JADBRANSKA SLOBODNA PLOVIDRA, SPLIT vs. OYSA LTD. [1979] GLR 129
26 April 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 15 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Empress Engineering Co., Re (1880) 16 Ch.D. 125; 43 L.T. 742; 29 W.R. 342, C.A.
(2) Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co., Re (1886) 33 Ch.D. 16; 54 L.T. 777; 2 T.L.R. 636, C.A.
(3) Sottomayer v. De Barros (1879) 5 P.D. 94; 49 L.J.P. 1; 41 L.T. 281; 27 W.R. 917.
(4) Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P 46; 77 L.J. P. 34; 97 L.T. 827; 24 T.L.R. 94, C.A.
(5) Baindail v. Bandail [1946] P. 122; 115 L.J.P. 65; 174 L.T. 320; 62 T.L.R. 623; 90 S.J. 151, C.A. (6) McFeetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd. 1913 S.C. 773; 50 Sc.L.R. 505; 1913 1 S.L.T. 325. (7) Charron v. Montreal Trust Co. (1958) 15 D.L.R. (2d.) 240.
(8) Bondholders Securities Corporation v. Manville (1933) 4 D.L.R. 699; 3 W.W. R. 1. (9) Kent v. Salmon [1910) T.P.D. 637.
(10) Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A.C. 202; 10 T.L.R. 479; 58 J.P. 540; 71 L.T. 1; 6 R.
188, H.L.
(11) Spurrier v. La Cloche [1902] A.C. 446; 71 L.J.P.C. 101; 86 L.T.631; 18 T.L.R. 606; 51 W.R. 1, P.C.
(12) Johannesburg Hotel Co., Re; Ex parte Zoutpansberg Prospecting Co. (1891) 1 Ch. 119; 60 L.J.Ch.
391; 64 L.T. 61; 39 W.R. 260; 2 Meg. 409, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order under the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38), ss. 29 and 37 (1) for leave to enforce an arbitration award made in London under the English Arbitration Act, 1950, against the respondents. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
E.K. Akyea Djamson (with him Elizabeth Adu (Miss)) for the claimants.
Carl E. Quist for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
The claimants are a company registered under the laws of Yugoslavia. The respondents are a limited liability company registered under the laws of Ghana. On 29 August 1976 the claimants, as owners, and the respondents, as charterers, entered into a time-charterparty under which the claimants let and the respondents hired the claimants’ vessel M.V. Matija Gubec for one West African round voyage of about 45 to 55 days without guarantee. The agreement was signed in Hamburg on behalf of the owners by their agents and on behalf of the charterers by brokers on the authority of their European representative, Horst Tessendorf. It is in the English language and in the form approved by the Baltic and International Maritime Conference. Clause (23) of the charterparty provided for arbitration in London in case of dispute.
A dispute did in fact arise following the repudiation of the charterparty by the respondents. It seems that after the repudiation of the charter party one. Captain Tanko Gomulin, manager of the claimants, came to this country and had discussions with the respondents. Following this visit, the respondents’ managing director, Emmanuel Bulley Larmie, wrote a letter to the claimants asking them to submit a statement of account an indicating that the respondents would settle what was due in Ghana currency through the claimants’ local agents, Scanship (Ghana) Ltd. In view of the construction which is now sought to be placed on this letter, I reproduce it infull hereunder:
“OYSA LIMITED P.O. Box 7997, Accra.
28 January 1976 24666 Tel 24501 Your Ref……….
Our Ref. SH 2/6/76.
The Manager, Jadbranska Slobodna Plovidba, Split, Yugoslavia.
ATTN. CAPT. TANKO GOMULIN.
Dear Captain Gomulin, STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT You will recall that during your short visit to Ghana you indicated to me that on your return home you would furnish us with statement of account.
We are anxious to ascertain the extent of our indebtedness to your firm following the withdrawal of your ship the M.V. Matija Gubec which was then on charter to us. As agreed, we shall settle
[p.132] of [1979] GLR 129 is due in local currency through your agents, Scanship (Ghana) Ltd.
Yours faithfully For: OYSA LIMITED (Sgd.) E. B. Larmie.
Managing Director.
cc: Mr. Tilimann, Ahlmann Transport KG B-2000 Hamburg II, West Germany.
The Manager, Scanship (Ghana) Ltd., P.O. Box 1703, Accra.”
It does not appear that the claimants honoured their part of the agreement alleged to have been reached between their Captain Gomulin and the respondents’ managing director. At any rate, it had not been stated anywhere in the papers before me that a statement of account was ever submitted by the claimants to the respondents. What has been alleged and proved is that one Alexander George Bischoff of 23 College Hill, London, E.C. 4, who claimed to have been appointed sole arbitrator under s. 7 (b) of the English Arbitration Act, 1950 (14 Geo. 6, c. 27), has made an award in favour of the claimants. The said section 7 (b) under which he purported to act is in the following terms:
“7. (b) if, on such a reference, one party fails to appoint an arbitrator, either originally, or by way of substitution as aforesaid, for seven clear days after the other party, having appointed his arbitrator, has served the party making default with notice to make the appointment, the party who has appointed an arbitrator may appoint that arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator in the reference and his, award shall be binding on both parties as if he had been appointed by consent.”
At the alleged arbitration the owners claimed (a) damages for repudiation of the charterparty, cost of bunkers and disbursements for charterers’ account totalling U.S. $70,728.76, and (b) additional hire for a period in excess of 60 days on time-charter amounting to U.S. $9,473.09. The hearing took place in London on 14 May 1976. The case for the owners was conducted by counsel, attended by a solicitor and a witness. The charterers were not represented. At the conclusion of the hearing the arbitrator found that claim (a) of the owners succeeded in full, but he dismissed claim (b).
The owners have now applied by summons for an order under sections 29 and 37 (1) of the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38), for leave to enforce the award in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect.
[p.133] of [1979] GLR 129
Attached to the summons are a copy of the award and also a copy of the charterparty pursuant to which the award was made.
It is provided by section 36 (1) of the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38), that among the foreign awards which may be enforced under section 37 (1) are awards made in any state declared by the President by legislative instrument to be a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or any other state to which the section is by legislative instrument applied by the President on the basis of reciprocity. There is however a saving clause, section 41, in respect of awards enforceable in Ghana before the coming into force of Act 38. Counsel are agreed that section 41 applies to make an English arbitration award enforceable in Ghana.
The respondents however contend that at the time the charterparty was signed the company was not in existence, and they have attached photostat copies of the certificate of incorporation and the certificate to commence business issued on 31 October 1975 and 4 November 1975, respectively. They have also exhibited the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors held on 14 November 1975. It would appear from these minutes that Tessendorf, who was appointed chairman, was authorised to negotiate for loans or overdrafts or both for the company. There is no mention of any intention to charter a ship. Although at that meeting a managing director with “overall responsibility for the operation of the company in Africa” was appointed, no appointment appears to have been made of a “European representative.” Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that Tessendorf was the linch-pin of the new company, for while the managing director’s salary was fixed at ¢12,000 per annum, Tessendorf, as chairman of the board of directors, was allowed the princely sum of D.M. 20,000 per month.
There seems to be little doubt that at the time the charterparty was signed arrangements for the formation of the company were well advanced, and no difficulties would have arisen if Tessendorf had retained his links with it. It however appears that these links have been broken and the respondents now say that they are not liable, first because Tessendorf had no authority to bind the company and, secondly, because the company being non-existent at the time the agreement was signed are not bound by it. The respondents also alleged that Tessendorf collected the freight in foreign currency and has not accounted to the company for it. According to counsel, in view of the clause providing for arbitration in London the law of England applies and the case is governed by such English cases as In re Empress Engineering Co. (1880) 16 Ch.D. 125, C.A. and In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co. (1886) 33 Ch.D. 16, C.A. In the former case, a pre-incorporation contract provided for the payment of solicitors’ fees. The memorandum of association adopted this agreement, and the directors subsequently ratified it. An order having been made for the winding-up of the company the solicitors claimed to prove for the fees amounting to 60 guineas. In affirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor dismissing the claim, Jessel M.R. said at p. 128:
[p.134] of [1979] GLR 129
“I must say that I do not see how it was possible for the Vice-Chancellor to have decided otherwise than he did. The contract between the promoters and the so-called agent for the company of course was not a contract binding upon the company, for the company had then no existence, nor could it become binding on the company by ratification, because it has been decided, and, as it appears to me, well decided, that there cannot in law be an effectual ratification of a contract which could not have been made binding on the ratifier at the time it was made, because the ratifier was not then in existence. It does not follow from that that acts may not be done by the company after its formation which make a new contract to the same effect as the old one, but that stands on a different principle. I am of opinion, therefore, that there was no contract binding the company to pay this £63 to Messrs. Jones & Pride.”
In the latter case, an attempt was made to prove for damages against a company in the course of winding-up for their breach of a pre-incorporation agreement which its articles had adopted. In his judgment Lopes L.J. said at pp. 21-22:
“The question is whether there was a contract between Wallis and the company. There no doubt was an agreement between a man called Nunneley, who was agent for Wallis, and a man named Doyle, who described himself as trustee for the company. But at that time the company was not incorporated, and therefore it is perfectly clear that the agreement was inoperative as against the company. It is also equally clear that the company, after it came into existence, could not ratify that contract, because the company was not in existence at the time the contract was made. No doubt the company, after it came into existence, might have entered into a new contract upon the same terms as the agreement of the 24th of July, 1882.”
Counsel for the claimants does not appear to dispute that if the law which is applicable is English law then the award made in favour of the claimants is unenforceable. It is however his contention that the law applicable is Ghana law since this is a question of the capacity of the respondents to enter into the charterparty. According to counsel, the respondents subsequently ratified the charterparty and under our law this can be done under section 13 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179).
The rules of private international law applicable in Ghana were saved by section 49 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). Although the matter is not free from doubt the consensus of legal opinion is that a person’s capacity to enter into a contract is governed by the system of law with which the contract is most closely connected: see Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), rule 130 at p. 744. The question arises most often in cases of marriage where the law of several countries imposes disqualifications unknown to the law of several other counties. The attitude of the courts in England is that where two persons domiciled in different countries marry under English law their capacity to do so is to
[p.135] of [1979] GLR 129
be determined, not by the law of their domicile, but by English law. Such, for example, was the situation in Sottomayer v. De Barros (1879) 5 P.D. 94; Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P. 46, C.A. and Baindail v. Baindail [1946] P. 122, C.A. In Sottomayer v. De Batrros (supra) the petitioner, a Portuguese lady domiciled in England, married the respondent, a Portuguese gentleman domiciled in England. They were first cousins and by the law of Portugal could not lawfully marry without a dispensation from the Pope. The marriage took place in England. On a petition for a declaration that the marriage was null and void it was held that the marriage was lawful. In Ogden v. Ogden (supra) the question was whether a marriage contracted in England between an English woman domiciled in England and a French man domiciled in France was valid although the marriage had, on the petition of the French man’s father, been dissolved by a French court on the ground that the consent of the parents, as was required by French law, had not been obtained. It was held that the marriage was valid and that a later marriage entered into by the English woman with an English man domiciled in England was bigamous and must be annulled. In Baindail v. Baindail (supra) the respondent who had an Indian wife, whom he had married according to Hindu rites, went through a ceremony of marriage in England with an English woman. It was held that although the law of India permitted polygamous marriages, English law did not and the subsequent English marriage was therefore nul land void.
There seems to be a dearth of authority on the matter in other kinds of contract, but reference may be made to the following cases: McFeetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd. 1913 S.C. 773; Charron v. Montreal Trust Co. (1958) 15 D.L.R. (2d.) 240; Bondholders Securities Corporation v. Manville (1933) 4 D.L.R. 699 and Kent v. Salmon [1910] T.P.D. 637. In McFeetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd. (supra) the plaintiff, who was domiciled In Ireland, was employed as a labourer in Scotland. Having been injured in an accident in the course of his employment, he agreed to accept compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts. Subsequently, he brought an action in Scotland claiming damages at common law and alleged that as an infant under Irish law he was not bound by the agreement. It was held that the plaintiff’s capacity was determined, not by Irish, but by Scottish law. In Charron v. Montreal Trust Co. (supra) a married couple, who were domiciled in Quebec, entered into a separation and maintenance agreement in Ontario in a form appropriate to Ontario law. The agreement was valid under Ontario law, but under the law of Quebec the parties lacked capacity to make it. It was held that the validity of the agreement was governed by the law of Ontario as the proper law of the contract. In Bondholders Securities Corporation v. Manville (supra) a married woman domiciled in Saskatchewan entered into an agreement in Florida for the purchase of land in Florida and signed promissory notes for the purchase price. It was held that the wife’s capacity to make the notes was governed by the law of Florida and not by the law of Saskatchewan. In Kent v. Salinon (supra) a married woman domiciled in England agreed to buy goods in the Transvaal. As the law of England then stood she had no capacity to enter into the contract although she had under the law of the Transvaal. it was held that the contract was valid.
In this case the claimants, a Yugoslavia firm, and the respondents, a Ghanaian firm, entered through German agents into a charterparty in an internationally recognised form in Hamburg under which they agreed that any disputes arising between them with regard to the charterparty are to be referred to arbitrators in London. It seems to me that in those circumstances the charterparty has the closest connection , not with the law of Yugoslavia, or Ghana, or the Federal Republic of Germany, but with the law of England: see Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A.C. 202, H.L.; Spurrier v. La Cloche [1902] A.C. 446, P.C. I think that it is safe to say that an English court would not enforce the charter party if in the eye of the law of England the respondents had no capacity to enter into it and have not since then done any act which in the view of the law of England makes the agreement binding on them.
Although this disposes of the application, I think I should add that even if the law applicable, were Ghana law I would have held that there has been no ratification and therefore the charterparty is unenforceable against the respondents. The evidence offered by the claimants to show that the respondents ratified the charterparty entered into on their behalf on 29 August 1975, is the Itetel dated 28 January 1976. It seems to me that although section 13 was enacted to obviate the hardship and inconvenience which sometimes arises by a strict application of the English rules, the burden which lies on a claimant to prove ratification is a very heavy one. The case of In re Johannesburg Hotel Co.; Ex parte Zoutpansberg Prospecting Co. [1891] 1 Ch.119, C.A. may be referred to. In that case, before the existence of the hotel company, two persons named Tyler and Phelps executed a written contract which, upon the formation of the company, was adopted and confirmed by the two gentlemen who really were the only active persons in either company, but in the name of all the persons who signed the memorandum of association. The question was whether the identity of the two gentlemen in question was sufficient to establish the contractual assent of the prospecting company. In a judgment in which Bowen L.J. concurred, Lord Halsbury L.C. said at p. 128:
“It may be (indeed, it certainly is so) that the companies were but nominees—puppets—only intended to move as their manufacturers intended they should move, and had they by resolution passed under such circumstances as to bind the company for which they were then of pressing to act, I do not deny that the abstraction would be bound by formal acts, however unreal might be the separate identity of each company.
But persons who engage in such transactions must at least make their puppets move in a legal manner. The knowledge of and intention of the individual persons is nothing to the purpose. It is the abstraction, the ideal legal personage, which is sought to be bound. Its whole nature is artificial, and it can only be bound by such acts as it, in its abstract form, consents to be bound by.”
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It seems to me that it is necessary that there be a clear and unequivocal act on the part of the company if ratification is to be inferred. Such an act may be a resolution of the company in general meeting adopting the contract, or a resolution to the same effect passed by a meeting of the board of directors and confirmed by the company in general meeting. I do not think that a letter signed by the managing director would be sufficient unless there is evidence that he was communicating a decision to ratify taken by the company in general meeting or by the board of directors which has been confirmed by the company in general meeting.
In this case it has not been suggested that the respondents have either at a meeting of the board of directors or in general meeting agreed to ratify the charterparty entered into on their behalf on 29 August 1975. The letter signed by the respondents, managing director merely called for a statement of account, and although it is reasonable to infer that the account related to the charterparty, the letter did not bind the company to pay whatever sum the claimants alleged to be due. No doubt, it would have been open to the respondents to admit or falsify. The conclusion I have come to, then, is that even if Ghana law applies it has not been shown that after coming into existence the respondents ratified the charterparty Ahlman-Transport KG entered into on their behalf on the authority of Tessendorf. The award which is based on the charterparty is therefore unenforceable as against the respondents. The application is accordingly dismissed with ¢500 costs.
DECISION Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
