IN RE WIREDU (DECD.); OSEI vs. ADDAI [1982-83] GLR 501
20 January 1980 · OWUSU-ADDO J · ≈ 14 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 59Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASE REFERRED TO
Dyer v. Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq. Cas 92; 2 W & T.L.C. 749; [1775-1802] All E.R. Rep. 205; 30 E.R. 42.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for the determination of the ownership of an estate house included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased intestate. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
K. K. Attobrah for the plaintiff.
Dei Kwarteng for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF OWUSU-ADDO J.
The brief introductory facts of this case are that after the death of one Francis Wiredu at Mamponteng in 1965 the plaintiff, his maternal first cousin, was appointed his customary successor. He
[p.503] of [1982-83] GLR 501 applied for letters of administration in 1978 to administer the deceased’s estate. Attached to the application was the usual inventory of the deceased’s properties including an estate house No. K.39, South Suntreso.
A caveat was entered by the defendant who contended that the estate house was not one of the deceased’s properties but his (defendant’s) property. His reasons being that he approached the deceased to use his influence to obtain an estate house for him but it was agreed between him and the deceased that the deceased’s name would appear in the State Housing Corporation’s books as tenant. The deceased was therefore his nominee whilst he was the real owner of the estate house.
On 8 May 1978 the defendant’s application for letters of administration, No. 169/78, was placed before this court. In that application, the defendant described himself in his supporting affidavit as the customary successor of the deceased. Having been examined viva voce by the court the defendant admitted that he had not been appointed the deceased’s customary successor and apologised to the court for committing perjury. At that stage the court dismissed his application for letters of administration upon his own admission. The contents of the defendant’s false affidavit will be referred to at a later stage of this judgment.
On 14 November 1978 the plaintiff’s motion brought under Order 60, r. 20 (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), applying for letters of administration was granted and the court ordered a writ of summons to issue for the determination of ownership of the estate house.
The controversy between the parties is about the ownership of the estate house No. K.39, South Suntreso, Kumasi. The plaintiff’s claim is that as customary successor to the late Francis Wiredu, who died intestate, he is entitled to ownership of the deceased’s estate house. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of his statement of claim read:
“4. The plaintiff says that in his lifetime Francis Wiredu applied for and was allocated estate house No.
K.39, South Suntreso, Kumasi, on rental basis, he lived there from 1953 until his death.
5. (a) The plaintiff says that as customary successor, he took over the control of the said house; he however permitted other members of the family to stay in the said house and saw to it that the monthly rent was paid.
(b) The plaintiff says that the defendant, being a nephew, also lodged in the said house on his return from his trips to Nigeria.
6. The plaintiff says that the hire-purchase instalments on the said house was completed in April 1978, after that the family
[p.504] of [1982-83] GLR 501 met and it was agreed that the plaintiff, as customary successor, should have Francis Wiredu’s name changed to his name; the plaintiff therefore found it necessary to apply for letters of administration with a view to changing Francis Wiredu’s name to his name as the owner of the said house.”
For his part the defendant by his counterclaim, claims a declaration of ownership in possession of the estate house and as lessee of the State Housing Corporation (SHC). The relevant paragraphs of his statement of defence read:
“6. In 1953 the defendant approached the said Francis Wiredu to use his influence to obtain an allocation of an estate house for the defendant. The late Wiredu agreed to do so, but said that in order to succeed he would have to make the application in his own name, because as he explained, the authorities should not know he was applying for the house for another person.
7. The defendant says he and the late Francis Wiredu agreed that if the latter was successful in the application and the house was allocated to him he would hand over all the relevant documents to the defendant so that the defendant would occupy the house as tenant of the corporation and to pay the rents . . .
10. Pursuant to the agreement between the defendant and the late Wiredu the latter handed over the house to the defendant together with the rent book as soon as it was allocated to him and the defendant says he went into occupation thereof as tenant of the corporation.
11. The plaintiff, the head of family and the other members of the family knew that:
(i) The late Wiredu did not live in the house from 1953, when it was allocated to him, to 1965 when he died, and (ii) the defendant lived in the house as tenant of the corporation and paid the rent and other outgoings on the house on the defendant’s own behalf.
12. The defendant also says he made extensive extensions to the house during the period referred to (supra) and later after Francis Wiredu had died, and although the plaintiff and the other members of the family were aware of these extensions none of them challenged the defendant’s right to make the extensions.
13. In 1966 all tenancies of the corporation were converted into hire-purchase transactions. Consequently, the defendant says he was requested by the corporation to enter into hire
[p.505] of [1982-83] GLR 501 purchase agreement with the corporation in respect of the said house and to pay the hire-purchase price by instalments.
16. The defendant says he finished paying the hire-purchase instalments in April 1978, and almost immediately the plaintiff herein supported by the head of family applied for letters of administration in respect of the estate of the late Wiredu. It is apparent that the main reason for the application was to enable the applicant as successor to use the letters of administration to support a claim by him to be substituted for the deceased as lessee of the corporation.
17. The defendant contends that although the late Francis Wiredu’s name appeared as lessee of the corporation, the deceased was in fact the nominee of the defendant and the defendant was in equity the real owner of the house and lessee of the corporation.”
The issues joined for the determination of the court read:
“1. Whether or not the late Francis Wiredu in his lifetime applied for and was allocated estate house No.
K.39, South Suntreso, which said house has been paid for under hire-purchase agreement with the State Housing Corporation (SHC).
2. Whether or not the said house is family property and whether or not the plaintiff as customary successor is entitled to it.
3. Whether or not the late Francis Wiredu was the nominee of the defendant and the defendant was the real owner of the said house and lessee of the SHC.”
The plaintiff’s case:
Some time in 1953, the late Francis Wiredu applied for and was allocated estate house number K.39, South Suntreso, Kumasi (hereinafter referred to as the estate house) on rental basis and later on hire-purchase by the State Housing Corporation. He lived in the estate house with the defendant and other members of his family as well as tenants until he died in 1965. For the sake of brevity, Francis Wiredu will be referred to as the deceased. On his death, the plaintiff, his first maternal cousin, was appointed his customary successor. Because the defendant is his nephew the plaintiff said he permitted him to continue staying in the estate house and take full charge of it. In addition to collecting rents from tenants and making incidental payments the plaintiff authorised the defendant to carry out extension works on the estate house and to enter into a hire-purchase agreement with the State Housing Corporation (SHC) on his behalf.
The plaintiff said in April 1978 he had wanted to obtain a loan to liquidate the balance outstanding on the hire-purchase price of the
[p.506] of [1982-83] GLR 501 estate house but the defendant assured him that he would be able to pay the balance of ¢124 from rents he had collected from the tenants. The defendant paid the money and showed him a receipt issued by the State Housing Corporation for ¢124.
At two family meetings held on the deceased’s death the estate house was discussed and it was agreed that the plaintiff should apply to the State Housing Corporation to have his name substituted for that of the deceased. When he approached the officers of the corporation they informed him that the change of ownership could not be effected without obtaining letters of administration from the court.
The evidence of the plaintiff was corroborated substantially by his two witnesses. His first witness is his, the plaintiff’s brother, Peter Kwarteng Osei, a retired school teacher. He said the estate house belonged to the deceased and denied that the deceased obtained it for the defendant.
The second plaintiff witness, Akua Fokuo, is the mother of the deceased. She said the deceased got the estate house for himself and lived in it with the defendant for about six years before his demise. The deceased informed her about his intention to get the estate house even before it was allocated to him.
Case for the defendant:
The defendant said the deceased and his mother were maternal first cousins. The deceased was working with the then Public Works Department when the estate house was allocated to him on his behalf. What happened was that because he was very close to the deceased he approached him to use his influence as a civil servant to get an allocation of an estate house to him. To this the deceased agreed, but suggested that in order to facilitate the allocation he, the deceased, would use his name as civil servants were exclusively considered for allocation of the estate houses at that time. In the course of time, the estate house was allocated to the deceased and he in turn handed it over to him in 1955 when he moved in. At first, it was a rental unit and he paid a monthly rent of ¢4.45 to the State Housing Corporation. The house consisted of a chamber, hall, a store room, kitchen, toilet and a bathroom.
In 1962 his cousin Rose Akyaa, his third witness, came to live with them in the house. His first witness Kwadwo Agyarko, and one Oppong also lived with him in the house. As the accommodation was inadequate his brother called Oppong built an additional bedroom for Rose to occupy.
Later in 1966 the State Housing Corporation converted the rental units into hire-purchase system and thereby rents paid were treated as deposits to offset the hire-purchase price. He continued to pay the monthly instalments on the estate house in the deceased’s name until
[p.507] of [1982-83] GLR 501 he finished payment in 1978. He said he had expended about ¢3,000 from his own resources on the estate house to the knowledge of members of the family including the plaintiff. It is worthy of mention that the plaintiff and his witnesses admitted that the defendant had carried out extension works on the estate house but they maintained the cost of the works was paid from rents the defendant had collected from the tenants living in the estate house.
The first defendant witness, Kwadwo Agyarko, who appeared to be his very close friend said he lived in the estate house with the defendant and his family, as the defendant’s house boy for several years. According to him, the defendant once introduced the deceased to him as his uncle who had acquired the estate house for him. He denied the deceased ever lived in the estate house with them.
The second defendant witness was Andrews Kwadwo Banahene, a senior assistant estate officer of the State Housing Corporation. He told the court that the estate house was allocated to the deceased in April 1955 as a rental unit until July 1958 when the hire-purchase system was introduced. He tendered an interim hire-purchase agreement signed by the deceased on 30 March 1961. It is marked exhibit 2.
In addition to this exhibit, the witness tendered exhibit 1, the plan of the estate house; exhibit 3, a letter with an affidavit attached from the defendant asking the corporation to substitute his name for that of the deceased; and exhibit 4, a letter from the plaintiff making a similar request as the defendant’s, and their reply thereto, exhibit 5. Exhibit 6 is the defendant’s letter inquiring about the balance outstanding on the hire-purchase price. The evidence of this witness confirmed the defendant’s evidence relating to alterations carried out on the estate house. He, however, denied that in his twenty years’ experience as an estate officer, preferential treatment was ever given to civil servants or any class of persons in the allocation of estate houses. He emphasised that every Ghanaian irrespective of occupation, tribe or status is eligible for consideration for allocation of an estate house.
The last witness for the defendant is his first cousin Rose Akyaa. She lived in the estate house from February 1964 until 23 December 1978 when she moved into a house built for her by her husband. She said the defendant’s brother called Donkoh built an additional room to the estate house for her occupation at the cost of ¢200. But throughout her stay in the estate house she was not aware that it belonged to the defendant.
The most important issue for determination is whether or not the late Francis Wiredu was the nominee of the defendant. In other words, is the defendant the real owner of the estate house and a lessee of the State Housing Corporation? This issue can be resolved by finding out the real intention of the deceased when he applied for the estate hous
[p.508] of [1982-83] GLR 501 which was allocated to him in 1955.
In order to determine his intention regard must be had to the deceased’s dealings with regard to the estate house during his lifetime. It is to be noted that all the allocation papers relating to the estate house were prepared in the name of the deceased and there is no evidence that he did inform any member of his family that he had obtained the estate house for the defendant.
On this issue, the evidence of the deceased’s mother, Akua Fokuo, the second plaintiff witness, is significant. She said that the deceased had discussed with her his intention to purchase an estate house long before he obtained it. I found her to be a very straightforward and reliable witness and I believe her evidence touching on the ownership of the estate house. It is however conceded that the deceased permitted the defendant, his nephew, to stay in the estate house soon after it had been allocated to him. But this alone is not sufficient to make me infer that the estate house was obtained by him for the defendant.
This case can be likened to a resulting trust or purchase in the name of another. The legal position of a purchase in the name of another has been lucidly treated by Eyre C.B. in the English case of Dyer v. Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 92 at p. 93:
“The clear result of all the cases, without a single exception, is, that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold; whether taken in the names of the purchasers and others jointly, or in the name of others without that of the purchaser; whether in one name or several, whether jointly or successive, results to the man who advances the purchase money… and it goes on a strict analogy to the rule of common law, that where a feoffment is made without consideration, the use results to the feoffor.”
In cases of this type, the purchaser should seek to establish the trust as soon as possible, for the presumption is weakened by lapse of time. It has been suggested by Professor Lewin in his book on Trusts (15th ed.) at p.146, that in such cases after the death of the legal owner, the true purchaser can only establish his claim successfully by parol evidence of the clearest nature.
In deciding where the preponderance of evidence lies due regard must be had to the balance of probabilities as well as the balance of improbabilities. On the evidence I find it quite impossible that the deceased would have continued to be a tenant of the State Housing Corporation until his death in 1965 if the defendant’s claim that he is the owner and purchaser of the estate house was true. At least, the defendant would have requested the deceased to substitute his name for that of the deceased during the latter’s prolonged illness before his [p.509] of [1982-83] GLR 501 demise.
Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that allocation of estate houses at that time was made to both public officers and non-public officers alike. Thus the defendant’s case that only civil or public servants were considered for allocation of estate houses at that time hence he permitted the deceased to obtain the estate house in his, deceased’s name, was refuted by the evidence of the defendant’s last witness who is the senior estate officer of the State Housing Corporation.
I must mention that when the defendant applied for letters of administration to administer the deceased’s estate on the ground that he was his customary successor, he deposed to an affidavit that the estate house belonged to the deceased. This declaration constitutes a clear admission against interest and it does not now lie in the mouth of the defendant to assert ownership of the estate house.
Referring again to the evidence of the defendant’s cousin, Rose Akyaa, the third defendant witness, who lived in the estate house with the defendant for about ten years, it is surprising that she had no knowledge that the house belonged to the defendant. Surely, if the estate house belongs to the defendant he would have told her so.
On the totality of the evidence, I am fully satisfied that the deceased Francis Wiredu applied for and was allocated estate house No. K.39, South Suntreso, for himself and he was not at any given time a nominee of the defendant. On his death intestate the estate house has become his family property. Accordingly, I enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff, and the defendant’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Costs of ¢300 awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.
DECISION
Judgment for the plaintiff.
D. R. K. S.
