KORBLAH II ALIAS TETTEH AND ANOTHER vs. ODARTEI III [1980] GLR 932
17 January 1980 · ANIN JA · ≈ 23 min read
[1980] SLR (CA) 5Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Odartei III v. Badoo alias Kobla II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 1.
(2) Odartei III v. Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs, High Court, Accra, 27 July 1978, unreported.
(3) Doherty v. Doherty [1968] N.M.L.R. 241.
(4) Siasuom v. Kyi [1971] 1 G.L.R. 483, C.A.
(5) Quartey v. Quartey [1963] 1 G.L.R. 58, S.C.
(6) Ababio v. Tutu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 489, S.C.
(7) Ewia v. Erziah VI (1927) F.C. ‘26-’29, 280.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of the High Court, Accra, in a petition by originating summons issued by the plaintiff-respondent for the determination of certain issues pertaining to a cause or matter
[p.934] of [1980] GLR 932 affecting chieftaincy. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Anin J.A.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom for the appellants.
D. A. Nii-Aponsah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
By an originating summons filed on 31 October 1975, the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs:
“This summons is issued upon application of Nii Odartei III, sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina) in the Greater Accra Region of the Republic of Ghana who claims to be the only sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina) for the determination of the following questions: whether under the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370):
(1) The alleged enstoolment of George Aryee Damey Tetteh, the fourth defendant, under the stool name of Nii Tetteh Korblah II was valid.
(2) The notification in the Local Government Bulletin No. 50 of 22 November 1974, of the alleged enstoolment of the fourth defendant is not void and of no effect.
(3) Paragraph (2) of the Greater Accra Regional Administration’s letter No. GAL/ 74/Vol. 3 dated 31 July 1975, purporting to prohibit the plaintiff from interfering in the affairs of Nsakina, that is, the selling of land and the performance of any duties as chief of the area is not void as being ultra vires or without jurisdiction. And for a declaration that:
(a) The plaintiff is the sole legitimate sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina).
(b) There is no such traditional office as senior sub-chief of Nsakina with jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s area of authority, namely, Odarteiman (Nsakina).
(c) The plaintiff is entitled to perform his customary duties as sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina) including the management of the stool lands under his jurisdiction.”
From the copious affidavits and exhibits filed and submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, three outstanding facts emerged: Firstly, Odarteiman or Nsakina is a village in the Greater Accra Region. In respect of this village there exist two Local Government Bulletin notices recognising two different persons, i.e. the plaintiff and the fourth defendant herein, as “sub-chief” and “senior
[p.935] of [1980] GLR 932 sub-chief” respectively. In the first place, a notice in the Local Government Bulletin dated 28 September 1973 (exhibit N) announced the enstoolment of the plaintiff (James Odartei Lamptey) as sub-chief under the stool name of Nii Odartei III. The effective date of his enstoolment is stated as 29 August 1968 and the particulars of the town or division are given as “Odarteiman (Nsakina), Ga Traditional Area, James Town.”
A second Local Government Bulletin dated 22 November 1974 (exhibit A) gave notice of the enstoolment of the fourth defendant (George Aryee Damey Tetteh) as “senior sub-chief” under the stool name of Nii Tetteh Korblah II with effect from 10 June 1966 for the town of Nsakina in the Sempe Division.
Pausing here for a moment, it is clear that these two Local Government Bulletins pose serious constitutional problems for the little village of Nsakina. Prima facie, they saddle her with a duality of chiefs as well as duality of divisional overlords. On the testimony of these Local Government Bulletins published in the official gazette, Nsakina would appear not only to be torn between two chiefs, i.e. the plaintiff and the fourth defendant, but also to be condemned to subservience to two rival divisional overlords, i.e. James Town Alata stool and Sempe stool at one and the same time.
The second important matter disclosed by the pleadings is an arbitration conducted by the third defendant into the affairs of Nsakina which was subsequently set aside by Griffiths-Randolph J. in the High Court, Accra: see Odartei III v. Badoo alias Korbla II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 1. Apparently, during the 1973 Ga Traditional Homowo celebrations, there arose a dispute between the plaintiff herein and the fourth defendant’s immediate predecessor (R. A. Badoo) as a result of which the latter was alleged to have assaulted the former. The matter was submitted to the third defendant and his elders for customary arbitration. And they made an adverse award on the traditional status of the plaintiff as a sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina) under the James Town stool which did not form part of the subject-matter of the reference to customary arbitration. On the plaintiff’s motion to the High Court for setting aside the award on the main ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction, Griffiths-Randolph J. on 7 June 1974 held that since the submission to customary arbitration was a case for assault, the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction when they made an award in respect of plaintiff’s traditional status as sub-chief and accordingly set the arbitral award aside. These High Court proceedings and judgment were no doubt recapitulated by the plaintiff herein to establish firstly, the absence of any res judicata defeating his present
[p.936] of [1980] GLR 932 action and secondly, to demonstrate that an administrative ban imposed by the second defendant’s agent subsequently on the plaintiff prohibiting him from “interfering in the affairs of Nsakina, that is, the selling of land and the performance of any duties as a chief of the area” had no legal basis and was made in contempt of the High Court which had earlier set aside the third defendant’s arbitral award.
The said administrative ban constitutes the third important factual matter divulged by the pleadings, and it is contained in a letter, exhibit B, dated 31 July 1975 written by J. A. Mensah, Regional Administrative Officer, Greater Accra. The letter opens with a reference to the third defendant’s report on the said arbitral award, which found in favour of the fourth defendant and the Sempe Divisional stool and rejected the rival claims of the plaintiff and the James Town Divisional stool. It then continued:
“(2) I am therefore directed by my Regional Commissioner to instruct you to refrain from interfering in the affairs of Nsakina, that is, the selling of land and the performance of any duties as a chief of the area.”
After allegedly exhausting his remedies and protesting to no avail by a letter dated 19 August 1975 to the Regional Office against the illegal administrative ban on his activities as a chief, the plaintiff petitioned the High Court by the above-quoted originating summons.
In his judgment, Odartei III v. Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs, High Court, Accra, 27 July 1978, unreported, the learned judge Amua-Sekyi J. first referred to the mass of documentary evidence adduced in the case including Gold Coast Civil Service Lists from 1908 to 1919 and Gold Coast Chiefs’ Lists from 1924 to 1941. These official publications contained references to the “Onukpa” or Headman of Odarteiman or Nsakina and the past occupants of that post. It was the plaintiff’s case that all the named headmen with the exception of one were his ancestors. By contrast, none of these ancient official documents contained any mention of either the fourth defendant’s predecessors or his alleged office of senior sub-chief. The plaintiff accordingly invited the court to hold that his adversary’s alleged traditional office was non-existent and that his alleged enstoolment as senior sub-chief and his gazette notice were null and void and of no effect.
The learned judge next drew attention to section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), which the plaintiff invited him by these proceedings to interprete. He then queried:
“The question is whether the court can, by looking at section 48 (1) and the documentary evidence adduced in this case come
[p.937] of [1980] GLR 932 to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to any or all of the reliefs he seeks?”
He easily rejected the plaintiff counsel’s argument that oral evidence about his client’s nomination, election and installation was unnecessary on account of the various gazette notices by pointing out that if the questions raised in the summons could be resolved simply by looking at the tendered gazette notices, then what, by parity of reasoning, prevented the fourth defendant’s claim to be “senior sub-chief of Nsakina” under the rival Sempe Divisional stool from being upheld without more since it was also contained in a Local Government Bulletin? That said, the learned judge next drew attention to the discretionary nature of the originating summons and to the fact that the court was not bound to grant the relief prayed if in its opinion a declaration ought not to be made on an originating summons: see Order 54A, r. 5 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The learned judge then made this important observation:
“I do not think that the question whether or not the fourth defendant is a chief depends wholly upon construction of statute. What seems to be required is evidence of the history of the stool of Odarteiman and of the manner in which the fourth defendant was nominated, elected and installed a chief or in which he was appointed and installed a chief . . . I do not agree that such evidence was not called for by the nature of the issues before the court. Since such evidence is not before me I cannot . . . say that the enstoolment of the fourth defendant was invalid or that he ought not to have been accorded recognition as senior sub-chief by the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs.”
In the concluding passage of his judgment, the learned judge surprisingly held that the fact:
“that the plaintiff is sub-chief of Odarteiman is not at issue in these proceedings. If it were, objection might be taken that I have no jurisdiction to try that question and if I am to be consistent I would be bound to uphold that objection: see my decision in Ababio II v. Boso Traditional Council [1979] G.L.R. 53 delivered on 26 May 1978. Further it seems to me that the effect of the decision of Griffiths-Randolph J. setting aside the arbitration proceedings and award was to restore the plaintiff to his position as sub-chief until such time that he is lawfully removed or he abdicates or dies.”
He accordingly made two declarations: First, quashing the said administrative ban of the second defendant on the ground that it is of no
[p.938] of [1980] GLR 932 legal effect; and secondly, declaring that “the plaintiff is entitled to perform his customary duties as sub-chief of Odarteiman (Nsakina) including the management of the stool lands under his jurisdiction.”
Neither the first nor second defendant appealed from this judgment. By their amended notice of appeal, the third and fourth defendants implored this court to reverse the whole judgment. And the plaintiff-respondent for his part filed an amended notice for the variation of the judgment for:
“(1) an order that under the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), the customary practice of election of chiefs only from established royal houses or families and also from the precedents thereof disclosed by the exhibits, i.e. the chiefs’ lists of ancient vintage relied upon by both parties, the alleged enstoolment of George Aryee Damey Tetteh, the fourth defendant, with the name of Tetteh Korblah II, is wholly invalid and of no effect whatsoever; (2) a declaration that the plaintiff-respondent is the sole chief of Odarteiman or Nsakina with the status of sub-chief, a position immediately below that of a divisional chief of the Ga Traditional Area; (3) a declaration that there is no such traditional office as “senior sub-chief of Nsakina, with jurisdiction over the plaintiff-respondent’s area of authority, namely, Odarteiman (Nsakina).”
In support of the main appeal filed by the third and fourth defendants-appellants, Mr. Kom argued together three additional grounds of appeal:
(1) The court erred in holding that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit—relating to the nomination, election and installation of a chief.
(2) In view of the conflicting mass of evidence adduced by both sides the action should not have been commenced by originating writ of summons.
(3) The trial judge erred in holding that the suit is one of construction of section 48 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).
The gravamen of his argument was that looking at all the relevant documents tendered in evidence, the real issue as between the plaintiff and the fourth defendant was, who is the chief of Odarteiman or Nsakina; as between James Town Alata stool and Sempe stool, it was which stool has suzerainty over Odarteiman or Nsakina. The consequential reliefs claimed can only be decided with the settlement of either the one or both main issues. He submitted further that in holding that “that the plaintiff is sub-chief of Odarteiman is not at
[p.939] of [1980] GLR 932 issue by these proceedings,” the learned judge erred and also misconceived the main issue in the case. Had he appreciated the main issue raised by the summons as summarised above, he would have realised that they raised causes or matters affecting chieftaincy and therefore falling outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. Furthermore, a proper appreciation of the real issues should have convinced him of the inappropriateness of the procedure of originating summons adopted; and he should have accordingly ordered pleadings for the action to take its normal course under Order 54A, r. 5 of L.N. 140A. He cited in support the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Doherty v. Doherty [1968] N.M.L.R. 241 where it was held that, “it is generally inadvisable to employ an originating summons for hostile proceedings against a trustee, and this procedure is of course quite unsuitable where the facts are in dispute, and the evidence is by way of affidavit.” Mr. Kom next submitted that the issues at stake did not involve any construction of section 48 of Act 370. Unless the court first determined the fundamental question of fact as between the plaintiff and the fourth defendant as to who is the proper person to occupy the stool, it cannot give the reliefs prayed. Touching on government gazette notices relied upon by the plaintiff in his first affidavit, Mr. Kom singled out several instances of different stools claiming suzerainty over Odarteiman, e.g. Sempe and Akumaje in 1908; Sempe (1912); Akumaje (1917); James Town (1919); while the Ga Mantse (the third defendant) in his affidavit of 6 December 1977 asserted the Sempe stool’s suzerainty over Nsakina. Since the material facts and in particular the rival claims of the plaintiff and the fourth defendant to have been appointed chiefs were in controversy, and the traditional history of the stool was not given, he finally submitted that the court below erred in giving judgment to the plaintiff.
For the plaintiff-respondent, Nii-Aponsah replied to Mr. Kom’s additional ground (2) by first submitting that the conflict between the parties is more apparent than real. He distinguished the Nigerian case of Doherty v. Doherty (supra) by pointing out that a preliminary objection was there taken at the trial as to the propriety of the procedure by original summons adopted whereas none was taken here prior to the hearing of the appeal. In his view there was only a superficial conflict between the parties; hence resort to originating summons was proper. He also argued that under Order 70, r. 2 of L.N. 140A, procedural objections ought to be taken timeously; and if not so taken they may be deemed to have been waived, especially after taking fresh steps with full knowledge of the irregularity. He contended further that his client’s status as a chief has been recognised by the publication in the chiefs’ list and gazette notice (exhibit N); and the consequential reliefs prayed ought to be allowed.
[p.940] of [1980] GLR 932
It is trite learning that all civil appeals in this court are by way of re-hearing and that this court has power to make any order within the competence of the trial court; and that generally this court has “as full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted in the court as a court of first instance, and may re-hear the whole case, or may remit it to the court below to be re-heard, or to be otherwise dealt with as the court directs”: see rules 31 and 32 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), on this court’s wide power to give any judgment and make any order. The general discretion conferred on the trial High Court by Order 54A, r. 5 applies with equal force to this court when hearing an appeal from a judgment in a suit commenced by originating summons; consequently, this court shall not be bound to determine any question of construction if in its opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons.
The general practice rule is that where the main point at issue is one of construction of a document or statute, or is one of pure law, then the originating summons is the appropriate procedure: see Siasuom v. Kyi [1971] 1 G.L.R. 483, C.A. It is not, however, appropriate where there is likely to be any substantial dispute of fact: see Odgers Pleading and Practice (21st ed.), p. 314. At page 319, the learned editors stated the same rule thus:
“the procedure is primarily designed to deal with questions of law or discretion arising upon facts substantially not in dispute, and, indeed where there is any choice in the matter, it is wrong to bring proceedings by originating summons if it is known that the facts are disputed.”
And in the local case of Quartey v. Quartey [1963] 1 G.L.R. 58, the former Supreme Court held per Korsah C.J. at p. 63 that there is no absolute right to proceed by originating summons and it is not the appropriate method to adopt in asking the court to determine whether a crime has been committed under the Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 127 (1951 Rev.) or any other statute.
In my considered opinion, there were substantial questions of fact in dispute between the parties which were incapable of resolution by reference solely to the enactment, i.e. section 48 (1) of Act 370, the official publications and the mass of documentary evidence tendered. For example, the following primary issues fell for determination:
(a) which of the two rival individuals, the plaintiff or the fourth defendant, qualified to be the “chief” of Odarteiman or
[p.941] of [1980] GLR 932
Nsakina in terms of the statutory definition and, more importantly, the customary mode of nomination, election and installation of a chief; (b) which of the two rival divisional stools, James Town or Sempe, was the true overlord of Nsakina; (c) the existence or non-existence of the alleged office of senior sub-chief; (d) whether Nsakina traditionally was ruled by a sole chief or by a chief and a senior sub-chief jointly; (e) whether an ‘onukpa’ or headman is a chief for the purpose of the relevant enactment; (f) the powers and jurisdiction of a senior sub-chief vis-à-vis a chief of Nsakina under customary law and usage; and (g) the validity or invalidity of the alleged enstoolment of both the plaintiff and the fourth defendant as chiefs.
Admittedly, the summons called upon the court to determine the specific questions set down by construction of the relevant provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), in particular section 48 (1), which provides the definition of a chief; (see now the different definition in article 181 of the Constitution, 1979). Section 48 (1) of Act 370 enacts:
“48. (1) A Chief is an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a chief on the National Register of Chiefs:
Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a Chief for the purposes of the exercise by him of any function under this Act or under any other enactment, unless he has been recognised as such by the Minister by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin.”
Since in this case no evidence was adduced about the mode of nomination, election and installation of the rival individuals as chief of Nsakina, or about the prevailing customary practice in Nsakina for the appointment of a chief or about the history of the stool, I agree with the trial judge that the construction of the enactment and its application to the facts stated in the affidavits and supporting documents would not suffice to resolve the factual questions in issue between the parties. By the same token this court finds itself unable to determine the threefold issues set out in the plaintiff-respondent’s notice of variation of the judgment in the absence of (a) the relevant evidence concerning the history of the Nsakina stool; (b) the material facts about the customary practice in vogue for the appointment of
[p.942] of [1980] GLR 932 chiefs in that village; and (c) the necessary background information about both the rival chiefly offices and the competing divisional overlords.
In my opinion, the complex facts in dispute between the parties cannot be resolved simply by construction of an enactment, section 48 (1) of Act 370—and by reference to the mass of documentary evidence adduced and the official publications exhibited. The disputed facts, rival histories and customary usages and practices could only be elicited in a trial commenced in the ordinary way before the appropriate tribunal. Such a trial would enable knowledgeable witnesses to be called to supply the missing relevant evidence.
Furthermore, the gazette notices and other official publications exhibited were not legally conclusive proof of the matters contained therein. They are only prima facie proof of the facts notified and may be rebutted by any other evidence. Order 37, r. 55 of L.N. 140A, is here apposite:
“55. All Proclamations . . . nominations, appointments and other official communications of the Government, appearing in any such Gazette, may be proved by the production of such Gazette, and shall be prima facie proof of any fact of a public nature which they were intended to notify.”
Where, however, as in this case, the facts were in dispute and the Local Government Bulletin notification of the plaintiff’s enstoolment dated 28 September 1973 (exhibit N) was countered by the Local Government Bulletin notification of the fourth defendant’s enstoolment dated 22 November 1974 (exhibit A), the vexed issue of the due nomination, election and installation of the rival persons had been thrown wide open for the one Bulletin notice tended to cancel out the other in its meaning and legal effect.
In Ababio v. Tutu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 489, S.C. during the course of the hearing of a land appeal, an issue arose whether the absent respondent, a chief, had abdicated as had been alleged by the appellant who had earlier produced a government gazette containing a notice of the respondent’s abdication. At the resumed hearing, leave was granted for the respondent to go into the witness-box, where he testified that despite the said gazette notice to the contrary, he had never abdicated but had continued in office and had been served in his capacity as Assacherehene with his opponent’s notice of appeal. In upholding the respondent’s denial of having abdicated, the former Supreme Court held that the gazette notice was only prima facie proof of the fact notified. On the evidence, direct as well as circumstantial, before the court it had been convincingly established that the respondent, Nana Osei Tutu, did not abdicate, and the gazette
[p.943] of [1980] GLR 932 notice was therefore held to have been rebutted. The court was fortified in its decision by the Full Court decision in Ewia v. Erziah (1927) F.C. ‘26-’29, 280 at p. 282:
“The production of the Gazette, containing the notice of the confirmation and installation of Blay IV, as Omanhene of Eastern Apollonia, although prima facie evidence of such confirmation and installation, by reason of the provisions of Order VI, rule 11, was not conclusive evidence to justify the Court in dismissing the suit.
In my opinion, therefore, the suit should be remitted to the Court below for rehearing. . .”
In the present case, the documentary evidence showed the existence of two relevant Local Government Bulletin notices of enstoolment of two chiefs for the same village. Worse still, these two Bulletins gave patently contradictory information about the divisional overlord of the said village stool, the one mentioning James Town stool while the other named Sempe stool; and other exhibits tendered (e.g. the Gold Coast Civil Service Lists from 1908 to 1924 and the Chiefs’ Lists) added further confusion by naming Akumaje stool in addition to Sempe and James Town. It cannot be said that the exhibits left the basic facts free from doubt or controversy. On the contrary, from the outset it was self-evident that there was likely to be substantial disputed facts; for instance paragraph 2 of the plaintiff’s first affidavit of 31 October 1975 filed on the same date as the originating summons stated that the fourth defendant “has been parading about with the alleged title of sub-chief and relying on it to the detriment of himself and his people.” This was not a case involving question of law or discretion arising upon undisputed facts. Since it was known to the plaintiff-respondent that the facts of his alleged enstoolment were disputed by the appellants herein it was wrong for him to resort to the procedure of originating summons. The wrong procedure adopted and the resultant absence of relevant evidence in the event disabled the court from deciding the substantial questions of fact and law in issue between the parties; and the trial is therefore unsatisfactory.
One final comment. In holding that the management of stool lands falls within the statutory functions of a chief under the proviso to section 48 (1) of Act 370, the learned judge clearly erred. The correct legal position is that this function falls within the customary duties of a chief. The chief is, virtute officii the trustee and custodian of all stool properties, including realty, attaching to the stool and entrusted to him upon installation. As Mr. Justice Ollennu shrewdly states in his invaluable Essay on “Chieftaincy under the law” at page 44 of the Essays in Ghanaian Law—”Management of stool lands has
[p.944] of [1980] GLR 932 been one of the aboriginal functions of a Stool. It is true the central government has made certain administrative arrangement for the more efficient discharge of these customary duties by a chief: see, e.g. Stool Lands Act, 1960 (Act 27), the Local Government of the Ordinance, Cap. 64 (1951 Rev.), Part VII, and the new constitutional provisions in article 190 Constitution, 1979—nevertheless, that function appertains to the chief’s customary powers and not to his statutory duties. Government recognition of a chief under the proviso to section 48 (1) has nothing to do with a chief’s management of stool lands; and the learned judge erred in holding the contrary. The plaintiff-respondent’s competence to exercise that customary function depends primarily on whether he has as a matter of fact been nominated, elected and installed a chief in accordance with customary law. On this, the Local Government Bulletin of 28 September 1973 (exhibit N) affords only prima facie proof; and since the plaintiff’s averments have been rebutted, they must be conclusively established in a proper trial before the appropriate tribunal.
For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal herein and refuse the respondent’s notice to vary the judgment of the court below. I would further set aside the judgment appealed from together with the order made as to costs. If these costs have been paid they must be refunded to the appellants herein, who are also entitled to their costs in this appeal assessed at ¢500. I would also order that the originating summons be struck out without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to bring fresh action against the appellants herein in the appropriate forum. The costs of the abortive trial, fixed by consent at ¢400 shall be borne and paid by the plaintiff in any event.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I am in agreement with the judgment just read by the president of the court, but I wish to add a few words of my own in respect only of the procedure adopted by the plaintiff in these proceedings.
The learned president of the court has set out the reliefs sought by the plaintiff in his originating summons and I need not reiterate them here. The plaintiff was seeking certain declarations on originating summons, and Order 54A of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), sets out in clear and unequivocal terms the occasions when such a procedure is to be adopted.
It is quite clear that the use of Order 54A is also resorted to when a right depends on the construction or interpretation of an instrument or a statute. In my judgment where there are disputed facts which can only be tested by viva voce examination, the initiation of proceedings by resorting to originating summons is most inappropriate. In the instant case, there is a mass of disputed documentary evidence
[p.945] of [1980] GLR 932 by way of affidavit evidence and exhibits and the trial judge could not by any stretch of legal ingenuity resolve those facts without oral evidence, A fortiori he was thus incapable of making any declarations flowing from any interpretation to be put on certain provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), as he was required to do. I consider the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Doherty v. Doherty [1968] N.M.L.R. 241 which was cited to us by Mr. Kom, counsel for the defendants-appellants, as very instructive; and it does also fortify me in my view that where facts are disputed by the parties the employment of originating summons is inappropriate. I have always made this point clear on several occasions when I was a judge of the High Court, and I am still of the same opinion. In the Nigerian case the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that “it is generally inadvisable to employ originating summons for hostile proceedings against a trustee, and this procedure is of course quite unsuitable where the facts are in dispute, as the evidence is by way of affidavit.” (The emphasis is mine.) There were a great number of issues to be determined by the trial court. The facts averred by the plaintiff’s affidavits were controverted by the defendants’ affidavits, and these facts were legion. How then could an originating summons be used in initiating the instant proceedings? I think the trial judge, when faced with such a situation, should have exercised his powers under Order 54A, r. 5 so as to leave the plaintiff free to proceed by the appropriate procedure and in the proper forum. I endorse the orders made by the president.
JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal allowed. D. F. L.
