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[1986] SLR (HC) 16High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

SERWAH vs. SEFA [1984-86] 2 GLR 390

7 July 1986 · AMMAH J · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 16
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OSCOLASERWAH v SEFA [1984-86] 2 GLR 390 [1986] SLR (HC) 16
APASERWAH v SEFA [1984-86] 2 GLR 390, [1986] SLR (HC) 16 (Ghana).
BluebookSERWAH v SEFA [1984-86] 2 GLR 390, [1986] SLR (HC) 16 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for damages for slander. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Barimah for the plaintiff.

Debrah for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMMAH J.

The plaintiff by her writ of summons is claiming ¢200,000 damages against the defendant for slander. The writ of summons is accompanied by a statement of claim elaborating her claim.

[p.391] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 390

The defendant is a son of the landlord of the plaintiff. It would appear that the defendant was at the material time not living in the house where the plaintiff was a tenant, but some of his relatives were living there with the plaintiff upstairs; the defendant was however visiting the house.

The plaintiff’s case is that on 18 March 1985 at about 6.30 am she was giving her child tea when the defendant knocked at her door. She opened the door and came out. The defendant who was at the entrance asked her what nonsense she had said the previous day to his niece, Ama Dankwa. He then abused her as a bad woman with a bad character as that of her late father who stole and died after D.D.T. had been administered to him. The defendant continued to abuse her as a prostitute and that the child she claimed or claims to be that of Lawyer Senkyiri was or is not his. The plaintiff maintains the child is for Lawyer Senkyiri by customary marriage. According to the plaintiff the defendant went further to say that her family members were of bad character hence people were unwilling to marry from her family. The plaintiff gave the impression that the incident attracted many people to the house at the time. She denied having locked the defendant’s niece in her room where a warrant officer then present had said the house would be turned into people’s house. She admitted that Ama Dankwa, Hayford Kissi and Daniel Owusu lived with her upstairs in the house but denied that they accompanied the defendant when he came to knock at her door. This incident happened at the upper part of the house which the plaintiff was occupying with other relatives of the defendant, that is to say Ama Dankwa, Hayford Kissi and Daniel Owusu. Felix Addo Bamfo (who at the material time was living with a tenant downstairs) said he came out and stood near his verandah. He confirmed that the defendant abused the plaintiff as stated.

The impression given by the plaintiff was that she never replied to any abuse showered on her by the defendant. She felt her reputation had suffered and being aggrieved initiated this summons after the defendant had failed to apologise to her.

The defence case was that on 17 March 1985 the plaintiff had sent her maidservant one Cecilia Baidoo with ¢20 being rent to Ama Dankwa who in turn should give it to the defendant. Ama Dankwa refused to accept the money because she had been instructed by the defendant not to. There is evidence which shows that the defendant was not satisfied with the amount of rent and was taking steps to eject the tenants from the house. When the money was returned to the plaintiff she asked her maidservant to call Ama Dankwa for her. The latter went to see the plaintiff who was then with an army warrant officer in her

[p.392] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 390

room. According to Ama Dankwa the plaintiff locked her room. She explained to the plaintiff why she had refused to accept the ¢20. Thereupon the warrant officer asked her about the rents being paid in respect of the house but she told him she did not know. During the discussion in the plaintiff’s room the army warrant officer mentioned he would take action to turn the house into a people’s house. Later Ama Dankwa left the plaintiff’s room and reported what had happened first to her husband, Hayford Kissi, and later to the defendant.

When the defendant got this report he came to the plaintiff ‘s house on 18 March 1985 at about 6 am. He called on Ama Dankwa, and then went to knock at the door of the plaintiff followed by Ama Dankwa, Hayford Kissi and I. D. Owusu. The defendant appeared annoyed. He confronted the plaintiff to know the whereabouts of the army warrant officer who had said the previous day that he would turn the house into a people’s house so that he should take such action.

The defendant denied that he abused the plaintiff as she stated in her evidence and alleged in paragraph (3) of her statement of claim. His denial on this aspect of the case was supported by his three witnesses who claimed they were present at the time. The defendant said he rather abused the army warrant officer who was then absent for what he was alleged to have said. The defendant admitted at one stage that he told the plaintiff she was a fool. There is evidence by some of the witnesses for the defendant that the latter abused the plaintiff as a crazy and mad person but the substance of their evidence was that there was an exchange of abuses between the parties.

I would here like to advert to certain aspects of this case with regard to a pleading point. In paragraph (4) of the statement of defence the defendant averred as follows:

“In further answer to paragraph (3), the defendant says that on 18 March 1985 he went to enquire from the plaintiff how it came about that the plaintiff called the defendant’s niece to a room in which there was a warrant officer, unknown to the defendant’s niece, locked the room and after which the said warrant officer threatened the defendant’s niece, inter alia, to turn the house into a people’s house, should the defendant eject the tenants out of the house.”

During the course of the trial attempts were made by the defence to give evidence that the plaintiff also rained abuses on the defendant during the exchanges. But counsel for the plaintiff raised an objection to that on the ground that it had not been pleaded in defence. I upheld his objection. In my view if the defendant’s case was that the plaintiff also abused him that was a material fact which should have been

[p.393] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 390

pleaded in the statement of defence. I ruled during the trial that such evidence on the part of the defence not averred in the pleadings be expunged.

It is significant to note that counsel for the defendant in spite of such objection did not apply to the court at any stage to amend the statement of defence. If that had been done it surely would have been considered on its merits but nothing of that sort was done and I think the defendant should be bound by his pleadings.

After the incident the defendant was led down by two of his witnesses. But it is not clear from the evidence of Hayford Kissi and D. Owusu whether the latter talked to Felix A. Bamfo downstairs.

In this case the parties are Ghanaians and I understand from Kwahu. In my view it is customary law as distinct from English common law which should govern this case. John Mensah Sarbah in his Fanti Customary Laws (3rd ed.) at p. 113 has defined slander as follows:

“Words which cause or produce any injury to the reputation of another are called defamatory, and, if false, are actionable . . . Words imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all words which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they are spoken, are actionable.”

Slander therefore as known and recognised by customary law is actionable per se without the English requirement of proof of actual or legally presumed pecuniary damages.

On the facts of this case, I believe that what Ama Dankwa said happened on 17 March 1985 because that could be the possible reason why the defendant went to the plaintiff’s house on the following day. I therefore disbelieve the plaintiff when she denied that aspect of the case. I also believe that on 18 March 1985 the defendant’s witnesses followed him to the door of the plaintiff ‘s room and were present when the incident happened. I have rather found it difficult to accept the special words of abuse which the plaintiff said were uttered by the defendant. The words appeared exaggerated and coloured because those present denied that such words were uttered. I also take the evidence of Felix Bamfo with a pinch of salt; he was not close enough to convince me that he actually heard what happened.

Be that as it may, I am satisfied from the evidence of the defendant himself and his witnesses that he abused the plaintiff as a “fool, a mad and crazy woman.” Such words in my view establish slander under customary law as they sound to the disreputation of the plaintiff. It has not been shown that what was said of her is true. I therefore find it false.

[p.394] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 390 On the evidence and the pleading point I have referred to, I think the plaintiff should be entitled to judgment.

I would award the plaintiff ¢5,000 damages for slander with ¢3,000 costs.

DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

M.C.N.-N.

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