IN RE SACKITEY (DECD.); DZAMIOJA ALIAS ASHONG vs. SACKITEY AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1196
16 September 1982 · ASARE-KWAPONG J · ≈ 33 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Holtam (Decd.), In re; Gillet v. Rogers (1913) 108 L.T. 732.
(2) Chalcraft (Decd.), Re; Chalcraft v. Giles [1948] 1 All E.R. 700; [1948] L.J.R. 111; 64 T.L.R. 246;
92 S.J. 181.
(3) Banks v. Goodfellow (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 549; 39 L.J.Q.B. 237; 22 L.T. 813.
(4) Craig v. Lamoureux [1920] A.C. 349; 89 L.J.P.C. 23; 122 L.T. 208; 36 J.L.R. 26, P.C.
(5) Baudains v. Richardson [1906] A.C. 169; 75 L.J.P.C. 57; 94 L.T. 290; 22 T.L.R. 333, P.C. (6) Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 290.
(7) Cole (Decd.), In re; Cudjoe v. Cole [1977] 2 G.L.R. 305, C.A.
(8) Brown v. Darko [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II) 539.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by the executor under a will for the recovery of, inter alia, a house and a cocoa farm from two of the children of the testator before the distribution of the estate to the devisees under the will. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Yaw Asare (with him Oppong Adjei) for the plaintiff.
A. D. Tagoe (led by Nii Odoi Annan) for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF ASARE-KWAPONG J.
In this case the plaintiff who is an executor of the will of the late J. B. O. Sackitey, claims against the defendants herein for an order for recovery of possession of:
“(a) two-storey building No. NK. 72, Koforidua together with the outhouse attached to it and the self-contained outhouse adjacent to the two storey-building and 38 ropes of cocoa farm at Brenya Akwabourso bounded on the north by Subri River, south by Nsubadu River, east by Tetter Kado Mawunge’s property and the west by River Birim which the defendants forcibly and unlawfully seized without authority;
(b) order for account and payment to the plaintiff of all moneys wrongly received by the defendants.”
In his statement of claim accompanying the writ of summons, the plaintiff alleged the following particulars of his claim:
“1. The plaintiff is one of the executors of the will of the late Joseph Bismark Osei Sackitey of Koforidua.
2. The defendants are a daughter and a son respectively of the deceased.
3. The said Sackitey who died on 26 May 1979 executed a will and appointed me as one of his executors. The probate was granted on 23 December 1980.
[p.1200] of [1982-83] GLR 1196
4. Before the probate was granted the two defendants herein encroached upon the estate of the deceased and falsely lay claim to the properties named above, even though the will of the deceased was read in their presence and to their hearing.
5. According to the caretakers of the farm, the two defendants have collected the proceeds of cocoa harvested and made use of the money without permission from the plaintiff.”
The defendants resisted the claim and in their statement of defence averred in paragraphs 5 and 6 that: On 10 November 1980 they were jointly granted letters of administration with the will annexed of their late father’s estate by the High Court, Accra after the plaintiff had refused to take out probate as one of the executors named in the said will dated 16 December 1965. The plaintiff further failed to issue a caveat or otherwise oppose the defendants’ application for letters of administration. The defendants also categorically denied the allegation in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim and in reply stated that they had been granted letters of administration of their late father’s estate issued from the High Court, Accra, and dated 10 November 1980 and the said letters of administration have not been revoked.
The defendants also averred in paragraph 9 of the statement of defence as follows:
“9. The defendants challenge the alleged will of which the plaintiff claims to have obtained probate on 23 December 1980 on the grounds that:
(i) Their late father was born in 1866 and that in 1975 at the ripe old age of 109 years he was too old and his mind was too feeble for him to have made a valid will or to have his mind adverted to the matters deposed to in the alleged will.
(ii) From 1969 the deceased had fallen ill, and years before 1975 he had become pure blind and could not have read a will by himself nor could he have signed his name on the said will because his hands were shaky and he was partially paralysed.
(iii) The attestation clause of the alleged will does not contain a jurat verifying that the said will was read and explained to him and that he clearly understood it before he appended his signature thereto.
(iv) The said will was obtained by duress and undue influence by one Docia Manue aided and abetted by Edward Ansah one of the witnesses to the execution of
[p.1201] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 the alleged will, and a long standing paramour and associate of the said Docia Manue and confidant on all matters connected with the deceased’s household. The defendants counterclaim that the grant of probate made to the plaintiff on 23 December 1980 be revoked and set aside.”
The plaintiff in his reply to the defendants’ counterclaim, averred in paragraph 1 (c) that the allegation that the executors named in the alleged will have renounced probate was false because no summons was issued to the said executors to attend court and show cause by an order for the administration of the property of the deceased. He also averred that the letters of administration granted to the defendants was not issued in accordance with rule 10 of Order 60 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), that all such actions should have been issued in the region in which the immovable properties of the deceased were situated in accordance with the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 1977 (LI 1107). The defendants having fraudulently withheld the above facts from the court which issued the letters of administration, the said grant became null and void and of no effect. It was also stated in paragraph 3 and 4 of the reply:
“3. In further reply thereof, the plaintiff says that from official records the deceased was not born in 1866.
That the deceased was a full scholar who could read and write, and was never blind, though he was ill by old age, he was able to read and understand, he could correct and sign his name.
4. The plaintiff denies that the said will was obtained by duress and undue influence. The plaintiff denies the defendants’ counterclaim and says that the grant of the probate is valid.”
In his rejoinder and reply to the plaintiff’s defence to the counterclaim, the defendants averred, inter alia:
“(c) That paragraph (1) is also denied. The will of 16 December 1965 was, in fact, read at a family meeting held at Odumase, Manya Krobo at which Docia Manue, the third wife of the late Joseph Bismark Osei Sackitey was present. At the said meeting Docia Manue was asked to state whether she knew of any other will of the deceased but the said Docia Manue did not admit knowledge of any such will.
(d) In fact, before letters of administration were granted to the defendants, the plaintiff was repeatedly invited to either come and prove the will or to renounce probate. The presiding judge on 3 November 1980 adjourned the hearing [p.1202] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 of the application and directed counsel for the applicants to go personally and invite the plaintiff to either prove the will or to renounce probate, but he still refused to do either. The plaintiff was therefore fully aware of the pendency of the application for letters of administration but failed to take any steps by way of caveat or otherwise to prohibit the grant of letters of administration to the defendants.”
At the close of the pleadings, the issues set down for trial were:
(a) Whether or not the, plaintiff is entitled to his claim.
(b) Whether or not the defendants committed fraud by false pretence in obtaining the letters of administration granted on 10 November 1980.
(c) Whether or not the said letters of administration is null and void of no effect.
(d) Whether or not paragraphs in the statement of defence, i.e. paragraph 9 (i) (ii) and (iii) conflict with paragraph 9 (iv), and should be struck out.
(e) Whether or not the deceased was too old, his mind was too feeble to make a valid will.
(f) Whether or not the deceased was blind and could not sign his will.
(g) Whether or not the will was obtained by duress.
The facts of this case are that the late Joseph Bismark Osei Sackitey, a native of Krobo Odumase, settled at Koforidua and acquired the property contained in his will. He died on 26 May 1979. During the course of the trial it was revealed that the deceased testator made three wills, namely 1957, 1965 and 1975. It was quite clear from the evidence that the defendants have no quarrel with the signatures on the 1957 and 1965 wills but deny that the testator signed the will of 1975 or alternatively it was obtained under duress.
In his evidence in support of his claim, the plaintiff told the court that when the deceased died his funeral was held at Odumase Krobo. After that a memorial service was held at Koforidua where he had lived all his life. At the memorial service the family invited the registrar of the High Court, Koforidua, to read the will of 1975 to the family. He said that it was after the will had been read that he got to know that he was appointed an executor. He therefore went to the High Court, Koforidua, and obtained three copies of the will, gave a copy to Akuse chief and to the other executor Peter Nyarko and he took one which he tendered in evidence together with the probate and marked exhibit A. He explained that at a family gathering, the second plaintiff witness, Mr. Ansah, one of the witnesses who attested the
[p.1203] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 signature of the testator, the two defendants and other children of the testator were present when the will was read. He said after reading the original will, the registrar took it away, until the court subpoenaed the registrar of this court at a later stage of the proceedings to produce the original in court on an application by counsel for the defendants. It is significant to note that the plaintiff, the defendants and all the principal members of the family admitted that the assets of the testator had not been distributed.
The second plaintiff witness, Edward Kwame Ansah, in his evidence told the court that he had been friendly with the testator for some time and that he was called by the testator one day to witness his will. He said one Quarcoo too was invited and that they were present when the deceased signed the will and both of them also signed exhibit A (the will). He described the deceased as normal when he signed exhibit A. He said he was present when the will was read by Mr. Addo, High Court Registrar, Koforidua. Other members of the family as well as the defendants were present.
He said the second defendant was not satisfied with the contents of the will. He stated categorically that when the will was made the deceased was mentally alert and was not feeble. He said he treated the deceased as his father, and denied in very strong terms that Docia Manue had ever been his girl friend. He explained that he took interest in the affairs of the deceased person because the deceased had told him that after his death he (witness) should look after the interest of his children. According to this witness it was the deceased who bought his own coffin when he was alive.
He further explained that, he had known the deceased for well over twenty years before this case and that he rendered various services, including engaging lawyers to litigate for him. He gave the approximate age of the deceased as over 90 years but he could read by the aid of glasses. He said the deceased ate and walked by himself without any assistance. He finally stated that in a land litigation he obtained the services of Mr. Yaw Asare, a legal practitioner, for him and when he wanted to prepare his will, he engaged the services of the same lawyer for him.
The plaintiff also sued for accounts and when the first plaintiff witness was called as witness, he was not able to give accounts of the purchases he made from the farmers in the area in dispute. It became evident that he did not know the second defendant and so he was asked to stand down for the person who did the purchases from the area to give evidence.
The third plaintiff witness, Jacob Kofi Tannor, a produce clerk of C.M.B., Akwabourso was therefore called to give evidence. In his evidence he gave account of cocoa he purchased from the second defendant since the death of the deceased in respect of the 38 ropes
[p.1204] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 of cocoa devised to Docia Manue and her children in the will of 1975 at Akwabourso. The amount paid for 1979-1980 period was ¢20,476.00; the amount for 1980-81 second season was ¢7,042.06 and the amount for the period 1981-82 was ¢31,576. The total amount paid to the defendants for the three seasons amounted to ¢58,992.
Narh Victor was the fourth plaintiff witness. He is farming on abusa basis for the testator. In his evidence he stated that he works on both Akwabourso and other farms on abusa basis. He said he had been employed by the testator for twelve years and that it was the second defendant and Docia Manue who took the money to the testator. He further stated that the second defendant supervises the abusa tenants. He explained that he could not tell the age of the testator, but he was grown at the time he engaged him and when he became old, he walked with the aid of a stick.
The first defendant witness in her evidence told the court that the testator confided in her and that by 1972 the testator could not walk properly and that he was spoonfed because he could not put a spoon in his mouth. He travelled outside the country between 1973 and 1974 and when he returned in 1975 the testator’s senses were not good and that one had to mention his or her name before he or she was recognised by the testator because of his poor eyesight. She, however, left the house between 1975 and 1977 but that she was in constant touch with the testator. According to her, the testator was paralysed in his right hand by 1975 and that she was writing for him. She named the person who treated him as Akwei and a herbalist both of whom are dead. It appeared later that the said Akwei was a dispenser. She opened a joint account with the testator in 1976 at Ghana Commercial Bank and while she was signing, the testator was thumb-printing.
Nyarko Mate Korle was the second defendant witness. (He was in court throughout the proceedings the previous day). He said after the funeral of the testator at Odumase-Krobo, the family found two wills in his box, one dated 1957 and other 1965. He stated that the 1965 will was registered in Accra and went to a lawyer to obtain letters of administration for the defendants. According to him, the testator appointed three executors for the will of 1965 but when the three persons were invited to obtain probate none came forward to do so. One Ampofo renounced the probate, Moses Azu, the third defendant witness, did not renounce the probate, but the plaintiff according to him, told them that he had no interest in the will. He said he knew that the testator lived all his life at Koforidua but he could not tell
[p.1205] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 why a search was made in Accra and not at Koforidua. He did not know whether notice was posted at Koforidua where the properties were situated. He finally stated that the family decided to prove the will of 1965 because that made provision for the members of the family and that it superseded the 1957 will.
The third defendant witness was Moses Austin Nyarko Azu, a cousin of the testator. He stated that between 1969 and the date of his death, the testator was paralysed in his right hand and that he could not use the right hand actively and could not raise it and that it was not possible for him to sign his name. He said he witnessed the will made in 1965, exhibit 3, but he did not prove it in court because he had heard that there was another will made in 1975 by the testator and that he did not want to bring confusion in the family. He denied that the will of 1975 was signed by the testator. He, however, did not show any other signature of the testator from the letters he was receiving from the testator. In fact, he never produced any in court.
The second defendant gave evidence for himself and on behalf of the first defendant. He admitted that the testator (their father) owned the two farms mentioned in the will of 1975, and that he is the supervisor or head labourer of the farms, since the testator settled permanently at Koforidua and when the testator became ill in 1967; thereafter he managed the farms and sent the proceeds to the testator at Koforidua until his death when he kept the proceeds for the farms for himself without accounting to anyone. He also stated that the testator became paralysed in his right hand since 1976 and never regained his health until he died in 1979. He said the hand of the testator shook and that he was spoonfed. According to him the testator was partially blind and could not read and write and that all letters had to be read and written for him because his sight was weak. He stated that when the 1965 will was discovered the executors did not go to obtain probate and so he applied for letters of administration and obtained it during the latter part of 1980. He said notice was posted at the testator’s house at Koforidua but someone removed it. He gave an account of expenses he made at the funeral of the testator as ¢51,476. This witness never mentioned any doctor who attended to his father during the whole period of his illness to corroborate the evidence of the first defendant witness. The fourth defendant witness, Peter Nyarko Baah Sackitey, was a nephew of the testator. According to him the testator died well over 100 years old. He was one of the executors named in the 1975 will. He stated that he lived and worked with the testator from 1926 to 1928, and when he left the deceased he occasionally wrote to him and that he knew his signature. He recognised the signature on exhibit 3 as that of the testator but not that on exhibit A. He however admitted that nine years before the death of the
[p.1206] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 testator, he never saw him and he never had any letter written by him for comparison. The fifth and sixth defendant witnesses, officers of the Ghana Commercial Bank, gave evidence to show that an application was made for a joint account to be opened by the first defendant witness and the testator, and that the first defendant witness was to sign and the testator was to thumb-print. This form was tendered in evidence and marked exhibit 6. However, whether the account was opened or not the witnesses could not produce any evidence to the effect saying the signature form was missing. In any case, the period when the application was made was in April 1976, a year after the alleged will was made by the testator in 1975.
At the close of the case and having heard the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and his witnesses on one hand and that adduced by the defendants and their witnesses on the other, I am of the view that the gravamen of the defendants’ case is highlighted in paragraph 9 of the defence. And I would like to deal with the issues arising from paragraph 9 as already set out in full above.
Firstly, the evidence concerning the age of the deceased was not certain. According to the evidence given by the plaintiff and his witnesses, the deceased was about 90 years when he died. The defendants on the other hand stated that he was born in about 1866. No baptismal certificate was produced by the plaintiff to prove this fact even though the deceased had gone to school and was educated. If there was no baptismal certificate, perhaps the age of his living brothers would have been shown for comparative purposes if the age is so important to them. Be that as it may, the deceased died at a ripe age and there is evidence from both parties that he was old and died weak man and according to the defendants his mind was feeble and could not have adverted his mind to the matters deposed to in the alleged will of 1975. According to the evidence of the witness to the will, which is very vital to the issue, he stated as follows:
“I know the deceased, he lived just opposite me. We have been friends for years because he passed through my house to his. I got to know him further when he called me to witness his will. I was there when both of us signed exhibit A. When the deceased invited us he was very normal. The deceased himself signed the will in our presence.”
Counsel for the defendants cross-examined this witness at length, at least for about five days to find out where and when the deceased signed the will in the absence of the original will before it was produced at a later stage, but this witness did not faulter and unable to describe what happened in the signing ceremony. If therefore the alleged will was signed by the testator as alleged by this witness and
[p.1207] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 the witnesses in turn signed their respective names in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other both present at the same time, then section 2(3) of the Wills Act, 1971 (Act 360) does not require any more legal rituals than these.
But that is not the end of the defendants’ grievance with the will. They maintained that the testator’s mind was too feeble and could not have adverted to the matters deposed to in the will. It appears that what the defendants meant was that the testator was so ill that he did not have the requisite mental and physical strength to make a will. This question brings me to paragraph 9(ii) of the statement of defence. This complaint relates to the testamentary capacity of the testator. Furthermore, the defendants and their witnesses contended that the testator could not have signed the will because he was paralysed on the right side of the body, that is, his right leg and right hand were completely paralysed and that he had no capacity to make a will.
The plaintiff and his witnesses on the other hand agreed that the testator was ill and died of heart attack and not a stroke from paralysis. There is no medical report from the defendants to prove that the testator died of stroke having paralysed in the right leg and hand. The only evidence offered on this point was by the first defendant witness who said that it was one Dr. Akwei who attended to the testator and a herbalist; but conveniently enough both of them are dead. Even if the doctor was dead, his medical history can be traced from the doctor’s clinic.
Even if the second defendant did not know whether the testator was weak in the right hand and could not raise his hand, a contention which the plaintiff had refuted, the law allows that he be assisted to hold a pen to sign; there is nothing legally wrong with a person being assisted in signing his name if his fingers are neither strong nor mobile enough to hold and manipulate a pen provided he accepts it as his signature. The second plaintiff witness said that “I was present when the testator signed it.” Any evidence to the contrary must be proved by the defendants on whom the onus probandi shifts.
The witnesses for the defendants identify the signatures on the wills of 1957 and 1965 to be those of the testator and not the one on the 1957 will. There was no evidence perhaps from a handwriting expert to prove otherwise. The mere assertion by the witnesses is not enough; concrete evidence to disprove it is necessary. For we must take judicial notice of the fact that a person’s signature changes with passing old age because when a person gets old his “hand shakes.” The signature on exhibit 1 is that of a person who had advanced in age and his hand shakes and it will certainly differ from that of the signatures on the wills of 1957 when the testator was younger than in 1975. Even the law allows that if a person is so weak as to be unable to sign his usual signature a mark or initials are sufficient:
[p.1208] of [1982-83] GLR 1196
See In re Holtam (Decd.); Gillet v. Rogers (1913) 108 L.T. 732. Also whether a testator can write or not, an incomplete signature is sufficient where there is evidence, as in this case, that the testator intended it to be the best he could do by way of writing his name: see In re Chalcraft (Decd): Chalcraft v. Giles [1948] 1 All E.R. 700. I hold therefore that the signature on the 1975 will was that of the testator. The second issue pertains to the mental capacity of the testator. What are the criteria for determining mental capacity to make a will? Perhaps the illuminating judgment of Cockburn C.J in Banks v. Goodfellow (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 564 at p. 549 may be quoted:
“The English law leaves everything to the unfettered discretion of the testator, on the assumption that, though in some instances, caprice, or passion, or the power of new ties, or artful contrivance, or sinister influence, may lead to the neglect of claims that ought to be attended to, yet, the instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind may be safely trusted to secure, on the whole, better disposition of the property of the dead, and one more accurately adjusted to requirements of each particular case, than could be obtained through a distribution prescribed by the stereotyped and inflexible rules of a general law.”
However, the learned Chief Justice drew a distinction at p. 566:
“It may be here not unimportant to advert to the law relating to unsoundness of mind arising from another cause — namely, from want of intelligence being equally a cause of incapacity. In these cases it is admitted on all hands that though the mental power may be reduced below the ordinary standard, yet if there be sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the testamentary act in its different bearings, the power to make a will remains.”
The law is that there should be sound disposing mind both at the time when the instructions for the will are given and when the will is executed, but if the will is shown to have been drawn in accordance with instructions given when the testator was of sound disposing mind, it is sufficient that when he executes it, he appreciates that he is being asked to execute as his will, a document drawn in pursuance of those instructions though he is unable to follow all its provisions.
In the present case, there is evidence that the second plaintiff witness engaged the services of Mr. Yaw Asare to litigate for him in a land suit. This was confirmed by the second defendant in his evidence. It is therefore assumed that the solicitor
[p.1209] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 acted on the instructions of the testator and that the onus on the plaintiff has been discharged from the evidence on record that the testator was of disposing mind when he made the will of 1975.
On the issue of want of an attestation clause in the 1975 will, with the greatest respect of counsel for the defendants, I do not see the necessity of a jurat in this case when it has been proved that the testator was an educated man and I have come to the conclusion that he signed the will of 1975 by himself. This being the case a jurat is not necessary, an exercise which is necessary only for the protection of illiterates.
And the last issue raised by paragraph 9 of the statement of defence that the said will was obtained by “duress and undue influence,” by one Docia Manue aided and abetted by Edward Ansah, one of the witnesses to the execution of the alleged will, and a long standing paramour and associate of the said Docia Manue and confidant on all matters connected with deceased’s household. In the instant case, it was the defendants who averred undue influence and the onus was on them to prove it but there is no evidence on record that either the second plaintiff witness or Docia Manue used any duress or exerted any influence on the testator to make the will of 1975.
It was not in dispute at the trial that Mr. Edward Ansah, the second plaintiff witness, visited the testator regularly during his lifetime and that he used to go to settle disputes when the children did something wrong against the testator. The second defendant said so without mincing words. Nevertheless, the defendants in their defence sought to establish a special relationship between the second plaintiff witness and Docia Manue but on the evidence what he said during cross-examination was as follows:
“Q. The house of the second plaintiff witness is in front of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. You said since 1967 Docia Manue had been going to the house of the second plaintiff witness?
A. Yes.
Q. You know that the second plaintiff witness was a friend of the deceased from 1967 until his death?
A. That is not true.
Q. The second plaintiff witness was coming to your house to speak to the children; that was known to everyone in the house?
A. I knew that he was coming to the house, but if anyone knew I do not know.
Q. The second plaintiff witness had no immoral relation with Docia Manue?
[p.1210] of [1982-83] GLR 1196
A. I never said anything about immorality between the second plaintiff witness and Docia Manue.”
The last answer is intrinsic in that the defendant never imputed immorality to Docia Manue, and it can be reasonably inferred from the last answer that he never gave instruction of his solicitor about immorality between the second plaintiff witness and Docia Manue. Who then told the solicitor that the second plaintiff witness was a paramour of Docia Manue? At this stage I would advise counsel for the defendants in very strong terms that he should confine himself to his instructions and not to use the platform in the court-room to make unfounded and serious allegations against witnesses when they have no other platform to exonerate themselves by suing perhaps for damages.
The allegation is unfounded. Apart from the evidence uttered by the second defendant to establish the alleged undue influence no other witness said anything in support of this allegation. There is no doubt that whatever unfounded suspicions were entertained by the defendants, were removed by the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses. What the defendants rather failed to prove was undue influence, the proof of which lay on them at the trial. Perhaps in this connection, the case of Craig v. Lamoureux [1920] A.C. 349, P.C. may be cited:
There a husband, two days before the death of his wife and while she was seriously ill, was instrumental in having her will prepared and executed. Under the will, the husband was the sole beneficiary. The Supreme Court of Canada upset the will on the ground that the husband had failed to prove that there had been no undue influence. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council allowed the husband’s appeal on the ground that the onus had been erroneously placed on the husband. In order to render a will void, undue influence and duress must be an influence which can justly be described by a person looking at the matter judicially to have caused the execution of a paper pretending to express a testator’s mind, but which really does not express his mind, but something else which he did not really mean.
And the relationship of marriage is one where it is, generally speaking, impossible to ascertain how matters have stood in that regard. Again it is not sufficient to establish that a person has the power unduly to overbear the will of the testator. It must be shown that in the particular case the power was exercised, and that it was by means of the exercise of that power that the will was obtained: see Baudains v. Richardson [1906] A.C. 169. If one applies the above principles and the test contained therein to the facts of this case, it is clear that the defendants failed to prove that the second plaintiff witness and Docia Manue exercised any power unduly to overbear the will of the testator.
[p.1211] of [1982-83] GLR 1196
The next point is whether an inference of undue influence can be drawn from the nature of the disposition in the will. [The court after referring and rendering the full text of the will continued]. The second plaintiff witness did not take any benefit under the will although he has been accused of being the conduit pipe through which the unholy water of undue influence was pumped into the mind, heart and soul of the testator. The defendants were given nineteen ropes of cocoa farm plantation at Subrisu Akwabourso, as well as one rope of land at Dawa near Asesewa and the one at Odumase-Krobo and all the testator’s personal effects.
There is no doubt that the testator had many children and if in his instructions to Mr. Yaw Asare, he either forgot or did not mention them, why should the finger of suspicion be pointed at the second plaintiff witness or Mr. Yaw Asare. Perhaps here is a case which enables one to remark that perhaps the testator had too many children, the names of all he failed to mention to Mr. Yaw Asare. If it is true that some children have been left out for unknown reasons then their course is to seek extra-judicial methods in drawing attention to their grievances. The remedies of these children lie outside the court room. The court cannot re-write the testator’s will and include these children as beneficiaries.
In conclusion, it must be emphasised that the plaintiff succeeded in proving that prima facie, the will of 1975 and the circumstances surrounding its execution were in order and it has been executed in due form. When the onus shifted to the defendants to substantiate the charges of improper execution, mental or physical incapacity and undue influence, they failed to discharge that onus: see Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 290; see also In re Cole (Decd.); Cudjoe v. Cole [1977] 2 G.L.R. 305, C.A. For the above reasons, I would hold that the 1975 will is in order and it revoked all previous wills under section 9 (3) of Act 360. Consequently, the wills of 1957 and 1965 are null and void.
Now the next question to decide is whether the plaintiff had a locus standi in this case. Counsel for the defendants argued laboriously and vehemently that the plaintiff having distributed the estate of the deceased, his duties were completed and he therefore had no cause of action. But is it true that he distributed the estate to the beneficiaries? There is evidence on record that the estate of the deceased had not been distributed by the plaintiff due to the unco-operative attitude of the second defendant. The second defendant had plucked and sold cocoa on the 38 ropes of cocoa on the farm bequeathed to Docia Manue and her children and had pocketed the proceeds. The other witnesses for both the plaintiff and the defendants have testified to that point, and that the second defendant had encroached upon the
[p.1212] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 properties devised to the others. How can it be said that the plaintiff had distributed the properties of the testator?
As pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff, by section 1 (1) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63), the movable and immovable property of a deceased person shall devolve on his personal representative with effect from his death. By section 108 of Act 63, personal representative means executor, original or by representation, or administrator for the time being of a deceased person. In Brown v. Darko [1961] G.L.R. 539 at p. 540 in a similar situation it was held that the estate of a deceased person rests in the personal representative which includes executors and therefore not until the executor in this case, i.e the plaintiff witness executes a vesting assent to the beneficiaries the first plaintiff witness is the proper person to sue in respect of the estate of the deceased. This was not done before the defendants seized and plucked the cocoa devised to Docia Manue and pocketed the whole money. In view, therefore, of the above, I would hold that the first plaintiff witness, the executor, has a locus standi in this case to sue.
The plaintiff sued for accounts. The defendants have admitted that they have been in possession of the 38 ropes of cocoa farm at Akwabourso devised in Docia Manue and her five children. There is evidence on record that the defendants realised the following: ¢20,476 during 1979-80 cocoa season; ¢7,042 during 1980-81 cocoa season and ¢31,576 during 1981-82 cocoa season. The amount totalled ¢59,094. A will speaks from death and at the demise of the testator this amount accrued to the estate but the defendants wrongfully plucked and sold the cocoa. In the circumstances, this amount must be refunded to the first plaintiff witness for eventual payment to Docia Manue and her five children, because when the testator died the defendants knew that there was another will existing before going to Accra to obtain probate for the 1965 will. This is so because from the evidence, the defendants were at the memorial service when the will was read. The third plaintiff witness, one of the executors of the 1965 will, refused to take probate because according to him he had heard of the will of 1975 and so he did not want to bring confusion into the family.
Now the defendants gave account of how the amount realised from the farms devised to Docia Manue and her five children was utilised. The plaintiff and his witnesses denied that the defendants purchased those items. Be that as it may, if a father has been so kind as to bequeath nineteen ropes of cocoa farm and other properties to the defendants they be grateful to him and glorify his memory by doing as they did. The amount alleged to have been spent by them as children of the testator is not recoverable and cannot under any
[p.1213] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 circumstances be charged to the estate of the deceased which he had divested himself from as soon as he died. Probate of the will of 1965 was obtained in Accra and counsel for the defendants in his address asked why did the plaintiff not raise a caveat.
The third plaintiff witness, one of the executors to the will of 1965, refused to take probate for the reason he assigned above. The first plaintiff witness also in his evidence told the court that he refused to take probate because he was not called upon to take probate; and so the defendants, the beneficiaries under the will, applied for and obtained the probate. It appears that they never filed any motion at the High Court, Accra to call upon the executors to come and take probate for them to renounce before the defendants took probate.
Counsel alleged that they sent for the executors and they refused to come to court. I think as counsel for the plaintiff has pointed out in his address, the proper procedure was for counsel for the defendants to file a motion at the High Court, Accra, calling upon the executors to appear in court to take or renounce probate. Thereafter if they refused to take probate, the beneficiaries themselves would apply for such probate; so that in future as in this case, when the person who would have raised a caveat denies knowledge of the notice, there will be evidence on record to show that the proper thing was done.
The plaintiff denied seeing any notice posted on the wall of the testator. The defendants said it was done but it was removed by someone. Who is that someone? This being the case, I am of the view that the probate obtained by the defendants in Accra was done secretly without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The properties in dispute are at Koforidua, why was the probate not obtained at Koforidua for other interested parties to know? I accept the evidence of the first plaintiff witness that he raised no caveat because he did not see any notice, and further hold that no one removed the notice.
There are other matters which are not germane to the present issue but which I feel bound to comment on. During the initial stages of this case, I was of the opinion that the case involved the interpretation of a will and so I suggested that the issue should have been brought on originating summons, but when the case developed I realised that I was wrong in my suggestion; in view of the evidence. If counsel for the plaintiff has taken a cue from the bench, and had discontinued the action by bringing an action on originating summons, I would have been the same person to have ordered pleadings, and this method would have delayed this matter unduly. I am glad that counsel for the plaintiff did not heed my advice and went on with the case in accordance with his instructions. Counsel for the defendants further argued
[p.1214] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 that the 1975 will was dated 29 November 1975, but for some unexplained reason the will was only lodged at the High Court, Koforidua in March 1978 which appears on the envelope in which the will was lodged. He said it is most unusual for a solicitor to keep the will in his chambers for nearly three years after it has been executed.
This argument on the face of it appears damaging for the plaintiff’s case. For by section 12 (1) of Act 360, it is stipulated as follows:
“12 (1) Any person who has in his possession or under his control any paper or writing of any deceased person, being or purporting to be testamentary, shall immediately deposit it with the High Court or any other Court.”
However, by subsection (3) of the same Act it is stipulated that:
“(3) Any person who fails to deposit any such paper or writing as required by subsection (1) of this section within fourteen days after having knowledge of the death of the deceased, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N¢10,000 or to imprisonment not exceeding ten years or both.
My understanding of this section is that if the will of the testator had not been deposited at the High Court, Koforidua, before the death of the testator, it could still be deposited fourteen days after the death of the testator except that the person depositing the will will incur a penalty in accordance with subsection (3) of section 12. If the legislature had intended the will to be declared null and void for not depositing it before the death of the testator it would have said so without mincing words. In this case the will was deposited at the High Court, Koforidua in 1978, a year before the death of the testator. I therefore do not see any reason for the defendants complaining about the three-year period of delay. Having disposed of these matters and having considered the evidence on record, I would hold that the plaintiff has proved his case and succeeds. I would therefore give judgment for the plaintiff as against the defendants jointly and severally for an order of recovery of possession of:
(1) The two-storey building No. NK.72, Koforidua together with the outhouse attached to it and the self-contained outhouse adjacent to the two-storey building. and 38 ropes of cocoa farm at Brenya Akwabourso bounded on the north by Subri River, east by Tetteh Kado Mawunge’s property and the west by River Birim.
(2) I further order that an amount of ¢59,094 being the proceeds of cocoa plucked from the farms bequeathed to Docia [p.1215] of [1982-83] GLR 1196 Manue and her five children by the defendants be paid to the plaintiff forthwith. I would award the plaintiff costs of ¢5,000 against the defendants jointly and severally.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.
Counterclaim dismissed.
J. A. A.
