REPUBLIC vs. CAPE COAST DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II; EX PARTE AMOO [1979] GLR 150
1 May 1978 · ANIN JA · ≈ 26 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lawes v. Hutchinson (1835) 3 Dowl. 506; 1 Cr.M. & R. 766; 5 Tyr. 236: 4 L.J.Ex. 59; 149 E.R.
1289.
(2) Kemp v. Balne (1844) 1 Dow. & L. 885; 13 L.J.Q.B. 149; 8 J.P. 506; 8 Jur. 619; sub nom. Ex parte Balne 2 L.T. (O.S.) 354.
(3) R. v. Worthington-Evans (Judge Sir Shirley); Ex parte Madan [1959] 2 Q.B. 145; [1959] 2 W.L.R.
908; [1959] 2 All E.R. 457; 103 S.J. 473, D.C.
(4) R. v. Hurst (Judge Sir Donald); Ex parte Smith; R v. Oxford Electoral Registration Officer; Ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 961; [1960] 2 All E.R. 385; 104 S.J. 468; 58 L.G.R. 348, D.C.
(5) R v. Lewes Justices; Ex, parte Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Gaming Board for Gt. Britain [1972] 1 Q.B. 232; [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1466; [1971] 2 All E.R.
1126; sub nom. R v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Home Secretary 115 S.J. 306, D.C.
(6) R v. West Sussex Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Johnson (Albert and Maud) Trust Ltd. [1973] 1 Q.B.
188; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 725; [1972] 3 All E.R. 468; 116 S.J. 633; 71 L.G.R. 169, D.C.
(7) R v. Leeds Crown Court; Ex parte Bradford Chief Constable [1975] Q.B. 314; [1974] 3 W.L.R.
715; 118 S.J. 849; sub. nom. R v. Crown Court at Leeds; Ex parte City of Bradford Chief Constable [1975] 1 All E.R. 133, D.C.
(8) R. v. Akiwumi and Bannerman; Ex parte Dako (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 372.
(9) Republic v. Keta District Magistrate; Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459.
(10) Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a ruling by Edward Wiredu J. reported in [1976] 1 G.L.R. 116 quashing by certiorari the judgment of a magistrate grade II. The facts are set out in the judgments of Anin J.A. and Apaloo C.J.
COUNSEL
E. S. Aidoo for the appellants. de Graft Aidoo for the respondent.
[p.152] of [1979] GLR 150
JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.
This is an appeal from the decision of Edward Wiredu J. sitting in the Cape Coast High Court dated 10 November 1975 in a certiorari application. In his ruling, reported at [1976] 1 G.L.R. 116, he held at p. 122 that the District Court grade I, Cape Coast, presided over by Mr. F. A. B. Haizel, a lay magistrate, then acting as grade I magistrate was “incompetent to have heard and disposed of” a suit instituted by the respondent herein against the University of Cape Coast in the district court grade I for the sum of ¢650 being acting or responsibility allowance or both. The learned judge accordingly granted the certiorari application and quashed the proceedings and judgment dated 29 May 1975 of the inferior court.
The salient facts in support of the certiorari application, as can be gleaned from the respondent’s affidavit dated 4 June 1975, were that the respondent retired from the employment of the University of Cape Coast; and subsequently issued a writ against the University in the Cape Coast District Court Grade I for ¢650 being his acting or responsibility allowance or both. During the pendency of the case, the substantive district magistrate grade I went on leave. In purported exercise of the power conferred on him to appoint certain categories of judicial officers, the Chief Justice appointed Mr. F. A. B. Haizel, the district magistrate grade II, Cape Coast, a layman, as acting district magistrate grade I, Cape Coast. Mr. Haizel proceeded to hear the case. However, while the case was part-heard before him, the substantive grade I magistrate, Cape Coast, resumed duties; and this fact was brought to the notice of Mr. Haizel by the respondent’s solicitor. Nevertheless he heard the case to a conclusion and delivered a judgment on the merits. It was this judgment which was sought in these certiorari proceedings to be quashed on the stated ground that they are “a nullity since the district magistrate grade II of Cape Coast had no capacity and jurisdiction to sit over the said suit.”
Whether or not a district magistrate grade II has jurisdiction to hear a suit for the recovery of the liquidated sum of ¢650 is primarily dependent on the relevant provisions of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), and any other enactment for the time being in force: (see Act 372, s. 40 (1)) defining the civil jurisdiction of district courts (grades I and II). Unfortunately, in the trial court the pleadings and arguments of learned counsel as well as the ruling of the learned judge missed this basic jurisdictional point; and instead focused attention on less important or stimulating issues like the extent and scope of the Chief Justice’s powers in the appointment of an acting district magistrate grade I; the qualifications needed for such appointment; and the competency of a lay magistrate to sit in a district court (grade I) as acting grade I magistrate; and the power of the High Court to quash by certiorari the judgment of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction.
The principal enactment defining and delimiting the jurisdiction of the district courts (grades I and II) is the Courts Act, 1971. Section 33 empowers the Chief Justice by means of a legislative instrument to divide Ghana into districts with such limits as may be specified therein.
[p.153] of [1979] GLR 150
For each such district, provision is made in section 34 for the creation of district courts (grade I or grade II) to which the Chief Justice shall assign district magistrates appointed under article 120 of the Constitution, 1969. He is also empowered to nominate any judge of the Superior Court of Judicature or a circuit judge to sit as a district magistrate (grade I or II) for any district.
In the first place, the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a district court have been defined by section 35 of Act 372, which provides that each district court shall exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Courts Act and other existing enactments only in respect of causes and matters arising within its district, subject of course to any other statutory provision to the contrary. In the second place, the limits of the civil jurisdiction of the district courts (grade I) have been defined in section 37 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372); while those for the district courts (grade II) are contained in section 38. The civil jurisdiction is conferred by each section on the court (grade I or II) itself.
For the purpose of the present appeal, it is perhaps only necessary to refer to section 37 (1) (a) and section 38 (1) of Act 372, which define and delimit the jurisdiction of district courts grade I and II, respectively, in personal civil actions arising under contract or tort or for the recovery of any liquidated sum. For these classes of personal civil actions the upper jurisdictional limit is fixed at a maximum of ¢2,000 for district courts grade I; and at ¢1,000 for the grade II district court. Furthermore, it is provided by section 37 (3) that:
“(3) Where in any action, cause or matter the amount claimed or the value of any land or property exceeds the amount or value specified in subsection (1) [of section 37] the [District Court Grade I] shall, notwithstanding that subsection, proceed to hear the case if the parties agree that it should do so.”
Similar provision is made for the district court grade II by section 38 (2), thereby enabling that court also to hear personal suits in excess of the stipulated maximum of ¢1,000 provided the parties agree that it should do so. In the present case, the parties certainly were not in agreement about the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. However the amount claimed, being ¢650, was well within the jurisdictional competence of even the district court grade II and the claim preferred against that august legal persona, the University of Cape Coast, arose within the area of jurisdiction of the Cape Coast District Courts Grade I and Grade II.
In my opinion, the question raised in the certiorari application of alleged want of jurisdiction in the district court grade II to entertain the suit fell to be resolved in the first instance by reference to the above provisions of the Courts Act, 1971, and other enactments conferring jurisdiction on that inferior court. Acting under rule 32 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), which empowers this appellate court to give any judgment and make any order that ought to have been made, I would in
[p.154] of [1979] GLR 150 my part hold that the amount claimed by the respondent herein in the District Courts (Grades I and II) Cape Coast, was well within the jurisdictional limit of both inferior courts by virtue of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), ss. 37 (1) and 38 (1); consequently the application for certiorari based on the alleged grounds of lack of capacity and jurisdiction was misconceived and incompetent.
That in my opinion suffices to dispose of the principal issue in this appeal. However, in deference to both learned counsel for their full and interesting submissions on other grounds of appeal filed, it is only proper that we should turn our attention to other weighty matters raised by them. One such important matter is to be found in the appellant’s second ground of appeal which was argued first, to wit: “the learned judge relied on the wrong statutory provision in considering whether the district magistrate grade II concerned could properly be appointed to sit on the matter in issue.” It was submitted by Mr. Aidoo, counsel for the appellant, that the then Chief Justice was justified in law in appointing Mr. Haizel, a non-lawyer, to act as a district magistrate grade I because by virtue of section 34 of the Courts Act, he is empowered to assign district magistrates appointed under article 120 of the Constitution, 1969, to the district courts (grade I or grade II). Hence, it was argued, the Chief Justice can assign a district magistrate grade II to any district court, either grade I or II, provided that that magistrate has been properly appointed. Mr. Aidoo further relied on section 8 (4) (b) of the Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 10), as inserted by paragraph 3 of the Judicial Service Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 83); and pointed out that the learned trial judge omitted this paragraph (b) from his consideration in his ruling. Had he considered it, it was contended, he would have reached the conclusion that it was not unlawful for the Chief Justice to appoint a lay person like Mr. Haizel to act as a district magistrate grade I.
The relevant statutory provisions are contained in the Judicial Service Act, 1960 (C.A. 10), as amended by paragraph 3 (c) of the Judicial Service Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 83); and they are reproduced in full here:
“(3) No person shall be appointed to a post specified in column 1 of the following Table, unless his standing as a legal practitioner is at least that specified in column II of that Table.
TABLE I II Justice of Appeal .. .. .. .. 12 years Judge of the High Court .. .. .. 8 years Circuit Judge .. .. .. .. .. 5 years Judicial Secretary .. .. .. .. 5 years District Magistrate (Grade I) .. .. .. 3 years District Magistrate (Grade II) .. .. .. 18 months
[p.155] of [1979] GLR 150
(4) The Council on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission may appoint— (a) a legal practitioner, who does not have the standing specified in the aforesaid Table, for an acting appointment to a post specified therein: and (b) a person who is not qualified as a legal practitioner, as a District Magistrate (Grade II) upon a limited engagement.”
In my considered view, the learned judge’s first holding that only a “legal practitioner” as defined by C.A. 10, amended by N.L.C.D. 83, is eligible for an appointment as an acting grade I magistrate is entirely correct. Comparing C.A. 10, s. 8 (3) and (4) (a) is amended by N.L.C.D. 83 on the one hand with section 8 (4) (b) on the other hand, it would be noticed that it is only in the case of a legal practitioner who does not have the requisite standing in terms of the stipulated minimum years of post qualification experience that the designated authority is permitted to appoint “for an acting appointment to a post specified therein” (i.e. to a post named in the Table at the end of s. 8 (3)). While the provisions of section 8 (3) are mandatory or imperative; those of section 8 (4) (a) are permissive and empowering. Therefore, while a legal practitioner of a standing less than the stipulated minimum number of years in column II in the Table cannot be appointed to the corresponding substantive post in column I, it is nevertheless permissible to appoint such a legal practitioner to hold an acting appointment in such a post. No such concession is made in the case of a lay person; for presumably the obvious reason that the Table does not, and was never intended by the lawgivers, to cater for him. It provides exclusively for legal practitioners and the posts to which their standing makes them eligible for appointment. To take the post of a district magistrate (grade I) as an example, it is only a legal practitioner with a minimum standing of three years who can be appointed to the substantive post; however, a legal practitioner of less than three years’ standing may be appointed acting district magistrate grade I. A lay person such as Mr. Haizel in the instant case is not eligible to be appointed as such acting district magistrate grade I. That is presumably why special provision is made for lay persons in the ensuing paragraph (b) of section 8 (4). Though not qualified as legal practitioners, they may be considered for appointment upon a limited engagement as district magistrate (grade II). Their appointments are upon a contractual basis, i.e. “on a limited engagement”—and not on pensionable basis. To extend to these lay persons, holding only limited, contractual posts of district magistrate grade II, acting posts in the higher rungs of the judicial ladder requiring standing as a legal practitioner, would in my respectful view, completely nullify the carefully modulated scheme of appointment of only legal practitioners with stipulated standing to acting and substantive posts set out in the above Table. If I am wrong in my view and on a true interpretation of the above provisions a lay person can indeed be appointed acting district magistrate grade I, then I would ask, what stops such a lay person being appointed acting judge of the High Court or even acting justice of
[p.156] of [1979] GLR 150 appeal? One has only to pursue counsel’s argument to its logical conclusion to realise that the lawgivers could not have contemplated such an absurd result. With respect, I wholly concur with Edward Wiredu J. in his reasoning and conclusion in this aspect of the case; and I would hold that the purported appointment of Mr. Haizel, a lay person, as acting district magistrate grade I was made per incuriam, the relevant provisions of section 8 (3) and Table and section 8 (4) of C.A. 10, as amended by N.L.C.D. 83, para. 3 not having been either considered or else correctly applied.
Furthermore, I find Mr. Aidoo’s argument that the Chief Justice is entitled, acting under section 34 of the Courts Act (Act 372), to assign a lay person like Mr. Haizel to preside over the Cape Coast District Court (Grade I) as acting grade I magistrate, unconvincing and erroneous. Section 34 enacts that:
“34. There shall, in respect of the districts referred to in section 33 of this Act be District Courts designated District Courts (Grade I or Grade II) to which the Chief Justice shall assign District Magistrates appointed under article 120 of the Constitution:
Provided that the Chief Justice, and any Justice of the Superior Court of Judicature or a Circuit Judge nominated by the Chief Justice may sit as a District Magistrate (Grade I or Grade II) for any district.”
In my view, this section has nothing to do with the qualification for the post of acting district magistrate (grade I) generally or with the particular question whether a lay person can lawfully be assigned to preside over a district court (grade I). The section simply empowers the Chief Justice to set up district courts (grade I or II) corresponding with the division by him in a legislative instrument of Ghana into districts with clearly defined areas of jurisdiction; and then describes the category of judicial officers to sit as district magistrates (grade I or grade II) for these districts. Leaving aside the proviso, the main part of the section enables the Chief Justice to assign district magistrates duly appointed under article 120 of the Constitution. That provision clearly evinces a clear intention on the part of the legislature that those to be assigned respectively as district magistrates grade I and II shall have been lawfully appointed under the Constitution and any other enactments for the time being regulating such appointments. In my respectful opinion, it does not authorise the Chief Justice to appoint persons who are not qualified in terms of the relevant statutory provisions to sit as either substantive or acting district magistrates grade I. One therefore has to fall back on the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions already examined above for the answer to the question who qualifies to be appointed to act as a district magistrate (grade I)? Section 34 does not provide the answer.
In another ground of appeal, Mr. Aidoo contended that the learned judge erred in holding that certiorari lies to quash the judgment of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case before him. He relied heavily on a statement in Vol. 11 of Halsbury’s Laws of
[p.157] of [1979] GLR 150
England (3rd ed.), para. 239 at p. 130: “Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction.” This statement owes its origin from a dictum by Parke B. in the old English case of Lawes. v. Hutchinson (1835) 3 Dowl. 506 at p. 508.
“The Act [21 Jac. 1, c. 23] restricts the removal of a case to any time before judgment; after judgment it can only be removed by writ of error. We have no power, therefore, except for the purpose of enforcing execution under the Act, to remove the proceedings after judgment, except by certiorari with a writ of error.”
Another old authority relied upon by Mr. Aidoo was Kemp v. Balne (1844) 1 Dow. & L. 885, where the plaintiff in an inferior court had, it was alleged, issued execution more than a year and a day after judgment, without a scire facias and the defendant was thereupon taken in custody. On a motion for a habeas corpus to discharge the defendant on the ground of the above defect, it was held that the court had no power to grant a certiorari to bring up the record; the general rule being that no certiorari could issue to bring up the record of an inferior court after judgment. It is noteworthy that Williams J. remarked obiter in that case at p. 887, that it was possible that if there was want of jurisdiction in the lower court, certiorari to quash might lie after judgment; since writ of error did not lie upon that ground.
It is unnecessary to quote the other old cases cited by Mr. Aidoo; for notwithstanding the rule of the old English common law as to the non-availability of certiorari to quash judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction, the development of modern English common law undoubtedly permits resort to the High Court for prerogative orders (including the order of certiorari) to quash proceedings and judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and subordinate tribunals for either excess or want of jurisdiction; breaches of the rules of natural justice; error of law on the face of the record: and fraud, perjury or duress in procuring a decision. Learned counsel for the appellants filed many such recent English cases which must be taken to reflect the true position of English common law today. Thus, in R v. Judge Sir Shirley Worthington-Evans; Ex parte Madan [1959] 2 Q.B. 145, D.C., where a certiorari application was made to quash the order of a county court judge (who had set aside previous judgments and all proceedings and had ordered new trials in respect of actions between the parties) on the ground that the judge, not having tried the original actions, had no jurisdiction to make the orders; but the order for certiorari was refused on the grounds that rules 1 and 2 of Order 37 of the County Court Rules, 1936, did not designate the individual judge who tried the case as the only judge with power to order a new trial; and that in the circumstances, the order for a new trial complained of was properly made. The Queen’s Bench, however, stressed that in a proper case the High Court had power by certiorari to bring up and quash the order of a county court judge made without jurisdiction in that behalf,
[p.158] of [1979] GLR 150
In the following, year, the same court quashed by certiorari an order of an inferior tribunal exercising civil jurisdiction in the case of R v. Judge Sir Donald Hurst; Ex parte Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 133, where the applicants complained against registration directions given by a county court to a registration officer, under the Representation of the People Act, 1949 (12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 68), s. 9 (1). In granting the application, Lord Parker C.J. referred to Madan’s case (supra) and held at p. 143, “I am quite satisfied that certiorari will lie against a county court judge if he has acted without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of the County Courts Act, 1959, to which I have referred.” The learned Chief Justice was referring to section 107 which reads in part, “no judgment or order of any judge of county courts, nor any proceedings brought before him or pending in his court, shall be removed by appeal, motion, certiorari or otherwise into any other court whatsoever . . .”
Again, in R v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1466, D.C., the same court presided over by Lord Parker C.J. held that witness summons issued by a magistrate under section 17 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55), could be set aside by order of certiorari. And in R v. West Sussex Quarter Sessions; Ex parte A. & M. Johnson Trust Ltd. [1972] 3 W.L. R. 725, D.C., where the court refused to grant the order in an application alleging that, since the adjudication by quarter sessions in a right of way case, fresh evidence had been discovered that would have altered the decision in the inferior court; it held that in the absence of fraud or forgery, certiorari would not lie to quash the decision merely because fresh evidence had since the hearing been discovered. Lord Widgery C.J. at p. 729 made this important observation:
“The prerogative orders are the great residual jurisdiction whereby this court controls the activities of subordinate tribunals, and it controls them in three main categories: first against excess of jurisdiction; secondly against errors of law on the face of their judgments; and thirdly and perhaps most important, against a denial of natural justice. Within those three heads, this court can and will by certiorari control the errors of lower tribunals, . . .”
Finally in R v. Crown Court at Leeds; Ex parte City of Bradford Chief Constable [1975] 1 All E.R. 133, it was held by the Queen’s Beach, presided over by Lord Widgery C.J. that the power of the High Court under section 10 (5) of the Courts Act, 1971, to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction by means of the prerogative orders in relation to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court was not limited to cases where the Crown Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. The power extended to all circumstances which would normally be appropriate for the use of prerogative orders including cases where there was an error of law on the face of the record.
Turning to the common law of Ghana, there is no doubt that Edward Wiredu J. was wholly right when he held at p. 120 that “the powers of this [High] court to quash proceedings and orders of inferior courts by certiorari is too trite law to admit of any dispute now.” A host of local
[p.159] of [1979] GLR 150 authorities supports his holding, e.g. R v. Akiwumi and Bannerman, Ex parte Dako (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 372, where Smith J. granted certiorari to quash the order of a magistrate’s court for the sale of premises for non-payment of rates on the ground of the failure of the applicant for the magistrate’s order to fulfil statutory conditions precedent to the making of the application, i.e. non-service of the mandatory statutory notice. Held, the order for sale must go as having been made in excess of jurisdiction; and the sale itself was invalid as well as the magistrate’s certificate of purchase. Reference may also be made to the recent case of Republic v. Keta District Magistrate; Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459, where the magistrate ordered that the applicant, a judgment debtor in a previous suit, should pay the balance of the costs in the said suit to the judgment creditors within seven days and in default of payment, the judgment creditors were empowered to imprison the applicant for three months. The magistrate failed to comply with the relevant court rules for the examination of the means of the judgment debtor before committing him to prison; and it was held, per Francois J. (as he then was), that certiorari would lie to quash the magistrate’s order because of his failure to carry out the mandatory duty of examining the debtor’s means prior to the committal order and also because of the breach of natural justice rules.
Finally, in Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227, Abban J. held that under article 114 of the 1969 Constitution, reproduced in section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), the High Court has very wide supervisory powers by the issue of prerogative writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and declaration over all inferior courts or tribunals; and that in any case it is well established at common law that it is only by an exceptionally strongly worded formula that the legislature can effectively deprive the High Court of its supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals.
In view of the above local cases, and article 114 of the Constitution and section 20 of Act 372, 1 have no doubt whatsoever that the High Court is competent to quash by certiorari the judgments and orders of inferior tribunals on the grounds of either want or excess of jurisdiction: breach of the rules of natural justice; error of law on the face of the record; and fraud, perjury or duress in procuring a decision. For that reason, I do not regard the above quotation from Halsbury’s. Vol. 11, para. 239 at p. 130 as an accurate statement of the common law of Ghana; neither do I regard it as still true of the modern English common law in view of the above-cited post-1955 English authorities. The law stated in Halsbury’s, Vol.
11 (3rd ed.) is declared therein to be that in force in England on 1 June 1955.
To sum up, suit No. 21/75 instituted in the District Court (Grade I), Cape Coast between the parties herein, involving a claim for the sum of ¢650 and arising within the district of the District Courts (Grades I and II), Cape Coast, fell amply within the jurisdiction of both district courts. Notwithstanding the nullity of the purported appointment of Mr. Haizel,
[p.160] of [1979] GLR 150 the Cape Coast District Magistrate Grade II, as acting grade I magistrate, his hearing and determination of the said suit was not void for want of jurisdiction; since he was the district magistrate grade II lawfully assigned to the Cape Coast District Grade II Court; and since that court also had jurisdiction concurrently with the district court grade I over suits involving claims for the sum of ¢650 arising in the Cape Coast district. He correctly signed his said judgment as district magistrate grade II. In my considered view, the application for certiorari must be refused for the simple reason that both District Courts Grades I and II, Cape Coast, had concurrent jurisdiction over the said suit for the liquidated sum of ¢650 in a personal action arising within their common area of jurisdiction.
In the result, I would allow this appeal and set aside the reliefs granted by the court below while affirming the ruling appealed from in the parts already indicated. I would restore the said proceedings and judgment of Mr. Haizel, district magistrate grade II.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
I agree that the proceedings and judgment of the magistrate should be restored and I share the view of the law which my brother Anin J.A. has expounded with his usual clarity. I think it is too late in the day to contend that a superior count in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals is inhibited by any sound rule of law or practice from quashing either the proceedings or judgment of an inferior court for want of jurisdiction if that jurisdiction was purported to be exercised in civil as opposed to criminal proceedings.
The one great virtue of the common law is that it is not static but is and has been amenable to adaptation to meet changed conditions. If 100 years ago, the prerogative writ of certiorari could not be used to quash the illegal proceedings of an inferior court on the only ground that the proceedings were civil, not penal, then that is not the law today either in its home ground—England, or certainly in this country. No principle was urged to commend it and my brother Anin has shown by case law that no such distinction is recognisable today.
As is well known, the remedy of certiorari is a useful tool in aid of justice and ought to be used to correct defects of justice whether they arise from illegality, fraud, breach of the rules of natural justice, error on the face of the record and the like. I am not even prepared to say that the category of cases in which this useful remedy can or should be used is closed. There is no reason why I should stifle the development of the law by any such assertion. It has been suggested elsewhere that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971, enlarged the scope of certiorari. As that matter does not arise for decision, I would reserve my opinion on that point. Accordingly, I cannot share the doubt about the appropriateness of certiorari, which Aboagye J. seems to have felt and to which he gave expression in his ruling granting “leave to appeal”: see [1976] 1 G.L.R. 169.
Having said that much, I think I owe it to my predecessor-in-office to say that the whole case proceeded on a fundamental mistake of fact. The [p.161] of [1979] GLR 150 case presented to the High Court, the latter’s decision and the learned arguments urged before us on this appeal, are all based on the supposition that as Chief Justice, Azu Crabbe appointed the non-professional magistrate in question as a magistrate grade I—an office to which only qualified lawyers of certain standing can be appointed. If he had in fact done so, I would, like the judge below and my brother Anin J.A., have agreed that the learned Chief Justice took an erroneous view of his powers.
But in truth, Azu Crabbe C.J. did not appoint Mr. Haizel as acting magistrate grade I. On this factual matter, I am in possession of information which was not available to counsel or to the court below. The truth is that the said magistrate was only authorised to sit in a court room normally used by the grade I magistrate who was on leave. The clear intention was that he should exercise in that court such jurisdiction as was within his legal competence. And in entertaining the suit in issue, he did so. Indeed when Azu Crabbe C.J. became aware that the magistrate claimed that he had been appointed as acting magistrate grade I, he took issue with him and challenged him to produce for his inspection, the letter appointing him to that position. At the request of the then Chief Justice, the Judicial Secretary addressed a query to the magistrate in the following terms:
“ACTING APPOINTMENT It has come to the knowledge of His Lordship the Chief Justice through the judgment in Republic v. Cape Coast District Magistrate Grade II; Ex parte Amoo that you purported to act as an acting district magistrate grade I on the appointment of His Lordship the Chief Justice and that you sat in that capacity and heard the case described as K. A. Amoo v. University of Cape Coast in 1975 in Cape Coast Grade I Court and gave judgment in it.
His Lordship has requested that you bring immediately for his perusal the letter purporting to have appointed you the acting district magistrate grade I.
Please treat as urgent.”
To this, Mr. Haizel replied inter alia:
“(1) That I emphatically state it here that I have not acted or purported to act as a district magistrate grade I, apart from my relieving duty at grade I.
(2) That I am awfully sorry for the misconception in this issue respecting the relieving duty which is the usual routine in the course of our office duties.
(3) That to conclude, there had been no letter purporting to appoint me, as acting grade I magistrate other than the letter of the relieving duty at grade I district court.”
It seems plain that if the true facts had been known to counsel, the application to quash the proceedings would not have been made and I feel certain the learned judge below would not have held that the magistrate
[p.162] of [1979] GLR 150 had no jurisdiction to entertain a personal claim of the value of ¢650. It would come to me as a surprise if an argument were ever made that because a magistrate sat in a building ordinarily used by the High Court and there exercised jurisdiction within his legal competence, that the proceedings or judgment was liable to be vacated only on that score. Perhaps it might be helpful to point out that section 36 (1) of the Courts Act, 1971, empowers the Chief Justice to direct when and where any session of the magistrate’s court may be held. In this case, the grade II magistrate sat in the court room of the grade I magistrate with the Chief Justice’s authority. I would think the proceedings are perfectly lawful. Accordingly, as I said, I agree that the proceedings and judgment of the magistrate in question be restored.
JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.
I also agree that magistrate Haizel’s proceedings and judgment should be restored and I accordingly concur in the allowance of the appeal.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
Ruling of High Court varied.
Judgment of trial magistrate restored.
