IN RE WEREKO (DECD.); WEREKO vs. ARMAR AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 849
10 January 1980 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 12 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Akrong v. Bulley [1965] G.L.R. 469, S.C.
(2) Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234; 56 L.T. 220; 56 L.J.Ch. 707; 35 W.R. 143, C.A.
(3) Bonsu v. State Insurance Corporation [1977] 1 G.L.R. 303, C.A.
(4) Fakaa v. Duah [1966] G.L.R. 394.
(5) Yeboah v. Mackenzie, Court of Appeal, 2 February 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 103.
(6) Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157; [1941] 1 All E.R. 7; 164 L.T. 290; 57 T.L.R. 177; 84 S.J.
703, H.L.
(7) Peacock v. Amusement Equipment Co., Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 347; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 288; [1954] 2 All E.R. 689; 98 S.J. 523, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for damages for negligence which resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s daughter. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Nunoo for the plaintiff.
R. K. Apaloo for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
By his amended writ, the plaintiff, for and on behalf of the estate of Olivia Sarpong Wereko (deceased), has sued the defendants claiming general damages against them jointly and severally for negligence which resulted in the death of his daughter, Olivia Sarpong Wereko. Her death was occasioned by the collision of an omnibus and a taxi-cab driven by the first and third defendants, respectively. The defendants have not contested their liability in [p.851] of [1980] GLR 849
negligence and the only issue outstanding for determination is the quantum of damages, if any, which is awardable. The plaintiff’s daughter, Olivia, was 21 years old when she died on 21 July 1976. She was educated at the Holy Trinity Secondary School where she sat for and passed the G.C.E. “O” level examination. Thereafter she entered a commercial college and sat for the R.S.A. examination in commerce, shorthand and typing. She had, before her death, gained temporary employment at the Electricity Corporation on a salary of ¢124 per month. She also had the prospect of a permanent appointment with the Agricultural Development Bank. She was on her way to Takoradi to find out the result of her “grading” test when she was involved in this fatal accident. She was survived by a ten-month old baby daughter. The plaintiff has sued the second defendants, the Omnibus Service Authority, as the masters of the first defendant and the fourth defendants, the State Insurance Corporation, as the underwriters of policies of insurance covering both vehicles at the time of the accident.
The defendants’ counsel has, in his address, challenged the capacity whereby the plaintiff has brought the action. His contention is that the plaintiff’s capacity is not disclosed either in the writ or in the statement of claim. Counsel further argued that if by the subsequent amendment of the title of the suit the plaintiff now pretends to sue in a representative capacity then it must fail as the amendment does not show that he has obtained any letters of administration and, even if he had obtained one before his amendment, as the writ was a nullity it could not be saved by the purported amendment. The defendants’ counsel found his submissions on want of capacity fully bottomed in the decision in Akrong v. Bulley [1965] G.L.R. 469, S.C. When judgment was yet to be delivered a motion was brought on behalf of the fourth defendants praying that this court sets aside the service of the writ of summons against them principally for misjoinder. The main reason for this late application was, of course, the alleged discovery by the fourth defendants that the second defendants were in breach of the licence-clause of their policy by allowing the first defendant, aged 22 at the time of the accident, to drive the omnibus. It was argued on behalf of the fourth defendants that as they were not liable to the plaintiff in tort they could not be joined to the other defendants who were the tortfeasors. It was further contended that the fourth defendants were joined on the assumption that they were liable to indemnify the second defendants for the tortious liability of their servant, but that as there was no basis for such indemnity the joinder of the fourth defendants should be set aside.
[p.852] of [1980] GLR 849
In regard to the motion to set aside the writ against the fourth defendants, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to the motion and the argument advanced by his counsel in support of his affidavit afford sufficient answer to the application. In paragraph (1) of the joint defence filed on their behalf the defendants admitted that subject to proof of the alleged injury, loss and damage, the plaintiff was entitled to damages against them and that they would not contest the issue of liability. Whereupon the plaintiff subsequently moved for and obtained an interlocutory judgment against them. By that judgment the issue of liability became concluded and closed. I accordingly agree with the plaintiff’s counsel that even if the fourth defendants have good grounds to set aside the writ, they should have first moved to set aside the interlocutory judgment. But their tardy discovery that the second defendants were in breach of the policy of insurance can hardly be any good ground to disturb the interlocutory judgment, if there was such an application before the court. Before the court will accept fresh evidence which has come to light subsequently as a ground to set aside a judgment the court must be satisfied that the alleged fresh evidence is material and that it could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before the judgment: see Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 56 L.T. 220, C.A. The recent Court of Appeal decision in Bonsu v. State Insurance Corporation [1977] 1 G.L.R. 303, C.A. should also stifle the last breath, in prayer, of the applicants. That case came before the Court of Appeal from a circuit court where the court below had dismissed the plaintiff’s action against the State Insurance Corporation (who had been joined as co-defendants) on the grounds that their liability only arose after the plaintiff had successfully obtained judgment against the insured tortfeasor and not before and that the joinder was, accordingly, wrong. The Court of Appeal had no inhibitions in allowing the plaintiff’s appeal on several grounds, of which the outstanding grounds were:
“(a) that of estoppel or waiver because (as stated at p. 308) ‘By filing a counterclaim, the co-defendants demonstrated that their joinder was not defective’ and that (b) as stated at p. 306) ‘the circuit judge introduced for the first time a matter that had not been canvassed throughout the whole case either on the pleadings or on the evidence.”
Mr. Enoch D. Kom, who has come out with a critique in an article (see (1977) 9 R.G.L. 154) on the decision in Bonsu v. State Insurance Corporation (supra) mercifully acknowledges that these two were sound reasons for upsetting the judgment of the circuit judge. In
[p.853] of [1980] GLR 849
like manner the fourth defendants, by submitting to interlocutory judgment and without raising any issue of misjoinder in their defence, are estopped from challenging their joinder.
The objections to the plaintiff’s capacity to sue which the defendants’ counsel canvassed for the first time in his address must also be rejected, even if they were maintainable, for the simple reason that these matters were not pleaded. The decision in Akrong v. Bulley (supra) in which counsel for the defendants found so much relish is, in my view, quite inapplicable. The action in that case was founded upon the United Kingdom Fatal Accident Acts, 1846-64 wherein the limitation period within which to sue was twelve calendar months. When the plaintiff therefore took out the letters of administration to cure the defect in her capacity the period had run out and the writ was, accordingly, held a nullity. The Fatal Accident Acts are no longer statutes of general application with us. The limitation period prescribed by our Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), s. 16 (6) is that “the action should be commenced within three years after the death.” The plaintiff’s daughter died on 21 July 1976 and the plaintiff’s motion to amend the title of his suit by inserting after his name the words “for and on behalf of the estate of Olivia Sarpong Wereko, deceased” was allowed on 20 July 1979. Thus the plaintiff had a very close shave in amending the title of his writ within the statutory period of limitation. In my view the argument about want of capacity to sue fails. In his supporting affidavit to the motion the plaintiff deposed that the action is a representative one and on behalf of the estate of the deceased. That presupposes that the plaintiff must have taken out letters of administration in respect of the estate of her deceased daughter. The plaintiff, indeed, did not plead this matter but this court can take judicial notice of its own proceedings which granted letters of administration to the plaintiff.
Quite apart from this amendment of the title which sought to rectify the plaintiff’s capacity to sue, the writ was not a nullity before the amendment was made as contended. This is because the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action in his own right. In Fakaa v. Duah [1966] G.L.R. 394 it was held that persons who fell within the term “member of family” as defined by section 15 of the Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), were entitled to maintain an action under the Act without proof of any loss and that damages could, however, be recovered only on behalf of or for the benefit of those who had actually suffered loss. This was a decision of the High Court. One of the serious points of law canvassed on appeal in Yeboah v. MacKenzie, Court of Appeal, 2 February 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 103 was that the plaintiff’s writ was a nullity ab initio because he lacked the capacity to sue at the date of the
[p.854] of [1980] GLR 849 institution of the suit. This was, according to the appellant’s counsel, because the plaintiff was neither an administrator of the deceased nor a dependent. Whilst conceding that an action under the Civil Liability Act, 1963, could be brought by a personal representative, the court also recognised that in certain cases a dependent could also institute the action provided that he was a dependent in relation to the person whose death was caused by the wrongful act, as defined by section 15 as well as the First Schedule to Act 176. By this the plaintiff, who is a father of the deceased, had a statutory capacity to bring the action for himself and also for the other dependents of the deceased. Here again the court ruled that if such a dependent failed by evidence to show that the death of the deceased resulted in any pecuniary loss to himself he could not recover anything. The plaintiff has disclosed by his supporting affidavit that he is not suing for himself and he has, indeed, led no evidence to the contrary. By an earlier amendment to his statement of claim, as also by his evidence in court, the plaintiff disclosed that his deceased daughter was survived by a daughter, Janet Abena Agyeiwa, who was born on 16 September 1975 and for whom, as disclosed in his affidavit, he wanted to obtain adequate maintenance.
The defendants must certainly be liable in damages for the loss of expectation of life of Olivia. For a young woman who had gone through secondary education and learned some vocation on top of that, there can be no doubt that she had before her the prospects of predominantly happy days which were cut short at 21 years. At least there is no evidence to the contrary. The conventional figure for such a loss, re-asserted in Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157, H.L., has not exceeded £500. Taking my guide from this conventional figure and making a modest but proper adjustment to it because of the change in the value of the cedi in the money market, I would award ¢3,000 damages under this head. The Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), also permits a claim for funeral expenses just as it does for loss of expectation of life. There is no evidence on how much was spent on her funeral. Undoubtedly some expenses were made in transporting the body to her hometown in a coffin and on other necessary items. I would award under this head ¢1,000. In awarding this sum, I of course, discountenance any gratuitous donations see: Peacock v. Amusement Equipment Co., Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 347, C.A. At 21 years, Olivia could reasonably be expected to have maintained her earning capacity until the age of 55, that is, a further 34 years. Her daughter, who was aged ten months on her death, thereby lost her dependency on her mother. Her lost years are 20 which I will reckon as her years of purchase. As noted before
[p.855] of [1980] GLR 849
she was on a temporary employment and her salary was ¢124 per month. She had the immediate prospect of employment as a stenographer for which she had trained. It was conceded by the defendants’ counsel that a stenographer’s salary as obtains in the Civil Service can be applied as the criterion to the earning power of the deceased. It is well known that a stenographer grade II is on the salary range of R.25 whilst a grade I stenographer is on the salary range of R.35,40. These stenographers, like other employees in the Civil Service, have enjoyed occasional review of their salaries since the Mills Odoi Commission laid down salary ranges. Out of her salary which she had hoped to earn as a stenographer (I use the expression “she had hoped” advisedly because Olivia died just as she was about to be launched in her career) she would reasonably have maintained her daughter on ¢3 a day. The daughter’s dependency would then have been ¢90 per month or ¢1,080 per annum. Applying therefore to the annual benefit the “multiplier” or the “years of purchase” the loss of dependency will be ¢1,080 x 20, i.e. ¢21,600. Having regard to the unpredictable contingencies of this mortal life I would tax down this figure by one-third to the round sum of ¢14,000.
In the result, I give judgment to the plaintiff (and against the defendants jointly and severally) in the sum of ¢18,000 which is made up:
Loss of expectation of life = ¢ 3,000 Funeral expenses = 1,000 Loss of dependency of Janet Abena Agyeiwaa = 14,000 ______ Total = ¢18,000 ______ I award to the plaintiff ¢600 costs. The bulk of the damages awarded, i.e. ¢14,000 is for the benefit of an infant and, as it was done in Yeboah v. MacKenzie (supra), this court must play its paternalistic role and save the infant’s money from dissipation. I, accordingly, order that the defendants do pay into court the whole of the damages and costs awarded. Out of this amount I authorise the registrar of this court to pay to the plaintiff the ¢4,000 (representing loss of expectation of life and funeral expenses) and pay also to the plaintiff the ¢600 costs awarded. The sum of ¢2,000 should also be paid out of the sum in respect of the infant’s dependency to the plaintiff to be applied by him for the infant’s maintenance. I order the registrar of this court to forward the balance of ¢12,000 to the public trustee who shall be at liberty to invest the same in a safe security in Ghana and to utilise such part of the trust fund or interest or both as, in his [p.856] of [1980] GLR 849 discretion, shall be adequate for providing reasonable maintenance and education of the child until she attains 21 years or gets married.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.
Damages awarded for negligence.
S. O. K. O.
