IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ABUDULAI vs. YAKUBU II [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
29 October 1985 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 66 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Djomoa v. Amargyei [1961] G.L.R. 170, S.C.
(2) Mutchi v. Annan (1907) Red. 211.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by Mahamadu Abudulai under the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C.L. 86), from the findings made against him by the Ollennu Committee of Inquiry and implemented by the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Edward Wiredu J.A.
COUNSEL
E. O. Appiah (with him W.A.N. Adumua-Bossman) for the appellant.
Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter Adjetey) (with him I. Mahama) for the respondent.
[p.194] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
The history of the present dispute involving the selection and enskinment of a person to the Nam of Yendi which has become commonly known in local parlance as the Yendi Skin Affairs and which has for the first time found its way into our courts on appeal reveals the chequered history the dispute has had.
Almost all governments of this country since independence have had something to do about the dispute which was commenced by predecessors of the present parties. I can count not less than four committees of inquiry that have been set up to go into the dispute almost invariably on the same or similar terms of reference.
Many lives have been lost as a result. Lives involving indigenous Dagbon citizens, and forces personnel sent over to keep the peace. Huge sums of money have been spent and precious time also wasted. The sad stories one had to read after the release of government’s acceptance and an order for the implementation of the findings and recommendations of one committee after the other are very well known. The last of such committees is the Ollennu Committee whose findings are now before us on appeal. It is my fervent hope that the result of the appeal is not going to remind us of the past as I have tried to portray above.
This appeal is by Mahamadu Abudulai against the findings of the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry established under the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry Instrument, 1972 (E.I. 74), (hereafter referred to simply as the Ollennu Committee or the committee for short). The terms of reference of that committee are set out on page 1 of the report. The appeal itself is brought under the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C.L. 86). Section 1 (1) reads:
“1 (1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person aggrieved by the findings of the Committee of Inquiry appointed under the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry Instrument, 1972 (E.I. 74) and which findings were implemented by the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299) may within three months after the commencement of this Law appeal against such findings to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218).”
The parties to this appeal are Mahamadu Abudulai (who will hereafter be referred to as the appellant) and Na Yakubu II (also hereafter referred to as the respondent). No less than seventeen grounds of appeal were originally filed on behalf of the appellant. One more additional ground was later filed.
When the appeal came before us for hearing an objection was taken by counsel for the respondent against the propriety of some of the
[p.195] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 grounds of appeal originally filed on behalf of the appellant. Basing his submission on the relevant provisions of P.N.D.C.L. 86 and the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299), learned counsel submitted that the appellant did not have an unrestricted right to attack every finding made by the Ollennu Committee. He argued that the appellant was limited under P.N.D.C.L. 86 which clothed him with the right of appeal to attack only such findings of the committee as were implemented under N.R.C.D. 299. He submitted that only one finding made by the committee was implemented under N.R.C.D. 299. He pointed out that one finding to be the finding that “the purported nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai was null and void.”
The burden of learned counsel’s objection was that it was incompetent for the appellant to be allowed to argue grounds 1, 2, 3, 9, 12, 16 and 17 of the original grounds of appeal. Some of these grounds, submitted counsel, raised issues of law and others did not attack those findings made by the committee was implemented under N.R.C.D. 299. He therefore contended that these grounds could not be legitimately argued in this appeal.
We summarily upheld the objection as against grounds 1, 2, 3, 9 and 17 and dismissed it in respect of grounds 12 and 16 after hearing learned counsel for the appellant on the objection raised. We intimated then that we shall embody our reasons in the main judgment. I will therefore deal with this aspect of the case first.
In order to appreciate the reasons for rejecting the objection against grounds 12 and 16, it would first be necessary to quote in extenso the original grounds of appeal which had provoked the objection. The grounds are as follows:
“(i) The committee erred in holding that the making of the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry Instrument, 1972 (E.I. 74), was not ultra vires the National Redemption Council (Establishment)
Proclamation, 1972.
(ii) The committee erred in holding that E.I. 74 of 1972 was not repugnant to the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and hence was not void.
(iii) The committee erred in holding that its first term of reference was not res judicata having regard to the report of the Mate Kole Committee and its acceptance in a White Paper published thereon.
(iv) The committee erred in holding as invalid the resolution of the Dagomba State Council made in 1948 as regards the composition of the body responsible for the selection and appointment of Ya-Na.
[p.196] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
(v) The findings made by the committee to the effect that the selection of a Ya-Na is made by the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kpati-Na and Gomli was wrong. This finding was against the weight of the evidence. No such custom was established as ever having been practised.
(vi) The committee was wrong in finding that the selection of a Ya-Na was not done by the elders of Dagbon as a whole group, that is to say by the Gushie Na, Yalzori Na, Naton Na, Gulkpe Na, Sunson
Na, Tolon Na, Kumbung Na, Kuga Na, Zohe Na, Tugurinam and Gagbinda Na.
(vii) The committee erred in finding that the customary procedures for the selection of a Ya-Na is by soothsaying. The committee should have found that the customary procedure was by consultation for a consensus among the chiefs and elders.
(viii) The committee erred in finding that a Gbon Lana as Gbon Lana per se is not entitled to be considered as a candidate for the Namship of Yendi nor to be chosen as a Ya-Na. The committee was wrong in finding that the only candidates for Namship are Karaga Na, Mion Lana and Savelugu Na.
(ix) The committee erred in holding that the legislative instrument (L.I. 59 of 1960) was validly made.
(x) The committee erred in finding that Amadu was the Gomli and that Bawa was not the Gomli.
(xi) Each of the findings made by the committee to the effect that the selection and enskinment of Mion Lana Andani as Ya-Na were made in accordance with the customary procedures was wrong. This was against the weight of the evidence before the committee.
(xii) The committee was wrong in finding that Mion Lana Andani became a Ya-Na and that he was deskinned.
(xiii) The committee was wrong in finding that there are two ruling families or houses in the Dagomba Dynasty, namely Abudulai house or family and Andani house or family.
(xiv) The committee was wrong in finding that the Nam alternates or rotates between Abudulai house or yili and Andani house or yili.
(xv) The committee was wrong in finding that Bukari of Savelugu became a Ya-Na.
(xvi) The committee was wrong in finding that Yakubu Andani was the most appropriate person to be made Ya-Na. In fact the father of Yakubu Andani not having been a Ya-Na could never be qualified to be a Ya-Na.
[p.197] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
(xvii) There was no basis in evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy implied in paragraphs 28, 581, 582,, 583, 584 and 585. The underlying suggestions made by those paragraphs are unfortunate.”
I will now examine the provisions of section 1 (1) of P.N.D.C.L. 86 and the preamble and paragraph 1 of N.R.C.D. 299 in order to determine what restrictions they impose on the appellant’s right of appeal. The relevant provisions of N.R.C.D. 299 read:
“WHEREAS on the 18th day of August, 1972 the National Redemption Council appointed a Committee of Inquiry to inquire into certain matters relating to the Yendi Skin;
AND WHEREAS the said Committee found that the purported nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na was null and void;
AND WHEREAS the National Redemption Council deems it fit to give due effect to the said finding of the said Committee of Inquiry;
NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972 this Decree is hereby made:
1. The purported nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na and Paramount Chief of Dagbon is hereby declared to be null and void for all purposes, whether under customary law or otherwise.”
It is my respectful view that a careful examination of P.N.D.C.L. 86 and paragraph (1) of N.R.C.D. 299 which form the central core of the arguments submitted on the objection reveals that what learned counsel for the respondent described as the one finding, namely “the purported nomination or selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na was null and void” is the sum total or the conclusion of a number of sub-findings the committee made on the various issues raised on the selection and enskinment of a Ya-Na. Among them may be mentioned the following findings on such issues as to who are:
(a) eligible to contest for the Nam, procedure for nomination and selection; when and how to apply; the customary body which does the selection; and
(b) procedure for enskinment, who are the functionaries, when does one become a Ya-Na, etc.
All the above and other relevant issues which were raised for determination before the committee that enabled it to conclude finally
[p.198] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 that the “nomination, selection and enskinment” of the appellant was null and void are issues on which a finding one way or the other was made by the committee and, in my view, such findings are findings that can legitimately be attacked in this appeal within the meaning and language of P.N.D.C.L. 86 and N.R.C.D. 299.
Let us examine ground (xii). The committee found that Mion Lana Andani III became a Ya-Na. Following from this finding it held that the selection of the appellant was uncustomary because his funeral had at the time of the selection of the appellant not been performed. It is therefore legitimate for the appellant to show that any of the above findings was wrong in order to establish that his selection was in conformity with custom. The finding that Mion Lana Andani became a Ya-Na was also relevant to determine the eligibility of the respondent to the Namship. Ground (xvi) is also legitimate for the reasons already dealt with above to show that if Mion Lana Andani never became a Ya-Na then his son the respondent (described in the ground as Yakubu Andani) would not be eligible for the Nam and, in fact, he would have no locus in this appeal or to contest for the Nam. These are justifiable reasons for overruling the objection to grounds (xii) and (xvi). The combined effect of sections 1 and 2 of P.N.D.C.L. 86 and N.R.C.D. 299 confirms the contention that not a single finding of the Ollennu Committee was implemented, rather more than one finding was envisaged within the contemplation of the legislature when P.N.D.C.L. 86 was passed.
It is pertinent at this stage to state that at the time the Ollennu Committee was set up the appellant was the occupant of the Yendi skin following the government’s acceptance and implementation of the Mate Kole Committee Report. The Mate Kole Committee had earlier on inquired into the Yendi skin affairs under terms similar to the Ollennu Committee and had found that the appellant was properly selected and enskined under Dagbon custom. It was a petition against his enskinment by the supporters of the respondent that provoked the setting up of the Ollennu Committee.
Now to the appeal itself. The first finding the committee made was on the issue as to, “What body of persons was responsible for the selection of Ya-Na under the Dagbon custom?” Two rival stories were presented before the committee. The evidence brought on behalf of the respondent was that the customary body of persons was made up of the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, the Gomli and Kpati-Na who form the traditional body responsible for the selection of a candidate for the Nam. The evidence produced on behalf of the appellant on the other hand was intended to show that before 1948 selection to the Nam was done by the elders of Dagbon but a body known as “the Selection [p.199] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
Committee” of the Dagomba State Council took over this duty of the elders in 1948.
I must say at the outset here that the evidence produced to support the traditional body of selectors was so conflicting, confusing and inconsistent that it is my view that the committee’s finding on this issue in favour of the respondent was insupportable. The conflicting and inconsistent nature of the evidence makes it unreliable. It is, in fact, a wrong finding. I must also say that the contentions that the elders of Dagbon were responsible for the selection even though more attractive was vague and uncertain as to the identity of those elders that it could not be accepted to form the basis of any proper judicial pronouncement.
The committee’s duty was to find out the customary body responsible for the selection as established by usage. This had to be proved. Not a single instance was cited to support the respondent’s contention that the selection was done by the group of four. On the contrary, on a close examination, the evidence produced to support the contention that the selection was done by the group of four (as found by the committee) and soothsaying together was so confusing and conflicting that no proper judicial finding could be made on the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses. The evidence at some stage became more confusing when questions on this issue were put to find out who were the kingmakers. Those who select together with those who enskin form the body of kingmakers. Selection and enskinment are separate and distinct issues each with its own peculiar procedure and performed by two distinct identified persons. It is possible, however, for a participant in the selection also to be a functionary in the enskinment but before the committee, the two were treated separately and were to be proved separately as two distinct issues. The committee in its report made the two separate and distinct but the evidence brought to support the contention of the respondent at certain points confused and combined the two as if they were one and the same thing. Where the evidence was direct on selection the witnesses conflicted, some testified that the four did the selection by soothsaying together. Others said the Kuga-Na does it alone. Some said the Kuga-Na in consultation with the sons of Ya-Nas and the elders of Dagbon. There was no consistency in the evidence brought to support the respondent’s contention. Kpati-Na who testified in this case denied being a member and having ever been a member of the body responsible for selecting a Ya-Na. He denied having ever joined the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam and the Gomli in soothsaying for any such selection. He also denied this before the Mate Kole Committee. In the face of such conflicts and inconsistencies in the
[p.200] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 evidence produced to support the respondent’s contention, and denied by the Kpati-Na, it becomes difficult to follow and accept the finding in favour of the respondent by the committee that “it had been conclusively proved that the customary body responsible for the selection was made up of Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Gomli and Kpati-Na”, even against the latter’s own testimony that he had never been one of such persons. The finding made by the committee that Tugurinam had personally taken part in the selection of no less than four Ya-Nas in so far as that finding was made to strengthen the contention brought on behalf of the respondent, cannot be supported on the evidence. The names of the four Ya-Nas he mentioned were Na Mahama II, Na Mahama III, Na Abudulai III and Na Andani III otherwise known as Mion Lana Andani. On the evidence, Na Mahama III enskinned in 1948 and Na Abudulai III enskinned in 1954 were not selected by the body led by the Kuga-Na. The selection of Na Mahama II could not have been done with Kpati-Na participating. Kpati-Na as has been noted in the present proceedings and before the Mate Kole Committee denied being one of the traditional persons responsible for selecting a candidate for the Nam. He has not also been shown to have ever taken part in any selection of a Ya-Na. Mahama Kpati-Na whose name appears on exhibit C in the Mate Kole Report was found not to have been the official holder of that traditional post of Kpati-Na at that material time on his own admission before the Mate Kole Committee and he was also not found to have had any authority from the holder of that post at that time he thumbprinted that document. He did not also testify before the Ollennu Committee to support his claim that traditionally Kpati-Na is a member of the selecting body.
On this issue, apart from the oral evidence produced there was available before the committee a mass of documentary evidence which were not considered by the committee. The documentary evidence introduced more complications into the already confused situation. The first documentary evidence was provided by Blair. In his book entitled The Constitution of the State of Dagbon (hereafter referred to simply as Blair) at 28 can be found the following:
“Method of Election:
The Gushie-Na, the Kuga-Na, the Tuguri-Nam and the Gomli form the committee of selection. All these candidates present themselves for selection and recourse is made to the spirits of the dead Chiefs, the cult of whom is controlled by the Gulkpe-Na, Baghali-Na and the Kuga-Na and, from the results of a sacrifice, it is decided which of the candidates is the possessor of a “good head”, i.e., the man whom the spirits desire.”
[p.201] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
Here the names of the body of selectors differ from what the committee found. The next documentary evidence on this issue can be found in Tamakloe’s Brief History of the Dagomba People. At 67 the author says, ‘When the chiefs of Kuga, Sunson and Zabzugu and the Chief Minister, Balo-Na and Kumlana have selected the man for the kingship.” Tamakloe names persons different from Blair. Then we have exhibit C at 155 of the Ollennu Committee Report which names Kuga, Zohena, Kumlana and the Chief of Sunson, as being responsible to select the Ya-Na. Exhibit N at 154 of the Ollennu Committee Report where it is stated as follows; “Kings are elected by the Chiefs of all the Country and the final candidates are submitted to the Chief of Gushiego, Head of all Dagomba Fetish, who by Fetish practices selects the King.” See also appendix 21 (b) at 199 of the Ollennu Committee Report at 201, para. 4. The committee itself in criticising the case presented on behalf of the appellant had this to say in paragraph 249 of the report:
“249. But there is more to it than that. The evidence led on behalf of Mahamadu Abudulai and the 3rd Parties is not just a display of ignorance of what the custom is, it is a demonstration of untruthfulness, deliberate, strenuous effort to conceal the truth. When those witnesses persisted in their denial of who the elders were who did the selection from ancient times, they did so by design to save themselves the embarrassment of admitting that the elders who did the selection are the Kuga-Na, the Tugurinam, the Zohe-Na and the Gomli. “
The introduction of Zohe-Na supports the Kpati-Na’s claim that he is not a member of the selecting body. Here Kpati-Na had been dropped and substituted by Zohe-Na. See also exhibit F at 141 and the evidence of Kuga-Na at 209 of the report.
In this state of confusion and conflicts as to the body responsible for the selection how could the committee legitimately justify its criticism that the appellant’s witnesses feigned ignorance when they contended that the selection as far as they knew was done by the elders of Dagbon.
Most of the witnesses for the appellant are recent appointees to their respective traditional posts. Indeed, there is a mass of documentary evidence as well to support their stand from the history of the selection of some earlier Ya-Na’s exemplified: (a) by the selection of Na Gongobli. The evidence shows that it was the elders who agreed and assembled for the soothsaying, and (b) in the selection of Na Zagina it was the elders who referred the matter to the Nyini, the selection of Bukari of Savelugu evidenced by exhibit 9. The appellant’s
[p.202] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 stand was also supported by Tamakloe at 53-54, where he noted that the final selection rested with the elders. Then exhibit N referred to (supra). Selection by the elders here appears more attractive. What makes the appellant’s case as presented on this issue vague is the uncertainty as to which elders do the selection. An amorphous body like all the elders of Dagbon who on the evidence could not be identified and as admitted to be around a thousand in number cannot be accepted as a basis for making any proper judicial pronouncement in his favour. I think in the face of such confusing and conflicting evidence provided by the witnesses both orally and documentarily it was wrong for the committee to have found it “conclusively proved that the Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kpati-Na and Gomli form the customary body responsible for selecting the Ya-Na” as contained in paragraph 254 of the report. Kpati-Na at least on the evidence claims not to be one of the traditional selectors. Not a single instance where the four had soothsayed and selected a Ya-Na was given before the committee. It follows from this that Mion Lana Andani who is also described as Andani III through whom the respondent is claiming his right to the Nam was not proved to have been customarily selected by a body entitled to do so.
Granting even that, that finding in paragraph 254 is correct, the case presented on behalf of the respondent to substantiate the claim of Mion Lana Andani still cannot stand. The evidence provided to support this was given by the Gomli, Tugurinam, Kuga-Na and Kaleen. The documentary evidence on this is contained in exhibit Z of the Mate Kole Committee Report. That document is exhibit C in the Mate Kole Committee’s proceedings. Its contents show that the body described in paragraph 254 of the Ollennu Committee Report, three days after the death of Na Abudulai soothsayed and selected Mion Lana (Na Andani III) for installation as Ya-Na. There is also exhibit C (a letter written by Kaleen) in the Ollennu Committee Report. The selection of Mion Lana three days after the death of Na Abudulai III violated the customary procedure. The custom is that it is only when the Gbon Lana has been installed and the funeral of the deceased Ya-Na performed that the selection is made. That the claim of Mion Lana is in violation of the custom apart from exhibit C in the Mate Kole Committee Report is supported by events recorded in exhibits Y and W at 28 and 30 respectively of the Mate Kole Committee Report. They both show that the funeral was performed on 7 November 1968 and that on 5 November 1968 exhibit C was received at the District Administration. These events show that even before the funeral the name of the Ya-Na elect had already been made known and that the selection was before the installation of the Gbon Lana and before applications could be received from other contestants as required by custom.
[p.203] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
In any event the evidence on record shows that this body of selectors did not and could not have met, soothsayed and customarily selected Mion Lana Andani. First, there are the conflicts in the evidence tendered to prove it. Secondly, in view of Kpati-Na’s consistent evidence denying being one of such selecting members. This fact that the Kuga-Na’s group did not and could not validly select Andani is also supported by exhibit H at 143 of the Ollennu Committee Report. Exhibit H is an application written by Mion Lana and addressed to the then acting President of the Dagomba State Council. The significant thing about exhibit H is that the application reveals two striking matters of extreme importance. First, the application by the Mion Lana for consideration to be selected for the Nam even in 1953 was not sent to the Kuga-Na as the respondent’s witnesses would want the committee to accept; the other significant aspect of exhibit H is that it shows the recognition of the state council’s competency to deal with the application by Mion Lana Andani himself. How can he now be heard to say that in 1968 he was selected by Kuga-Na and his group?
The evidence on selection prior to the coming into force of the selection committee of 1948 was so unsatisfactory that I think the issue of what body (as it existed before 1948) was responsible for the selection of a Ya-Na was not properly resolved judicially. Thus the committee’s finding on this issue is insupportable. The committee further failed to give any adequate consideration to the mass of documentary evidence before it in resolving this issue of selection, its finding on the issue therefore cannot stand.
All hopes, however, are not lost because there is evidence produced by the appellant’s witnesses that a new body made up of a committee of eleven members (four elders and seven divisional chiefs) of the state council was at the time of the sitting of the committee the body customarily responsible for the selection of a Ya-Na—apparently to streamline the confusion. This body on the evidence was the body that selected Na Mahama III in 1948, Na Abudulai III in 1954 and the appellant in 1968.
The selection committee is composed as said earlier of seven divisional chiefs and four elders. The resolution of the Dagomba State Council that set up the committee in 1948 was made on 12 May 1948 at a meeting presided over by Andani as Gbon Lana and Acting President of the state council. This resolution was confirmed at a meeting of the state council held on 11-12 December 1953. It is of interest to note that both the Kuga-Na and Mion Lana Andani were present at these meetings.
The 1953 resolution has been criticised as being ultra vires the powers of the state council and the confirmation of the 1948 resolution
[p.204] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 as also being against the rules of natural justice since the said meeting was presided over by the appellant as Gbon Lana when the eligibility of the Gbon Lana was an issue before the council. The Gbon Lana Abudulai who in 1953 presided over this meeting, it must be noted here, was not the appellant, but rather Abudulai who later became Na Abudulai III. The 1948 resolution itself was passed under the presidency of Andani III, the father of the respondent. The Ya-Na is an indispensable member of the council, if he was alive, not sick, and present. There cannot be the state council without the Ya-Na. In his absence some one must act in his place. He is the natural president of the council and presides over all its meetings irrespective of the agenda. The Gbon Lana when installed steps into the shoes of the Ya-Na and performs all the functions of the Ya-Na including presiding over all meetings of the Dagomba Traditional Council. This function of the Gbon Lana is customarily inherent in his position as the regent. The council has the power to discuss all matters affecting the Dagbon State including the Ya-Na and the Nam itself subject to any such statutory limitations there might be. A close examination of the minutes on the discussion of the eligibility of the Gbon Lana to contest the vacant post of the Nam in terms as reported does not justify the criticism that there was a violation of any rule of natural justice and the objection on this score is rejected as unjustified. The term is not a term of art, it means nothing more than the Ya-Na in council with his elders and divisional chiefs. It is an indigenous institution and is recognised as such: see page 27 of Blair at where it’s indigenous duties are described as: (a) declaration of war; and (b) changing of a custom or the making of a new one.
It is the customary legislative body: see Blair at 27. It was therefore wrong for the committee to have held that the Dagomba State Council was created under the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No. 2 of 1932). Even if it is accepted that the native authority created under Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 can be equated to the state council as it existed, then all that the statute did was, in my respectful view, to adopt that indigenous institution as it existed and to confer on it certain statutory duties and powers. Its indigenous legislative functions were not taken away by any statute and they were also not conferred on any other institution established. The law as I understand it is that where a body exists as an indigenous institution and a statute is passed conferring certain statutory powers or functions on such an indigenous institution, the institution is not debarred from exercising its indigenous powers and functions unless these powers were taken away expressly or are conferred by statute on another [p.205] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 institution. Such powers as are conferred on the indigenous institution by the statute are in addition to those it already possessed.
In view of the above, I find that no legislation existed prior to 1948 that took away the indigenous legislative function of the Dagomba State Council and it was within the competence of the state council to change any custom. In fact, the state council must be commended in this regard in helping to resolve the state of confusion and uncertainty surrounding the issue as to what body was entitled to select a candidate for the Namship and making the position clear and certain.
In my judgment, the resolution passed in 1948 was within the competence of the Dagomba State Council and was validly made. I also find in my judgment that the confirmation made in 1953 to the 1948 resolution by the state council was in accordance with the statutory requirement and therefore valid. The item introduced concerned a question of constitution within the language of section 2 (a) and (c) of Ordinance No. 5 of 1952, and jurisdiction was conferred by section 5 of the Ordinance. Constitutional matters are dealt with and regulated under Part III of No. 5 of 1952 as distinct from purely ordinary customary law matters under Part IV of the Ordinance which requires approval under section 13. The issue raised concerning the Gbon Lana was a mere documentation of the existing constitutional right of the Gbon Lana to contest for the Nam and did not introduce any amendment or modification of a customary law. This was not appreciated by the committee which held wrongly in my view that section 13 of Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 was applicable. Even the item on the voting procedure was not a modification of the custom, to justify any approval of the Governor under section 13. The absence of any saving clause in Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 as against the provisions for saving clauses in both No. 4 and No. 8 Ordinances (i.e. State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance and State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance respectively, can be explained in terms that in the case of the two latter legislations, there were earlier statutory provisions that regulated the modifications of customs whereas in the former there was no such statute and modifications of customs in Dagomba was regulated by customary practice. Section 6 of Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 which deals with constitutional matters did not attach any sanction to non-compliance with its provisions. Its language is clear and does not call for invalidation for non-compliance. In any case the 1948 resolution was not regulated by any statute and it continued in force even if the 1953 resolution is held to be void.
It is significant to note that in 1948 Na Mahama III was selected by the selection committee: see the evidence of Tugurinam before the Ollennu Committee and Zohena before the Mate Kole Committee. See
[p.206] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 also exhibit XX4 of the Ollennu Committee Report at 230, para. 9. Then in 1954 Na Abudulai III was also selected by the selection committee. Both Kuga-Na and Tugurinam partook in the selection in 1954 as members of the selection committee and, in fact, their candidate was Mion Lana Andani; see exhibit D at 139 of the Ollennu Committee Report. It cannot be true that Kuga-Na, Tugurinam and the two others whom the committee found to form the customary selection body did meet to select Mion Lana Andani by soothsaying after the death of Na Abudulai III. For they were aware and very well knew of the existence of the selection committee which Mion Lana himself as acting president of the state council had presided over and created in 1948 and which in selecting Na Mahama III both Kuga-Na and Tugurinam participated by voting for Gbon Lana Andani who was put up as their candidate to contest against Mahama. How can the three, i.e. Kuga-Na, Tugurinam and Andani, at such a later hour decide to refuse to accord the selection committee its rightful place under the custom.
In my judgment, the customary body that was responsible for the selection to the Nam in 1948 and 1954 as well as in 1968 and at the time of the sitting of the Ollennu Committee was the selection committee set up by the Dagomba State Council in 1948. It was this body undisputedly that selected the appellant. The criticism levelled against the voting procedure when the appellant was selected on the particular facts available is highly technical and is therefore rejected.
The above finding seems to conclude this appeal in favour of the appellant but I shall now examine the other findings made against him which had been legitimately attacked in this appeal to see how he succeeds or fails. These include the findings that:
(a) his selection was not by soothsaying as required by custom;
(b) he was not one of the occupants of the three gates of Mion, Karaga and Savelugu;
(c) that he as Gbon Lana was not qualified;
(d) his selection was done before the funeral of Andani III was performed;
(e) his election offended the customary practice of rotation as there were two ruling houses; the Abudulai and the Andani houses; and
(f) finally that his enskinment was procured by force of arms.
I will first deal with the issue of eligibility. The overwhelming evidence on record supports the view that the Gbon Lana had from time immemorial been an eligible candidate to contest for the Nam. The evidence is supported by the respondent’s witnesses. The caveat some of them tried to place on the Gbon Lana’s claim to contest was completely swallowed up by the overwhelming evidence on record. The caveat becomes nonsensical by the committee’s finding that selection
[p.207] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 was by soothsaying. Evidence on this shows that once an application was made a stone was chosen to represent that particular applicant. In this connection, only want of luck can elude an applicant from being selected. The bald fact is, that by established practice as shown, the evidence both oral and documentary is overwhelming in supporting the eligibility of the Gbon Lana. It shows that there are four candidates if the Gbon Lana applies in addition to the established three gates. It further shows that the three gates are subject to the long customary rights of the Gbon Lana to contest if he wishes. In fact, the three gates skins were not originally known to the Nam, whereas historical events show that the Nam from its inception was the preserve and exclusive right of sons of the Nam. The three gates only became established in the course of history and was, in fact, introduced after the reference to the Nayiri.
The wisdom behind the Gbon Lana’s right to the Nam is not far to find, for with the right of grandsons to occupy any of the three gates skins the possibility of resorting to a change in custom to find a successor if at any time the skin became vacant and the three gates skins were already occupied by such grandsons is avoided and the Gbon Lana automatically becomes the only eligible candidate. His right therefore ensures continuity. I accept as a correct statement the contention by learned counsel for the appellant that the decision by the Dagomba State Council as appeared in appendix C at 54 of Blair that the adoption of the three gates was a direct answer to item (g) at 22 of the book in respect of matters the government wanted settled at the 1930 Conference. It referred to existing chieftainships properly so-called. The three gates were in addition to the long customary right of the Gbon Lana. If the committee’s finding in disqualifying the appellant because as a Gbon Lana he was not eligible is right, then it would appear stupid for the Kuga-Na and Tugurinam, persons the same committee found to be members of the customary kingmaking body, to have put up and voted for Gbon Lana Andani as one of the candidates to contest the Nam as against Na Mahama III. For they would have known that he was not eligible and his application was going to be treated as such. The two put up Gbon Lana Andani because they knew he was eligible. The appellant was eligible and was customarily selected as a candidate for the Nam: see the evidence at the Sereboe Committee, exhibit TT, at 207-210 of the report. This question was sealed by the incorporation into written form of the Gbon Lana’s eligibility, by the state council in 1954. If what was required, as was contended before us for eligibility, was experience in chieftaincy matters acquired by those occupying the three gates skins, then I would be tempted to say that the experience of the occupants of such insignificant skins, i.e. Mion, Kuga and Savelugu is very insignificant
[p.208] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 compared with the experience acquired by a Gbon Lana as acting president who assumes the duties of the whole Dagomba State until a substantive Ya-Na is enskinned.
The jurisdictional experience of the three former chieftains, however long their reign, will be negligible when compared with that of the Gbon Lana even over a short period.
On the issue of soothsaying. The findings by the committee that selection was by soothsaying is ridiculous, and cannot be accepted. It is also unproved. No evidence was provided apart from the isolated instance of Gogobli. Its acceptance even is inconsistent with the system of rotation and the reference to the Nayiri. Rotation or alternation cannot be married with soothsaying. If soothsaying was the practice then the problem that arose for solution which went before the Nayiri was not beyond solution by soothsaying. All that the elders had to do was to pick a stone for each candidate and to soothsay. Kaleen’s analogy of soothsaying in choosing the wooing of a woman is ridiculous and even if accepted can be described as individual and private soothsaying. The nature of soothsaying described in the evidence, in my view, is nothing more than a Christian praying for God’s guidance in finding a solution to a problem he is confronted with. I think the view that soothsaying is done on individual basis and privately seem to be the more probable and acceptable practice. This must not be confused with the customary practice of making sacrifices to the ancestral gods after death, etc. I am consoled that in the final analysis the committee itself recommended a departure from such a primitive practice on which no proper judicial pronouncement can be made.
On the issue of selection before celebration of funeral. Another finding against the appellant was that his selection was void because it was done when the funeral of the deceased Andani had not been performed. The question here is, was Andani also described by the committee as Na Andani III ever a Ya-Na? The obvious answer is in the negative. He was not customarily selected either by the body the committee found responsible for selection whose names appear in exhibit C and in exhibit Z, or the selection committee of the state council. Kpati-Na denied having participated in any such selection before the Ollennu Committee and had already done so before the Mate Kole Committee. He denied having joined the others in soothsaying in selecting Andani. He said before the two committees that he was not a member of the selection body. This alleged selection, three days after the death of Na Abudulai III, violated the custom, the funeral of the latter not having been performed. He was not selected by the selection committee, the body customarily entitled to do the selection. Not using his adoption, his participation and his use of the selection committee on
[p.209] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 previous occasions as the body to select the Ya-Na as estoppel against Andani on his present stand to denounce the selection committee created under his presidency to invalidate the selection of the appellant, the issue here is whether it will be just and fair to permit him and his collaborators to challenge its competency now by saying that the 1953 resolution was invalid, using the provision of the 1952 Ordinance?
In the case of Djomoa v. Amargyei [1961] G.L.R. 170, S.C. the Supreme Court held that to permit a vendor or other grantee of land for valuable consideration to plead the Concession Ordinance so as to defeat or annul his grant to the benefit of himself and to the detriment of the other party is little short of a plea tantamount to fraud and the court must not lend its support to any form of fraudulent practice. In other words, to permit Andani who presided over the state council’s meeting of 12 March 1948 which passed the resolution setting up the selection committee, and the Kuga-Na who together with Andani in 1954 confirmed the appointment of the said committee, and to permit Andani again having contested the Nam by applying to the said committee as Gbon Lana and for the Kuga-Na and Tugurinam who sponsored and voted for the Gbon Lana Andani at one of the meetings of the selection committee for selecting a candidate for the skin, to be heard now to say that the selection of the appellant by the same selection committee was void because the resolution that set up the committee was done without complying with statutory provisions, to the advantage of Andani their candidate, will be a conduct little short of a plea tantamount to fraud. What the three are now saying is that even though we took part in appointing the selection committee in the past, we have participated in the previous meetings for appointing candidates for the skin, we even presented a candidate to the selection committee in the past, what we are saying is that the creation of the selection committee is now void because we created it without complying with statutory provisions. If what they are now saying is right then the appointment of Andani as Mion Lana by Na Mahama III who himself was selected by the selection committee for the Nam was also null and void and he Andani would have no locus to challenge or contest for the Nam at all. Kuga-Na and Mion Lana as late as 1961 were still giving the state council more powers to decide on the issue of eligibility to the skin: see exhibit 22 of appendix F. The court cannot lend its aid to such conduct on the part of the Andanis.
Up to this stage the appellant has on the evidence successfully established his eligibility, his selection under custom and is left with his installation. But before installation, he has two obstacles to surmount: The question, whether there are two ruling houses that contest the Namship alternatively or on rotation basis and whether at the time he was selected it was the turn of his house. In this connection, whilst the appellant contends that eligibility to the Nam is on individual
[p.210] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 qualifications, the respondent contends that it rotates between two houses, namely the Andani and Abudulai houses. The history of the Nam as I can gather from the evidence is that in its inception it was the preserve of the sons of previous Ya-Nas who from time to time seized office through violence. Then came the period when occupants of the Nam nominated their successors, then a more refined method of selection by elders was introduced with time. The evidence as to who constituted this selection prior to 1948 is so conflicting and confusing that it is difficult on the evidence to identify that body. The evidence further shows that in course of time the number of contestants was limited to four candidates, the regent and the occupants of the Mion, Karaga and Savelugu skins. These form the four candidates. The history does not show that there had been any contest to the Nam by reference to any house. The evidence by the respondent which the committee accepted and therefore disqualified the appellant was that Na Abudulai and Na Andani II each of whom succeeded to the Nam established a ruling house after Na Yakubu’s death, namely the Abudulai house and the Andani house. The respondent contended that candidates to the Yendi skin had to be chosen from these two houses alternatively. The committee found the agreed order of succession to the skin since the death of Na Yakubu 1845-1954 as follows:
“(1) Na Abudulai I of Abudulai House.
(2) Na Andani II of Andani House.
(3) Na Alhassan I of Abudulai House.
(4) Na Bukari of Andani House.
(5) Na Abudulai II of Abudulai House.
(6) Na Mahama II of Andani House.
(7) Na Mahama III of Abudulai House.”
The committee then concluded as follows:
“This agreed order therefore, conclusively proves that the Dagomba custom of succession as established by usage is that the Abudulai and the Andani Families succeed to the Skin alternatively, i.e. by rotation.”
The committee found the selection of the appellant to have violated the custom and therefore found the selection void. This conclusion is rather curious. The appellant’s case was that eligibility was personal to each contestant provided he could establish that he was the son of the previous Ya-Na and that he is one of the four candidates. The appellant denies the evidence of two royal houses and contends that the eligibility of all candidates to the skin is through a common ancestor. The committee following from the above also accepted the respondent’s
[p.211] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 contention that the candidates from the two ruling houses rotate or alternate.
These two findings have been attacked as not proved and not established on the evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order of succession as appeared above was a mere coincidence, I am compelled to agree with this if one considers the finding by the committee itself that selection to the Nam was by soothsaying. The two (i.e. soothsaying and rotation) cannot be married. The existence of one negates the other. In other words, the two systems cannot co-exist unless perhaps it is practised at any one moment among members from the same house which is not the case put up by the respondent. The history of the Nam dates back beyond 1945 and Na Yakubu was not the only Ya-Na who had more than one wife so that each woman created a house for her son. Na Zulande had three children who became Ya-Nas but that did not create three ruling houses. Na Doglo had five children of his becoming Ya-Nas but no five ruling houses were created. Na Zanyina had two of his sons becoming Ya-Nas but that did not also create two ruling houses. There are many others as can be found in Tamakloe, Part V. The respondent led no evidence to show why an exception was created after Yakubu’s death; nor was evidence led to show what happened either during his lifetime or after his death to justify the creation of the two ruling houses. It is sound law that once a position is proved to have been practised and established the presumption is that that which is established by practice continues until there is shown an occurrence or an event which lawfully alters the established practice or position. The history of the Nam is that all candidates who contest for the Nam apply at the appropriate time based solely on their personal qualification. Not a single instance was shown on the evidence where a candidate contested for the Nam on the basis that he was from a particular house. There does not exist in my judgment two ruling royal houses from which candidates for the Nam were chosen and the committee was wrong in making that finding. It was submitted that by the terms of reference (c) of E.I. 74 the government must be deemed to have accepted the fact that there were two ruling houses. This argument is untenable, my understanding is that this was one of the matters the committee was required to determine, i.e. the claim by the respondent that there are two royal ruling houses as against the appellant’s that there is no such thing as ruling houses.
The committee’s finding against the appellant that his selection also offended the customary practice of rotation was unjustified. On the issue of rotation or alternation between the Abudulai and the Andani [p.212] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 houses, even if the committee’s finding is accepted and the other finding by the committee also that Mion Lana Andani otherwise known as Andani III was properly installed as a Ya-Na and died as a Ya-Na, then following the system of rotation the lot fell on the Abudulai house to provide a candidate for the Nam. The appellant is the choice of the Abudulai house. The argument here is that by the system of rotation when Na Andani became the Ya-Na the post of Mion Lana became vacant and this according to convention (as found by the committee) should have gone to the appellant as Mion Lana Abudulai. On the death of Na Andani III, he Mion Lana Abudulai, the choice of the Abudulai house, should have become the next Ya-Na and the respondent as Gbon Lana would have occupied the gate skin of Mion Lana, a position made vacant by the appellant who had become the Ya-Na. The committee’s finding in paragraph 5 at 128 that between 1954-1969 no member of the Andani family occupied any of the three gates skins to qualify for the Nam is wrong and not supported by the evidence. It was in 1954 after Gbon Lana Andani had lost the contest for the Nam to Na Mahama III that the latter appointed him to the gate skin of Mion. There is therefore no justification in the committee making it appear as if there was a move to oust the Andani house to justify its recommendation for putting up the respondent in preference to the appellant who should have got the Nam after Andani III.
On the committee’s own findings the justice of this case heavily weighs against the respondent and favours the appellant who when installed as Na Abudulai IV appointed the respondent to the gate skin of Mion thus following the rules laid down in exhibit 22, appendix F para. 4 at 204 of the Ollennu Committee Report. The committee was on its own findings wrong in nullifying the installation of the appellant as Ya-Na and the appointment of the respondent as Mion Lana. For there was no justification on the facts as found by the committee to have disturbed the position of the appellant at the time of making its report when the appellant who by the system of rotation had already been installed after the death of Na Andani III. The committee’s stand against the appellant because his installation preceded the funeral of Na Andani, in my view, on the particular facts and circumstances under which this was done, is highly technical and unjustified. It was the turn of the Abudulai house on the death of Andani III and the committee should not have disturbed the selection and installation of the appellant.
The above arguments have been put forward solely on the assumption that the existence of two ruling houses and the rotation or alternation between these two houses were proved. These in my judgment, however, were not proved.
[p.213] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
The next and the last point for consideration in this appeal is the installation of Mahamadu Abudulai. The finding on this can be found at paragraph 532 of the committee’s report. The said paragraph reads.
“532. As to the circumstances of the installation, we find that Armed Forces of the State, the Army and the Police, were employed to compel some traditional office-bearers to participate in the ceremony against their will that being the case, the participation of these Elders in the ceremony is of no effect.”
To sum up on the evidence the committee said in paragraphs 533 and 544 at 89 and 90 respectively:
“533. Mahamadu Abudulai, upon the evidence, (i) has not occupied any of the three (3) Gate Skins, the occupation of which is a condition precedent to selection to the Namship, (ii) he was not selected by the Constitutional body of King-makers, rather his purported election was made by the illegal Selection Committee and in the teeth of opposition by the traditional body, as is verified by Exhibit “E”, Minutes of the said Committee meeting held on 8th November, 1968, and (iii) his purported installation was procured by the use of force … 544. Since custom is what is shown by established usage and since the established usage in this regard is that two families, Abudulai and Andani, have dominated and continue to dominate succession to the Yendi Skin, it necessarily follows that the custom is that there are two ruling families or houses in the Dagomba dynasty; namely: the Abudulai House or family and the Andani House or family.”
My own reading of the relevant paragraphs of the committee’s findings on this aspect of the matter shows that the burden of the finding against the installation is that part of paragraph 532 that reads:
“We find that Armed Forces of the State, the Army and the Police, were employed to compel some traditional office-bearers to participate in the ceremony against their will; that being the case, the participation of these Elders in the ceremony is of no effect.”
We shall now examine the evidence in support of this finding to see how it is justified. According to the committee three eye-witnesses testified on behalf of the Andani family. These witnesses were named as Tampion Lana Alhassan, described as brother of Na Andani III, Mahamadu Yakubu described as leader of the youth in the palace and
[p.214] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
Tugurinam. Of the three only Tugurinam had on the evidence a part to play in the installation ceremony and it is his evidence that showed the circumstances under which he came to perform his part of the installation ceremony. The pieces of evidence relied on and used by the committee starts from paragraph 524-530 of the report.
In this regard, it is principally the testimony of the Tugurinam that must engage serious attention. In dealing with this appeal it is necessary to look at his stand in the whole Yendi Skin Affairs and also to consider the conflict between the official account and what was produced on behalf of the respondent. It is clear from the proceedings that Tugurinam had already taken a stand in the matter which on the undisputed facts are a challenge to his credibility. Among these are: (a) his contention that three days after the death of Na Abudulai III, Kpati-Na or at least his representative joined his group to select Mion Lana for the Namship; (b) that Na Mahama II was selected by a traditional customary body of four led by the Kuga-Na; (c) his denunciation of the selection committee created in 1948 by the state council which had selected both Na Mahama III and Na Abudulai III; and (d) by supporting the system of rotation and yet putting up Gbon Lana Andani to contest the Namship as against Na Mahama III in 1948 after Na Mahama II. Throughout the proceedings he had identified himself with the Andani cause and was therefore an interested party to see that the other side lost on his evidence. Of all the functionaries to the installation ceremony he was the only one who complained about the force of arms. The allegation of the use of force was settled on his sole testimony. No one from the police or the army was called to testify before the committee even though on the evidence the names of some of the forces personnel present were mentioned and those on official duty could have been found.
The committee was set up by the government and had every power and the resources to have gone into this matter properly. It was not a proper judicial exercise on the part of the committee to have accepted Tugurinam’s accusation against the forces personnel without hearing their side of the story.
The conduct of Tugurinam as admitted by him in cross-examination that he brought the appellant out from the Katindum the following morning after the installation and his acceptance of his customary fees negated any form of force allegedly used to frighten him into action. Moreover the evidence shows that some of the functionaries were at the Katindum to perform their part of the ceremony on his invitation. He cannot therefore be heard to say that it was force of arms that prompted him to act.
[p.215] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
The committee also referred to the evidence of Kpati-Na Musa and one Yahaya to find support for the accusation that people were killed in connection with the installation. I have carefully examined the evidence of the two witnesses and nowhere did any of them say or admit that people were shot and killed in connection with the installation. What Yahaya said about shooting and killing had no reference to the installation. The evidence of Yahaya negates any use of force on any person and anyone being shot and killed in connection with the installation. The witness was present during the whole of the enskinment ceremony at the Ya-Na’s palace. He testified that during the enskinment ceremony a cow was slaughtered and the Kuga-Na took part of the meat.
He said, “The Tugurinam entered the lorry which I brought together with the Kuga-Na and I sent them to their respective places.” Continuing, witness said, “I took them just in front of the palace of the Ya-Na, sent them all to their places and the Kuga-Na told me that the following day early in the morning he would mount his horse and come to greet the chief.” Cross-examination of the witness showed that there was no shooting at the installation. The committee’s finding that he admitted that there were shooting and killing in connection with the installation is not supported by the evidence. It is true that all the witnesses admit there had been some shootings and killings at Yendi. Yahaya according to his evidence said he heard of this and also heard that the shootings and the killings were the result of some persons attacking the police. His testimony on this seem to support the official report on the shooting incidents some time in the morning of Monday 8 September. The Tampion Lana said, “we saw Alhassan, the police officer, holding a short rifle. My Lord the moment he drew nearer to us he immediately ordered his men to fire and they started shooting our people down.” This allegation was capable of being proved if the committee had offered Alhassan the opportunity. In any case, this incident could not have occurred in the presence of Yahaya.
The cause of this apparently unprovoked conduct on the part of Alhassan as told by the Tampion Lana was not given and unless he was drunk or out of his senses this can hardly be accepted without question. Alhassan’s conduct, if true, can only be explained in the language of what is contained in the official report and what Yahaya claimed to have heard which appears to be a more probable story than the Tampion Lana and Mahamadu Yakubu would want it appear as an unprovoked attack. If that explanation is accepted then the question is, who provoked the shooting? And whether it was in connection with the installation? Obviously the supporters of the respondent’s father who were then occupying the palace, and they are the same people who are
[p.216] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 seeking to benefit by using the shooting and killings to nullify the installation of the appellant. The question to answer here is, was the shooting in connection with the installation or was it in connection with resistance shown by those occupying the palace who refused the forces personnel entry to search for weapons and attacked them? These two rival stories were not judicially resolved by the committee.
The official report on the shooting has its own story to tell. Nobody in this proceedings testified that contrary to what the official report stated the shooting was in connection with the installation. No proper evidence was taken by the committee on this aspect of the case that would have enabled it to arrive at a more acceptable judicial finding. The one-sided evidence obtained from the respondent’s witnesses without hearing the other side to the dispute here (i.e. the police and the army) against whom the blame had been laid, is improper and this cannot form a safe base for making a sound judicial decision. Be that as it may, the stark fact remains that of all the functionaries to the installation, only Tugurinam complained. He himself admitted taking his customary fee after the ceremony. Kuga-Na took part of the meat that was provided. Tugurinam was at the palace to bring out the Ya-Na as custom demands. On this aspect of the ceremony this is what he said:
“It is actually the custom—in the case of Na Andani III it was the custom which enabled me to go and perform my function and led him out, but in the case of Mahamadu it was force of arms which led me to go and perform my function. My lord it is true that custom demands that I lead the Ya-Na out and in fact I did so in the case of Andani III. But now in the case of Mahamadu Abudulai I was forced to go into Katindum and I came out the following day with him.”
If one carefully analyses the above evidence one cannot otherwise but conclude that Tugurinam had already taken an uncustomary stand against the appellant. His evidence that Andani was customarily selected is false not only because those who were entitled under the custom did not select him but also those persons he claimed selected Andani did not, in fact, select him and could not have selected him. The evidence shows that no functionary of the enskinment ceremony has the right to refuse to perform his function if the candidate chosen was customarily selected. I have found in my judgment that the appellant was customarily selected by the body entitled to do so, it was therefore incompetent and uncustomary for the Tugurinam to have refused to perform his part. If therefore it is his case that he would not have
[p.217] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 performed his part because the appellant was not so customarily selected then he must be told that his stand was wrong.
Since he had no customary right to refuse to perform his part, he must be deemed to have done so along with all the other functionaries who performed their part. Knowing his stand in this proceedings, his failure to perform alone if proved or accepted must not be held to invalidate the whole installation of the appellant. His stand in this regard is uncustomary. This apart, I think the way the committee resolved this issue was wrong for if it had inquired into all the evidence required on this issue and had considered the fact that he willingly accepted his customary fee, it was likely the committee would have rejected his evidence that he performed his part because of force of arms. One may ask, for what did he accept the customary fee? The obvious answer is, for what he customarily did on the installation day in the Katindum. The acceptance of the customary fee is evidence of his customary performance. His testimony about the use of force of arms was an afterthought: see also exhibit 22, appendix F, para. 7 at 204 of the report. No other functionary to the enskinment testified to support the finding of the committee. Apart from Tugurinam who were the other functionaries the committee was referring to?
To conclude, the appellant upon the evidence: (a) was eligible to contest for the Nam; and (b) was selected by the body entitled under customary law to select a Ya-Na and was properly installed as Ya-Na. The correct custom and customary procedure for the selection and enskinment of a Ya-Na as ascertained were followed and the committee was wrong in declaring his selection and enskinment null and void. His appeal must therefore succeed.
Following the government’s acceptance of the findings made by the Ollennu Committee the government on 5 November 1974 issued N.R.C.D. 299 to implement these findings. N.R.C.D. 299 deskinned the appellant and deprived him of all rights, duties and privileges of a Ya-Na. In fact, the Decree made it an offence if the appellant in any manner asserted any claims to be Ya-Na. It also enskinned the respondent who is described in the Decree as Ya-Na Yakubu II, Paramount Chief of Dagbon.
It has taken the appellant almost eleven years to justify his claim to the Nam. He must have undergone great deal of mental stress during the interim and having found in my judgment that the committee’s findings are wrong, it is my view that by section 2 of P.N.D.C.L. 86 the provisions of N.R.C.D. 299 shall as from today cease to have effect in relation to the appellant. It is my further hope that the National House of Chiefs will take the necessary steps at the earliest convenient time to regularise the situation by restoring the appellant’s name. I have found [p.218] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 the appellant to have been unlawfully deprived of his rightful position as Na Abudulai IV, Paramount Chief of Dagbon.
JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.
I have read the judgment of my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. and agree that the appeal be allowed. I wish, however, to add a few words of my own in particular reference to the body charged with the responsibility of selecting a candidate for the Nam of Yendi, i.e. the selection committee of the Dagomba State Council. In my view, the success or otherwise of the appellant’s appeal is founded on the legality and effectiveness of the selection committee that came into existence in 1948.
My brother Edward Wiredu J.A. has taken pains to refer to the confused state of the evidence presented by the respondent as to the proper persons responsible for the selection of a Ya-Na. This amorphous body of kingmakers who resorted to the uncertain method of soothsaying for the selection of a Ya-Na had at one time gone to the Nayiri of Mamprusi to assist them in the selection of a Ya-Na because of their inability, soothsaying notwithstanding, to do so. How can soothsaying, a very unreliable method, be a channel for the selection of a person to occupy such an important office as the skin of Yendi?
The Dagomba State Council in their wisdom therefore decided to set up in 1948 a selection committee comprising eleven of their members—four elders and seven divisional chiefs—to select a candidate for the Nam of Yendi. In doing so they were exercising their aboriginal powers which they had had for a great number of years.
The Ollennu Committee in their report had this to say in paragraph 213: “. . . the State Council is a creature of statute and the only powers it could exercise are those prescribed in the Ordinance, the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No. 2 of 1932).” It is generally accepted that a body created by statute carries out its functions given to it by the statute but here the state council, as an indigenous institution, was in existence prior to the promulgation of the legislation which by an order of the Chief Commissioner made the Dagomba State Council a native authority under the said Ordinance. Before the Ordinance two of the most important functions of the state council were, “(a) a declaration of war; and (b) changing of a custom or the making of a new one”: see page 27 of the Constitution of the State of Dagbon by Mr. H. A. Blair, Acting District Commissioner, Eastern Dagomba. Incidentally, this man could speak Dagbani for at the 1930 Conference the interpretation of the Acting Chief Commissioner’s address into Dagbani and the Ya-Na’s reply into English was done by this gentleman, Mr. Blair. This power to change the custom of the Dagbon State has been in existence for several years and it was not the creature of any statute. It has been an aboriginal
[p.219] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 power exercised from time immemorial by an indigenous institution such as the Dagomba State Council. There is nothing in the 1932 Ordinance expressly taking away this all-important power of the Dagomba State Council, nor impliedly giving this power to another authority to exercise it. I have examined Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 and do not find anything in it to show that this power of changing the custom of the State of Dagomba is no more exercisable by the council—Ya-Na and his councillors. The Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 was made for the good order and welfare of the inhabitants of each native authority.
Let us look at the functions of a native authority as set out in the said Ordinance. For instance, a native authority has a duty to maintain order (section 4); power to employ persons to assist in carrying out its duties (section 5); power of a native authority to prevent crime and to arrest offenders (section 6); power of a native authority to compel the attendance of natives before the native court (section 7); power of a native authority to issue orders for certain administrative purposes, such as restricting the manufacture of native intoxicating liquors, prohibiting or restricting the holding of drinking bars, prohibiting the cultivation of poisonous or noxious plants, prohibiting the pollution of water in any strewn, and such similar purposes (section 8); again a native authority was given power to do certain acts in time of famine in its area (section 9). Section 10 of the Ordinance deals with the promulgation of orders under sections 8 and 9. Power to administrative officers to require native authorities to issue orders (section 11); power of a commissioner to direct cancellation of any order made by a native authority (section 12). Section 13 deals with penalties for offences by natives and section 14 prescribes penalties for conspiring against a native authority; whilst section 15 deals with penalties imposed on native authorities for non-performance of their duties. Power of the chief commissioner to make rules for the better carrying into effect of the objects and purposes of the Ordinance (section 16), and section 17 gives power to native authorities to make rules generally providing for the peace, good order and welfare of the natives of the area they operate, and the last section—section 18—deals with the preservation of the jurisdiction of native courts concerned in the issue of orders and rules. These are the purposes for which the Native Authority (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1932 (No. 2 of 1932), was enacted. There is nothing in the Ordinance taking away the aboriginal power of the Dagomba State Council to make or change its customs. If the Dagomba State Council was constituted a native authority for the Dagomba Area then it was so constituted to carry out the duties set out in the Ordinance and the state council still exists to exercise its inherent aboriginal jurisdiction in constitutional matters, such as making or
[p.220] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 changing the customs in its area. Thus, in short, Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 left untouched the inherent aboriginal jurisdiction of the chief and his council and I find support for this view from the observations of Griffith C.J. in Mutchi v. Annan (1907) Red. 211 at 216, where the learned Chief Justice said:
“The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance merely regulates those of the Courts to which it applies; it does not abolish and re-establish them, but, taking them as they stand with their customary constitution and customary procedure, it merely cuts down some of the unlimited civil jurisdiction which they possessed. . .”
(The emphasis is mine.) But this case is in a much stronger position as the Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 never cut down nor disturbed any part of the jurisdiction of the Dagomba State Council in constitutional matters.
In my view therefore, the Dagomba State Council in 1948 had the inherent aboriginal jurisdiction to appoint, by a resolution, a selection committee charged with the responsibility of selecting a person for the skin of Yendi when it becomes vacant.
The position of the Dagomba State Council changed a little as a result of the enactment of the State Council (Northern Territories) Ordinance, 1952 (No. 5 of 1952). That Ordinance, in fact, confirmed the aboriginal power of the state council to modify any customary law in force in the area of its authority. The only change that has occurred is that such modification of the customary law must be submitted to the Governor (now the government) who may by order approve of it if satisfied. But prior to 1952 no such approval was required, and the Ordinance No. 2 of 1932 did not cut down the aboriginal powers or change the character of the Dagomba State Council as an indigenous institution.
It is my view that the Dagomba State Council has all the commendation for introducing a resolution in 1948 to appoint a selection committee out of its traditional members for the selection of a candidate for the Nam of Yendi. I say so because the appointment of the selection committee did away with the amorphous body that had, prior to 1948, been selecting a candidate for the skin of Yendi with the aid of the uncertain and primitive method of soothsaying. In my view, it was an enlightened step that the Dagomba State Council took in 1948 for the appointment of the selection committee.
Be that as it may, of the reasons given, the appointment of the selection committee in 1948 was validly made by the Dagomba State Council and it was within their competence and inherent jurisdiction. From that day to the present that body—the selection committee—is the only competent authority within Dagbon to select a candidate from those eligible for installation as a Ya-Na.
[p.221] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
I now come to consider Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 in view of the pronouncement of the Ollennu Committee in relation to an amendment to the 1948 resolution. An amendment to the 1948 resolution was passed in 1953 and the committee held that to be null and void because it did not comply with the provisions of section 13. First, the Dagomba State Council had power under section 12 (2) of Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 to make modifications to the customary law then in force. But such a modification of the customary law would require the approval of the Governor. It does appear that no such approval was given and in the circumstances what happened at the 1953 meeting could not stand as was held by the Ollennu Committee. If on the other hand the modifications made in the 1953 meeting to the 1948 resolution were of a constitutional nature then the approval of the Governor was not necessary and the Ollennu Committee rightly held this view in paragraph 33 of their report.
However, if the decisions in the 1953 meeting are held to be invalid in view of section 13 of the Ordinance No. 5 of 1952 then the validity of the 1948 resolution that set up the selection committee is not in doubt whatsoever because it would not be affected by the 1953 decisions. It is still valid and of full force as I have already indicated in this judgment.
Nonetheless, the appellant who was a Gbon Lana was appointed by the selection committee. As Gbon Lana he had a right to apply to be considered for the skin of Yendi. The custom in Yendi is that all sons of Ya-Nas can aspire to the Nam and the Gbon Lana is always the eldest son of the immediate deceased Ya-Na. This being so he has an inalienable right to apply to be considered if he chooses to contest. The statement that the Gbon Lana has a “faint hope” of ever becoming a Ya-Na does not commend itself to me. Mr. Kaleen, a retired education officer, also stated that “the Gbon Lana (regent) may also apply to contest for the paramountcy. This by custom is an act of formality.” How can his application to contest for the Nam be a formality when he is the son of the immediate deceased Ya-Na and as the Gbon Lana he acts as president of the council? In any event, as a son of a Ya-Na, the Gbon Lana’s eligibility to aspire to the Nam is unimpeachable.
Be that as it may, with the full force of the 1948 resolution, the selection committee in 1948 selected Mahama III for the Yendi skin (see exhibit XX4, 226 at 230, para. 9). Again in 1954 the selection committee selected Abudulai III who at the time was Gbon Lana. At the said selection committee’s meeting Kuga-Na and Tugurinam being members of the selection committee were present and voted for Mion Lana Andani (see exhibit D) but he lost to Abudulai, and Gbon Lana was selected for the Yendi skin. Despite their active participation in the selection committee for the selection of a candidate for the skin of Yendi, these two elders of the council were, at the Ollennu Committee
[p.222] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 of Inquiry, trying to deny the existence of the selection committee. The Ollennu Committee of Inquiry considered them to be witnesses of truth because they said it was not the selection committee that selects candidates for the Nam of Yendi but some other body. Their credibility, in my view, was in serious doubt and no reliance should have been placed on their evidence.
Indeed, in 1961 the Dagomba State Council made it abundantly clear that “the Gbon Lana (reigning regent) of a deceased Ya-Na” is eligible to contest with others for the Nam. At that meeting also a reference was made to the selection committee as being the only authority capable of selecting a candidate for the Nam. The council was merely re-affirming the constitutional provisions that have been in force in the Dagomba Traditional Area since 1948. It is interesting to observe that at the meeting at which these matters were discussed and reaffirmed, Kuga-Na, Karaga-Na and Mion Lana Andani were present and all gave their approval by attesting their signatures or marks to the document in question (see exhibit ZZ at 204-206). This Mion Lana Andani was appointed Mion-Lana by Na Abudulai III who before his selection and enskinment was Gbon-Lana. This Mion Lana Andani was the father of the present respondent. Perhaps I should add that according to Dagomba custom if Gbon Lana is not selected for the Nam, he automatically occupies the gate skin made vacant by the occupant’s selection as Ya-Na.
It can be seen at this stage therefore that when the selection committee came into existence in 1948 it had performed its duty satisfactorily and systematically by selecting three Ya-Nas, namely Ya-Na Mahama III who reigned from 1948 to 1953, and Ya-Na Abudulai III who sat on the Yendi skin from 1954 to 1967. Then again in 1968 Mahamadu Abudulai, the appellant herein, then a Gbon Lana, was selected by the selection committee for the Nam and enskinned customarily. In so far as the enskinment ceremony of the appellant is concerned, my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. has so ably dealt with it that any attempt by me to say anything in support will be a mere surplusage. In fact, the Ollennu Committee found that Mahamadu Abudulai, the appellant, was selected by the selection committee but denied that the committee had power to make the selection. I have demonstrated in this judgment the falsity of the reasoning of the Ollennu Committee in refusing to accord legality to the selection committee appointed in 1948 by the Dagomba State Council, an indigenous institution.
In view of what I have stated previously as regards the competence of the Dagomba State Council, an indigenous institution, to appoint the selection committee in 1948, the Ollennu Committee’s finding in
[p.223] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 paragraph 148 of their report that, “The Dagomba State Council was appointed by a Native Authority under section 3 of the Ordinance (Ordinance No. 2 of 1932). The Dagomba State Council therefore is a body created by statute; it is not an indigenous institution”, is in my judgment a wrong judicial statement. In my opinion, it was in 1952 that the Dagomba State Council was clothed with a statutory garb and given certain powers additional to those exercisable by them prior to 1952.
Finally, in my judgment, having regard to the evidence, oral and documentary, the only reasonable conclusion deducible is that the selection by the selection committee and the subsequent enskinment of the appellant as Abudulai IV were valid and were in conformity with the constitution and customs of the Dagombas.
I wish to make it abundantly clear that the selection of Na Andani III was not made by the selection committee but by a body identifying themselves as kingmakers, and his selection as well as the subsequent enskinment was declared invalid by the Mate Kole Committee of Inquiry which had been appointed to investigate the matter before the Ollennu Committee of Inquiry. I share the views of the Mate Kole Committee on this issue. It is interesting to note that Mion-Lana Andani whom the so-called kingmakers selected in 1968 was among the signatories to the document of 30 May 1961, reaffirming the competence of the selection committee to select a candidate for the Yendi skin.
The Mate Kole Committee found that Na Andani III had not been constitutionally selected and enskinned because his selection was not made by the selection committee. I also hold the same view on the evidence before us. The government of the day accepted the findings of the Mate Kole Committee and the logical inference from those findings of the Mate Kole Committee as well as my own was that Na Andani III was never a Ya-Na and therefore his son, the so-called Na Yakubu II, the respondent herein, could not have been selected and enskinned as Ya-Na of Yendi since his father according to the constitution of Dagbon was never a Ya-Na. It is a well-known custom in the Dagomba Traditional Area that only sons of Ya-Nas can aspire to the Nam of Yendi. In the circumstances, the selection of the appellant having been validly made by the selection committee and the ceremony of enskinment or installation having been carried out in accordance with custom, Na Abudulai IV became the acknowledged Ya-Na of the Dagomba people from 1969 to the present day and continues to be Ya- Na until he dies, for destoolment or deskinment is unknown in Dagbon custom.
[p.224] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189
In the result, the appeal succeeds and the findings by the Ollennu Committee nullifying the selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai, the appellant herein, are hereby set aside with costs.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I have had the opportunity of reading beforehand the learned judgment just read by my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. and I agree with the reasons and the conclusions. I would, however, like to add a footnote in respect of two aspects of the case.
First, the evidence on record as to who were entitled by Dagbon custom to make valid nomination or selection of a candidate for the Yendi skin was very unsatisfactory. The evidence proffered by the respondent left a lot to be desired. Kpati-Na, for example, who was supposed to be one of the selectors according to the respondent, completely dissociated himself from the body of selectors. He denied having joined Gomli, Kuga-Na and Tugurinam in the selection of a Ya-Na. He was consistent in his denial, if one recalls the fact that he had maintained this stand at an earlier inquiry, i.e. Nene Azu Mate Kole Committee of Inquiry.
Again, the conflicts in the testimony of the other witnesses who testified on this issue and also the conflicts in the documentary evidence tendered at the inquiry were such that it is very difficult to appreciate how the committee came to its finding in paragraph 254 of the report. In my view, looking at the evidence as a whole, it was wrong for the committee to hold as it did in the said paragraph that it had conclusively been proved that by custom of Dagomba the body which alone can make valid selection of a new candidate for enskinment as Ya-Na is constituted by Kuga-Na, Tugurinam, Kpati-Na and Gomli.”
The next aspect is the installation of Mion Lana Andani as Andani III. It ought to be borne in mind that the respondent claimed his right to the Nam through Andani III; and it follows that if Andani II was found not to have been customarily and constitutionally selected as Ya-Na and that his installation was therefore of no consequence, then the respondent would not even be in a position to claim the right to be considered for the Nam.
The accepted Dagbon custom is that on the death of the occupant of the Yendi skin his eldest son is made or installed regent with the title of Gbon Lana; and one of the functions of the regent is to perform the funeral of his late father—the late Ya-Na, and it is only after that that a new Ya-Na can be selected.
However, the evidence (both oral and documentary) that was adduced before the committee clearly indicated that three days after the death of Na Abudulai III when his funeral had not yet been performed Mion Lana (Na Andani III) was selected as Ya-Na. The selection was
[p.225] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 189 in flagrant disregard of Dagbon custom and in my opinion that alone was sufficient to nullify his installation as Ya-Na; and the respondent could not therefore make a valid claim to the Nam when the person through whom he claimed that right was legally and constitutionally not a Ya-Na.
The committee also held that there had been two ruling houses or families in Dagbon, namely Abudulai house and Andani house. With due respect to the committee, the overwhelming evidence adduced on both sides did not support this conclusion. The evidence rather made it abundantly clear that the eligibility or the right to be selected as Ya-Na did not depend on the claimant belonging to any particular house or family. It depended, first and foremost, on the claimant being a son of a previous Ya-Na. Furthermore, there was nothing in the evidence to support the committee’s finding that succession to the Yendi skin had been by a system of rotation between the so-called two ruling houses or families. If the committee was right in making that finding, then how can that finding be reconciled with another finding of the committee in paragraph 290 of the report which stated that “the occupants of the three gates, namely, Karaga, Mion and Savelugu are the only persons eligible by the customary law and constitution of Dagomba to be selected to the Yendi Skin.” In my opinion, the committee greatly erred when it held that two ruling houses or families occupy the Yendi skin in rotation. As already stated, the persons entitled or eligible to be selected as Ya-Na, on the admissible evidence before the committee and in accordance with the custom and the constitution of Dagbon, are Karaga Na, Mion Lana, Savelugu Na and Gbon Lana.
The fact that paragraph 3 (c) of the committee’s terms of reference made mention of the “competing claims of Andani and Abudulai families to the Yendi Skin” could not be taken as an established fact that in Dagbon succession to the Yendi skin alternates between such families. In the circumstances, since no system of rotation as regards succession to the Yendi skin has ever existed in Dagbon custom or constitution, the recommendation of the committee in paragraph 574 had no justifiable basis and should not be countenanced.
I do not intend to discuss all the other aspects of the case as they have been fully and ably dealt with in the main judgment read by my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. and as I said earlier on, I am also in favour that the appeal ought to be allowed with costs.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Findings of the Ollennu Committee of Inquiry set aside.
D.R.K.S.
