen days, in the case of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, or
(b) three months, in the case of an appeal against a final decision, unless in the case of an appeal against a final decision, the Court extends the period within which an appeal may be lodged.
(2) The periods specified in the preceding sub-rule shall, (a) in the case of an appeal as of right, be calculated from the date of the decision appealed against, and
(b) in any other case, be calculated from the date on which leave is granted.
(3) A civil appeal shall be deemed to have been lodged when the notice of appeal has been filed.
(4) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal in respect of a final decision shall not be made after the expiration of three months from the expiration of the period prescribed by this rule within which an appeal may be lodged.
(5) An application for the extension of time within which to lodge an appeal shall be supported by an affidavit,
(a) stating that leave has been granted where necessary, and the date of the leave,
(b) setting forth good and substantial reasons for the application, and
(c) giving the grounds of appeal which, prima facie, show good cause that the appeal is of substance.
(6) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) of this rule where a person has applied to the Court below for an extension of time within which to lodge a civil appeal and a period of not less than one month has expired since the time when the said application was made without the Court below having granted
[p.908] of [1980] GLR 883 or refused the application, the applicant shall be entitled to move the Court to have the application determined by the Court.,”
Counsel were agreed that for the purposes of the instant application the total period is six months. The bone of contention is the operative date—13 February 1979 or 29 March 1979.
These rules tell their own tale. But there is a distinction. Whereas the 1962 Rules use simpliciter the word “decision” in rule, 10 (2), the 1970 Rules use the words “final decision” in rule 8 (4). The word “decision” has two meanings: On one hand, it denotes a judicial act or a judicial declaration. On the other, it denotes the determination of a specific issue in a cause or matter, such as a question of law or a question of fact.
I am here dealing with the first meaning of the word, that is to say, a judicial declaration. For a judicial decision to operate as the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, it must be a final decision. I hasten to add that a judicial decision may be a judgment, a decree, an award, a declaration, an order, or even a certificate of the court. The important matter, for our purposes, is that it is final. When then, is a judicial decision final? It seems to me that finality has been reached in any particular case when the judicial act of the court in question (as stated by Spencer-Bower and Turner in The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2nd ed.), p. 132, para. 164):
“. . . leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter, in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review, or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it.”
(The emphasis is mine.) In Au Pui-Kuen v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1979] 2 W.L.R. 274, a case in which a court did not give reasons for its judgment, the Privy Council stated at pp. 278-279:
“In the instant case, their Lordships do not know all the factors that the majority of the Court of Appeal took into account in reaching their decision of February 17, 1977, that there should be a new trial; for neither at that time nor thereafter have they given their reasons for it. If a new trial is to be ordered it is often the case that in the interests of justice at the fresh trial, the less said by the Court of Appeal, the better. In the absence of disclosed reasons their Lordships can infer that the Court of Appeal took into account the matters urged upon them by counsel for the defendant . . .”
[p.909] of [1980] GLR 883
In the instant application, the question of an inference to be drawn does not arise. But the decision in Au Pui-Kuen v. Attorney-General Hong Kong (supra) at p. 278, P.C. is instructive on the question of the importance of the reasons for a judgment or a decision of a court. For the dominant purpose of all our efforts to do justice between man and man is subserved by this idea of the binding force of a precedent. It is only where precedents fail us that we must have recourse to some other help, to some other enlightenment. A judgment is thus not much of a help without the reasons therefor.
When this court, on 13 February 1979, made known its judgment in the case, had it finally disposed of the matter? It had to sit again on 29 March 1979, to finally dispose of the matter. The parties would be interested to come to court again to hear what the court had to say on the matter, to learn of the reasons for the judgment so as to determine what to do, despite the fact that the judgment of the court had been given. The case therefore did not end on 13 February 1979. That fact cannot be challenged. Between 13 February 1979 and 29 March 1979, this court had to busy itself with certain events which culminated in the judicial act which determined the matter on 29 March 1979. The expression used by the court, “we will set out full reasons for our judgment later” clearly shows that this court was still in possession of the matter and had not finally dealt with the matter. By this court’s own showing there remained some act on its part which would give finality to the determination of the matter before it. In other words, when on 13 February 1979, this court stated that it “will set out full reasons later,” it had left the reasons for the judgment to be ascertained later by the parties. The judgment was, therefore, not absolute. It was not complete. It was therefore not a final decision. I doubt whether this court would, in the circumstances, change its mind. But I would not rule out the possibility, in an appropriate case, of a modification. I can foresee a situation where if a trial court had said, simpliciter, the “The plaintiff wins,” eye-brows would be raised. And this court will definitely “have a thing or two to say” about the decision, if not about the justice responsible for the decision.
Is this court then permitted to do what it would condemn in a subordinate court? I should think not! We have in these courts—I am not an exception—been giving decisions, the reasons for which are later pronounced. It has been a long standing practice from the days of the West African Court of Appeal. Perhaps the West African Court of Appeal took a cue from the Privy Council. But the constitutional position is that the Privy Council advised the Sovereign. Hence the information to the parties of its decision. I am inclined to
[p.910] of [1980] GLR 883 the view, then, now that this matter has been raised, that we should not allow a common error to pass as current law. But that is quite a different matter.
The Privy Council, for our purposes, means the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It was, and still is an advisory body. It advised the Sovereign. That explains its practice of informing the parties to an appeal before it of the advice that it would tender to the Sovereign. This practice of letting the parties know of the decisions before advice is formally tendered seems to me to be the origin of our practice of sometimes—not always—giving our decisions immediately after an appeal has been argued, the reasons for which are later made known. I need to emphasise that, strictly, the constitutional theory is that a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is not an actual judgment. It is an advice—merely an advice—to the Sovereign. Hence the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is not bound by its own previous “decisions.”
Moreover, omne majus continent in se minus—the greater contains the less. The decision of a court of law on the issues before it is a conclusion, a consequence of the reasoning of the court. It is not the other way round. As I understand the procedure of these courts, we often rely on what we call the ratio decidendi of a case. It is part of the life of the law in these courts.
Until the Supreme Court dissents from a decision of the Court of Appeal, the decisions of the Court of Appeal constitute binding precedents for all other courts. Hence the provisions of clause (3) of article 121 of the Constitution, 1979, requires the Court of Appeal to “. . . be bound by its own previous decisions and all Courts inferior to the Court of Appeal shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Court of Appeal on questions of law.”
The law was the same before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. I am here dealing in this case with pure questions of law. And what happened on 13 February 1979, cannot be described as a binding precedent. The judgment on 29 March 1979 could be so described in so far as it dealt with any question of law. I must, therefore, emphasise a very fundamental rule, which seems to me self-evident, that the value of a judgment depends upon the significance of its ratio decidendi. I appreciate that what is important, as far as the parties are concerned is the decision of the court. But I appreciate more that what is required of this court, and for that matter of all other courts of competent jurisdiction, is the weight that can be attached to the judgment of the court.
[p.911] of [1980] GLR 883
That judgment is incomplete without a ratio decidendi, that is to say, “the general principle which runs through the case and governs the decision of it,” Illumination in these courts can only come by a process of analysis and synthesis of our judgments. And that is dependent upon the ratio decidendi of our judgments.
There is a distinction. In other words, there can be no valid judgment without reasons. And I would proceed from there and say that until the ratio decidendi is made available there is no final judicial determination of the cause or matter before the court. The decision of the court is based upon the judgment of the court. I do not entertain the slightest doubt that what transpired on 13 February 1979 was a provisional judgment, conditional upon the delivery of the final judgment or the reasons for the judgment which finally took place on 29 March 1979. Until this court completed its work on 29 March 1979, time, in my view, did not begin to run.
The next issue raised on the application is whether there could be such an application at all, that is to say, an application seeking a review by the full bench of the Court of Appeal, of a decision of the Court of Appeal?
The superior court of judicature now comprises the High Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. This is based on article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979. It seems to me that on the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, any enactment establishing or otherwise dealing with the full bench of the Court of Appeal, became inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution relating to the judiciary. And as such, under the provisions of article 1 (3) of the Constitution, became “void and of no effect.” There could, therefore, be no application now to the full bench of the Court of Appeal for a review. The simple reason is that there is now no such court as the full bench.
But counsel for the applicant seeks to rely on section 3 of Part III of the First Schedule to the Constitution and on article 117 (2). On this matter, I think, myself, that the reliance is misconceived. This court is not sitting now as the Court of Appeal, the decisions of which are subject to review by the full bench. This court is sitting now as the Court of Appeal established under the provisions of’ article 114 (5) of the Constitution. It is a court subordinate, not to the full bench of the Court of Appeal. It is a court subordinate to the Supreme Court. I thus have my doubts whether the application is properly before us.
Section 5 of the First Schedule to the Constitution, 1979, states:
“5. Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this
[p.912] of [1980] GLR 883
Constitution shall, subject to section 3 of this Schedule be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”
This transitional provision, does, I think, reinforce my view that there is no full bench, now, of the Court of Appeal to which an application could be made. There could, therefore, in my view, be no application for a review by the full bench.
I readily concede that this court can be duly constituted to sit as the Supreme Court under section 3 (1) of Part III of the First Schedule to the Constitution. This court as so constituted would consist of three justices as provided under clause (2) of article 121 of the Constitution. And an application before it would be an application to the Supreme Court as so constituted pursuant to the provisions of section 3 (1) of Part III of the First Schedule to the Constitution. And not an application to this court qua the Court of Appeal.
The argument of counsel for the applicant presupposes that this court is sitting as the Supreme Court by virtue of the provisions of section 3 (1) of Part III of the First Schedule to the Constitution. Counsel for the respondent has made the same assumption. This court is not so sitting. It was not constituted as such. If it were, this court as presently constituted would not have dealt with other cases which could not, by any stretch of the imagination be considered as applications or appeals to the Supreme Court. I am not aware that this court is constituted as the Supreme Court. And the application before us does not so state.
But this second issue raised on the application now before this court was not argued in the light in which I have sought to deal with the matter. I have not had the benefit of the assistance of counsel on this issue. In Abdilmasih v. Amarh [1972] 2 G.L.R. 414, C.A. this court dealt with a matter in which the trial judge had relied on an Act of Parliament. Counsel did not argue the matter. This court, per Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) stated at pp. 425-426:
“Before giving consideration to the substantive argument, it is, I think, necessary to dispose of a pleading point. The defendant did not herself plead the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2). The question therefore is, whether the judge was entitled in his discretion to accord her that statutory relief. In Hammond v. Odoi, High Court, 23 October 1967, unreported, I, as trial judge, expressed obiter the view that a judge could, in, a deserving case, grant that relief whether or not that relief was sought by way of pleading. Although differing from me on other points, Azu Crabbe J.A.
[p.913] of [1980] GLR 883
(as he then was) in Odoi v. Hammond [1971] 2 G.L.R. 375 at p. 392, C.A. also obiter, concurred in that view of the matter on appeal. Since that judgment, I have reflected further over the matter and by and large adhere to that view. The Act was passed to meet a social need and its policy objective ought not to be hemmed in by technical procedural rules. Nevertheless, I think that where the Act was not in fact pleaded, the judge, if he thought the facts justify the invocation of that remedy, should either invite the defendant to plead the Act or at least draw the plaintiff’s attention to its provisions so that the latter may, if he chose, meet it either by evidence or further cross-examination of the defendant. Such a course will accord with the philosophy which informs all our procedural rules, namely, the prevention of surprise to the other side.
The reason why I thought this slight qualification of my earlier view necessary, is demonstrated by the singular circumstances of this case. The case before the trial judge proceeded on the unmistakable basis that if the plaintiff succeeded in his claim for declaration of title, the ancillary reliefs of possession and damages would follow as a matter of course. Indeed counsel for the defendant himself put it in biblical metaphor. He said in his address: ‘If the plaintiff succeeds on the first relief, then having sought the kingdom of God, all other things shall be added unto it, namely, the other reliefs sought.’ It is the more so in this case where the defendant gave an undertaking to the court that she would restore the land to the plaintiff, if the issue of title was decided against her. The issue of title was indeed decided against her but the judge suo motu, granted her relief under Act 2 of 1960 and declined to accord the plaintiff that remedy. I think the invocation of this Act must have come as a complete surprise to the parties; to the plaintiff, it would have been a painful, to the defendant, a pleasant one. I think the course which I suggest, would, if followed, avoid the surprise which both parties must have felt in this case. If, of course, the defendant expressly pleads the Act, it is better still.”
Apaloo J.A. stated further at pp. 428-429:
“Although the learned judge examined this case with great care and transparently endeavoured to hold the scales fairly and evenly between the parties, on the question whether or not the defendant was entitled to the relief provided by Act 2 of 1960, he slipped and we ought to put him right.”
[p.914] of [1980] GLR 883
In this application, I would consider that a situation somewhat similar to the above case has arisen. Counsel did not raise the matter in the light in which I have raised it. Nor did the court, in the course of the arguments before it, draw the attention of counsel to this issue. And I would agree, if it were argued, that I had taken the parties by surprise. The Constitution, 1979, is the fundamental law of the land. It is still in its infant stages. For the development of our law, therefore, it is absolutely essential that issues which verge on constitutional matters are fully argued. No invitation was extended to counsel so that this matter could be well argued.
This application raises a novel issue as to when time begins to run. Does time begin to run from the date when the court gives a judgment or a decision, without assigning any reasons therefor? Or does time begin to run from the date the reasons for the judgment or decision are given? The novelty of the issue demands that an authoritative statement of the law is pronounced on the matter. Besides this novelty, the second issue is a constitutional one. And the Supreme Court is the appropriate court to deal with questions of constitutionality.
In all the circumstances, therefore, of this application I would allow the application and grant the extension of time sought. I give the applicant fourteen days from the date of this ruling within which to set her house in order.
DECISION
Preliminary objection upheld.
Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
