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[1981] SLR (SC) 5Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

KWAKYE vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 9

22 March 1981 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (SC) 5
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OSCOLAKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 9 [1981] SLR (SC) 5
APAKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 9, [1981] SLR (SC) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 9, [1981] SLR (SC) 5 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION before the Supreme Court for a declaration that the purported trial and sentence in absentia of the plaintiff by the special court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3 was unconstitutional and void, wherein the Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the court.

COUNSEL

B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy (Thompson with him) for the plaintiff.

Hon. E. L. Djabatey, Deputy Attorney-General (Mrs. Orleans, Mrs. Adusa Amankwa and Mrs. Campbell with him) for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

He delivered the ruling of the court. On 5 December 1979, the plaintiff issued out of this court, a writ in which he seeks to invoke this court’s original jurisdiction. The relief indorsed in the writ was:

[p.11] of [1981] GLR 9

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff as published in the national press on 13 October 1979, is an infringement of the plaintiff’s fundamental human rights inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, void and of no effect.”

In accordance with rule 46 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), he filed a statement of his case. It is not necessary in this ruling to reproduce that statement in full. But the paragraph that appears material and on which a great deal of the argument addressed to us turned, is paragraph (3). It is in the following words:

“On 21 September 1979 the A.F.R.C. announced on the radio (and the announcement was published in the national press on 22 September 1979) that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.

3), and that details of the trials would be published later. The plaintiff was listed as one of the persons so tried and sentenced in absentia.”

Paragraphs (4)-(6) contained averments that the details of the. trials were never published but that on 13 October 1979, the national newspapers carried what was described as a press release purporting to have been issued by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. In that release, 51 persons including the plaintiff were said to have been sentenced to prison for a term of 25 years each. The plaintiff argued that having ceased to exist on 24 September 1979, the said Armed Forces Revolutionary Council could not have issued that release.

On 10 December 1979, the writ and the statement of the plaintiff’s case were served on the Attorney-General. Rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970, obliged a defendant who wishes to contest the plaintiff’s case to file a statement of his own case within fourteen days of the service on him of the plaintiff’s case. On the facts, such statement should have been filed on or before 24 December 1979. The defendant did not file any statement of his case then or at any time. The result was that at the date we heard argument, we only had before us the facts alleged but unverified in the plaintiff’s case.

The reason why the Attorney-General did not file his case is deducible, from the steps he took when he was served with the writ.

[p.12] of [1981] GLR 9

He apparently took the view that the action was not properly brought because a mandatory statutory provision had not been complied with before its commencement. Accordingly, on 11 January 1980, he moved to have the action struck out as “premature.” The statutory provision on which he relied is the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352) (hereinafter called the Decree). In so far as material, section 1 of that Decree reads:

“(2) No action shall be commenced against the Republic until the expiration of one month after written notice of intention to commence the action has been served by the claimant or by his attorney or agent:— (i) on the Attorney-General or an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department not below the rank of Senior State Attorney. . .”

Shortly before argument on this action commenced before us, the Attorney-General appears to have discovered another string to his bow. On 4 February 1981, he caused to be filed a supplementary affidavit to his original motion in which it was averred “that by virtue of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979; the action is misconceived and should be struck out.”

When trial opened before us on 9 February last, the Hon. Mr. Djabatey, Deputy Attorney-General, who appeared for the defendant, sought to have this action struck out or dismissed in limine on two grounds, namely, firstly, that as the plaintiff failed to give the Attorney-General one month’s notice of his intention to bring this action, he transgressed the mandatory provision of N.L.C.D. 352. He therefore contended that the suit was not properly before us and ought to be struck out, and secondly, that in view of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff himself, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or at least purported to have taken judicial action against him and accordingly, subsections (2) and (3) of section 15 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, forbid this court from entertaining the action or granting the plaintiff any remedy.

The plaintiff denies that this was the case and the two questions we were thus invited to decide were, firstly, whether the action was irregularly brought and secondly, whether section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution enjoined this court to decline jurisdiction.

The Decree on which the Attorney-General relied, came into force on 3 May 1969. Under it, no action may be commenced against the Republic until one month’s prior notice was given to

[p.13] of [1981] GLR 9

the Attorney-General. It is conceded that no such notice was given and if that Decree still stands vis-a-vis the constitutional provision on which the plaintiff founded his action, then the Attorney- General’s point is well made. The plaintiff claims that he was not tried but that a prison sentence of 25 years was allegedly imposed on him in his absence. He says that act contravened chapter 6, the human rights provisions of the Constitution, and invites us to so declare.

That the Constitution, 1979, clothes this court with jurisdiction to make the declaration sought by the plaintiff in a fit case is hardly in doubt. Article 2 (1) (b) enacts that:

“12. (1) A person who alleges—. . .

(b) that any act or omission of any person, is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

It is precisely that complaint that the plaintiff makes. If we construe article 2 (1) (b) alright, he is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court as soon as the act complained of was committed or even threatened. If he succeeds in obtaining a declaration, this court may exercise the powers granted it under article 2 (2) and make appropriate consequential orders. Indeed the “unconstitutional” act may be one which demands the timeous intervention of this court. But the Decree prevents him from seeking a timely assistance from the court. He has to wait for one month after notifying the Attorney-General of his intended action. If, as may well happen, time is of the essence of the matter, the object of seeking the court’s intervention may have been defeated. Yet by the clear terms of the Constitution, he may seek the declaratory relief by invoking this court’s jurisdiction the same day or the day after the act complained of.

We think that where a person seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court on a complaint founded on article 2 (1) of the Constitution, the State Proceedings (Amendment) Decree, 1969, is ineffectual. It is, in our opinion, plainly inconsistent with that article and is voided by article 1 (2). We are accordingly unable to accept the Deputy Attorney-General’s submission on this point. We think the suit is properly before us and that the objection on this score ought to be and is overruled.

But the Deputy Attorney-General says even if we should hold against him on this issue, the court is nevertheless precluded by the provisions of section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions

[p.14] of [1981] GLR 9

from entertaining this suit. Section 15 (2) reads:

“(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

This subsection is very widely couched but it seems to us that as the plaintiff sought a relief which this court is prima facie entitled to grant, the defendant who claims that this court’s jurisdiction is ousted by this provision, must provide a factual basis for it. We think the defendant must produce facts which show that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or purported to have taken judicial action against the plaintiff. As the Attorney-General omitted to comply with rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), he placed no facts before us on which we can judge the applicability or otherwise of the ouster provision. But he says the plaintiff by his writ and statement of case provided such material and in particular he invited us to consider the averment in paragraph (3) of the statement of the plaintiff’s case which in his submission, suffices to attract the ouster provision.

We have looked at this paragraph and indeed all the paragraphs of the case with care and have given this submission prolonged consideration. Apart from what the plaintiff averred he heard on the radio, there is no independent evidence of it. He seems to have heard that 68 persons were tried in absentia but when the alleged press release was published, the number of persons allegedly tried in that manner was given as 51. And this official version of the number of convicted persons was given long after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had left office. In the writ itself, the plaintiff sought to have it declared that he was never tried and denies the validity of the purported sentence. The one person who by reason of his office is peculiarly fitted to have a reliable knowledge of this matter is the defendant. Yet he elected to file no answer to the plaintiff’s case. In the end we have come to the conclusion that to have a full and accurate picture of the factual position, the defendant should be afforded an opportunity, notwithstanding his lateness, of relating his version of the facts by filing a statement of his case.

Accordingly, the only course open to us and which we think will meet the ends of justice, is to order that the Attorney-General do file, within seven days, a statement of his case. If he had done this and in addition thereto pleaded the issues of law he raised

[p.15] of [1981] GLR 9

before us, this course would not have been necessary. If the defendant complies with this order, as we hope he would, we should be in a position to act in accordance with rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules and determine this matter and proceed to deliver judgment in court.

We make an order in these terms. Costs to be costs in the cause.

DECISION

Defendant ordered to file a statement of his case within seven days.

J.K.E.E.

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