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[1978] SLR (HC) 45High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

SOWAH vs. BANK FOR HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION AND TETE [1979] GLR 144

26 April 1978 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 45
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OSCOLASOWAH v BANK FOR HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION AND TETE [1979] GLR 144 [1978] SLR (HC) 45
APASOWAH v BANK FOR HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION AND TETE [1979] GLR 144, [1978] SLR (HC) 45 (Ghana).
BluebookSOWAH v BANK FOR HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION AND TETE [1979] GLR 144, [1978] SLR (HC) 45 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Milner v. Field (1850) 5 Exch. 829; 20 L.J.Exch. 68; 155 E.R. 363.

(2) Eaglesham v. McMaster [1920] 2 K.B. 169; 89 L.J.K.B. 805; 123 L.T. 198; 84 J.P. 146.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by a contractor for moneys due under a building contract financed by the first defendant-bank on behalf of the second defendant. The facts are set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

J. N. Okine for the plaintiff.

S. N. D. Atiegar for the first defendant.

Von Fleischer for the second defendant.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The plaintiff, Conrad Odoi Sowah, is the proprietor of a firm of building contractors and surveyors known as C. O. Sowah & Co. On 8 November 1974, the firm entered into a contract with Nai Tete, the second defendant, for the construction of a single storey house on his land at Labadi, Accra, at a cost of ¢12,400. The contract was tendered in evidence as exhibit B. Under it, the construction of the building was divided into six stages. Upon completion of the first stage Tete was to pay

[p.146] of [1979] GLR 144 the plaintiff ¢1,800; upon completion of the second stage, ¢2,800; upon completion of the third stage, ¢2,800; upon completion of the fourth stage, ¢3,000; upon completion of the fifth stage, ¢1,000; and upon completion of the sixth and last stage, ¢1,000. By clause 1 (b) the issue of a certificate of habitation by the Accra City Council was to be conclusive evidence that the building had been completed. The agreement was signed by Tete on his own behalf, and by the plaintiff on behalf of his firm. Although the Bank for Housing and Construction, the first defendant herein, is not a party to the agreement it is mentioned therein as the agent of Tete and it is provided that the various sums payable under the contract shall be paid by Tete or the bank.

It goes without saying that the bank not being a party to exhibit B is not bound by it, and no action could have been brought against it for non-payment of any sums alleged to be due under the contract. I take it that both parties were aware of this elementary fact but that references were made to the bank because of the expectation the parties had that all or part of the sums due under the contract would come from the bank. It is in this light that I view the subsequent agreement entered into between the plaintiff’s firm and the defendants on 3 May 1975. That agreement was tendered in evidence as exhibit D. Under it, it was recited that Tete had asked for a loan to finance the construction of a building on his land at Labadi and that the bank had agreed to grant him the loan subject to certain conditions. The agreement then goes on to state that the contractor had agreed to erect at “his own proper costs and charges” the building whose plans and specifications had been agreed upon. The contract sum was ¢16,575, of which ¢1,800 was to be paid upon the signing of the contract, and the balance in accordance with clause 13 (ii) which reads:

“After the bank shall have certified that work to the value of the said sum of one thousand eight hundred cedis (¢1,800) shall have been done by the contractor the contractor may at the end of each calendar month until final completion of the works submit to the client a claim for payment and upon the client confirming to the bank that the claim is fair and reasonable and requesting the bank to pay the same, the bank, after inspecting the works and satisfying itself that the claim is fair and reasonable and that the work is in accordance with the contract drawings and specifications, shall with the written consent of the client, issue a certificate stating the amount due to the contractor from the client and pay to the contractor the amount stated in such certificate within fourteen days from the issue of that certificate.”

Clause 10 of the agreement took account of the possibility of variations being agreed upon, thereby increasing or reducing the contract sum. The said clause10 provides:

“If the client with the written approval of the bank shall require any deviation from the contract drawings and specifications or any additional or other work to be done the contractor shall carry out the work according to such requirement and do the additional or other

[p.147] of [1979] GLR 144 work in a substantial and workmanlike manner within the time prescribed by and to the satisfaction of the client and the bank who shall estimate the value of the same or in the absence of such estimate at a fair and reasonable value and the bank at the written request of the client, shall on the final completion of the work pay to the contractor the amount of such valuation. If the client shall not require part of the work contained in the specification to be done the contractor will make such deduction from the price mentioned in clause 13 hereof as the bank shall certify in writing to be fair and reasonable.”

My understanding of clause 13 (ii) is that the obligation of the bank to pay moneys to the plaintiff or his firm arose only after the bank had issued its certificate. The bank did not bind itself to lend Tete money to pay the plaintiff regardless of the view the bank took of the work done by the plaintiff’s firm, or merely because Tete had expressed himself as being satisfied with it. With regard to clause 10, I am also of the view that unless the bank gave its prior written approval to variations or subsequently ratified them they would not be bound by such variations to lend to Tete more than the contract sum.

With these preliminary views, let us look at the situation which subsequently arose, and which has led to the present litigation. The undisputed evidence is that the bank paid a total of ¢11,036 to the plaintiff’s firm under the contract exhibit D, leaving a balance of ¢5,539. The first payment was of ¢1,800; the second ¢6,138; and the third ¢3,098. In each case, the payment was made after the bank had issued its certificate. It seems that at the time the third certificate was issued the plaintiff was claiming to have done work in excess of ¢11,036, for on that very day the bank wrote a letter to the plaintiff calling upon him to carry out certain outstanding works as a condition for the issue of the final certificate. That letter was tendered in evidence by the plaintiff and is marked exhibit C. The works the plaintiff was called upon to execute comprised the following:

“(a) (i) Internal decoration of property with emulsion paint.

(ii) External painting of property with snowcem.

(iii) Paint all wooden structures with oil paint.

(b) Construct new fence 75’ x 88’ within the existing one.

(c) Filling of yard with laterite, grading and famming.

(d) Make good all cracks in the house.

(e) Replace all doors patched with timber at top and bottom.”

The letter is dated 9 February 1976. In his evidence the plaintiff claimed that he completed the building in accordance with the specifications and drawings as far back as September 1975, when the Accra City Council issued their certificate of habitation. There is a dispute as to whether the certificate is still extant. However, evidence which Tete attempted to lead to prove that it was not, was, upon objection being taken by the plaintiff, rejected as being inadmissible. But even if exhibit B had been the document governing the obligations of the parties I would not in spite of clause 1 (b) of that agreement, have felt myself bound to hold that the certificate of

[p.148] of [1979] GLR 144 habitation was conclusive that the contract had been completed on the part of the plaintiff, as in his amended statement of claim paragraph 8 (c) the plaintiff avers that the certificate has been withdrawn. However, in my view, exhibit D supercedes exhibit B and is what determines whether or not the bank is bound to pay the plaintiff although it has declined to issue its final certificate.

The law on the matter will be found in two cases, one of which was decided as long ago as 1850. The first is Milner v. Field (1850) 5 Exch. 829. In that case, a building contract contained a proviso that no instalment should be paid unless the plaintiff delivered to the defendant a certificate signed by the surveyor of the defendant that the works had been done according to the specifications. In an action to recover an instalment under the contract it was held that the want of a certificate was a good defence to the action. In the second case, Eaglesham v. McMaster [1920] 2 K.B. 169, where a building contract provided that “the certificate of the architect is a condition precedent to the contractor’s right of action against the employer,” the Earl of Reading C.J. said at p. 175:

“It is not the Court which says that the plaintiff shall not come before it except upon production of a certificate; the parties themselves have so agreed. The object of the clauses is to leave these matters to a person who has expert knowledge of building work and has the confidence of both parties, and the plaintiff was content to enter into the contract upon that footing.”

It seems to me that the plaintiff has failed to understand the position of the bank as financier. The bank like any other lending institution, wants to make sure it can recover its money in case of default by the borrower. The only way to ensure this is to insist that no payments are made unless the security therefor is sufficient. In this case, unless payments are made strictly according to the value of the work done by the plaintiff the bank may be unable to recover the loan advanced to Tete in the event of his defaulting on the agreed instalments. Hence the insistence of the bank that the plaintiff carry out the works listed in exhibit C before it issues its certificate entitling the plaintiff to be paid out of the loan approved by it for Tete. In paragraphs (3) and (6) of the amended statement of claim the plaintiff admitted that the works are within the contract, exhibit D, and when under cross-examination by counsel for the bank he also admitted that he has not carried out the works. I therefore find that the refusal of the bank to issue its certificate is fully justified. Exhibit B on which the plaintiff appears to be relying does not bind the bank to pay him anything. I therefore hold that under exhibit D the bank is not bound to pay any money to the plaintiff unless it is satisfied that work to that value has been carried out and it has issued its certificate.

The plaintiff’s claim is not for the balance due under exhibit D, but for the larger sum of ¢22,753. Out of this amount ¢11,717 is said to be due under exhibit B as allegedly varied by Tete and ¢12,173 for other works alleged to have been requested by the defendants and for which variation orders ought to be issued. The plaintiff claims in addition the

[p.149] of [1979] GLR 144 wages of two watchmen at the rate of ¢150 per month from 1 October 1975 to 30 June 1977 and thereafter ¢250 per month up to the date of judgment. He also claims damages for breach of contract.

In exhibit B the contract sum was ¢12,400. It contained no provision for variation. If, therefore, Tete varied exhibit B one would have expected to find that a fresh contract would be entered into in respect of the extra works. Apart from exhibit D no such contract has been produced. Further since the plaintiff cannot deny that he received ¢11,036 from the bank on Tete’s account, the balance as per exhibit B would be ¢1,364. But, as I have said, exhibit B was superceded by exhibit D under which the balance due to the plaintiff, upon completion of the work to the satisfaction of the bank is ¢,5539. For the bank to be liable for any variation it must be proved that it gave its written consent as laid down by clause 10 of exhibit D. This it certainly has not done, and it is one of the plaintiff’s complaints that the bank has declined to issue variation orders to cover variation in the contract. What the plaintiff calls variations are in fact part and parcel of the contract exhibit D.

Although on the pleadings Tete denied having authorised the plaintiff to make any variation, in his evidence he said in answer to questions from counsel for the bank that after signing exhibit D he did in fact authorise variations to the value of ¢4,200. This evidence was challenged by counsel for the plaintiff who put it to Tete that the variations concerned accounted for the difference between the contract price of ¢12,400 in exhibit B and the contract price of ¢16,575 in exhibit D; in other words, that they were taken into account when preparing exhibit D. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that Tete requested the plaintiff to make any variation from the original contract other than such as are reflected in exhibit D.

In the result, I dismiss the plaintiff’s action with ¢500 costs in favour of each of the defendants.

It now remains to consider the second defendant’s counterclaim. This is for the sum of ¢2,365 being materials supplied by the second defendant to the plaintiff, and for which the plaintiff agreed to pay. The averments with regard to this and the particulars of the materials will be found in paragraphs (10) and (11) of the defence filed on behalf of the second defendant. These paragraphs were admitted by the plaintiff in paragraph (9) of the reply. That concludes the matter. I find that the claim is admitted and accordingly I enter judgment for the defendant Tete on his counterclaim for ¢2,365 with ¢250 costs.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

Judgment for second defendant on his counterclaim.

D. R. K. S.

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