MENSAH vs. MORO [1981] GLR 728
23 March 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 11 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 12Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Harman v. Jones (1841) Cr. & Ph. 299.
(2) Black Point Syndicate, Ltd. v. Eastern Concessions, Ltd. (1898) 79 L.T. 658; 15 T.L.R. 117.
(3) Leney & Sons, Ltd. v. Callingham and Thompson [1908] 1 K.B. 79; 77 L.J.K.B. 64; 97 L.T. 697;
24 T.L.R. 55, C.A.
(4) Jones v. Pacaya Rubber and Produce Co., Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 455; 80 L.J.K.B. 155; 104 L.T. 446;
18 Mans. 139, C.A.
(5) Haines v. Taylor (1847) 2 Ph. 209; 9 L.T.O.S. 193; 11 Jur. 73.
(6) Tonson v. Walker (1752) 3 Swans. 672.
(7) Preston v. Luck (1884) 27 Ch.D. 497; 33 W.R. 317, C.A.
(8) Wiltshire Bacon Co. v. Associated Cinema Properties, Ltd. [1938] Ch. 268; [1937] 4 All E.R. 80;
107 L.J. Ch. 49; 157 L.T. 467; 54 T.L.R. 28; 81 S.J. 900, C.A.
(9) American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316; 119 S.J. 136;
[1975] 1 All E.R. 504; [1975] F.S.R. 101; [1975] R.P.C. 513, H.L.
(10) Punjabi Brothers v. Namih (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 381.
(11) Frimpong v. Obeng II [1974] 1 G.L.R. 16.
(12) Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A.
(13) Attorney-General v. Hallett (1847) 16 M.& W. 569; 16 L.J.Ex. 131; 8 L.T.O.S. 450; 11 J.P. 744.
(14) Newson v. Pender (1884) 27 Ch.D. 43; 52 L.T. 9; 33 W.R. 243, C.A.
(15) Earl of Ripon v. Hobart (1834) 3 My. & K. 169; S.C. Coop. t. Brough 333; 3 L.J.Ch. (N.S.) 145.
(16) Mitchell v. Henry (1880) 15 Ch.D. 181; 43 L.T. 186, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the plaintiff in a land suit for an order of an interim injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants and agents from further interfering with the land, the subject-matter of the suit pending the final determination of the case. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
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COUNSEL
W. Amarteifio for the applicant.
D. D. Gwira for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
This is a motion for an interim injunction brought by the plaintiff herein, to restrain the defendant, his servants, agents and workmen from interfering in anyway whatsoever with the piece or parcel of land which is the subject-matter of the suit. By his pleadings, the plaintiff alleges that some time in 1972 he acquired two plots of land from the Agona stool for building purposes. He avers further that some time in 1981 he discovered, much to his discomfiture, that the defendant, together with his workmen and labourers, had entered upon the land with the obvious intention of committing acts of trespass thereon. He says the defendant, in flagrant disregard of warnings to desist from his acts, pro- ceeded to fix pegs on the land and to make a profile and is now actively in the process of commencing the erection of a house on the said land. In an affidavit in support of the motion, the plaintiff avers that the land was granted to him in 1972 by the Agona stool represented by Nana Essiaku III (deceased) and Opanyin Kwame Tobah then head of the Agona Ahanta Anona stool family; and that in consideration of the grant, as indeed is required by custom, he provided the stool with a bottle of gin and paid for the land. He complains that the defendant’s activities on the land are obviously calculated to inflict irreparable damage to the land and calls for an immediate injunction to restrain him from causing further damage to the property.
The defendant, for his part, resists the motion and pleads contrariwise, that the real truth of the matter is that, contrary to his assertion that he had acquired two plots, the plaintiff in fact acquired only one plot of land which shares boundary with the land claimed by the defendant and that the latter land has never been granted to the plaintiff. The defendant denies that Kwame Tobah ever granted a portion of land to the plaintiff in 1972 because according to him, the said Kwame Tobah had been customarily removed as head of family in 1967, and thereby denuded of his capacity as head of family to make grants of family land. He says that the plaintiff’s single plot of land measuring 100ft. by 80ft. was in fact granted to him in 1972 by Opanyin Kobina Yeboah, then regent and head of the Agona stool family, with the concurrence of Nana Essiaku III. Thereafter, the said Opanyin Kobina Yeboah, with the concurrence of Nana Essiaku III, granted a plot of land different from the plaintiff’s land to the defendant. He avers that when a dispute arose about the disputed land, the stool family went into
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the matter, inspected the land and adjudged that the land claimed by him was not the land granted to the plaintiff. He averred these matters in his affidavit in opposition.
Opanyin Kobina Yeboah, who had earlier on applied and had been allowed to join the suit as co-defendant, swore to an affidavit supporting the facts deposed to by the defendant. One fact which is undisputed is that whereas the plaintiff has not carried on any activity on the disputed land, the defendant has commenced building on the land. The defendant avers that he has so far expended about ¢100,000 in procuring sand, cement, stones, iron rods, window and door frames, flush doors and blocks; not to mention contractor’s fee and the cost of clearing the land.
In every litigation, there is an inevitable lapse of time between the commencement of the action and the trial, however efficient and expeditious the judicial machinery may be. A person who is causing injury to property which is the subject-matter of the action would naturally, if not prevented, take advantage of the lapse of time to continue the injury. It was for the purpose of averting such injury that equity assumed the power to grant interim injunctions the purpose of which was and still is to preserve the status quo ante litem (see Harman v. Jones (1841) Cr. & Ph. 299; Black Point Syndicate, Ltd. v. Eastern Concessions, Ltd. (1898) 79 L.T. 658; Leney & Sons, Ltd. v. Callingham and Thompson [1908] 1 K.B. 79, C.A. and Jones v. Pacaya Rubber and Produce Co., Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 455 at p. 457, C.A. Although its purpose is laudable, yet the courts do not grant an interim injunction to an applicant just for the asking. Nor do the courts act arbitrarily. On the contrary, our courts have, over the years, evolved very articulate rules and principles for their guidance and, true to the dynamic and flexible character of the common law tradition, these rules and principles have and continue to undergo a process of metamor- phosis.
Let us now make an excursion into these rules and principles. As far back as the middle of the eighteenth century, the principle was laid down that an applicant for an interim injunction must adduce sufficient evidence to disclose a prima facie case: see Haines v. Taylor (1847) 2 Ph. 209 and Tonson v. Walker (1752) 3 Swans. 672 at p. 679 where Hardwich L.C. stated, “ . . . not a clear right, but probability of right, may be, and is, a ground for an injunction.” In the nineteenth century, the Court of Chancery applied this test in Preston v. Luck (1884) 27 Ch.D. 497 at pp. 505-506, C.A. Similarly in the twentieth century it continued to be applied: see Wiltshire Bacon Co. v. Associated Cinema Properties, Ltd. [1938] Ch. 268, C.A. It was in 1975 when this principle, so firmly
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established as to be able to withstand all sidewinds, was incisively reviewed and eventually overruled in all its substance except for an umbrage of a relic which was accorded judicial dispensation. For, in the celebrated case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396, the House of Lords in no uncertain terms rejected the principle. Lord Diplock stated at p. 407:
“Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expressions as ‘a probability,’ ‘a prima facie case,’ or ‘a strong prima facie case,’ in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.”
Needless to point out, the near demise of the prima facie principle in the English courts automatically spelled the doom of that principle as applied in Ghana in such cases as Punjabi Brothers v. Namih (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 381 and Frimpong v. Obeng II [1974] 1 G.L.R. 16 and others. For, in Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428 the Court of Appeal endorsed Lord Diplock’s statement in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (supra). After quoting with approval the speech of Lord Diplock, Amissah J.A. embarked upon an inquiry into the proper test for the establishment of the requirement of the seriousness of a claim and in doing so, his Lordship examined the pleadings, affidavits and the documents available and on the face of these documents, arrived at a conclusion that the requirement had been fulfilled by the applicant.
The test, therefore, is whether on the face of the pleadings, affidavits and other evidence, documentary or otherwise, such a serious case to be tried is disclosed as to warrant the grant of the application. In the instant case, I am clearly of the view that the applicant has raised a serious question to be tried and to that extent he has satisfied the legal requirement. But I am of the view that the defendant’s pleadings and affidavit raise a more serious question to be tried and, for that reason, it would be inequitable to grant the application on the sole ground that the applicant has raised a serious question to be tried. In such circumstances, equity would enjoin the court to go on to consider whether the balance of convenience tilts in favour of granting or refusing the relief being sought. Recourse must be had once again to Lord Diplock’s speech in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (supra) where at p. 408 his Lordship stated:
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“. . . the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendant’s continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage. If, on the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiff in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the court should then consider whether, on the contrary hypothesis that the defendant were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be adequately compensated under the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages for the loss he would have sustained by being prevented from doing so between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an adequate remedy and the plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no reason upon this ground to refuse an interlocutory application.
It is where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to either party or to both, that the question of balance of convenience arises.”
The problem therefore resolves itself into the question of whether there would be an irreparable damage to either party which could not be adequately compensated for by damages. Thus Lord Diplock’s speech reverberated what Parke B. said in Attorney- General v. Hallett (1847) 16 M. & W. 569 at p. 581:
“The principle upon which our refusal proceeds is, that an injunction is not granted in the case of an ordinary trespass; though in instances where, looking at all the circumstances, it appears that the act complained of or threatened falls under the description of irreparable injury, it will . . . viz. such an injury as could not be compensated in damages.”
Upon a close study of the authorities, it no doubt becomes a matter of the greatest importance in an application for an interim injunction, where it is not obvious that there will be an irreparable damage of some sort to either party, that the parties, particularly
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the party who seeks injunction, demonstrate by their pleadings and affidavits, etc. facts from which the court can infer irreparable damage. The applicant in this case has not made any such demonstration but the respondent has done so. In cases where a defendant has or threatens to erect a building on a disputed plot of land, the attitude of the English courts has been to restrain the erection of the building if the plaintiff has raised a serious question to be tried and has demonstrated that he will suffer a special damage, e.g. the access to light if the building is constructed: see Newson v. Pender (1884) 27 Ch.D. 43, C.A. Giving an instance of an irreparable injury, Alderson B. said in Attorney-General v. Hallett (supra) at p. 581:
“The case of the wrongful exhaustion of a mine in the course of a suit, is such an instance, for no decree can restore it in its original primary state to the owner.”
In other words, no amount of pecuniary damages paid to the owner of the mine could restore the mine to its original character and form to satisfy the owner. A similar example would be where a virgin forest is reduced to a secondary forest by the acts of trespass. No amount of pecuniary damages can revive the virgin forest.
What damage in this case could the defendant’s act of putting up a building on the disputed land cause to the plaintiff that could not be adequately compensated in damages? There is none that I can see. The defendant in this case can be made to pull down his building if the applicant succeeds at the trial and he will have his land intact. On the other hand, if the defendant were to succeed at the trial, he would not be adequately satisfied with pecuniary damages for the deprivation of his right to build on his own land. He is now in full preparedness to build while the plaintiff has not shown a similar pre-disposition. But there is one more factor for consideration and it is that where, as in this case, the issues as to the facts are serious and multi-faceted, equity will be reluctant in granting an injunction: see Earl of Ripon v. Hobart (1834) 3 My. & K. 169 and Mitchell v. Henry (1880) 15 Ch.D. 181 , C.A.
For the foregoing reasons, the application is refused. The defendant is hereby granted ¢500 costs. The case is adjourned to 13 April 1981 for mention.
DECISION
Application for interim injunction refused.
J. K. E. E.
