IN RE TIMBER AND TRANSPORT KUMASI-KRUSEVAC CO., LTD. ZASTAVA vs. BONSU AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 370
22 June 1979 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 11 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 40Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Peveril Gold Mines Ltd., In re [1898] 1 Ch. 122; 67 L.J.Ch. 77; 77 L.T. 505; 46 W.R.198; 14 T.L.R. 86; 4 Mans. 398, C.A.
(2) Welton v. Saffery [1897] A.C. 299; 66 L.J.Ch. 362; 76 L.T. 505; 45 W.R. 508, H.L.
(3) Llanelly Railway & Dock Co. v. London & North-Western Railway Co. (1873) 8 Ch.App. 942; 42 L.J.Ch. 884; 29 L.T. 357; 21 W.R. 889.
(4) Eaglesham v. McMaster [1920] 2 K.B. 169; 89 L.J.K.B. 805; 123 L.T. 198; 84 J.P. 146.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
A PETITION for the official winding-up of a limited liability company wherein the respondents raised a preliminary objection. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Joe Reindorf for the petitioners.
E. D. Kom (Jonathan Arthur with him) for the respondents.
George Thompson for the Registrar of Companies.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
This is a petition for the official winding-up of a limited liability company called Timber & Transport Kumasi-Krusevac Ltd. The original name of the company which was formed
[p.372] of [1980] GLR 370 in 1966, was Timber & Transport Co., Ltd. On 20 July 1971, Timber & Transport Co., Ltd., its principal shareholders, Osei Bonsu Snr. and Osei Bonsu Jnr., entered into a written agreement with a Yugoslav company, Sumsko-Industrijski Kombinat “Crvena Zastava” or the “Red Flag” Timber Industrial Combine, whereby the Osei Bonsus agreed to transfer part of their shareholding in Timber & Transport Co., Ltd. to the Yugoslav company which, for its part, agreed to invest in and manage the company. It was further agreed that the name of the company would be changed to its present form, the town of Krusevac being the situation of the registered office and the principal place of business of the Yugoslav company.
The affidavit attached to the petition shows that the Yugoslav company took up its shares, invested U.S. $250,000 as equity share capital, appointed a new managing director and brought over from Yugoslavia a number of experts to assist in running the joint enterprise. The name of the company was on 1 September 1971 changed to its present form. From that moment, it could be said that the fundamental obligations assumed by the parties under the agreement had been performed, and that to that extent the contract was discharged by performance. In so far as anything more remained to be done, clause 16 provided that the agreement should take precedence over and prevail against the regulations of Timber & Transport Co., Ltd. wherever the two were in conflict, and it was further directed that a resolution to that effect be passed by the board of directors of Timber & Transport Kumasi-Krusevac Ltd. and registered along with a copy of the agreement with the Registrar of Companies.
Differences having arisen between the parties to the agreement, the Osei Bonsus have caused a writ to be issued in this court against the “Red Flag” Timber & Industrial Combine claiming the following reliefs:
“(a) Rescission of the contract dated 20 July 1971;
(b) Declaration that the said contract is discharged; or (c) Damages for breach of the said contract.”
The writ and statement of claim are attached to this petition as exhibits 00.10 and 00.11. The answer of the Yugoslav company is this petition for the official winding-up of Timber & Transport Kumasi-Krusevac Ltd. On 12 February 1979, this court heard and granted an ex parte application filed on behalf of the Yugoslav company for the appointment of the Registrar of Companies as provisional liquidator under section 4 (7) of the Bodies Corporate
[p.373] of [1980] GLR 370
(Official Liquidations) Act, 1963 (Act 180), and for an appropriate injunction.
On the hearing of the petition itself, Mr. Kom, counsel for the respondents, has raised as a preliminary point, the question whether having regard to clause 15 of the agreement, the petition is competent. Clause 15 provides:
“Upon coming into force and effect as aforesaid, this agreement shall be and remain irrevocable for ten years, and accordingly no member or director of the new company may, during the term of ten years immediately following upon coming into force of this agreement, present a resolution to the board of directors or an application to court, seeking the liquidation or winding-up whether voluntary or involuntary of the new com- pany or in any way seek or attempt to bring the existence of the new company to an end.
After the expiration of the said ten years this agreement shall continue in force from year to year, and any member or director of the new company who then desires to bring the existence of the new company to an end shall give in writing not less than one year’s notice to the board of directors of any step he intends to take for achieving that desire.”
There is no room for argument that by clause 15 the parties to the agreement bound themselves not to seek either in court or elsewhere the winding-up of the company as re-constituted until after the expiration of a period of at least ten years.
Mr. Reindorf, counsel for the petitioners, however, contends that clause 15 is void because it contravenes the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) and the Bodies Corporate (Official Liquidations) Act, 1963 (Act 180). Of the various cases cited by him only In re Peveril Gold Mines, Ltd. [1898] 1 Ch. 122, C.A. need be considered in some detail. In that case, a motion was brought on behalf of two of the shareholders of the company to stay proceedings upon a petition for the compulsory winding-up of the company. The petition had been presented by a shareholder holding 5,000 fully-paid shares. One of the two shareholders held 20 shares, on which 16s. 6d. per share had been paid, and the other held 13,600 fully-paid shares. All the shares were of the nominal value of £1 each. It was conceded for the purposes of the motion that the petitioner was a contributory who would be entitled to petition, but for clause 164 of the articles of association, which provided:
“No petition shall be presented or proceeded with by a member to wind up the company, except and unless (a) by consent in
[p.374] of [1980] GLR 370 writing of not less than two of the then board, or (b) in pursuance or by permission of a resolution passed by a majority at a general meeting of the company, or (c) the petitioner or petitioners shall hold, or together hold, not less than one-fifth of the then issued capital of the company, upon which all calls shall have been paid.”
It was admitted that the petitioner had not complied with any one of the conditions mentioned in the clause.
The motion came before Byrne J. He was of the view that although section 82 of the Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict., c. 89), laid it down that a contributory “may” present a petition, it conferred a right upon every shareholder just as much as if the terms of the section had been that every contributory should have “the right to present a petition.” He held that the terms of the section were intended to confer a right of which a contributory could not be deprived, either entirely or in a modified way, by the terms of the articles of association. At p. 123 he said:
“The memorandum and the articles of association embody the contract between the different members of the company, but those documents must not conflict with the provisions of the Acts regulating the incorporation of joint stock companies.”
And he continued at pp. 124-126:
“. . . the question really is, whether or not the petitioner has by becoming a shareholder entered into a contract, enforceable either by the company or by other individual shareholders, not to exercise the right which s. 82 prima facie in terms confers upon him . . . The article which I have to deal with is really an attempt to fix upon the holder of every share an obligation, so to speak, running with the share, in contravention of the provisions of the Act of Parliament . . . If the articles are to be regarded as part of the terms of the contract between the company and the person applying for shares, I am of opinion that the company had no right, having regard to the Act of Parliament, to enter into such contract as a condition and part of the general contract binding upon all shareholders, whatever separate or distinct bargain they might have the power to make with an individual who happened to be or to desire to become a shareholder.”
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the decision by Byrne J. was affirmed. At. p. 131 Lindley M. R. said:
“Any one who is familiar with the Companies Acts knows perfectly well that these registered limited companies are
[p.375] of [1980] GLR 370 incorporated on certain conditions; they continue to exist on certain conditions; and they are liable to be dissolved on certain conditions. The important sections of the Act of 1862, with regard to dissolution, are ss.
79 and 82. Sect. 79 states the circumstances under which such a company may be dissolved by the Court, and s. 82 states the persons who may petition for a dissolution. Any article contrary to these sections—any article which says that the company is formed on the condition that its life shall not be terminated when any of the circumstances mentioned in s. 79 exist, or which limits the right of a contributory under s. 82 to petition for a winding-up, would be an attempt to enforce on all the shareholders that which is at variance with the statutory conditions, and is invalid.”
At p. 132 Chitty L.J. said:
“In my opinion, this condition is annexed to the incorporation of a company with limited liability—that the company may be wound up under the circumstances, and at the instance of the persons, prescribed by the Act, and the articles of association cannot validly provide that the shareholders, who are entitled under s. 82 to petition for a winding-up, shall not do so except on certain conditions.”
However, like Byrne J., the Court of Appeal left open the question whether the company, or for that matter the shareholders among themselves, could enter into an agreement outside the regulations waiving or limiting a shareholder’s statutory right to petition for the official winding-up of the company. At p. 131 Lindley M. R. said: “I do not intend to decide whether a valid contract may or may not be made between the company and an individual shareholder that he shall not petition for the winding-up of the company. That point does not arise now.” And Chitty L.J. also said at pp. 131-132: “We have not now to consider whether an individual shareholder can or cannot bind himself not to petition for the winding-up of the company.”
In the earlier case of Welton v. Saffery [1897] A.C. 299 the House of Lords had agreed that what may not be made a regulation of the company binding upon all present and future members of the company may be made the subject of a private bargain between individual members among themselves. In the words of Lord Davey at p. 331:
“Of course, individual shareholders may deal with their own interests by contract in such way as they may think fit. But such
[p.376] of [1980] GLR 370 contracts, whether made by all or some only of the shareholders, would create personal obligations, or an exceptio personalis against themselves only, and would not become a regulation of the company, or be binding on the transferees of the parties to it, or upon new or non-assenting shareholders.”
The respondents have been at pains to point out that the agreement of 20 July 1971 was prepared by counsel for the petitioners. I can well imagine the petitioners as investors wanting some assurance that the agreement would be given a reasonable span of life to enable them make a success of the joint venture. Now, however, they say that clause 15 contravenes section 4 (1) of Act 180, and is therefore void. Section 4 (1) provides:
“4. (1) The Registrar or any person who is, (a) a creditor of the company, (b) a member or contributory of the company, or (c) the Attorney-General, but only on the ground specified in paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section, may present a petition to the Court for the official winding-up of the company.”
If, following In re Peveril (supra), we read “may present a petition to the Court” to mean “have a right to present a petition to the Court,” the question still remains whether it was open to the parties to the agreement to say, in effect, that that agreement was to remain irrevocable for a period of ten years. In my opinion it was. The agreement bound only the parties to it. Even if a copy was lodged with the Registrar of Companies it did not become part of the regulations of the company binding upon any existing or subsequent shareholder who did not give his individual assent to it. Unlike the clause in question in In re Peveril (supra) clause 15 was not, to quote Byrne J. again at p. 125, “an attempt to fix upon the holder of every share an obligation, so to speak, running with the share” in contravention of the provisions of Act 180, but part of a private agreement outside the machinery of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179).
The law is clear that every contract is prima facie permanent and irrevocable and it lies upon a person who says that it is revocable or determinable to show either some expression in the contract itself, or something in the nature of the contract, from which it is reasonably to be implied that it was not intended to be permanent and perpetual, but was to be in some way or other subject to determination: see Llanelly Railway & Dock Co. v. London & North-Western Railway Co. (1873) 8 Ch.App. 942 at pp. 949-950 per
[p.377] of [1980] GLR 370
James L.J. The effect of clause 15, then, is that a period of at least ten years must elapse before any of the parties to the agreement can apply to the court under Act 180, s. 4 (1) for the official winding-up of the company. Here, if I may borrow the words of the Earl of Reading C.J. in Eaglesham v. McMaster [1920] 2 K.B. 169, it is not the court which says that the petitioners shall not come before it until after the expiration of ten years; the parties themselves have so agreed. Since the petitioners were content to enter into the contract upon that footing they cannot complain if the respondents hold them to their bargain. It may well be that the action commenced by the Osei Bonsus cannot succeed without a winding-up order being made, but as far as the objection taken by Mr. Kom to these proceedings is concerned, I am of the view that it is unanswerable and must be upheld. The application for the official winding-up of the company is accordingly dismissed, and the interim orders made by this court on 12 February 1979 are discharged.
DECISION Preliminary objection upheld.
Petition dismissed.
S. O.
