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[1985] SLR (CA) 32Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

MIREKU vs. YEBUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 326

20 March 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 32
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OSCOLAMIREKU v YEBUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 326 [1985] SLR (CA) 32
APAMIREKU v YEBUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 326, [1985] SLR (CA) 32 (Ghana).
BluebookMIREKU v YEBUAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 326, [1985] SLR (CA) 32 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592 C.A.

(2) Ankrah v. Ofori [1974] 1 G.L.R. 185, C.A.

(3) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231.

(4) Burgoine v. Taylor (1878) 9 Ch.D. 1, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the defendant against judgment in default of appearance by him and his counsel at the trial. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Osei-Hwere J.A.

COUNSEL

C. O. Nyanor for the appellant

C. A. Lokko for the respondent.

[p.328] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 326

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. On 11 August 1977 the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) sealed her writ in the High Court, Accra claiming against the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) a declaration of title to a piece of land, particularly described; damages for trespass; and recovery of possession. Because of the unpredictable turn the trial of the case took at the court below it will be pertinent to bring into focus the issues in dispute by quoting both the statement of claim and the defence. These are formulated as follows:

“STATEMENT OF CLAIM 1 The plaintiff is the owner of the plot of land situate lying and being at Maamobi-Dzorwulu, Accra and described in the plaintiff ‘s writ of summons.

2 The said plot was granted to the plaintiff in 1961 by the then Osu Mantse, Nii Noi Dowuna IV, and evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated 23 October 1961 registered in the Lands Registry as No.

2178/1977.

3 Sometime in or about the month of May 1977, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had without her consent entered upon or otherwise trespassed on the said land and built thereon.

4 The said trespass is continuing in that the defendant has taken up occupation of the land.

5 By reason of the matters complained of the plaintiff has suffered damages.

6 Wherefore the plaintiff claims as per her writ of summons.”

“STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 1 That the defendant denies paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of claim and will put the plaintiff to strict proof of the averments in the said paragraphs.

2 In further answer to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of claim, the defendant says that in or about 1959 the then Osu Mantse customarily granted the land in dispute to the defendant and he immediately went into occupation and possession of the land and started developing it.

3 The defendant says further to the said paragraphs 1 and 2 that by the year 1960 he had constructed a concrete wall around the land and started building operations without any interruption or opposition by anybody.

4 The defendant denies paragraph 3 of the statement of claim and says that long before May 1977 the defendant had

[p.329] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 326 completed his development of the land into a dwelling-house which, by that date, was already occupied by the defendant and his family. The defendant says he is now living in the said dwelling-house.

5 Paragraph 4 of the statement of claim is denied. The defendant contends that he is in possession, occupation and enjoyment of the land as of right.

6 The defendant denies paragraph 5 of the statement of claim and will put the plaintiff to strict proof thereof.

7 The defendant avers that the plaintiff has no claim against the defendant and that the writ of summons should be struck out.

8 Save as hereinbefore specifically or impliedly admitted, the defendant denies every allegation of fact in the plaintiff’s statement of claim as if the same had been set out in extenso and traversed seriatim.”

It must be said with some credit for the career of the case at the court below that it was not attended by the “known slow process of the courts” of which this court took notice in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592, C.A. For on 16 January 1978 the court settled for trial the issues set down in the summons for directions even in the absence of the parties and their counsel. There were two subsequent adjournments thereafter when all the parties had not been served with hearing notice. Two other adjournments followed when the parties were present. When the case was called on the fifth adjourned date after the issues had been set down for trial the plaintiff’s counsel was in court, but not the plaintiff. Counsel announced her indisposition. The defendant was also in court, but not his counsel. The court presided over by Anterkyi J., adjourned the case to 6 December 1979 for hearing. That was, indeed, the very first time the case had been listed before him.

On the adjourned date for hearing (i.e. 6 December 1979) both the plaintiff and her counsel appeared in court but the defendant and his counsel were absent for no stated reason. The learned trial judge ordered the case to proceed. The plaintiff testified and called two witnesses, one of whom was her grantor. At the close of the plaintiff’s case the court adjourned the case to 18 December 1979 for judgment. However, on 17 December 1979 the defendant’s solicitor filed a motion praying the court that the defendant be granted leave to cross-examine the plaintiff and his witnesses and defend the suit. When the court assembled for judgment the defendant’s counsel brought to the notice of the court the motion he had filed praying that the matter be reopened so that the defendant be heard on the merits. The learned judge made short shrift of counsel’s application by ruling that the motion was not before

[p.330] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 326 the court as it was filed on 17 December 1979 and properly fixed for 20 December 1979. He then proceeded to read his judgment and gave judgment for the plaintiff.

Obviously because the motion (which was in effect to arrest the judgment) had been rendered futile, counsel did not appear to move it and it was dismissed for want of prosecution. He, however, took the positive step to apply to set aside the judgment. In the accompanying affidavit the defendant deposed that the affliction of an acute stomach disorder disabled him from appearing in court the day the case was heard. His counsel was travelling from Nkawkaw to Accra to attend court but his car developed some mechanical fault which resulted in his arrival at about 10.30 am to find that the court had risen for the day. His counsel, however, saw the judge in chambers to apologise for his lateness to court. As should be expected, the plaintiff opposed the motion.

The motion to set aside the judgment was dismissed not on the merits of the explanation offered in the defendant’s affidavit for his default but for the controversial and arbitrary reasons that the evidence for the plaintiff was very strong against the defendant and that if he had led evidence he would not have had a reasonable expectation of judgment in his favour. He expressed himself to have come to this conclusion because, according to him, whilst the plaintiff’s statement of claim disclosed the root of title the defence merely relied on a customary grant which the Osu Mantse of that period denied at the trial. In our opinion, the learned trial judge erred in his assessment of the evidence of the ex-Osu Mantse for the purposes of the application before him when, without passing through the crucial test of cross-examination, he lifted and placed it on the pedestal as the final word or the ultimate truth.

The plaintiff herself did not obviously foresee that the trial judge would take such a draconian view of the defence since, by her summons for directions, one of the issues joined was whether or not the defendant received a grant of the land in 1959 from the Osu Mantse. The defence also disclosed that at the time the plaintiff commenced her action the defendant had built on the land and was in occupation. The plaintiff acknowledged this in her statement of claim although she essayed to derogate from the effect of her admission in her reply. The pleadings then exposed the issue as to whether or not the protection under Act 2 would have availed the defendant had the judgment been set aside to permit him contest the action even on the strength of his customary grant. For by the definition of “conveyance“ in section 4 of Act 2 it includes “a transfer of land by customary law” and the right to the protection could, therefore, be acquired under a grant by customary law: see Ankrah v. Ofori [1974] 1 G.L.R. 185, C.A.

[p.331] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 326

The defendant appeals to this court to set aside the judgment obtained against him. As the trial judge refused the application to set aside for a wrong reason the issue whether the judgment ought to be set aside or not is left at large and this court can exercise its own discretion. The defendant supported his affidavit with a medical report issued by a surgical specialist at the Ridge Hospital on 19 December 1979 certifying that the defendant attended the surgical clinic at the said hospital on 5 and 6 December 1979. The plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition attacked this medical report as an afterthought, imputing by this that there was collusion between the defendant and the surgical specialist who issued it, to deceive the court. Her counsel took this up in argument to invite us to declare the medical report a fraud. The only reason for this attack was that as the defendant had said he was afflicted by his stomach ailment on the night of 5 December and he had sent his nephew in the morning of 6 December to inform his lawyer that he was attending the hospital it was most unlikely that he, in fact, attended hospital on 5 December. There is nothing in the defendant’s affidavit to suggest that he could not have attended the clinic on the night of 5 December when he had the attack. We think that counsel should not encourage or make attacks of such general and sweeping character on the integrity of responsible public officers. If they were justified it was the Bar’s duty to make them in court. If they were obviously unjustified there was a duty to refrain from making them. We hold that the medical report supported the defendant’s disability to be present in court on 6 December 1979.

His counsel could have saved the day but for his arrival late in court; although the plaintiff, here again, tried to dispute what the defendant deposed to that his counsel saw the trial judge in chambers to apologise before the court closed for the day. We would ourselves have thought him a brazen and audacious liar, if the defendant’s counsel could tell the very judge before whom he was to argue the motion that he had been to his chambers to explain his lateness to court whilst that was not the truth. As it seems to us, indolence in defending the action could not be attributed to either the defendant or his counsel. On the contrary, it was an unpredictable force majeure which differently struck down counsel and client that brought about the defendant’s doom.

No doubt the learned trial judge must have been irritated at the conduct of the defendant’s counsel in filing his motion to reopen the case only one day before the judgment or eleven days after he had had notice that the case had been adjourned for judgment. Counsel for the defendant blundered somewhat. But even there it was improper for the trial judge to have put on the blinkers in disregard of the motion which was brought to his notice or of which he had notice. The utmost recourse was for the trial judge to have compensated the other party in

[p.332] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 326 costs to permit the motion to be taken first. As pointed out by this court in Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231 at 238, “Unless it can be said to result in injustice, lateness per se, is not a disabling factor.” In a case like this any injury caused by the delay may be compensated for by the payment of costs. Accordingly the objection raised by the plaintiff’s counsel in support of his argument of mala fides in the defendant because he did not move timeously to reopen the case for the reason, as he argued, that he did not wish to confront the ex-Osu Mantse cannot be listened to. At any rate waiting for only eleven days to reopen a case after evidence had closed cannot be said to be a tardy application.

It is well to remember the guidance of Jessel M.R. in Burgoine v. Taylor (1878) 9 Ch.D. 1 at 4-5, C.A. where he said:

“Solicitors cannot, any more than other men, conduct their business without sometimes making slips; and where a solicitor watches the list, and happens to miss the case, in consequence of which it is taken in his absence, it is in accordance with justice and with the course of practice to restore the action to the paper, on the terms of the party in default paying the costs of the day . . .”

In our view, it will be highly unjust, in the absence of any wilful default on the part of the defendant, that by a sweep of the pen we endorse the judgment by default and consign to the plaintiff the disputed land and the house thereon.

It is a sad reflection of the constraints that hamper the administration of justice in our courts that this simple appeal has taken five years to be heard. The plaintiff’s counsel cites this inordinate delay as an example of the mala fides he attributed to the defendant and suggested that the defendant, once again, influenced the registry below not to process the record of proceedings. The earlier warning to counsel must be recalled. We have been told that the ex-Osu Mantse who testified for the plaintiff has since died. This cannot work injustice to any of the parties since the grant of stool land is not made by the Mantse alone. The defendant could not have had any hand in the delay otherwise the plaintiff should have reported those involved to the Chief Justice for disciplinary action. The defendant has made out his case and the appeal ought to succeed.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J. A. A.

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