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[1985] SLR (CA) 22Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

IN RE WEST COAST DYEING INDUSTRY LTD; ADAMS AND ANOTHER vs. TANDOH [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

7 March 1985 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 76 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 22
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OSCOLAIN RE WEST COAST DYEING INDUSTRY LTD; ADAMS AND ANOTHER v TANDOH [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 [1985] SLR (CA) 22
APAIN RE WEST COAST DYEING INDUSTRY LTD; ADAMS AND ANOTHER v TANDOH [1984-86] 2 GLR 561, [1985] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookIN RE WEST COAST DYEING INDUSTRY LTD; ADAMS AND ANOTHER v TANDOH [1984-86] 2 GLR 561, [1985] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Harmer (H.R.), Re [1959] 1 W.L.R. 62; [1958] 3 All E.R. 689, C.A.

(2) Elder v. Elder and Watson (1952) S.C. 49.

(3) Lundie Brothers Ltd. Re [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1051; [1965] 2 All E.R. 692.

(4) Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd., Re [1966] 1 W.L.R. 745; [1966] 1 All E.R. 242.

(5) Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell (1888) 39 Ch.D. 339; [1886-90] All E.R. Rep 65, C.A.

(6) Pearce v. Foster (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 536, C.A.

(7) Bellador Silk Ltd., Re [1965] 1 All E.R. 667.

(8) Thompson v. Goold & Co. [1910] A.C. 409, H.L.

(9) Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910] A.C. 444, H.L.

(10) Attorney-General v. Sillem (1864) 2 H & C 431; 159 E.R. 178.

(11) Farley v. Bonham (1861) 30 L.J.Ch. 239.

(12) Assam Railways and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1935] A.C. 445; [1934] All E.R. Rep 646, H. L.

(13) Hilder v. Dexter [1902] A.C. 474, H.L.

[p.568] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 (14) Ampah v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 403; affirmed [1977] 2 G.L.R. 171, C.A. (15) R v. Summers [1952] 1 All E.R. 1059; 36 Cr. App. R. 14, C.C.A.

(16) Kru v. Saoud Bros. & Sons [1975] 1 G.L.R. 46, C.A.

(17) R v. Kylsant [1931] All E.R. Rep 179.

(18) Mahama v. Soli [1977] 1 G.L.R 215, C.A.

(19) Westbourne Galleries Ltd., Re [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1378; [1970] 3 All E.R. 374.

(20) Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd., Re [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1042; [1971] 3 All E.R. 184, C.A.; reversing [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1194; [1970] 3 All E.R. 57.

(21) Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 E.R. 189.

(22) Nurcombe v. Nurcombe [1985] 1 W.L.R. 370; [1985] 1 All E.R. 65, C.A.

(23) Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 W.L.R 1202, P.C.

(24) R v. Halpin [1975] Q.B. 907; [1975] 3 W.L.R. 260; [1975] 2 All E.R. 1124, C.A. (25) Towers v. African Tug Co. [1904] 1 Ch. 558.

(26) Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer [1959] A.C. 324; [1958] 3 W.L.R. 404;

[1958] 3 All E.R. 66, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the ruling of the trial High Court refusing an application brought by the appellant under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), ss 218, 220 and 222 for, inter alia, relief against oppression against the respondent-majority shareholder in the West Coast Group of Companies. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment Abban JA.

COUNSEL

Quansah for the appellant.

Dr. Kuma (with him Agyeman and Zwennes) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

Originally there were two appellants. But when the appeal was called for hearing, learned counsel for the second appellant announced to the court that his client was no longer pursuing the appeal and in consequence thereof he had filed “notice of withdrawal of appeal.” The court in the circumstances dismissed the appeal of the second appellant, Charles Tetteh Darko, and awarded costs of ¢2,000 against him and in favour of the respondent.

Thus, so far as the second appellant is concerned, the judgment entered against him in the court below stands with full force and effect. The first appellant alone pursued the appeal in this court and for the sake of brevity he will, hereafter, be referred to simply as the appellant.

[p.569] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

The appellant brought an application in the High Court, Accra under sections 218, 220 and 222 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), asking for certain reliefs against the respondent in respect of a company known as West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. The substance of the complaint alleged, inter alia, that the respondent, who was the managing director and the majority shareholder of the said company, had conducted the company’s business in a manner oppressive of the minority. That is the respondent had conducted the company’s affairs with complete disregard of the interests of any shareholder other than the respondent himself. A number of instances of the respondent’s alleged conduct were particularised by the appellant in his affidavit in support of the application.

The appellant attached to his application annexures marked A, B, B1 and C, respectively. Annexure B contained minutes of an extraordinary general meeting held by the shareholders of the West Coast Group of Companies, namely the West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd; the West Coast Spinning Co. Ltd; Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and the West Coast Farms Ltd. These minutes indicated that the appellant was, on 15 February 1980, dismissed as the managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and was also removed from the directorship of all the other sister companies. The notice of the said removal and dismissal was conveyed to the appellant by a letter, annexure B1, which, among other things, stated:

“The shareholders resolved, in view of the very serious and fraudulent nature of your actions against the Solid Construction Co. Ltd. during your tenure as managing director and your own decision as contained in your reply (undated) to the executive chairman’s letter of 7 June 1979 to sever your business connections with the executive chairman, that you be removed as a director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and the other companies within the West Coast Group.”

In his affidavit paragraph (1), the appellant stated, “I am a director and shareholder of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd., incorporated under the laws of Ghana in or about October 1966 as No. 1918.” On this basis, the appellant asked for several reliefs. The reliefs sought included an order declaring null and void the transactions which had been recorded in the minutes of the extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders within the West Coast Group of Companies held on 15 February 1980, which I have already referred to, and a declaration that his dismissal from the directorship of West Coast Group of Companies was also null and void. The appellant further asked the court for an order directed to the Registrar of Companies to appoint inspectors to

[p.570] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 investigate the affairs of all the companies within the West Coast Group of Companies by virtue of section 220 of Act 179. The appellant in his concluding paragraph asked the court “to make such further or other orders as the court may seem fit.”

I should remark that the appellant sought no fewer than thirteen different remedies. But I have just listed these to indicate the nature of the reliefs which the appellant, by his application enjoined the High Court to pronounce upon in his favour.

The respondent opposed the application. By an affidavit, consisting of several paragraphs, the respondent denied all the allegations of impropriety levelled against him by the appellant. The respondent in those paragraphs set out in detail the history as to how he incorporated the company—West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. in December 1966—from very small beginnings; and without any financial assistance from the appellant, the respondent managed to bring the company to its present status. The respondent contended that the appellant was not a subscriber to the regulations of the company and therefore not one of the original members of the company. Neither did the appellant, at any time after its incorporation, become a member; and that up to date, the appellant had not bought and paid for shares in any of the West Coast Group of Companies.

The respondent’s further contention was that after the West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. had been in existence for some time, he floated the other three companies—West Coast Spinning Co. Ltd. West Coast Farms Ltd. and Solid Construction Co. Ltd. The respondent, having become executive chairman of the four sister companies, invited the appellant to become a director of the four companies and the managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. respectively. The respondent then caused nominal shares of 63 fully paid ordinary shares to be placed in the appellant’s name, although the appellant never paid a pesewa for them. So that the said shares had, according to the respondent, been placed in the appellant’s name purely as the respondent’s nominee. In paragraph 12 of his affidavit, the respondent continued:

“That in none of these four companies of mine collectively described as West Coast Group of Companies has either of the applicants at any time applied independently for an allotment of shares or been alloted any shares for valuable consideration paid or payable to the company by either of them; indeed they have not alleged in their affidavit that they paid any consideration for any of the shares placed in their individual names by nomination. I have myself never executed any instrument of transfer of shares to either of them in respect of the shares I caused to be placed in

[p.571] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 their names, nor have the companies themselves ever issued any shares certificate to either of the applicants, recognising as they themselves have always done, that they are merely my nominees in all these companies.

Indeed, the second applicant has always been my employee and the first applicant’s association with my businesses was at my invitation as my nominee whom I regarded as a trusted friend.”

According to the respondent, he had always conducted the affairs of the companies competently and properly and in the best interest of the companies and in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Code. The respondent, finally, contended that the application was launched by the appellant in bad faith and without any claim of right; but solely because of the discovery which the respondent made in or about June 1979 of certain fraudulent practices and embezzlement by the appellant of large funds belonging to the Solid Construction Co. Ltd., and which frauds and embezzlement prompted the respondent to take certain steps to safeguard the interest of the companies. And one of such steps was the summary dismissal of the appellant from the directorship of the companies.

The respondent gave full details of the frauds and the embezzlement. The respondent, like the appellant, annexed certain documents to his said affidavit, namely the regulations of the West Coast Dyeing industry Ltd; a letter which the appellant addressed to the respondent after the latter had notified the appellant of his dismissal; a letter addressed to the appellant by the respondent and dated 4 June 1979; and lastly, a copy of the letter of summary dismissal sent to the appellant.

In the course of the hearing, the learned trial judge had to adjourn the case at his own instance. The appellant took advantage of the said adjournment and filed a supplementary affidavit. In that affidavit, the appellant attempted to explain away the fraud and the misappropriation of the funds of the company as spelt out in the respondent’s affidavit in opposition.

It may be observed that after counsel on both sides had advanced their arguments for and against the application, the learned trial judge felt that the issues could fairly and properly be resolved on the affidavit evidence alone. He therefore, rightly in my view, ruled that the parties, in addition to the said affidavit evidence, were at liberty to adduce oral evidence and to call witnesses.

The appellant did not see any need for this and so he chose to rely solely on his affidavits. The respondent, on the other hand, saw the need for it and thus called three witnesses to testify on his behalf.

[p.572] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

On 3 July 1980, the learned High Court judge in a considered ruling, dismissed the appellant’s application on several grounds. Some of those grounds were that the appellant was not a member of the company and could not therefore bring any application under section 218 of Act 179; that, in any case, there were no justifiable grounds for bringing the application and that the same was brought in bad faith; that the appellant was rather guilty of a criminal offence and of fraudulent breach of duty towards the company and therefore deserved to be disqualified under section 186 (1) (e) of Act 179, from being a director of any company for a period of four years.

It was against this ruling that the present appeal was launched. Learned counsel for the appellant abandoned the original and the additional grounds and obtained leave instead to argue only the further additional grounds of appeal filed on 15 October 1981.

Ground (1) of the said grounds reads as follows, namely:

“the learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the appellant had not been able to show that he is a shareholder within the true intendment of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), and could therefore not maintain his action.”

Learned counsel submitted that under section 218 of the Code, the capacity to bring an application is not limited to shareholders, that is members per se. But officers of the company are also entitled to bring applications under this section, provided that the grounds are justified. Learned counsel relied on the provisions of the Code itself to support his contention. Counsel argued that since the learned trial judge in his judgment found that the appellant was a director of the company, the learned judge was wrong in law when he held that the appellant had no capacity to bring the application. Learned counsel further submitted that in any case, the respondent in his affidavit in opposition stated that the appellant was his (the respondent’s) nominee shareholder and since for the purpose of the law a nominal shareholder is also a shareholder, it follows that the appellant was the only person entitled to exercise the incidents attached to those shares, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent might be the person entitled to the beneficial interest accruing from the said shares; and that for the purposes of Act 179, beneficial rights have nothing to do with an application under section 218 and the learned High Court judge was therefore wrong in holding that the appellant, as a nominee shareholder, was not a member of the company.

However, learned counsel for the appellant appreciated that the only official record of the company which contained the names of the members of the company, as required under section 32 of Act 179, was

[p.573] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 the register of the company. But learned counsel contended that the said register was in the possession of the respondent and could not therefore be tendered; nevertheless, for the purpose of section 218 of Act 179, the appellant was a member. Thus contended counsel, the learned High Court judge was wrong in relying solely on section 30 of Act 179 to hold that the appellant was not a member and, in the circumstances, he was also wrong in law in not considering the merits of the appellant’s application.

Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the learned High Court judge in fact addressed himself adequately to the merits of the application itself. On the question of capacity, learned counsel for the respondent argued that since the appellant sought a statutory relief under section 218 of Act 179, he ought to have satisfied the trial court that he was strictly within its ambit and that he had strictly complied with the terms of the said section; but this the appellant failed to do.

It is clear that the arguments about capacity depended on the construction of section 218, and I would like to observe that, although the argument put forward by learned counsel for the appellant may seem attractive, his construction of the said section was not quite correct. Section 218 of Act 179 in question reads:

“218. (1) Any member or debentureholder of a company or, in a case falling within section 225 of this Code, the Registrar may apply to the Court for an order under this section on the ground (a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members or debentureholders or in disregard of his or their proper interests as members, shareholders, officers, or debentureholders of the company; or

(b) that some act of the company has been done or is threatened or that some resolution of the members, debentureholders or any class of them has been passed or is proposed which unfairly discriminates against, or is otherwise unfairly prejudicial to, one or more of the members or debentureholders.

(2) If on such application the Court is of opinion that either of such grounds is established, the Court may, with a view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit: and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing may by order,

[p.574] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

(a) direct or prohibit any act or cancel or vary any transaction or resolution; or

(b) regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in future; or

(c) provide for the purchase of the shares or debentures of any members or debentureholders of the company by other members or debentureholders of the company or by the company itself and in the case of purchase of shares by the company without regard to the limitations imposed by sections 59 to 63, other than subsections (4) and (5) of section 59 of this Code.”

The words of the section are in themselves precise and unambiguous. So no more is necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The intention of the legislature is to give remedy to only members and debentureholders and not to an outsider who is not the Registrar of Companies. Otherwise, a floodgate would be opened for all sorts of busybodies poking their noses into the affairs of companies just to satisfy their curiosity. It is therefore quite plain that a director or an officer of the company who is also not a shareholder as well, and consequently does not qualify to be a member of the company concerned, is not entitled to seek any remedy under section 218 of our Act 179. Those who come under this section may be divided into three categories, namely a member of the company; a debentureholder of the company in question; and then the Registrar of Companies if the matters in question fell within section 225 of the code.

In the instant case, the Registrar of Companies did not come in and, incidentally, the appellant was not a debentureholder. In fact, he never claimed that capacity. The appellant initiated the action solely on the basis that he was a member of the company. Thus, the first hurdle which the appellant had to surmount was to bring himself within the membership of the company by cogent evidence. It was not enough for the appellant merely to aver in an affidavit that he was a member of the company especially where, as in the present case, his membership had been challenged and disputed. Since the appellant was not a subscriber to the regulations of the company and so he could not bring himself under section 30 (1), he could have established his membership by tendering the register of the company or his share-certificate, indicating his number and his shareholdings. This, at least would have been a prima facie evidence of his membership in terms of section 54 (1) of Act 179. If these documents were in the custody of the company, as the appellant alleged in his supplementary affidavit, one would have

[p.575] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 expected the appellant to serve a subpoena to produce on the secretary of the company. But the appellant, who was represented by an experienced counsel, never bothered to take that course even though the said secretary was in fact one of the witnesses who testified on behalf of the respondent.

It was obvious that the appellant had no share-certificate to support his alleged membership, neither did his name appear in the register of the company. Learned counsel for the appellant sought refuge in a paragraph in the affidavit of the respondent, where the respondent had stated that he had placed some shares in the name of the appellant as his (the respondent’s) nominee. Counsel argued that by that paragraph the respondent himself had accepted the appellant as a member of the company. As learned counsel for the respondent pointed out, the appellant in the court below relied only on certain returns and minutes of the company to establish his membership. It was therefore obvious that in this court the appellant attempted to shift grounds.

At any rate, the appellant himself rejected outright the said paragraph of the respondent. The appellant categorically stated in his supplementary affidavit that the appellant was not the nominee of the respondent in respect of any shares. The appellant even went to the extent of showing that the said paragraph of the respondent was false, in that the respondent at the material time was himself a poor man and could not make ends meet; and that in those circumstances the respondent who was not financial could not possibly have afforded to pay for those shares and to place them in the name of the appellant as a nominee.

The appellant concluded his denial of being the respondent’s nominee by stating in his said supplementary affidavit that, in any case, the purported allocation of those shares in the appellant’s name was irregular and invalid. I may here refer to portions of the appellant’s supplementary affidavit in question, where the appellant stated:

“Mr. Darko and I have therefore been in the company from its formative years. At no time did we consider ourselves nominees of Mr. Tandoh when he himself had not got a pesewa to buy food much more to float a company.”

In his original affidavit the appellant set out the shareholdings which showed that the appellant was supposed to have been allocated 63 shares, and then continued, “I deny that the above shares were all regularly allocated.” To crown it all, the appellant came out boldly and stated in his said affidavit that no shares had, in fact, been allocated to him. This averment could also be found in the appellant’s original affidavit and was in the following terms:

[p.576] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

“That at the meeting which the applicant (the appellant) requisitioned, one of the most important issues was going to be the allocation of shares, because it was generally agreed at the on-set of the company that allocation of shares shall be done when the company had started making profit, and this time was due.”

The requisition of this particular meeting could be found in the appellant’s letter dated 21 January 1980. In that letter the appellant put forward an agenda in which he made the consideration of the allocation of shareholdings one of the items to be discussed. The appellant brought the present action on 3 April 1980, when the meeting he requisitioned had not yet taken place. So that at the time the appellant commenced the present proceedings, on his own showing, no shares had, in fact, been allocated to him, and even if there had been any allocation (which the appellant denied), the said allocation was irregularly done and therefore invalid.

This was the stand of the appellant at the trial. However, I have also applied my mind to the issue and to the arguments so far advanced, and I agree entirely with the stand which the appellant took in the court below, namely at the time the action was instituted by the appellant no shares had regularly and validly been allocated by the company to the appellant and that any purported allocation of shares made by the respondent to the appellant was null and void and of no legal consequence whatsoever.

Another aspect of the matter is that the appellant, not being a subscriber or original member, any shares intended to be allocated to him ought to have been offered in writing first to the existing members of the company in accordance with regulation 10 (1) and (2) of the regulations of the company (exhibit AA), and as required by section 202 (1) (a) and (b) of Act 179. It was only after the existing shareholders of the company had declined the offer that those shares could be issued to the appellant. There was no scintilla of evidence that this mandatory provision of section 202 (1) (a) and (b) and incorporated in the company’s said regulations was ever complied with before the respondent purported to allocate the shares to the appellant either in the appellant’s own right or as the respondent’s nominee.

There was little wonder therefore that no share-certificate was ever issued to the appellant in compliance with section 53 (1)-(3) of Act 179. And in view of the non-compliance with the provisions of the said section 202, it would have been unlawful on the part of the company to issue any share-certificate to the appellant or to register him as a shareholder in the register of the company. In other words, it would

[p.577] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 have been of no legal consequence whatsoever, whether or not the appellant’s name was in the company’s register and whether or not he was issued with a share-certificate. Thus, in fact and in law the appellant was not and had never been a member of the company.

The proposition of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant, being a director of the company, could still take advantage of section 218 was wholly untenable. All the authorities are against that proposition. I will refer to, at least, one of them in due course. English decided cases and textbook writers have explained the scope of section 210 of the English Company Act, 1948, and which section is almost identical with section 218 of our Act 179. In The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed.) by Gower, the learned editors at pp. 599-600 under the sub-title—To whom [section 210] available?—have stated as follows:

“ The petition may be by any member; in other words, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has no application, and an individual member has a personal right to institute proceedings in a non-representative capacity… An oppressed director, or debentureholder or other creditor cannot obtain an order under section 210 for this is expressly limited to oppression of members, and this is so even if the director or creditor is a member but is being oppressed only in his capacity of director or creditor.”

In Re H.R. Harmer Ltd. [1959] 1 W.L.R. 62, Lord Jenkins in the course of his judgment said at 75, C.A.:

“It is to be observed, first, that the person permitted to apply under section 210 is ‘any member of the company,’…. This indicates that the oppression complained of must be complained of by a member of the company and must be oppression of some part of the members (including himself) in their or his capacity as a member or members of the company as such.”

The learned trial judge was therefore perfectly right when he held that the appellant had failed to prove that he was a shareholder within the intendment of the Code and had therefore not shown the capacity which would entitle him “on the face of his application to maintain the present action.”

The second ground argued on behalf of the appellant was that the learned trial judge erred in law when he held that there was nothing wrong with the summary dismissal of the appellant as the director of West Coast Group of Companies when the appellant’s complaint related specifically to West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. and when the provisions of section 185 of Act 179 had not been satisfied.

[p.578] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

In arguing the first part of this ground, learned counsel contended that the learned trial judge was wrong in holding that the appellant’s complaint that he was improperly dismissed was not properly redressible under section 218 of the Code. Counsel submitted that section 185 laid down the procedure for removing directors of companies. But this was not followed by the respondent; and even though the appellant could have come by a prerogative writ, the appellant preferred to come under section 218 because the extensive provisions made in that section covered cases where a director could show that his summary dismissal was wrongful, especially, as in the appellant’s case, where his position was not based on a contract of service. It was the further contention of learned counsel that since the appellant sought remedy only against the West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd., it was wrong for the learned trial judge to hold that the summary dismissal of the appellant from the other three companies within the West Coast Group was proper.

With due respect to learned counsel for the appellant, quite a number of reliefs which the appellant sought in his application never fell under the provisions of section 218; and one such relief was the complaint of unlawful dismissal. It has already been held that the appellant was not a member of the company and even though he was a director his position could not be equated to that of a shareholder-director. As I have said, the appellant was not in a position in the first place to establish and could not establish as required by the provisions of section 218 that he and any other shareholder of his group were being treated in an oppressive manner. The remedies provided in section 218 were designed to protect the rights of a member or members in their character as members. The fact that the appellant had been dismissed summarily by the company, did not give the appellant an automatic right to resort to section 218 to redress his grievance. As it was rightly pointed out by the trial judge, if the dismissal had been “part of a campaign of oppression of which he complained in his capacity as a member and not as a director it would be redressible under section 218.” But unfortunately for the appellant that was not the case here.

In Elder v. Elder and Watson (1952) S.C. 49 a petition for relief under section 210 of the English Company Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6, c 38), (which is almost identical with our section 218) was brought by the two petitioners, who were shareholders in a small family company, alleging that they had suffered oppression at the hands of the other shareholders who had used their voting power to remove the petitioners from their offices as directors and from their employment as secretary and factory manager, respectively. There had been serious personal

[p.579] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 differences between the parties. The petition was dismissed and the Lord President (Lord Cooper) in his judgment said at 55-57:

“. . . the essence of the matter seems to be that the conduct complained of should at the lowest involve a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely … I search the petition in vain for any relevant averment that the petitioners have suffered in their character as members of the company. Qua members, their position does not seem to me to differ significantly from that of any other shareholder. The true grievance is that the two of them, George Elder and James Glass, have lost the positions which they formerly held as directors and officers of the company. I do not consider that section 210 was intended to meet any such case, the ‘oppression’ required by the section being oppression of members in their character as such.”

Elder v. Elder and Watson. (supra) was followed in In re Lundie Brothers Ltd. [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1051, where it was held that the matter complained of by the petitioner related to his status as director and not as a member and therefore could not be the subject of relief under section 210.

In Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd. [1966] 1 All E.R. 242 at 246 Buckley J. put the matter as follows:

“First the matters complained of must affect the person or persons alleged to have been oppressed in his or their character as a member or members of the company. Harsh or unfair treatment of the petitioner in some other capacity, as for instance a director or a creditor of the company, or as a person doing business or having dealings with the company, or in relation to his personal affairs apart from the company, cannot entitle him to any relief under s. 210.”

I think enough has been said to indicate clearly that section 218 of our Act 179 was not available to the appellant in his character as a director and so his complaint of summary dismissal was not justiciable under the provisions of the said section.

I will deal briefly with the other limb of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, namely the appellant sought remedy in respect only of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. and it was wrong in law for the learned trial judge to have held that the appellant’s summary dismissal as a director from the other companies within the West Coast Group was also proper.

[p.580] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

Although the appellant named only the West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. in the title of the suit, he in fact and in truth put the affairs of all the companies within the West Coast Group in issue. Reference to some of the paragraphs in the appellant’s own affidavits will bear this out. In his paragraph (k) of the notice, the appellant sought a declaration that buildings put up with funds of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. were held in trust for the said company. In paragraph (1) the appellant asked for an order appointing inspectors to investigate the affairs of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd.; Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and the West Coast Farms Ltd. The most important of all, in paragraph (c) the appellant asked for a:

“declaration that the transactions that are recorded in minutes of the extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the companies within the West Coast Group held on Friday 15 February 1980 at the head office are all unlawful and null and void and of no legal effect.”

The minutes of the said meeting were attached to the appellant’s affidavit and marked exhibit B.

One of the transactions recorded in the said minutes, exhibit B, was a resolution which was passed at that meeting summarily dismissing the appellant from the directorship of the West Coast Group of Companies. The portion of the minutes in question reads as follows:

“Removal of Mr. O. S. Adams as Director

The shareholders resolved, in view of the very serious and fraudulent nature of Mr O. S. Adams’ actions against the company and his decision as contained in his undated reply to the executive chairman’s letter of 7 June 1979 to sever his business connections with the executive chairman, that Mr Adams be removed as a director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and the other companies within the West Coast Group.”

It was obvious that the appellant wanted the trial court to declare his summary dismissal as a director from all the four sister companies “unlawful and null and void and of no legal effect.” But the respondent in his affidavit in opposition insisted that the appellant’s said dismissal was lawful. From the above analysis it is clear that the appellant himself put the management of the affairs of all the four sister companies, as well as his summary dismissal as director from all the four companies, in issue. In the circumstances, the learned trial judge was in duty bound, after hearing evidence and arguments, to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the summary dismissal from the

[p.581] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 directorship of all the four sister companies. Indeed, the learned trial judge could not possibly pronounce on the validity of the appellant’s summary dismissal as a director of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd., and, on the same facts and in the same breath, hold as unlawful the appellant’s dismissal from the directorship of the other three sister companies. The learned trial judge was in the circumstances right in holding that the appellant’s summary dismissal as a director of the other three companies was also proper.

I will deal with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that in any case the summary dismissal was unlawful in as much as section 185 of Act 179 was not complied with. The submission, with respect to learned counsel, is misconceived. The learned trial judge held that the summary dismissal of the appellant, in the circumstances of the case, was justified under section 216 of the Code. The said section reads:

“216. The rights, duties and liabilities of officers and agents of companies shall continue to be governed by the rules of the common law and equity relating to principal and agent and master and servant save in so far as such rules are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Code.”

The appellant was an officer of the company. That is he was the managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and a director of the other three sister companies; and his relationship with those companies continued to be governed by the common law rules of master and servant, irrespective of section 185 whose provisions are not in conflict with the common law rules. There was therefore no obligation whatsoever on the part of the company to resort to the procedure under section 185 of the Code before the appellant could be dismissed from his office as a director or as a managing director. The company may choose either to adopt the procedure under the said section 185 or may proceed in accordance with the principles of common law and equity as provided by section 216, depending on the circumstances of each case.

In this particular case, the appellant, as found by the learned trial judge, had not only breached his fiduciary obligation towards the company as required by section 203 of the Code, but had also committed acts of serious fraud and criminal misconduct in his dealings with the company. As disclosed by the evidence, the appellant had been guilty of immoral and untrustworthy conduct that it would have been highly prejudicial to the interests of the West Coast Group of Companies to keep him. Prompt and swift action was therefore absolutely necessary to safeguard the interests of the four sister

[p.582] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 companies. Immediate summary dismissal was the right answer and that was justified under the common law.

In Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd ed.), the learned editors have stated at p. 557 as follows:

“It is, however, of considerable importance in the case of other officials of the company and of directors who hold some other office such as that of managing director. So far as their offices are concerned it is clear that, notwithstanding that they may hold long-term agreements, they can be dismissed immediately if guilty of misconduct. Any breach of their fiduciary duties clearly suffices.”

The well-known authority in support of this proposition is Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v. Ansell (1888) 39 Ch.D. 339, C.A. In that case the defendant was the managing director of the plaintiff company. He contracted on behalf of the company for the construction of certain fishing-smacks, and, unknown to the company, took a commission from the shipbuilders. The defendant was also a shareholder in an ice company and a fish carrying company which paid, in addition to the ordinary dividends, bonuses to shareholders who were owners of fishing-smacks and employed the companies. The defendant employed these companies for the plaintiff’s smacks but received the bonuses for himself. It was held that the receipt of the commission from the shipbuilding company was a good ground for the dismissal of the defendant from office and that he had to account to the plaintiff company, for the bonuses received from the ice and fish carrying companies. Bowen L.J. in the course of his judgment said at 363-364:

“[T]here can be no question that an agent employed by a principal or master to do business with another, who, unknown to that principal or master, takes from that other person a profit arising out of the business which he is employed to transact, is doing a wrongful act inconsistent with his duty towards his master, and the continuance of confidence between them. He does the wrongful act whether such profit be given to him in return for services which he actually performs for the third party, or whether it be given to him for his supposed influence, or whether it be given to him on any other ground at all.”

And in Pearce v. Foster (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 536 at 539-540, C.A. Lord Esher M.R. had this to say:

“But the question is, whether the breach of duty is a good ground for dismissal. I have never hitherto heard any doubt that that is

[p.583] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 the true proposition of law . . . Innumerable circumstances have actually occurred which fall within that proposition, and innumerable other circumstances which never have yet occurred, will occur, which also will fall within the proposition. But if a servant is guilty of such a crime outside his service as to make it unsafe for a master to keep him in his employ, the servant may be dismissed by his master; and if the servant’s conduct is so grossly immoral that all reasonable men would say that he cannot be trusted, the master may dismiss him.”

Lopes L.J. also said at 542:

“If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing servant.”

There is one vital observation which ought to be made as regards the complaint of summary dismissal. When the appellant’s secret contract relating to the renovation of Adisadel College, Cape Coast was discovered by the respondent, the respondent threatened to take action against the appellant. This led to the intervention by certain personalities. As a result of a meeting held by those personalities with the appellant and the respondent, the respondent was persuaded to stop whatever action he was contemplating taking against the appellant; and the appellant agreed to “phase out” his association with the West Coast Group of Companies. May I here refer to the letter written by the appellant to the respondent after the appellant had been informed of his summary dismissal. The letter was attached to the respondent’s affidavit as annexure B. Portions of that letter read as follows:

“At the meeting, I made it clear that, under the circumstances I would not like to continue in partnership with you any more. It was then decided that instead of a sudden break in our business relationship I should continue to come to the office for a week or two and then phase out, which I have done . . .

I therefore fail to see the purpose of your letter copied to A.E.S.C. I also fall to see where the question of a summary dismissal comes in since (a) I have already severed my business

[p.584] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 relationship with you and (b) I am not an employee of your group I feel you have been ill-advised and in fairness to our good relationship which we all wish to preserve, that you should withdraw your letter immediately.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) O. S. Adams.”

It was after the respondent had refused to withdraw the letter of dismissal that the appellant commenced the present proceedings. The question then is, could the appellant, having voluntarily “phased out” or, for that matter, walked out or resigned, so to speak, from the directorship of the West Coast Group of Companies, and having clearly admitted in his said letter quoted above that he was no longer an employee or no longer having any business connection with West Coast Group of Companies, come back to claim that he was still a director of those companies, and could only be removed after satisfying the conditions under section 185 of the Companies Code? I think the appellant should not be allowed to blow hot and cold. It was not surprising that the learned trial judge, in the circumstances, could not help but to state that the appellant’s “conduct in this regard deserved condemnation.” I also share the same view.

In ground (3) of the grounds of appeal, the appellant complained that the learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the appellant’s claim in respect of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. was vitiated by bad faith when there was no proof of bad faith on record. Learned counsel submitted that the application having been brought only in respect of the West Coast Dyeing Industries Ltd., and since no malpractices were found against the appellant in his dealings with the said company, there was no basis upon which the learned judge could make a finding that the proceedings were initiated in bad faith. It is true that in the title of the application only West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. was supposed to be the subject of the complaint. But again, as I have already indicated, the appellant in his reliefs and in his affidavit made references to alleged mishandling of the affairs of the other sister companies by the respondent in his capacity as the executive chairman.

The respondent in answering the points raised in the appellant’s said affidavit likewise alluded to the misconduct and the malpractices committed by the appellant in respect of, at least, one of the sister companies, namely Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and to the conduct of the appellant in participating and involving himself in the very activities the appellant complained about. So that the finding of good or bad faith could only be in respect of the whole application and also in relation to all the remedies the appellant sought as regards all the four sister

[p.585] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 companies. The appellant, for example, complained that the funds of West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. were improperly used for the extension of the golf course at Tema, which allegation the respondent denied. But it turned out that the appellant, despite the so-called knowledge that funds of the company were being diverted to extension of works at the said golf course, actively involved himself in the preparation which led to the inauguration and commissioning of the golf course. Not only that, it was found by the learned trial judge that the appellant actually attended the said inauguration and took a prominent part in the whole affair.

The question then is, if the appellant sincerely believed that the funds of the company were being improperly utilised for the golf course extension, why did he not boldly challenge the respondent at that time and why did he not call the respondent to order and take some positive step at that time to put an end to the so-called illegal expenditure, but should rather give tacit approval and encouragement to the respondent? What I see is that the appellant had, in fact, no genuine complaints against the respondent. It was only after the embezzlement of the company’s funds and the malpractices committed by the appellant and some of the employees of the company had been uncovered and the respondent had taken steps to expose and get rid of all those criminal elements in the company’s outfit, including the appellant, that the appellant thought of this application. The application, in my view, was presented without genuine object of obtaining redress for matters complained of. It was brought for a collateral purpose, namely to harrass and to blackmail the respondent into abandoning the cleaning up exercise which the respondent had embarked upon and which had already resulted in the summary dismissal of the appellant from the directorship of the West Coast Group of Companies. The application was therefore ill-motivated. That is it was conceived out of bad faith.

In Re Bellador Silk Ltd. [1965] 1 All E.R. 667, the petitioner sought relief under section 210 of the English Company Act, 1948. The petitioner was one of the directors and shareholders in a private company. He complained, among other things, that the distribution of profits had not been fairly made, that he had been excluded from the board, and the affairs of the company were being conducted irregularly. These complaints were held not to be justified on the facts and the petition was dismissed.

Plowman J. in his judgment at 671-672 said:

“I have thought it right briefly to review the facts and state my findings on them but, if I have done so somewhat cursorily, it is because, in my judgment, this case must fail for different reasons. First and foremost is the reason that I do not regard this petition as a bona fide attempt to obtain relief under s. 210 at all. It

[p.586] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 became obvious during Moss Simmons’ [the petitioner’s] cross-examination that he did not really want the relief for which he was asking in the petition and that its real object was to achieve a collateral purpose, namely, to get some satisfaction in regard to the repayment to Bellador, Ltd. or to the Simmons group of companies of the outstanding loan. Indeed, he made no bones about this in the witness-box … A petition which is launched not with the genuine object of obtaining the relief claimed, but with the object of exerting pressure in order to achieve a collateral purpose is, in my judgment, an abuse of the process of the court, and it is primarily on that ground that I would dismiss this petition.”

In view of the appellant’s conduct, as revealed by the evidence, his application could have suffered the same fate as the petition in Re Bellador Silk Ltd. (supra), even if the appellant had been a member of the company. That is to say, there was sufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the appellant and in the circumstances the application could have been dismissed on the sole ground that it was vitiated by bad faith and amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. The learned trial judge was therefore right in making that finding.

The last ground argued by learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned trial judge erred in law in invoking the sanction of disqualification prescribed in section 186 of Act 179, against the appellant when the provisions of the said section had not been satisfied and when there was no conclusive proof of criminal misconduct on the part of the appellant towards any of the West Coast Group of Companies. Learned counsel contended that there was evidence that section 186 (c) of the Code was not complied with, in that if the court intended to apply the said sanction, the court should have proceeded to investigate and make findings as against the appellant. The type of proceedings, in which such an order could be made, according to learned counsel, should be proceedings for winding up instituted by the Registrar of Companies or the Official Trustee.

Learned counsel again submitted that the standard of proof of the criminal misconduct required under section 186 is very high. But the witness, on whose evidence the learned trial judge relied, just detailed the circumstances of a meeting that was held by that witness and two other personalities with the parties herein; and that evidence did not show any criminal intent on the part of the appellant. Counsel further submitted that the contents of the appellant’s supplementary affidavit made the issue as to whether a crime or a breach of trust was committed very inconclusive; and the only way in which the matter could have been resolved was to have called the appellant and

[p.587] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 cross-examined him on it. But this was not done and in the circumstances the learned trial judge wrongly invoked the sanction of disqualification against the appellant.

The argument is wholly misconceived. Dealing first with the last point raised by learned counsel, I hasten to point out that long before hearing of his application was commenced, the appellant had had notice that one of the respondent’s contentions was that he, the respondent, had not committed any acts of impropriety against the company so as to be restrained from managing the affairs of the company as was being demanded by the appellant; but that it was rather the appellant whose criminal conduct the court should look into and on its motion, apply the sanctions under section 186 (1) (c) of Act 179.

Thus, one of the issues which all the parties were aware of before the hearing began was whether the court after hearing should restrain the respondent from managing the affairs of the company or whether the court should rather, on its own motion, disqualify the appellant under section 186 (1) (c). The appellant was therefore put on his guard to get ready with such admissible evidence as would convince the court not to invoke the said sanction against him. The appellant as I have stated, was represented by an able and experienced counsel who was supposed to know what was the best evidence to adduce to rebut the respondent’s contention. Even so, the learned trial judge went as far as asking the appellant to adduce oral evidence in addition to his affidavit evidence. But the appellant flatly refused to do so; and it would have been an abuse of judicial power if the trial court, despite the appellant’s refusal, had ordered the appellant into the witness-box to be examined and cross-examined. The appellant’s failure to make himself available for cross-examination, as counsel would have wished, cannot be blamed on the court.

I come to the more important part of learned counsel’s argument, namely that the disqualification under section 186 (1) (c) of the Code could not be imposed in any proceedings except in proceedings for winding up of a company. The relevant portions of the section in question read as follows:

186. (1) Where, . . .

(c) it appears that a person has been guilty of any criminal offence, whether convicted or not, in relation to any body corporate or of any fraud or breach of duty in relation to a body corporate, the Court, on its own motion or on the application of any of the persons referred to in subsection (3) of this section, may order that that person shall not, without the leave of the Court, be a director of or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be

[p.588] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 concerned or take part in the management of any company or act as auditor, receiver or liquidator of any company for such period as may be specified in the order.”

The persons referred to in subsection 3 of the section are the Registrar of Companies and the Official Trustee. It is clear that the section makes a general provision and does not indicate or specify the type of proceedings in which the court could restrain fraudulent persons and criminals from managing the affairs of companies. Section 186 (3)-(6) become applicable only when the application is to be made by the Registrar of Companies or the Official Trustee. But when the court decides to act on its own motion, as it was done in this present case, there is nothing in the section which forbids the court from so doing unless the proceedings before it are those of winding up proceedings.

It appears learned counsel, with due respect, has misconstrued the said section by reading into it something which is not in the section and which the section never intended; and by so doing learned counsel has attempted to give a restricted interpretation to the section by limiting the exercise of the court’s discretion, under the section, only in winding up proceedings. In the first place, there is no necessity to read words into the section. In the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to read into an enactment something or words which are not there: see Thompson v. Goold & Co. [1910] A.C. 409 at 420, H.L. per Lord Mersey and also Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910] A.C. 444 at 445, H.L. per Loreburn L.C.

The words of section 186 (1) (c) are plain and unambiguous; and in the circumstances the court is bound to ascertain the true meaning and the intention of the legislature from the language and the unambiguous expression used therein, and not to make out the intention from some other sources of information and then construe the words so as to meet an assumed intention.

The object of the section, no doubt, appears to be to safeguard the interest of members of the public who are shareholders of companies or who have either invested in or given credits to companies; and to ensure that the said investments and assets of companies are managed only by honest persons as directors and not by frauds or by persons with criminal propensity. In cases where the object of an enactment is the public safety, wide interpretation is called for or is necessary to effect that object; and giving section 186 (1) (c) that interpretation, I am of the view that there is nothing in the section which indicates that the legislature intended to confine or restrict the invocation of the disqualification sanction in winding up proceedings only. The applicability of the said section may arise in any proceedings. This is more so in proceedings brought under section 218 of the Code where,

[p.589] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 as in the present case, the conduct of both the appellant and the respondent as directors of the company was the subject matter of that application.

Thus, irrespective of the type of proceedings which are before the court, the court has a discretion to resort to section 186 (1) (c), and in a fitting case, make an order on its own motion, preventing criminals and fraudulent persons from managing companies. Furthermore, under the said section 186 (1) (c), the court when acting on its own motion does not necessarily need a report or the presence of the Registrar of Companies or the Official Trustee. It does not have to institute any investigations as learned counsel for the appellant attempted to advocate.

Learned counsel also referred to the interpretation which Professor Gower has put on section 186 (1) (c) as contained in his Final Report. The full title of the report is—Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of the present Company Law of Ghana. It was Professor Gower who drafted our Act 179. In that Final Report the learned draftsman put forward his views as to when and how section 186 (1) (c) of the Act 179 should be invoked; and learned counsel submitted that, according to the learned draftsman, this section 186 (1) (c) was intended to be invoked only in the course of winding up proceedings. What exactly did the learned draftsman state? At p. 134, para. 4 of the said Final Report the following can be found:

“4. Subsection (1) (c) deals with misconduct in relation to bodies corporate. The English Act is limited to misconduct coming to light in the course of winding up. Paragraph (c) is not so limited, though it is as a result of winding up proceedings that it is most likely to be invoked.”

The passage clearly shows that the learned draftsman acknowledged the fact that unlike the English Company Act, the application of section 186 (1) (c) of our Code is not restricted to fraudulent misconduct coming to light only in the course of winding up proceedings.

In any case, I do not think the comments of the learned draftsman should be taken to be the intention of the legislature. The unquestionable rule is that such views and comments made by framers of enactments are generally not admissible to explain the meaning of the enactments, The Code as drafted by the learned draftsman having been passed into law, its language could no longer be regarded as that of his. The language is regarded as that of the legislature that passed it into law; and so the meaning attached to it by the learned draftsman cannot control its construction: see Attorney-General v. Sillem (1864) 2 H & C 431 where Bramwell B. in delivering his judgment said at 537:

[p.590] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

“As has been excellently said, ‘Better far be accused of a narrow prejudice for the letter of the law’, than set up or sanction vague claims to discard it in favour of some higher interpretation, more consonant with the supposed intentions of the framers or the spirit which ought to have animated them.”

It may be recalled that in Farley v. Bonham (1861) 30 L.J.Ch. 239, Wood V.C. construed the Dower Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will 4, c. 105) to apply to gravelkind lands although this was avowedly contrary to the intention of the Real Property Commissioners who prepared that Act; for they stated in their report that it was their intention that the Act should not extend to lands of that tenure. So also in Assam Railway and Trading Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1935] A.C. 445, H.L. the report of a Royal Commission was not admitted to show the intention of an Act. The judgment of Lord Wright in particular is very instructive. At 457-458 the learned lord said:

“Mr. Latter sought to introduce into his argument certain recommendations from a Report of a Royal Commission on Income Tax in 1920; he argued that, as the Act of 1920 followed these recommendations, it should be presumed that the words of the section were intended to give effect to them and hence they could be used to show what was the intention of the Legislature in enacting the section … But on principle no such evidence for the purpose of showing the intention, that is the purpose or object, of an Act is admissible; the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words of the statute with such extraneous assistance as is legitimate.”

The court must always bear in mind the general warning of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Hilder v. Dexter [1902] A.C. 474, H.L. to the effect that the worst person to construe a statute is the person who is responsible for the drafting. The said warning is found at 477 of the report and it is as follows:

“My Lords, I have more than once had occasion to say that in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been employed. At the time he drafted the statute, at all events, he may have been under the impression that he had given full effect to what was intended, but he may be mistaken in construing it afterwards just because what was in his mind was what was intended, though, perhaps, it was not done.”

[p.591] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

When power is conferred to do some act of a judicial nature or public concern as in section 186 (1) (c), there is an implied obligation to exercise it when the occasion arises for it. The occasion to apply section 186 (1)

(c) arose during the hearing of the appellant’s application. It seems the only other obligation attached to the exercise of that discretion is that whenever in any proceedings the occasion to apply section 186 (1) (c) of Act 179 arises and the court is minded to make the disqualification order suo motu, the court must first give due hearing to the person to be affected. That is the person to be prejudicially affected should first be given every opportunity to testify on his behalf and to adduce evidence in defence of himself.

The learned editors of Maxwell on Interpretation (11th ed.) at p. 358 have stated the position in the following manner:

“In giving judicial powers to affect prejudicially the rights of person or property, a statute is understood as silently implying, when it does not expressly provide, the condition or qualification that the power is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure, such, for instance, as that which requires that before its exercise, the person sought to be prejudicially affected shall have an opportunity of defending himself.”

This then brings me to the question as to whether the learned trial judge complied with this implied obligation in the section. I think he did. As I have stated elsewhere in this judgment, the learned trial judge gave every conceivable opportunity to the appellant to lead oral evidence in addition to his affidavit evidence to rebut the evidence of crime and fraudulent conduct that had been put forward against him by the respondent. But, for no apparent reason, the appellant failed to take advantage of the invitation that was extended to him. He steadfastly refused to mount the witness-box to give evidence or to call witnesses to testify on his behalf. The learned trial judge having observed these fundamental rules of judicial procedure cannot be blamed for the appellant’s stubbornness.

I now turn to the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that conclusive proof of the criminal offence is required under section 186 (1) (c). With respect to learned counsel, this cannot be correct.

The section itself makes it quite clear that the person concerned need not be a convicted person. All that is required is that it must appear to the court that the conduct of the said person or the matters complained of amounted to a criminal offence; and like the breach of duty or the fraud, the crime must have been committed in relation to a body corporate.

[p.592] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

At any rate, the very high standard of conclusive proof advocated for by learned counsel for the appellant was achieved in the present case. For there was overwhelming evidence before the court on which the learned trial judge could hold that the appellant was guilty of a criminal offence and also of fraudulent breach of duty towards Solid Construction Co. Ltd., one of the companies within the West Coast Group. I may here refer to some of those acts which the appellant was found to have committed against the said company.

The appellant, as the managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd., without the knowledge of the board of directors of the said company, clandestinely opened a current account in the name of the company at the Social Security Bank, Head Office, Accra. Exhibit E, which was supposed to be the mandate from the Solid Construction Co. Ltd. to the said bank, was signed by the appellant and someone who was not an employee of the company and who had nothing to do with the company. On the said mandate, exhibit E, the appellant falsely stated that he, the appellant, was not holding directorship of any other company and that the Solid Construction Co. Ltd. had authorised the opening of the said account by a resolution passed by the company at a meeting held on 23 January 1978. In fact, no such meeting ever took place and no resolution of this kind was ever passed by the company. The post office box number which the appellant used in opening that account was totally different from the recognised postal address of Solid Construction Co. Ltd. In short, the appellant fraudulently concealed this bank account from the board of directors and secretly operated it to his benefit and to the detriment of the company.

It was established, on the evidence, that the appellant, in his capacity as the managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd., entered into three different contracts on behalf of the company with some institutions without informing the directors of the company. Neither did he record the said contracts in any of the books of the company as he was duty bound to do. The appellant again concealed these contracts from the board of directors. What was worse, the appellant, in his capacity as the said managing director, received payments in respect of these contracts. The said payments were made by cheques issued in the name of Solid Construction Co. Ltd.

The appellant, using the company’s stamp, fraudulently endorsed those cheques and made them payable to himself personally. He paid these cheques into his private bank account and then withdrew the amount and misappropriated it. Sums of money the appellant misappropriated in the manner as described, ran into thousands of cedis. These were the facts found by the learned trial judge and which facts are fully supported by the evidence on record. How can it then be

[p.593] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 argued that these facts did not satisfactorily and convincingly prove that a crime had been committed by the appellant against a body corporate? The appellant could easily have been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of stealing. The two accused persons in the case of Ampah v. The Republic [1976] 1 G.L.R. 403, misconducted themselves in the manner as the appellant did in the present case, and they were charged with stealing contrary to section 124 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).

Briefly the said two accused persons were executive director and accountant respectively, of the Ghana Chamber of Mines. Not only did they have authority to sign cheques for and on behalf of the Chamber of Mines but also received cheques issued in favour of the chamber. Whenever they received any cheque coming from outside and drawn in favour of the chamber, they endorsed the back and made it payable into some secret bank accounts of theirs. They later issued their own cheques to withdraw the money and misappropriated same. When they were found out they were prosecuted and convicted of stealing by the circuit court. One had seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour while the other had five years.

They appealed as far as to the Court of Appeal but the said court constituted by Azu Crabbe C.J., Amissah and Annan JJ.A. affirmed the convictions and the sentences, and dismissed the appeal: see [1977] 2 G.L.R. 171, C.A.

This case has been cited just to demonstrate in clear terms that the appellant’s conduct in relation to Solid Construction Co. Ltd. was criminal and fell squarely within section 124 of Act 29. Thus, the appellant was, without doubt, guilty of a criminal offence against that company even though he had not been convicted of it. He was also guilty of fraudulent breach of duty towards the said company. I am therefore of the opinion that the learned trial judge properly exercised his discretion when he invoked the provisions of section 186 (1) on his own motion, and ordered that the appellant:

“shall not without leave of the court, be a director or in any way whether directly or indirectly be concerned with or take part in the management of any company incorporated under Act 179 for a period of four years.”

For the above reasons, I find no merit in the appeal. Accordingly, I would dismiss it.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

I agree with the judgment read by my brother Abban J.A. I, however, desire to express briefly my views in a general

[p.594] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 nature on the issue of disqualification; and I do so in deference to the passionate anxiety of learned counsel for the appellant, as manifested in argument on the adverse consequences of such an order.

The appeal concerns the first appellant, Onesimus S. Adams, only; the second appellant having withdrawn his on the appeal being called. I find myself relieved from rehearsing the facts of the appeal, as they have been fully stated with matchless lucidity of language in the learned judgment just read.

Now acting under section 186 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) (which will be referred to simply as the Code) the learned trial judge made an order restraining the appellant from acting as a director or otherwise participating in the management or conduct of any company established under this Code, for a period of four years. That part of section 186 germane to the disputed order, may be quoted below:

“186 (1) Where, (a) a person is convicted on indictment, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty or any offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a body corporate, or

(b) a person is adjudicated bankrupt whether in Ghana or elsewhere, or

(c) it appears that a person has been guilty of any criminal offence, whether convicted or not, in relation to any body corporate or of any fraud or breach of duty in relation to a body corporate, the Court, on its own motion or on the application of any of the persons referred to in subsection (3) of this section, may order that that person shall not, without the leave of the Court, be a director of or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the management of any company or act as auditor, receiver or liquidator of any company for such period as may be specified in the order.”

By ground (4) of his further additional grounds of appeal, learned counsel has questioned the correctness of the trial court’s order as follows:

“The learned trial judge erred in law when he acceded to the request of the respondent to invoke the provision of section 186 (1) (c) of the Code against the first applicant because:

(i) The provisions of section 186 (1) (c) of the Code had not been satisfied.

[p.595] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

(ii) There was no conclusive proof of criminal misconduct by the first applicant.”

In substance counsel’s submissions were that an order under the section was of a penal nature and carried with it a stigma adverse to the commercial career of the person affected; consequently the degree of proof required to establish any allegation of criminal misconduct disclaimed by that section must be as high as that demanded for criminal offences. In particular no such order can be made by a court without prior investigation and receipt of a report by an inspector appointed under the Code. On the need for the intervention of an inspector, learned counsel urged it as the practice under the English Companies Act, 1948.

The submissions may be answered in the reverse order. It seems to me that whatever the practice may be under the English rules, it is plain that the relevant provisions in the Code, relied on by learned counsel, do not support counsel’s contention that no court order under section 186 (1) (c) can properly be made without prior investigation and report by an inspector appointed for that purpose. The provisions are subsections (3) and (4) of section 186 which provide:

“(3) An application for an order under this section may be made by the Registrar or by the Official Trustee, or by the trustee in bankruptcy of the person concerned or by the liquidator of any body corporate.

(4) A person intending to apply for the making of an order under this section shall give not less than twenty-eight days written notice of his intention to the person against whom the order is sought, and to the Registrar if the application is made by some person other than the Registrar.”

The point is that discovery of some offences that may have been committed by a director or other persons towards a company, may come to light in the course of a winding up, liquidation or other proceedings, in which the Registrar of Companies, the Official Trustee or other officials mentioned in section 186 (3) were engaged. It is in such a situation that a report of the said investigation or proceeding may be required by the court, where there is an application by any person named in section 186 (3) for the making of an order within section 186 (1) (c). The report is of course submitted to the court as part of whatever evidence the person applying relies on. And it is for the purpose of assisting the court to exercise its discretion under section 186 (1) (a) judicially.

[p.596] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

The initiative that may be taken by the Registrar of Companies or other persons empowered to apply by virtue of subsection (3), is plainly an alternative. For the order, in the words of section 186 (1), may be made by “the Court, on its own motion or on the application of any of the persons referred to in subsection (3) …” The conjunction “or” is here disjunctive.

Of course the provisions of subsection (4) as above quoted, are to ensure, by the notice, regular judicial proceeding and in conformity with the rules of natural justice by affording opportunity to the person against whom an order is sought, and the requisite persons, such as the registrar to be heard.

In the instant case, the parties involved were brought before the court on a petition under section 218 of the Code by way of motion, at the instance of the appellant. Before hearing commenced each party had an opportunity to file detailed and copious affidavits in support of his case. On the initial conclusion of argument by counsel, the learned trial judge must have taken the view, and properly we think, that he would need oral evidence, in enlargement of the affidavit evidence, to assist him further. He made this known in a ruling. By the stand taken by the appellant’s advisers, the appellant declined the invitation, and adduced no oral evidence.

The respondent on the other hand, availed himself of the court’s invitation, and called three witnesses. It stands to reason that when as in this case, the matter was initiated before it, and from affidavits and other evidence, the court was seised of all the facts the parties desire to urge, no necessity may arise for any report from persons referred to in subsection (3). The simple reason being that by the form of the proceeding, there was nothing to be reported upon by any of the persons referred to in subsection (3). And inferentially subsection (4) could not arise either. The court had all the facts as the parties thought would advance their cause. It was the duty of the court to decide on those facts in the light of the relevant enactments governing the issues; and it did so. In those circumstances, I do not lend a sympathetic ear to any singular proposition which seeks to elevate a report of the nature aforesaid, above the testimony of direct depositions in the full view and hearing of the court in the form of affidavits and oral evidence. It follows that the learned trial judge was justified in the procedure he adopted as one sanctioned by section 186 (1) (c) of the Code.

Now the gravamen of this ground of appeal was really that there was no conclusive proof of any criminal offence against the appellant to justify the order of disqualification. The reason, as submitted by learned counsel, is that a disqualification under section 186 (1) (c) being penal in effect, the criminal misconduct, which attracts an order under the section, calls for a high standard of proof. It was stressed by

[p.597] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 learned counsel that the standard is as onerous as that required in any criminal prosecution.

The point may be settled from the very wording of section 186 (1) (c). Whereas under section 186 (1) (a) the court is called upon to deal with a person “convicted on indictment”, and under section 186 (1) (b) with an “adjudicated bankrupt”, under section 186 (1) (c) it is sufficient if “it appears that” the person is guilty of a criminal offence towards a body corporate. It would be reading into the section a meaning not intended by the legislature, when learned counsel advocated that there should be established proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Be that as it may, it may be observed that there is no magic in the phrase “proof beyond reasonable doubt” by itself. On high authority all that it really calls for, even in criminal trials, is that the tribunal must be satisfied and feel sure of the guilt of the accused before it convicts. That was R. v. Summers (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 14, C.C.A. where indeed it was stressed that it was better that a summing up should avoid the use of the term “reasonable doubt” and direct the jury that, before they convict, they must be satisfied by the evidence so that they feel sure the prosecution have established the guilt of the prisoner.

But in the instant case, the evidence, in my opinion, was more than beyond reasonable doubt; it was beyond any shadow of doubt. As I have referred to earlier, the respondent took advantage of the trial court’s invitation and called witnesses on his behalf. The evidence of two of those witnesses, Messrs Myles Hagan and S. A. Winful, became most relevant and material in the proof of the original misconduct alleged against the appellant. It is true that the appellant, through counsel, challenged, in cross-examination, the evidence given by the two gentlemen. But those witnesses denied the suggestions put to them. Nor was anything said by the learned judge, as a result of the cross-examination, which cast doubt on their evidence. There was nothing fanciful or improbable about the testimony they gave. In those circumstances then, in the absence of a rival positive version from the appellant on the issue, the oral testimony, given by the two gentlemen, barring the affidavits, stood uncontradicted: see Kru v. Saoud Brothers and Sons [1975] 1 G.L.R. 46, C.A.

The effect was that the whole evidence, including the affidavit evidence, was lifted from the misty vale of the balance of probability to the assurance of certainty in favour of the respondent’s case. This led to the learned trial judge’s holding that:

“There cannot be any doubt that the proved conduct of the applicant in his dealings with Solid Construction Co. Ltd. and management, constitute breach of his duty within the language of section 203 of Act 179 to justify his summary dismissal.”

[p.598] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

The proved facts related to the details of three secret contracts, all of educational origins, monopolised for himself by the appellant, although in the name of Solid Construction Co. Ltd., and in his capacity as managing director. The mode of execution of the fraud and the means employed in diverting the payments to the appellant’s personal account were vividly deposed to in the respondent’s affidavit, and explained in the annexed exhibits.

It would be overloading what I intend to be a supporting judgment were I to set out the details. It is sufficient to say that the evidence established a meticulous design and execution by the appellant, in fraudulently diverting the clientele and very substantial proceeds that lawfully belonged to Solid Construction Co. Ltd. to himself. The learned trial judge rightly so found. It was misappropriation by stealing contrary to our Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).

Before us learned counsel hardly made any serious attempt to dislodge the evidence as to the findings on the serious frauds relating to those three secret contracts. One has every sympathy for learned counsel here, for the stand taken by the appellant at the court below, in refusing to adduce evidence. As it is, the exertions of learned counsel that proof of the criminal offence was not conclusive, with respect, had really no foundation.

I am satisfied that the learned trial judge cannot be faulted on his finding of fact as to the commission of criminal misconduct, by the appellant, towards the company, in the appellant’s capacity as managing director of Solid Construction Co. Ltd.

Learned counsel made a point of the stigma and hardship that naturally attaches to the order of disqualification. I am not unfeeling to the plight the appellant now finds himself in. I am of opinion that it is no special calamity; but one of the risks assumed by many a man in their calling in an industrial society. Thus a motor vehicle driver or a commercial traveller may be disqualified from driving for not less than twelve months, should he drive a vehicle when it is not insured against third party risk. Or for grave misconduct, a medical practitioner may have his name erased, or a legal practitioner disbarred. Besides the stigma, such persons might well lose their means of livelihood. But it is a case of balancing the interest of the individual against the well-being of the public. In the bustle of the pursuit of our various vocations, the law stands silent sentinel as protector of the public. The public needs protection for their investments of credit, whether as shareholders or members of the public at large, from over zealous and fraudulent business adventurers and even from well meaning but misguided directors.

As it might have become plain from my observations above, this case under some other procedure could have seen a full-dress criminal

[p.599] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 prosecution. And although perhaps the facts do not measure up to the same magnitude, it is an apt reminder of the case of R v. Kylsant [1931] All E.R. Rep. 179. It occurred in 1931—still within living memory—when the English aristocrat was prosecuted and convicted under the English Act, for an offence identical to our section 186 (1) (c) of the Code.

I am only to add that I entirely concur in the judgment of my brother Abban J.A. that the appeal be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I have had the privilege to read in advance the judgment just delivered by my brother Abban J.A. and I agree with him. It covers so fully and so admirably the matters of fact and the question of law which have been the subject of this appeal that I can state my own conclusions on some aspects of the case quite briefly and, as it were, as mere footnotes.

The capacity of the appellant to bring a petition under section 218 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), became a bone of contention both at the court of first instance and before this court. For the appellant it was argued that under the said section the capacity to bring an application is not limited to a member of the company alone but that, contrary to what the learned trial judge held, a director or an officer of the company who is not a member of the company within the definition of section 30 of Act 179, nonetheless, is endowed with the capacity to apply.

The construction advocated by the appellant’s counsel, with due deference to him, truncates section 218 (1). Looking at the said section 218 (1) even cursorily, it is plain that the beneficiaries of the power to apply under the section are a member, a debentureholder and the Registrar of Companies. Any one of these persons may exercise the power on any of the grounds stated in subsections (a) and (b) of section 218 (1). The ground for making the application stated in section 218 (1) (a) is that:

“the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members or debentureholders or in disregard of his or their proper interests as members, shareholders, officers or debentureholders of the company.”

The term “officers” if read in the context of the whole sentence makes it clear that the oppression complained of must be in disregard of the interest of the member or members as officers of the company to bring the section into play. It becomes quite obvious then that a director

[p.600] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 or officer of the company who is not also a member of the company has no locus standi to apply under section 218 (1) of Act 179.

It has rightly been recognised that section 218 of Act 179 has its origin in section 210 of the English Companies Act, 1948, although it is said that the ambit of our section 218 is wider: see Mahama v. Soli [1977] 1 G.L.R. 215, C.A. That case did not attempt to lay down, as it was suggested by the appellant’s counsel, that a director, qua director, was entitled to bring an application under section 218 (1) irrespective of his non-membership of the company. On the contrary it affirmed the converse that a member who is also a director is entitled to relief under the section even if the act complained of is also oppressive of him as shareholder or officer of the company. If, as it has been said, the ambit of section 218 is wider than the corresponding section 210 of the English Companies Act, then it is mainly because, unlike the said section 210, a debentureholder is empowered under our section 218 to apply for relief. A study of the judicial decisions on section 210 will, without doubt, be of immense assistance in determining the scope and operation of our section 218.

But, briefly, the historical background. In their report in 1945, the Committee on Company Law Amendment (the Cohen Committee) (Cmmd 6659) recognised the problems faced by minority shareholders in private companies. Two particular difficulties were mentioned by the committee. The first was the hardship which could result from provisions in the articles of private companies for the restriction of the transfer of shares. Such provisions whilst valued as a means of keeping a family business under the control of the family, could be used by directors to force the representatives of a deceased member to sell shares to the director at a price disadvantageous to the deceased’s estate (paragraph 58). The second abuse was the practice of directors absorbing a large proportion of the profits of the business in remuneration for their services thereby leaving little or nothing for distribution to the shareholders by way of dividend.

In the view of the committee these difficulties were, however, only illustrative of a more general problem. Although recognising the usefulness in dealing with the problem of the court’s power to order the winding up of a company, the committee felt that in such cases, because the break-up value of the assets could be small, the court ought to have the additional power “to impose upon the party to the dispute whatever settlement the court considers just and equitable” (paragraph 60). It was therefore recommended at p. 95 that:

“there be a new section under which, on a shareholders’ petition, the Court, if satisfied that a minority of shareholders is being oppressed and that a winding up order would not do justice to the

[p.601] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 minority, should be empowered, instead of making a winding up order, to make such other order … as to the Court may seem just.”

The Cohen Committee’s recommendations on this matter were accepted and were embodied in section 210 of the Companies Act, 1948.

Thus in Re Bellador Silk, Ltd. [1965] 1 All E.R. 667 at 672-673 Plowman J. explained:

“Before the Companies Act, 1948, an oppressed minority with the necessary tangible interest could petition for the winding-up of the company; but as the Lord President (Lord Cooper) pointed out in Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd. [(1952) S.C. at 64] the cure might be worse than the disease owing to the prejudice likely to be inflicted on the petitioners as a result of a compulsory liquidation, and in that situation the Act of 1948 empowered the court in certain circumstances to afford relief by various methods falling far short of the extreme expedient of a winding-up.”

We can now appreciate the historical perspective and the way the courts have enforced this section which protects minority shareholders against oppression.

All the decided cases are in agreement that the petitioner must be a member of the company and that the oppressive conduct must be directed towards the petitioner in his capacity as a member: see Elder v. Elder & Watson (1952) S.C. 49: Re Lundie Brothers Ltd. [1965] 2 All E.R. 692; and Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 374. Although in Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd. [1970] 3 All E.R. 57, Pennycuick J. (at first instance) was prepared to accept that personal representatives, even if not registered as members, would have locus standi under the section, his statement was obiter and, therefore, this point cannot be considered as settled. The petitioner has to show that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (including himself). This has been interpreted as meaning that there must have been a course of oppressive conduct and one isolated act, even if oppressive will not suffice. Thus, if a director were to take excessive remuneration this would not constitute oppression unless he used his position as a majority shareholder to retain that remuneration or to stifle proceedings by the company or its shareholders in relation to it: see Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd. [1971] 3 All E.R. 184, C.A. Further, a series of oppressive acts will not be sufficient unless they constitute a chain of events which continue right up to the presentation of the petition: see

[p.602] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 the Court of Appeal decision in Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd. (supra).

Among the matters to be considered by the court in making an order under section 210 of the Companies Act, 1948, is the provision that:

“……to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice that part of the members, but otherwise the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up.”

For this reason cases like Re Bellador Silk, Ltd. (supra) and Re Lundie Bros Ltd. (supra) established that to be able to petition for remedies under the section, a shareholder must show both that he would be entitled to a winding up order and that there has been oppression to him as a member. Our section 218 does not expressly stipulate that the court should consider whether the acts would justify a winding up order. I am of the view, however, that as our section 218 is also an alternative remedy to a winding up and there is express provision in the section that the registrar may bring the application in a case falling under section 225 of the Code the applicant must show also that he would be entitled to a winding up.

The effect of the general proposition that the duties of a director are owed to the company and not to the shareholders as such is that those duties can, in the absence of “fraud, dishonesty or illegality” only be enforced at the instance of the company. Furthermore, under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 E.R. 189, the court will not inquire into matters of “internal management” or, at the instance of a shareholder, interfere with transactions which though prima facie irregular and deterimental to the company are capable of being rectified by an ordinary resolution of the company in general meeting.

The rule in Foss v. Harbottle (supra) and its progeny have, indeed, survived a good deal of criticism and have left the discontented minority shareholder in many cases without a remedy. Even if his case falls within the limited number of exceptions to that rule, he may be unable to obtain the information he requires in order to proceed with any prospect of success unless he is in a position to obtain a winding up order or to persuade the Registrar of Companies to exercise his investigatory powers under the Code.

The question posed here is whether a shareholder or member of a company who applies under section 218 of the Code (or section 210 of the Companies Act) can succeed without making the company a party since, as it was observed by Lawton L.J. in Nurcombe v. Nurcombe

[p.603] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561

[1965] 1 All E.R. 65 at 69, C.A., “a minority shareholder’s action is in form nothing more than a procedural device for enabling the court to do justice to a company controlled by miscreant directors or shareholders.” In Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1202, P.C. it was held that a wrongly expelled director was not entitled to maintain an action in his own name to restore himself to office and that the remedy would be a derivative action on behalf of the company to right a wrong done to it. In that case the plaintiff commenced proceedings in big personal capacity in the High Court of Hong Kong against his co-directors and the company claiming, inter alia, a declaration that a notice signed by his co-directors requesting him to resign his office as a director was void and of no effect, and that he remained a director.

In Mahama v. Soli [1977] 1 G.L.R. 215, C.A. the court seems to have struck a discordant note. It said (as stated in holding (3) of the headnote at 216):

“(3) No provision of section 218 of Act 179 laid down the procedural requirement that the company should be made a party to the application in which no relief was sought against it. Although the result of the application might benefit the company, there was no reason why it should be made to litigate a plaint which under the section, was left to be agitated by complaining members.”

On the particular facts in Soli’s case (supra) it may well be that one cannot quarrel with the above statement. It must not, in any view, be taken to mean as stating with finality that section 218 completely dispenses with the need to make the company a party to the suit in proceedings under it. Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 6, at p. 445, para 863 fully states the law in actions in respect of corporate wrongs. In an action to redress a wrong done to a company, the company is the only proper plaintiff. Proceedings may, however, be brought by a member in his own name where such authority to sue in the company’s name cannot be obtained and the act complained of is of a fraudulent character or oppressive or ultra vires the company or is criminal; or where the wrongdoers control the majority of votes, etc. In such a case the plaintiff should distinctly allege the true nature of the act complained of and of the impossibility of getting the company to impeach its validity.

Now the burning question before the court below was whether the applicant established any prima facie proof that he was a member of the West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. within the intendment of section 30 of the Code. The affidavits filed by the appellant could not assert

[p.604] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 with any consistent confidence that he held shares in the company because his claim to any shareholding oscillated between what he deposed to in paragraph 9 (L) of his affidavit that shares in the company had not been allocated and what he deposed to in his supplementary affidavit that he was alloted 4,000 shares at a board of directors’ meeting held on 14 June 1967. The appellant annexed exhibit C to his affidavit. This contained alleged extracts from the companies register kept by the Registrar-General’s Department. These extracts comprised the annual returns of the West Coast Group of Companies and they disclose the shares held by the appellant in each company. In the annual returns for West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd. it discloses that the appellant holds 63 shares. Some of these returns were said to have been signed by the respondent.

One of the questions which fell for decision in R v. Halpin [1975] Q.B. 907, C.A. was whether a company’s annual returns submitted under the Companies Act 1948, was admissible to prove the truth of its contents. It was argued that at common law a statement in the return was possible only if it was made by the person having a duty to inquire and satisfy himself of the truth of the recorded facts, and that that person was the Registrar of Companies who had no such knowledge and that accordingly the statement in the annual return was inadmissible. It was held that the annual return was admissible to prove the truth of its contents. The common law, it was said, should move with the times and recognise that officials had no personal knowledge of the accuracy of the entries, and that the functions previously performed by one person were now shared by the person who had knowledge and the statutory duty to forward details to the Companies Registry and by the official charged with the duty to preserve entries and show them to the public when required by statute. Where there was a statutory duty on a company to submit accurate returns for public display, the statement in the document was prima facie admissible as evidence of the truth.

Exhibit C would, normally, have been admissible then to afford prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents but for the fact that it is a copy of mere extracts which have not been authenticated and the appellant who annexed it as his exhibit has himself rendered it nugatory by his protestation on oath that the contents are false. In the result the appellant failed to establish his locus standi as a member or shareholder, the sine qua non to set section 218 under which he applied in motion. For that failure of capacity alone he was properly bowled out of court. Having failed to establish his shareholding in the company (and what percentage of the shares he held, if a member) section 220

[p.605] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 was not open to him to apply to the court to order the appointment of an inspector to investigate the affairs of the company.

Even if the appellant’s standing as a member of the company is accepted, I am satisfied that the learned trial judge properly dismissed the application on the ground of mala fides. In Nurcombe v. Nurcombe (supra) Lawton L.J. said that the court was entitled to look at the conduct of the plaintiff in a minority shareholder’s action in order to satisfy itself that he was a proper person to bring the action on behalf of the company and that the company would benefit. A particular plaintiff, he pointed out, might not be a proper person because his conduct was tainted in some way which under the rules of equity might bar relief. In the instant case, the appellant was shown to have fully condoned in the expenditure made on the Tema Golf Club and enjoyed the festivities of the said club. He cannot be heard to complain. Where a shareholder in a limited liability company has, with full notice or knowledge of facts, himself received part of the proceeds of an ultra vires act committed by the directors and he still retains the money, he cannot, either individually or as suing on behalf of the general body of shareholders, maintain an action against those directors: see Towers v. African Tug Co. [1904] 1 Ch. 558. The ill-motivation for bringing this application at all is quite obvious; and enough has been said of it as springing from the appellant’s fraudulent and criminal proclivities.

Before parting company with section 218 of the Code, I have to remark that the English experience of their section 210 shows that their courts have been slow to apply that section. For instance, in the first 28 years of the section’s existence there are only three reported instances in which the section has been successfully invoked, viz Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v. Meyer [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, H.L.; Re H.R. Harmer Ltd. [1958] 3 All E.R. 689, C.A. and Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd. (supra) but the last case subsequently was reversed on appeal. Undoubtedly the requirement that the section will operate when the oppressive conduct is directed towards members in their capacity as members has contributed in curtailing the utility of the section. At least it should teach us that our courts must be very discriminatory in the application of section 218.

Fraud, like cancer, calls for a swift remedy. It must be uprooted. Therefore, when fraud is brought to the court’s notice and there is credible evidence to support it the court is obliged to deal with it swiftly and decidedly. The appellant’s disqualification by the trial judge did not in any way offend section 186 of the Code. It was amply justified by section 186 (1) (c). Apart from the court making an order on its own motion, an application for an order under the section may be made by Registrar of Companies or by the Official Trustee, or by the trustee in bankruptcy of the person concerned or by the liquidator of any body

[p.606] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 561 corporate—all human agencies: see section 186 (3). The court is not the “‘person” contemplated in section 186 (4) and, therefore, the investigative procedure laid down in section 186 (4) and (5) will not apply to the court. The court was its own master invoking section 186 (9) (c) and it spoke firmly and decisively. For all the foregoing additional reasons, I am for the dismissal of the appeal.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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