REPUBLIC vs. GHANA NATIONAL MUSEUM BOARD; EX PARTE NUNOO [1980] GLR 377
22 June 1979 · MENSA BOISON J · ≈ 10 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 64Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Mercer v. Whall (1845) 5 Q.B. 447; 14 L.J.Q.B. 267; 9 Jur. 576, 64 E.R. 544.
(2) Republic v. Central Disciplinary Board; Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the order of dismissal imposed on the applicant by the Ghana National Museum Board on the ground of breach of rules of natural justice and statutory procedure. The facts are set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
E. K. Amane for the applicant.
Mrs. Adusa-Amankwaa, Principal State Attorney, for the respondents.
[p.379] of [1980] GLR 377
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.
The applicant by counsel moves for an order of certiorari to quash a decision dismissing the applicant from the employment of the respondents, the Ghana National Museum Board (to be referred to simply as the board). The said decision was contained in a letter dated 13 September 1978, of which a copy is exhibited as D.
By his affidavit, the applicant was employed as a custodian superintendent by the board in June 1973, on terms and conditions as expressed in exhibit I, which is, as deposed in the respondents’ last affidavit, a true copy of the original letter of appointment. In 1975, the post of custodian superintendent was, on the unopposed affidavit to the applicant, upgraded from a category D post to C.
Now it appears that some time in October 1976, a flagrant burglary occurred at the headquarters of the board in Accra, where the applicant was stationed. Some losses of museum pieces must have been sustained, but the burglars were never traced nor apprehended. In May 1977, the board instituted an internal committee of inquiry, before which the applicant gave an account of his schedule of work with regard to the security measures in operation. Without further query or proceedings the applicant was served with notice of termination of appointment on 13 September 1978, to take effect in three months’ time. The said notice is exhibited as D.
It is the ground of the applicant that: (a) the order of dismissal is illegal as being contrary to the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960 (L.I. 47); and (b) the applicant being a civil servant cannot be dismissed without the board’s compliance with rules and procedure regulating the dismissal of civil servants.
While the respondents do not substantially controvert the facts, it is their stand that, as an employee of the board, the applicant was not a civil servant. Consequently the board was not obliged to proceed under LI 47; and in any case the board was never divested of its common law right as an employer to terminate the applicant’s engagement upon giving reasonable notice.
The letter of appointment, exhibit I, is important and it is set out in extenso below:
“Dear Sir, APPOINTMENT TO THE POST OF CUSTODIAN SUPERINTENDENT
[p.380] of [1980] GLR 377
(1) With reference to your letter dated 20 February 1973 and the subsequent interview granted you on 27 April 1973, you are hereby offered appointment as custodian superintendent in this institution subject to your medical fitness, on a salary scale of ¢1,092 X 48-¢1,284 per annum with effect from 1 June 1973. You will be placed at the ¢1,092 per annum point of the scale and subject to satisfactory work and conduct, you will be granted an increment of ¢48 per annum within the scale on the anniversary of your appointment.
(2) You will in the first instance be on probation for one year. If during your probationary period your work and conduct are not deemed to be satisfactory, the director of the board may determine your appointment without notice. After the successful completion of your probationary period, however, the director, subject to the overriding authority of the board, may determine your appointment only after giving you a month’s notice or paying you a month’s salary in lieu of notice. Conversely, you may after your probationary period leave the board’s services only after giving a month’s notice or paying the board a month’s salary in lieu of notice.
(3) Your duties will include general supervision of a section of junior staff and to be in charge of buildings and vehicles. In all the afore-mentioned matters, however, you will be responsible to the director through the keeper.
(4) For the meantime you will be stationed in Accra and should the need arise you will be required to serve elsewhere in Ghana. You will for the time being work under the direct supervision of the keeper.
(5) Your other conditions of service will, until further notice be those prescribed in the Government’s General Orders, circulars, and other directions which may be issued from time to time. Free medical attention in accordance with government rules applicable to public servants will be provided for you, your wife and children. You will be entitled to leave, sick leave, travelling allowance, etc., at the rates for the time being inforce.
(6) For the purpose of discipline, you will until further notice be subject to the disciplinary rules and regulations prescribed for public servants as contained in the Civil Service (Interim) Regulations, 1960 (L.I. 47), with which you are required to familiarise yourself.
(7) You will be required to contribute to the Social Security Fund established by the Social Security Act, 1965 (Act 279).
(8) You are to notify me in writing whether or not you accept the appointment on the above terms. If you do, you are to present yourself to a recognised medical officer of health upon
[p.381] of [1980] GLR 377 the authority of this letter for examination with a view to determining your physical fitness for the post now being offered to you. Accordingly, attached herewith is a medical form for you to present to the medical officer for completion and return direct to me.
Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) J. R. Aryee (Miss) for: Director Mr. E. W. Nunoo, P. O. Box 329, Accra.”
The applicant, on the premise that he was at the date of termination of a category C post relies on exhibit I paragraph (6), and contends that his dismissal should have followed the procedure laid down in LI 47. That broadly means that by regulations 61, 64 and 69 of LI 47, a dismissal, being a major penalty, required formal proceedings. The regulations are:
“61. (1) Proceeding against civil servants in categories B and C and against civil servants in category D (1) where the charge or charges, if proved, may warrant the imposition of a major penalty, shall be in the form of formal proceedings…
64. (1) Whenever a disciplinary authority considers that formal proceedings should be instituted against a civil servant he shall, after such disciplinary investigation as he considers necessary, frame a charge or charges against the accused civil servants in writing…”
Sub-regulations (2)-(14) set out the procedure to be followed.
“69. (1) Where a disciplinary authority is of opinion that a pensionable civil servant in catergories B, C, or D (1) or a category D (2) civil servant who has held a civil service post during the whole of the preceding 12 months should be removed from the civil service or reduced in rank on grounds of unsatisfactory service, he shall call on him in writing to show cause why he should not be so removed or reduced in rank, at the same time setting out a brief statement of his reasons for reaching this opinion…”
[p.382] of [1980] GLR 377
What the respondents maintain is that the National Museum Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 387), the enabling enactment governing the board, does not make its employees civil servants. Nor, it is contended, does paragraph (6) of exhibit I. That paragraph, it is said, adopts L.I. 47 for disciplinary purposes only, and that termination of appointment was not a disciplinary measure. According to learned counsel disciplinary measures apply while an employee was still in service, but stops at the moment of a decision to terminate an employee. The position therefore, on this contention, is that the board was entitled to act under the common law as spelt out in exhibit I, paragraph (2) in terminating the applicant’s appointment on reasonable notice of three months as given in exhibit D.
Now the respondents board is governed by N.L.C.D. 387. By its tenor I am satisfied it does not make employees of the board part of the civil service of the central government. Specifically paragraph 23 (2) of the Decree leaves no doubt that it is a statutory corporation when it provides:
“(2) The Board shall have power to appoint a Director of the National Museum and such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient conduct of its functions upon such terms and conditions as it may with the approval of the Commissioner determine.”
It was thus in my view competent for the board to have appointed the applicant upon the terms contained in exhibit I; and in particular to provide for termination of the contract of service by either party on a month’s notice.
The point of the matter here, however, is how to resolve the apparent conflict arising from the incorporation of LI 47 for disciplinary purpose as part of the terms of service. That is to say should LI 47, regs. 61, 64 and 69 be invoked before termination of service in circumstances which amount to a dismissal? Or can the board exercise its right of termination forthwith under paragraph 2 of exhibit I?
At common law a master need not, at the time of dismissing a servant, allege any specific act of misconduct on the part of the latter, as the cause of such dismissal; it being sufficient if such cause existed, in fact, at the time, whether or not the master knew of it at the time: see Mercer v. Whall (1845) 5 Q.B. 447 and other cases cited in Chitty on Contracts (21st ed.), Vol. 2, p. 55. It would seem therefore that had exhibit I stopped at the common law right of termination as expressed in paragraph (2) thereof, there would hardly be any complaint. As it is, the applicant’s appointment by exhibit D
[p.383] of [1980] GLR 377 was terminated for “gross neglect of duty.”
That decision was arrived at by the board upon the report of the investigating committee. Suppose the case to be that the board had decided upon the report to give the applicant a warning or, to suspend him for a week with loss of wages; that according to counsel for the respondent would be disciplinary because the applicant would still be within the service, and the provisions of L.I. 47 must be observed. As however, the decision of the board was to terminate the applicant’s engagement, and thus put him outside the service, it is said the action taken was not a disciplinary measure, and L.I. 47 did not apply. I fail to comprehend any distinction in substance in such hair-splitting logomachy.
In my view, the charge of “gross neglect of duty” having been found by the investigating committee, whatever punishment that ensues would be of disciplinary nature – which in this case was the major penalty of dismissal (or call it termination). In my opinion, by the incorporation of L.I. 47 in exhibit I the respondents had nullified their common law right of termination simpliciter; in that whenever any termination is the result of some punishment, such termination or dismissal becomes a disciplinary measure and resort must be had to proceedings under L.I. 47, before notice of termination can be properly served.
L.I. 47, reg. 61 (supra) requires formal proceedings in the case of the applicant as a holder of a category C post. L.I. 47, reg. 64 (supra) prescribes that in such formal proceedings charges must be framed and served on the applicant. Further, L.I. 47, reg. 69 enjoins serving finally upon the applicant a demand to show cause why he should not be removed from the service, when the board so decided. All these procedural forms were in the instant case ignored by the respondents, with the result that there was breach of the rule of natural justice, which demands the giving of prior notice with adequate opportunity to be heard in answer.
The case of Republic v. Central Disciplinary Board; Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299 cited by Mr. Amane, I think is in point. There the applicant, after his conviction in a district court on 13 June 1972, was dismissed from the Police Service with effect from 13 June 1972, by a dismissal notice dated 14 June 1972. Francois J., as he then was, held that the failure to prefer written charges as required by regulations 6 (1) (a) of the Police Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 688), made under the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350), and to have duly served upon the accused, rendered the decision to dismiss the applicant ultra vires, illegal and void, and a breach of natural justice.
[p.384] of [1980] GLR 377
In the present case, I hold that the board clearly took a wrong view of the law. In omitting to prefer charges, and to conduct a hearing with opportunity for the applicant to show cause against dismissal from the service of the board in accordance with L.I. 47, regs. 61, 64 and 69, the board committed a serious procedural error. By this error, I hold the board deprived itself of its jurisdiction to act under paragraph (2) of exhibit I.
In the result, the decision of dismissal contained in exhibit D, became ultra vires, null and void, and it is hereby quashed. The application is granted with costs of ¢250 to applicant.
DECISION Application granted.
S. O.
