MANSAH AND ANOTHER vs. DONKOR [1980] GLR 825
11 January 1980 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 13 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 10Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Badoo v. Ampung (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 439.
(2) Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218.
(3) Gblevi Family v. Amanie (Practice Note) [1961] G.L.R. 1, C.A.
(4) Barko v. Mustapha [1964] G.L.R. 78, S.C.
(5) Oppong Kofi v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174, S.C.
(6) Asare v. Teing [1960] G.L.R. 155.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the judgment of a trial magistrate court in favour of the plaintiff in an action for damages for trespass to land. It is unnecessary to state the facts.
COUNSEL
Osei Owusu-Afriyie for the appellants.
W. K. Ackun for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court Grade II, Offinso, delivered on 11 July 1974. The plaintiff by his writ of summons claimed against the defendant ¢200 as damages for trespass. By his statement of claim, [p.827] of [1980] GLR 825 however, he claimed that he was the:
“owner in possession of a piece of farmland having food-stuffs planted thereon situate lying and being on Offinso stool land at a place commonly known and called ‘Asuakoo-Akrofonso’ and which is bounded on the right by the property of Kwame Manu, then public incinerator, and then public latrine and then public cemetery, on the left by the property of Kwaku Forkuo and motor road.”
In support of his title, he claimed that his grandfather, Nana Appiah Osei, originally acquired a large tract of land from Nana Akwamuhene of Offinso of which the area in dispute formed a part. The grandfather cleared a parcel of the said land and made a gift of the disputed area to his son—the plaintiff’s father, Kwame Gyedua. Kwame Gyedua built a house on the land, planted oranges and other cash crops and in turn made a gift of his interest in the said land to the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff put his title to the land in issue.
According to the plaintiff, about two years before he instituted his action, the defendant entered upon the said land and carried away large quantities of food-stuff and continues plundering the land in spite of persistent warnings from the plaintiff to desist from these acts of plunder. These are the acts of the defendant which the plaintiff complains of as being wrongful and trespassory.
The defendant on her part admitted going upon the said land and carrying away food-stuff as alleged by the plaintiff, but denies that her acts are wrongful or trespassory. She claims that she derives her title from the co-defendant and that by an arbitration award in her favour the plaintiff is estopped from asserting any claim to the disputed area.
The defendant appeals against the judgment of the trial court on three main grounds:
“1. that the trial magistrate erred in not recalling the witnesses who were present at the visit to the locus in quo to give evidence when the parties re-assembled after the inspection;
2. the trial magistrate erred in basing his judgment against the defendant and co-defendant on evidence wholly or partly not on oath; and 3. the trial magistrate misdirected himself on the burden of proof when he stated that: ‘the court is to consider which of these two versions is true’.”
I shall consider these grounds in the order set out above.
A report of the inspection conducted at the site in dispute appears at page 36 of the record of appeal. In that report it is stated that:
[p.828] of [1980] GLR 825
“The plaintiff showed his father’s house on the northern side of the road with walls still clear behind the house; about twenty yards from the house he showed a frumtum tree with big stones packed under it which he said was the shrine of his father’s fetish Agyenkwa; on the left was another fetish Brahua shrine.”
In his judgment, the trial magistrate was obviously influenced by the statements made by the various persons who attended the visit to the locus in quo. He recited the statement allegedly made by the plaintiff and the co-defendant at the inspection regarding these shrines and concluded, admittedly after linking the shrines up with other evidence, that the area in dispute belonged to the plaintiff. Whether or not he would have come to the same conclusion had those statements not been made is a matter for conjecture. For in giving his reasons for giving a decision in favour of the plaintiff, the very first thing that he set down was:
“That the plaintiff’s father’s shrines are about twenty yards from his house, whereas the co-defendant’s boundary he directed only gives the plaintiff about four yards as backyard from his house.”
No where in the actual evidence on oath before the trial court was any mention made of these shrines. This was conceded by counsel for the respondent. But he contended that on the authority of Badoo v. Ampung (1949) 12 W.A.C.A. 439 it is the practice to record no more than that there has been an inspection of a site by the court and that it is absolutely unnecessary to recall those present at the visit to testify on oath as to what they observed.
To begin with, Badoo v. Ampung (supra) dealt with a situation where a native court panel had gone to a site to inspect it in order to acquaint itself with matters and objects which the witnesses had testified to. It has no reference to witnesses making statements at the site which have not been made on oath at the hearing before the court. The native courts did not have plans to assist them to appreciate the juxtaposition of one piece of property with another and it was a common feature of those courts to do no more than go to view the disputed area so that the evidence before them could be related to actualities and they may the better appreciate the contentions of the parties.
Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the impression a court gathers from what witnesses say to or show at an inspection can be treated in much the same way as the impressions a court forms from the demeanour of witnesses and need not be recorded as evidence before the court. Inspiration for this submission was [p.829] of [1980] GLR 825 derived from the judgment of Ollennu J. (as he then was) when he sat as a judge of appeal in Anto v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 218. At p. 223 of the report the learned judge had this to say:
“Viewing of land in land cases is peculiarly within native customary procedure. It serves in the Native Court the purpose which a plan serves in the Supreme Court. Native custom knew no writing and therefore by native custom no record would be made of the thing found at inspection of the land. The impression a native court forms at such inspection from things they see, or what the parties say to or show them at an inspection of land in dispute, can be treated on the same lines as the impressions they form from the demeanour of witnesses; and as they are entitled to act upon impressions in observing the demeanour of witnesses without recording the facts upon which they formed those impressions, so in my opinion they are entitled to act upon facts they collect at an inspection of land without first having those facts recorded as evidence on the record.”
It is to be noted that the learned judge in his observations limited himself to the inspection of land by native courts. The judgment appealed from is not that of a native or local court and even if it were, one would now expect the procedure in district magistrate’s courts in such matters to conform to the Practice Note of 10 June 1959 reported as Gblevi Family v. Amanie [1961] G.L.R. 1, C.A. which reads at pp. 1-2:
“The court should be accompanied by the parties and any relevant witnesses to the inspection. The parties or the witnesses there point out such places and things which are material to the case, etc. If certain other persons, who may assist the court in arriving at a decision in the matter are found on the land but who have not given evidence in court, are heard, those other persons should be asked to appear before the court when it re-assembles.
Then when the court re-assembles all the persons who were used at the view must be put into the witness-box, and on oath state what part they took in the recent visit to the locus and what each did.
The parties, that is the plaintiff and the defendant are to be given an opportunity of cross-examining those witnesses who after the inspection are called by the court itself, and at that stage must be deemed to be witnesses called at the instance of the court.”
[p.830] of [1980] GLR 825
In my view, this is a most salutary rule of practice which must be followed by all courts. For it is indispensable to the proper administration of justice that every witness should give his testimony under the sanction of an oath or its equivalent; and also that he should be subject to the ordeal of a cross-examination by the party against whom he is called, so that it may appear, if necessary, what were his powers of perception, his opportunities of observation, his attentiveness in observing, the strength of his recollection, and his disposition to speak the truth.
The co-defendant did state at the inspection that although the shrines belonged to the plaintiff’s father, they were on land which belonged to him (the co-defendant). As he was not recalled to testify as to what part he played at the inspection, the defendant had no opportunity of cross-examining him to elicit how this situation came about. The court itself by shunning the opportunity to re-call the co-defendant disabled itself from coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s version, concerning the land on which the shrines stood, was to be preferred to the co-defendant’s version. The two versions were never tested under the ordeal of cross-examination.
I venture to make one more observation in relation to the decision in Anto v. Mensah (supra). It was stated at p. 223 that native courts “are entitled to act upon impressions in observing the demeanour of witnesses without recording the facts upon which they formed those impressions.” I consider this statement to relate only to native courts. I see no reason why the foundation for an impression formed by a court of record should escape the rule that a court must furnish reasons for its decisions. “To my mind, it is not sufficient for a court to say that ‘from the demeanour of the witness the court finds his testimony unreliable.’ The demeanour which actuated this impression must be expressed.” It must be stated whether the witness was over-zealous on behalf of his party; exaggerating the circumstances; assuming an air of bluster and defiance; answering without waiting to hear the question; forgetting facts where he would be open to contradiction; minutely remembering others which he knows cannot be disputed; reluctant in giving adverse testimony; replying evasively; pretending not to hear the question for purposes of gaining time to consider the effect of his answer, etc. To give the carte blanche to a court to reject or accept the testimony of a witness upon a reason that is unexpressed would, in my view, be to pander to injustice.
The views expressed by Ollennu J. (as he then was) in the Anto case were obviously in respect of native courts for as a judge of the Supreme Court he was a member of the panel which decided Barko v. Mustapha [1964] G.L.R. 78 in which the second holding in the
[p.831] of [1980] GLR 825 headnote reads:
“(2) When a court has carried out an inspection on a plot of land, it should, upon resumption after the inspection, note down whatever transpired at the inspection and ask all those who gave material and relevant information at the inspection to go into the witness-box and repeat whatever they said at the inspection and be subjected to cross-examination. A court is not entitled to rely upon facts which have not been recorded in evidence, unless they are notorious facts of public interest of which judicial notice may be taken.”
I agree with learned counsel for the appellants that as the trial magistrate relied on the presence of these shrines as one of the reasons for his judgment without affording the appellants the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses after the inspection, a miscarriage of justice was occasioned.
The second ground canvassed before this court was that the magistrate erred in basing his judgment on evidence wholly or partly not on oath. On this ground, counsel for the appellants relied on the same arguments as he canvassed for the first ground. But counsel for the respondent contended that since the plaintiff’s testimony was substantiated by all the objects found on an inspection of the land, the inclusion of the shrines, upon which there was no testimony, as a reason for the judgment, is not enough to vitiate the proceedings.
The plaintiff said his father had oranges on the land, and orange trees were found on the land. He said he lived in the cottage with his father, and remnants of the cottage were there found. Afua Mmiri, the fourth plaintiff witness also mentioned the cash crops that she had planted on the farm and the cash crops were discovered on the farm. The only things of which evidence on oath was not received by the court were the shrines.
This argument is shorn of any strength it may appear to have when it is noted that the defendant and co-defendant did not claim the orange trees which stood about ten yards from the cottage. They laid no claim to the cottage. They only maintained that the cash crops found on the land were on their land and they had a right to them.
The issue between the parties was really one for the determination of the boundary between them, but it was somehow converted by the court into an action for a declaration of title to the whole area. And a miscarriage of justice resulted through the court basing its decision on information that did not form part of the evidence before it. In that, the court erred.
[p.832] of [1980] GLR 825 On the third ground of appeal, namely, that the learned magistrate misdirected himself on the burden of proof, counsel for the respondent contended that on the record there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict in favour of the plaintiff; and that the unfortunate statement by the magistrate that the plaintiff’s story was the more likely, should not prejudice the judgment, as it emanated from a person who was not a trained lawyer.
It has been stated ad nauseum by our courts that in litigation concerning title to land, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his title and that he does not do so by relying on the weakness of the defendant’s case: see Oppong Kofi v. Fofie [1964] G.L.R. 174, S.C.
The contention of counsel for the respondent that there was sufficient evidence on record to support the judgment in favour of his client and that a court of appeal re-hearing the case by way of appeal is at liberty to ignore a misdirection on the burden of proof and draw its own conclusions from the recorded evidence is, in my humble view, unsupported by the evidence on record.
The respondent based his title to the land in dispute on a customary gift from his father. In proof of this gift all that the respondent said was:
“. . . my father also presented the land to me as a gift during his lifetime. I thanked my father with two bottles schnapps and the sum of ¢16 in the presence of his nephew Kwame Appiah alias J. K. Appiah . . .”
But at page 19 of the record, the fifth plaintiff witness, who claimed to know both the plaintiff and his father said, “The plaintiff succeeded his late father and came to own the property as successor.” This does not support proof of a gift from father to son.
Again, the plaintiff testified at page 13 of the record that the only person present when his father made a gift of the land to him was Kwame Appiah, but when Kwame Appiah was called to give evidence on his behalf, he (Kwame Appiah) said at page 16 of the record that, “. . . some members of my family were also present and witnessed the gift.” Such contradictions in the testimony of the respondent and his witnesses as to how he came to own the land can hardly be said to be in support of proof of the title which he claimed was bestowed on him by his father.
Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove the essential requirements of a valid gift in accordance with customary law. These are publicity, acceptance and placing the donee in possession: see Asare v. Teing [1960] G.L.R. 155. I have no hesitation in holding that the
[p.833] of [1980] GLR 825 misdirection on the burden of proof was a serious one, carrying in its wake a serious miscarriage of justice.
In my view, where a serious miscarriage of justice results from failure to observe the rules of natural justice, or from the improper or non-application of the burden of proof, the verdict cannot be allowed to stand and the action must be remitted for re-trial. This appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgment of the trial court is set aside together with the costs awarded below. The case is remitted to be tried by the nearest grade I magistrate’s court in the area. I award costs of ¢200 to the appellants.
DECISION
Appeal allowed, case remitted for re-trial.
