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[1978] SLR (HC) 20High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

GRUMAH vs. NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 187

10 May 1978 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 13 min read

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OSCOLAGRUMAH v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 187 [1978] SLR (HC) 20
APAGRUMAH v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 187, [1978] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana).
BluebookGRUMAH v NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANK AND ANOTHER [1979] GLR 187, [1978] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Tennant v. Trenchard (1869) 4 Ch.App. 537; 38 L.J.Ch. 169; 20 L.T. 856.

(2) Solomon and Meagher’s Contract, Re (1889) 40 Ch.D. 508; 58 L.J.Ch. 339; 60 L.T. 487; 37 W.R.

331.

(3) Hiatt v. Hillman (1871) 25 L.T. 55; 19 W.R. 694.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by mortgagor to stop the mortgagee from exercising his power of sale under the deed of mortgage. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Owusu for the plaintiff.

Mustapha for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.

On 19 February 1971, a deed of mortgage and a general charge were made and executed on the one part by the plaintiff as mortgagor and Gum Trading Co., Ltd., a company of which the plaintiff was the managing director and majority shareholder, as chargor, and on the other part, by the first defendant as mortgagee and chargee.

Under the said deed of mortgage and general charge, the plaintiff sub-demised to the first defendant, his leasehold property with buildings thereon, situate at Bawku in the Kusasi District of the Upper Region of Ghana, for all the residue of the term created by the said lease except the last day thereof, as part of the security for a loan of ¢70,000 granted to the plaintiff by the first defendants. As a collateral security for the said loan, Gum Trading Co., Ltd. created in favour of the first defendants, firstly, a specific charge on all its plant, machinery, vehicles and stocks involved in and engaged upon its undertaking and business, and secondly a floating charge on all other assets not detailed in the second schedule to the said deed of mortgage, but which were nonetheless involved in and engaged upon the undertaking and business of the company.

The loan so granted together with interest and any further advances with interest thereon was, by the terms of the said deed of mortgage, to be repaid on or before 30 June 1975; upon which payment the sub-demise to the first defendant shall determine and the property so mortgaged, be redeemed. Clause 8 of the deed of mortgage conferred on the first defendants the power to sell and convert into money, all or any part of the mortgaged [p.189] of [1979] GLR 187 premises or charged assets, etc., by public auction or private contract, when the legal date for redemption has passed and the moneys secured, or any part thereof, or interest remains unpaid.

The first defendants, upon the plaintiff’s failure to repay the loan together with interest after the legal date for redemption had passed, sought to exercise the power of sale conferred on them by the deed of mortgage and general charge by affixing auction notices on the plaintiff’s properties listed in the schedule attached to the writ herein.

The plaintiff, in his writ of summons and statement of claim, does not dispute the fact that circumstances have arisen rendering exercisable the first defendants’ power of sale, but contends that such power of sale whether or not contained in a deed of mortgage, is exercisable only in respect of a legal mortgage. Having regard therefore to the equitable nature of the mortgage transaction between the parties in February 1971 says he, the first defendants cannot lawfully exercise the power of sale contained in the deed of mortgage.

It seemed to me, when the summons of directions came on for hearing, that the determination of two points of law, neither requiring evidence except for the rendering of the deed of mortgage dated 19 February 1971, would resolve the dispute between the parties. These two legal issues are:

(a) Whether or not the mortgage transaction between the parties evidenced by the deed of mortgage dated 19 February 1971 was of an equitable nature; and

(b) Whether the mortgagee’s or chargee’s power of sale contained in a deed of mortgage and general charge is exercisable only in respect of a legal mortgage or charge.

On 27 June 1977, an application filed by the defendants, under Order 25 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), to have this matter set down for legal argument was unopposed by the plaintiff, and an order to that effect was accordingly made and the suit adjourned to another date for legal arguments.

The deed of mortgage dated 19 February 1971, was by consent of counsel for the parties tendered and accepted in evidence as exhibit 1. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded, and he could not have done otherwise, that clause 2 of the deed of mortgage, which sub-demised the plaintiff’s leasehold property to the first defendants as security for the loan, was a legal mortgage. But he contended that the specific and floating charges created over the assets of Gum Trading Co., Ltd. in favour of the first defendants, were equitable charges in respect of which the power of sale was not exercisable without recourse to the courts. His reason for making this submission was that only an equitable charge can arise where the security furnished by the chargor is one of personality.

To begin with, the deed of mortgage and the general charge under consideration were executed on 19 February 1971, and are thus not governed by the Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 96). Until this Decree

[p.190] of [1979] GLR 187 came into force on 1 January 1973, the law governing mortgages in Ghana was to be gathered from the common law of England and such enactments affecting mortgages in England as had, by various statutes, been adopted in Ghana as statutes of general application. The Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), was the last of the Ghanaian statutes to introduce into our law, before the promulgation of our own Mortgages Decree, 1972, sections of the English Law of Property Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20), which relate to mortgages. The part of Act 372, upon which this introduction was based is section 111 (2) which provides that until provision is otherwise made by law, the various sections of the Law of Property Act thereunder enumerated, “shall apply in Ghana subject to such verbal amendments, not affecting the substance, as may be necessary to enable those sections to be conveniently applied in Ghana.”

But as the Courts Act, 1971, was assented to in September 1971, and exhibit 1 was executed in February of the same year, I cannot yield to the request by counsel for the defendants to invoke the provisions of section 111 (2) of that enactment so as to enable me to apply section 205 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, to the issues raised in this matter. Although many legal draftsmen had, for a considerable period before the Courts Act, 1971, came into force, drafted mortgage deeds on the assumption that the Law of Property Act, 1925, was legislation of general application in Ghana, it was an error which, it seems to me, stemmed from the influence of their training.

The Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D 84), which was repealed by the Courts Act, 1971, contains provisions detailing which of the English statutes were of general application in Ghana before January 1972, and it is to that enactment that we must now turn. By paragraph 93 (2) of N.L.C.D 84, it is provided that:

“2 The provisions relating to . . . statutes of general application which were in force in England on 24th July, 1874 and applicable, to Ghana immediately before the commencement of this Decree, shall continue to apply on and after such commencement until such provisions are modified, amended or revoked under this Decree.”

This section thus excluded the application of any of the sections of the Law of Property Act, 1925, in Ghana until the enactment of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). And it is to the common law of England and the English statutes of general application in force on 24 July 1874, that for almost one hundred years, mortgages in Ghana, including the one under consideration, were subject.

By 24 July 1874, a legal mortgage of leaseholds could be created either of two ways:

(i) By assignment of the lease to the mortgagee with a covenant for re-assignment on redemption; or

(ii) By the grant to the mortgagee of a sub-lease at least one day shorter than the lease, with a proviso for cesser on redemption.

[p.191] of [1979] GLR 187

Only mortgages could be created at common law; but in equity both mortgages and charges were possible. The charge by deed, expressed to be way of legal mortgage, was an invention of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which, at the execution of the deed under consideration, had not been accepted as legislation of general application in Ghana. Thus while the sub-demise of the plaintiff’s leasehold property was a legal mortgage, the charges created over the assets of Gum Trading Co., Ltd. in favour of the first defendants did not constitute legal charges. In equity, however, an equitable charge could be created by appropriating specific property to the discharge of some debt or other obligation without there being any change in ownership either at law or in equity. All that was necessary was that the property should constitute a security for the debt or other obligation. I am, therefore, of the view that the charges created over the assets of Gum Trading Co., Ltd. were of an equitable nature.

The question then is: Had the equitable chargee any power of sale of property over which the charge was created before 24 July 1874? To begin with, equitable charges arise out of agreement between parties, and the rights of the parties are thus limited by the terms of the express contract, and it is to the terms of the agreement that one must turn to for guidance. Generally speaking, where the charge can be treated as an equitable mortgage the chargee will have the remedies of an equitable mortgagee, but where the charge cannot be so treated, the principal remedies of the chargee are sale and the appointment of a receiver.

Where the charge is not by deed, the chargee must apply to the court for an order for sale: see Tennant v.

Trenchard (1869) 4 Ch.App. 537 at p. 542; but where the charge is by deed, as in the instant case, and the power of sale by the chargee is therein expressed, then the need for an order of court for sale of the property charged does not arise. The equitable mortgagee or chargee could, however, not convey the legal estate in the property mortgaged or charged. Until the advent of the Trustee and Mortgagees, etc. Powers Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict., c. 145) (hereinafter referred to as Lord Cranworth’s Act) he could only convey his equitable interest. The rights which the equitable mortgagee derived under that Act in respect of the power of sale did not remain peculiar to him, but were assimilated by the equitable chargee in deeds creating charges.

Under Lord Cranworth’s Act, the mortgagee was given statutory power to appoint a person to be a receiver, or receiver and manager of the mortgaged property in order to secure to the mortgagee the payment of his interest out of the rents and profits. What is more, under that Act, the mortgagee, on exercising his power of sale, was empowered by section 15 to convey the mortgaged property for all the estate and interest which the mortgagor on creating the mortgage had power to dispose of. Thus an equitable mortgagee by deed could convey the legal estate: Re Solomon and Meagher’s Contract (1889) 40 Ch.D. 508; and a mortgagee of leaseholds by demise could assign the leasehold reversion: Hiatt v. Hillman (1871) 25 L.T. 55. Such power of sale, however, could only be effectively

[p.192] of [1979] GLR 187 exercised to pass the legal estate to the purchaser without recourse to the courts if there was contained in the body of the deed, either:

(a) a declaration by the mortgagor that he holds the mortgaged property in trust for the mortgagee; which makes the statutory power of appointing new trustees exercisable by the mortgagee and people deriving title under him; or

(b) an irrevocable appointment of the mortgagee and the persons deriving title under him the attorney or attorneys of the mortgagor and the persons deriving title under him in his or their name and in his or their behalf to vest the legal estate in the mortgaged property in any purchaser or other person in exercise of the statutory powers conferred on mortgagees free and discharged from the mortgagor’s right of redemption.

I have already stated that clause 8 of exhibit I conferred on the first defendants a power of sale. Now clause 9 gave an irrevocable power to the first defendants to appoint a receiver or a receiver and manager as an attorney of the mortgagor and grantor and in their names to exercise all the powers enumerated in the sub-paragraphs of clause 9. The clause reads thus:

“At any time after the moneys hereby secured shall have become payable or if any instalment whether as principal or interest shall have fallen in arrear for two (2) calendar months the bank may without notice to the mortgagor appoint in writing under the hand of its duly appointed attorney or attorneys or under the seal of the bank any person to be receiver or receiver and manager (hereinafter called ‘the receiver’) of all or any part of the mortgaged premises or charged assets in like manner and in every respect as if the bank had become entitled to exercise the power of sale hereby conferred and every receiver so appointed shall have power and be entitled to do the following acts and things . . .”

The relevant sub-paragraphs are:

“(v) Sell and convert into money and realise all or any part of the mortgaged premises or charged assets or the fixed plant and machinery and other the fixtures and fittings in and upon the same or any part thereof by public auction or private contract and generally in such manner and on such terms and conditions as shall be proper.”

(ix) use the mortgagor’s name for all or any of the purposes aforesaid and in any legal proceedings and convey the property sold in the mortgagor’s or guarantor’s name and for all these purposes the mortgagor and the guarantor hereby irrevocably appoint every such receiver to be their attorney”.

Having regard to the foregoing, I am of the view that exhibit I effectively conferred on the first defendants a power of sale the efficacy

[p.193] of [1979] GLR 187 of which was not dulled by the equitable nature of the charges created therein. It is also to be noted from the title of this suit that, Gum Trading Co., Ltd. the guarantor of the charges created in exhibit I, is not a party to this action. I know of no rule of procedure or of law that permits an action to be initiated by or on behalf of a corporate body or limited liability company in any other than the name of the body corporate or that of the company. It seems to me therefore that the plaintiff, in so far as this action relates to the charges granted in favour of the first defendants by Gum Trading Co., Ltd. has no locus standi.

Counsel for the plaintiff has protested the absence of notice to him that the capacity in which the plaintiff sues would be impugned as regards the interest of Gum Trading Co., Ltd. I do not think that service of notice of such intention is necessary. Capacity to sue is a fundamental issue which even if a party fails to raise, cannot be ignored by any court, whether a trial court or an appellate court. A party who does not possess the capacity to sue is not entitled to judgment; he is not entitled to a hearing on the facts and his writ will be struck out unless, in the special circumstances of the case, the court, in the interest of justice, grants him leave to amend. Without such amendment made pursuant to leave to amend, a writ thus afflicted can support nothing.

Counsel for the plaintiff, apart from his lamentations over the absence of notice to him, did not seek leave to put his house in order; nor do I believe that I should have accorded him such leave since whether or not Gum Trading Co., Ltd. had been made a party to the action, the right of the chargee to exercise the power of sale bestowed on him by exhibit I would have been unaffected by the joinder, save that the judgment may have operated to estop the company from re-litigating the issue.

In the event, this court is unable to declare that the first defendants are not entitled in law to exercise the power of sale contained in exhibit I and to sell the securities properly described in the schedule attached to the writ without a court order first had and obtained. The consequential orders sought by the plaintiff are therefore refused and his action is dismissed with costs of ¢500 to the defendants.

DECISION

Action dismissed with costs.

L. F. A.

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