IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II vs. ABUDULAI [1984-86] 2 GLR 231
16 July 1986 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 12 min read
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATIONS by the applicant for stay of execution appeal and by the respondent for an injunction restraining the applicant from exercising his rights and powers as Ya-Na pending an appeal by the applicant from the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 29 October 1985. The facts are sufficiently set out in the nature of the court delivered by Adade J.S.C.
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COUNSEL
Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter Adjetey) (with him I. Mahama) for the applicant.
E. O. Appiah (with him W. A. N. Adumua-Bossman) for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
Adade J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. Civil motion No. 9/85 is an application by Na Yakubu II, the appellant herein, for an order that execution of the judgment of the Court of Appeal (see In re Yendi Skin Affairs; Abudulai v. Yakubu II [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 189, C.A.) be stayed pending appeal. It is brought under rule 20 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13). Civil Motion No. 13/86 is an application by Mahamadu Abudulai, the respondent in the appeal, asking this court to restrain, by injunction, Na Yakubu II, the appellant:
“from putting himself forward as Ya-Na in any name whatsoever and in particular that the said Na Yakubu II shall:
(1) forthwith vacate from, and cease to reside at, the Ya-Na’s palace at Yendi;
(2) refrain from appointing and/or installing any chief or Gbon Lana in Dagbon; and (3) not make any assurance whatsoever and howsoever of any land in Dagbon vested in the Ya-Na.”
As can be seen, the two motions are inextricably intertwined: Motion No. 9/85 is asking that the enforcement of the orders of the Court of Appeal be suspended while No. 13/86 is, contrariwise, requesting that the said orders be substantially enforced against the appellant, by restraining him from exercising and enjoying some important chiefly powers and privileges inherent in his office as Ya-Na. In the event the two motions were taken together and argued together. In this ruling, in order to avoid confusion, unless otherwise indicated, Na Yakubu II will be referred to throughout as the applicant, and Mahamadu Abudulai as the respondent, notwithstanding the particular application being commented upon.
From about 1974 up to the commencement of proceedings in the Court of Appeal in July 1984, Na Yakubu II was and had been the acknowledged chief of Yendi. The Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299) promulgated on 5 November 1974 had given recognition to his status, and had made it an offence for anyone, including specifically Mahamadu Abudulai, the respondent herein, from disputing his status.
In July 1984 pursuant to leave granted by the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C.L. 86), to “any person aggrieved by the findings of the [Ollennu Committee of Inquiry into the Yendi Skin
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Affairs]” the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in its judgment: In re Yendi Skin Affairs; Abudulai v. Yakubu II (supra) made certain findings which it incorporated into “orders” as follows:
(i) The proper authority to select a candidate for enskinment as Ya-Na for the Yendi skin is the selection committee.
(ii) The selection of the appellant by the selection committee in 1968 was valid.
(iii) The selection of Na Andani III by a group of persons styling themselves as kingmakers was unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
(iv) It follows from (iii) above that Na Andani III never became a Ya-Na in accordance with the custom of Dagbon.
(v) It follows again that the respondent herein, the so-called Na Yakubu II, could not have been selected to become a Ya-Na since his father never in law became a Ya-Na. This is so because the accepted custom in Dagbon is that only sons of Ya-Na can become a Ya-Na. In any case, the respondent’s selection was not made by the selection committee.
(vi) Mahamadu Abudulai, the appellant, was selected by the selection committee and properly enskined as Abudulai IV.
(vii) The findings of the Ollennu Committee nullifying the selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai, the appellant herein, are hereby set aside.
(viii) The findings of the Ollennu Committee of Inquiry which were given due effect by the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299) of 5 November 1974 are hereby set aside and the provisions of the said N.R.C.D. 299 which sought to deskin the appellant shall as from today cease to have effect in relation to him as Ya-Na under section 2 of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Law, 1984 (P.N.D.C.L. 86).
The effect of these orders is plain enough: to strip Na Yakubu II of his status as Ya-Na: see orders (iv), (v) and (viii) above; and to declare Mahamadu Abudulai as the Ya-Na: see orders (ii), (vi), (vii) and (viii) above.
Na Yakubu II has appealed against the whole of the decision of the Court of Appeal. The appeal is due to be heard in October 1986. In November 1985, barely one month after the judgment, he made the instant application for a stay of execution. Somehow, for reasons apparently unconnected with either party, the motion was not being heard. Believing that the delay was prejudicing his interests Mahamadu Abudulai on the 17 June 1986 filed his application for injunction already referred to.
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Arguing the application for a stay, Mr. Adjetey, counsel for the applicant, drew the court’s attention to the principles which normally should guide a court in considering such applications. In particular, he stressed his chances of success in the appeal, and invited the court not to disturb the situation as it existed immediately before the judgment of the Court of Appeal and which situation continues to exist up to date. On Mahamadu’s application for injunction, Mr. Adjetey argued that as the appeal was set down for hearing in October, barely three months away, it is neither convenient nor expedient to ask his client to vacate the palace, only to be restored thereto in October or November if he wins the appeal. He says his client has been the Ya-Na since 1974 exercising all the rights, powers and privileges attendant on and relating to that office, including, but not limited to, residence and physical presence in the palace; the sale and disposal of Lands; and the appointment and installation of chiefs. His actions have not prejudiced the State of Dagomba in any way; if anything, they have been beneficial to it and its peoples. He does not think that exercising these powers and rights for a further three months, up to October 1986, will make any difference to the fortunes of the respondent or his supporters. He says that on considerations of hardship and convenience, the balance clearly tips in favour of his client; therefore the application for stay should be granted, and that for injunction refused.
Given the assurance that the appeal is likely to be heard in October (or November 1986, on the outside) Mr. Appiah, counsel for Mahamadu Abudulai, is prepared to compromise on his request that Na Yakubu II be ejected from the palace. We take this compromise to imply that Mr. Appiah is withdrawing his application insofar as it affects the occupancy of the palace. We shall therefore make no pronouncement on that aspect of the matter, beyond reserving to Mahamadu Abudulai liberty to repeat his application on a future date (but not before 30 October 1986) if so advised and circumstances so dictate. But Mr. Appiah presses that the said Na Yakubu II must be restrained from disposing of skin lands, appointing and installing chiefs and behaving in every respect as a Ya-Na, as though the judgment of 29 October 1985 never exists and has never existed.
In presenting their cases, both counsel committed a lot of time and energy to the merits of the substantive appeal, each trying to persuade the court that his case is iron-cast and impregnable, whilst that of his opponent is irremediably weak and wobbly. As we are not dealing with the appeal itself we refuse to comment on its merits. These will be taken care of in due season.
As to the applications themselves, it is relevant to observe that these courts have consistently operated on the principle that where two
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parties are litigating, every care must be taken to ensure that the party who eventually wins does not find his judgment useless in his hands. Hence, at first instance, there are rules for interim preservation of the subject of litigation, and for injunctions to prevent waste. At the same time the courts try to hold the balance evenly between the parties so that one does not take undue advantage of the other during the course of the litigation. These principles are applied, subject to the balance of convenience in a particular situation and to the hardship which the making or the refusal of an order may have on one or other of the parties.
The same considerations apply when appeals are pending. The ideal situation will be to have the appeal heard quickly and disposed of so that one party, be he the appellant or the respondent as the case may be, does not have much opportunity to turn a delay into an advantage. Where, however, an appeal has to delay from one cause or another, either party is entitled, by applying to the court, to seek such interim remedies as will protect his interests if he should eventually win the appeal.
In this case the present Ya-Na, Yakubu II, asks for a complete suspension of the operation of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, enabling him, until the final determination of the appeal in this court, to carry on as before—exercising all his powers as Ya-Na. His application, if successful, will have the effect of preventing Mahamadu Abudulai, the party in the Court of Appeal, from moving into the palace and assuming his role as the new Ya-Na, a position which the said judgment entitles him to. Na Yakubu would have achieved this without any sacrifice on his part, even though he lost in the Court of Appeal.
Opposing the application, and arguing his own application for injunction, Mr Appiah, counsel for Mahamadu Abudulai, says that if a stay is to be granted and if Yakubu is to continue to occupy the palace, in at least two areas the Ya-Na must be stopped meanwhile from exercising his powers. These areas are: (a) the making and unmaking of chiefs; and (b) the sale and disposal of Dagomba lands. On (a) Mahamadu Abudulai swears in paragraph 12 of his affidavit filed on 17 June 1986 that “since the [judgment of the Court of Appeal in October 1985] the appellant [Na Yakubu II] has installed Gbon-Lana for Yelzori, Sunson, Sang, Sampiano and Gburimani.” Mr. Adjetey has not sought to deny this, even from the Bar, nor has he tried to explain why these installations had to take place—five installations within the space of barely eight months (November 1985—June 1986). In the absence of any explanation from him, we have only Mahamadu’s explanation to go by, viz that they are being done “provocatively” (see
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paragraph 14 of his affidavit), a conduct which he says “can easily cause breaches of the peace.”
We understand from the arguments of Mr. Appiah that the making and unmaking of chiefs (at least certain chiefs, such as those of the categories recited in paragraph 12 of his affidavit) are matters within the prerogative of a Ya-Na; these powers inhere in the office of Ya-Na. Mahamadu Abudulai therefore fears that unless some embargo is placed on the making of chiefs, he may, if he should win the appeal, find himself saddled with chiefs he may not approve of. We are of the opinion that his fears are well-founded. Given the fact that the appeal stands a good chance of being heard in October 1986, we do not think that anyone (Na Yakubu II or candidates for installation) will suffer any hardship if installations are held in abeyance for a few months. Accordingly, we will restrain Na Yakubu from exercising any powers whatsoever in respect of installations or deskinment of chiefs in the Dagomba Area.
Mahamadu Abudulai also says that all Dagomba lands are by custom vested in the Ya-Na, who may make assurances thereof, as he deems fit: see paragraph 10 of Mahamadu’s affidavit already referred to; and that, “13 Since the [judgment of the Court of Appeal] the appellant has been making assurances of Dagomba lands.” Here again there has been no attempt by Na Yakubu to deny the alleged transfers of lands, or to explain why and to whom they have been made. Apart from these transactions being a source of irritation and annoyance to Mahamadu Abudulai, we cannot but appreciate his apprehensions too that unless some steps are taken, he may find, if he should win the appeal, that as far as skin lands are concerned, his judgment will turn out to be an empty judgment; all the useful lands may have already been disposed of by his predecessor. In these circumstances, a court has a duty to preserve the property, pending the appeal. Prospective tenants cannot be damnified by this. If anything, the measure will protect them from being lured into avoidable risks. And neither party can claim to suffer any hardship if disposal of lands by sale, lease, gift or otherwise is suspended.
In paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the application for stay filed on 14 November 1985, the applicant says that, “Great and irreparable hardship will be caused to the appellant” if execution is not stayed. This claim is not further explained in the affidavit, nor was it expanded on in argument by counsel. In relation to lands specifically, the court is not told what hardship the applicant will suffer if transactions in lands are suspended. On the other hand, if the appellant should win the appeal the lands, thus protected, will be available to him to deal with. For our part, we think it prudent that all transactions in lands should be suspended,
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(a) to preserve the land for both parties; and
(b) to forestall a spate of land litigations should Yakubu II lose the appeal, and Mahamadu, the successful party, be inclined to eject the tenants put on the lands by Na Yakubu, or otherwise to interfere with their holdings.
Accordingly, we consider that the ends of justice will be served if Na Yakubu II is restrained from making any assurances of Dagomba lands, pending the final determination of the appeal.
In the result, we grant the application for stay, but subject to the following terms: viz that as long as the appeal pends and remains undecided, Na Yakubu II, his agents, privies or any persons claiming to act for or under his instructions:
(a) will not install, sanction the installation, or otherwise in any manner exercise any powers or rights in relation to the making or unmaking of any description of chiefs in the Dagomba Area; and
(b) will not dispose of Dagomba lands or any lands or property under the jurisdiction of the office of Ya-Na, or otherwise transact any business affecting such lands or properties either by sale, lease, gift or in any manner whatsoever.
As the two motions, No. 9/85 and No. 13/86, have been dealt with together, it is unnecessary to make a separate pronouncement in respect of No. 13/86.
The respondent, Mahamadu Abudulai, will have the costs of these applications, which we fix at ¢10,000.
DECISION Application granted subject to terms. L.K.A.
