MENSAH vs. ADDISON [1981] GLR 784
26 March 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 9 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant-tenant against the judgment of a magistrate court ordering his ejectment from the premises of the plaintiff-landlord wherein the defendant-tenant contended, inter alia, that the action by the landlord ought to have been dismissed by the trial magistrate for non-compliance with regulation 18 of L.I. 369. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Dawson for the defendant-appellant.
Hughes for the plaintiff-respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
The plaintiff-respondent (hereafter referred to as the plaintiff) sued the defendant-appellant (hereafter referred to as the defendant) at the District Court Grade 1B, Sekondi, claiming:
“That the defendant is a tenant on the plaintiff’s premises and [that] he is in a habit of causing ‘nuisance.’ She claims further that the defendant has refused to cook in the kitchen and has been cooking on the verandah, and thereby keeping
[p.786] of [1981] GLR 784 the premises untidy. The plaintiff claims that the defendant owns a house at Effiakuma into which he could move. She therefore seeks an order for ejectment against the defendant. She wants the defendant ejected so as to avoid likely trouble in the future.”
The plaintiff complained in her evidence-in-chief that the defendant’s wife had been frying garri and drying cassava upstairs. This made her write letters, exhibits A and B to the defendant. In these letters, she complained against cooking by the defendant’s wife on the verandah instead of in the kitchen. She also complained against the attitude of the defendant’s wife against her as not being conducive. She further complained against frying garri and drying cassava in the premises by the defendant’s wife who did thereby keep the house untidy. The plaintiff also referred to exhibit C which is the defendant’s reply to her two letters: exhibits A and B. She states that she now finds it difficult to keep the defendant in her house as a tenant and therefore prayed for ejectment.
The defendant does not appear to have denied the nuisance complained of by the plaintiff in his reply contained in exhibit C. He rather complained at length about an alleged poor state of disrepair of the premises he was occupying and the need for renovation. The defendant did not deny cooking on the verandah, neither did he deny that his wife has been drying cassava in the house, or that his wife’s attitude towards the plaintiff was not conducive to good relationship between landlord and tenant. The defendant rather stated in no uncertain terms that his wife would continue to cook on the verandah until, as he put it, the kitchen was put in good order. The defendant stated further that he knows the plaintiff was bent on ejecting him from the house but warned that the plaintiff was not going to find it easy.
I think this provoked the present action which is in effect an action for ejectment based on nuisance committed in the premises by the defendant’s wife. It is significant to note that the plaintiff (who was not represented at the trial) was extensively cross-examined by the learned counsel for the defendant. The plaintiff was, however, not challenged on her complaint that the defendant’s wife has been frying garri and drying cassava in the premises and cooking on the verandah. The plaintiff was again not challenged on her complaint against the conduct of the defendant’s wife towards her. The plaintiff stated under cross-examination by learned counsel that she does not like the attitude of the defendant’s wife towards her. She once complained about the manner in which the defendant’s wife and daughter greeted her, and as a result, the defendant, his
[p.787] of [1981] GLR 784 wife, and their daughter no longer greeted her. The plaintiff stated further, “they have no regard for my house. They send firewood to their place.” The defendant did not deny these acts and conduct of his wife which the plaintiff considered as a nuisance. The defendant only stated that his wife stopped frying garri in the premises before the action was instituted.
The trial magistrate, after considering the evidence adduced on both sides, came to the conclusion that the premises were in a bad state of disrepair and that the defendant should vacate within twelve months from the date of judgment to enable the plaintiff to renovate the premises after which the defendant would be entitled to return into occupation. He therefore entered judgment for the plaintiff. It is against this judgment that the defendant has appealed.
The original ground of appeal filed on 21 May 1980 is that, “The judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial.” Learned counsel for the defendant did on 22 January 1981 file the following additional grounds of appeal:
“1. The learned trial magistrate ought to have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369).
2. The learned trial magistrate erred in basing his judgment on extraneous matters.”
With all due respect to learned counsel for the defendant, I do not think his argument regarding non-compliance with the provisions of regulation 18 of L.I. 369 is tenable in this matter. This is because the provisions in question do not apply in the circumstances of this case. Regulation 18 of L.I. 369 which clearly provided for specific cases under section 17 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), states:
“Where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k) he shall furnish to the appropriate Rent Officer a declaration as in Form 14 of the First Schedule hereto.”
It is quite clear here that regulation 18 of L.I. 369 will apply in cases where the landlord may require possession of his premises relying on or coming under any of the provisions of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) and (k) of Act 220. Where, however, the landlord comes under any of the provisions of section 17 (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of the Act, he is not required to comply with regulation 18 of L.I. 369. This is because when a tenant, for instance, fails to pay due rent, or where he is in breach of a covenant in the tenancy
[p.788] of [1981] GLR 784 agreement, or where, as in the present case he is guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining occupiers, he automatically forfeits his right of occupation of the premises under Act 220, and the landlord is entitled to, and may come to court direct and ask for ejectment, if the tenant refuses to quit. Thus under section 17 (1) (c) of the Act, an order against a tenant for the recovery of possession of, or for ejectment from, any premises may be made where the tenant or any person residing with him has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining occupiers.
The trial magistrate appears to have found in his judgment that the defendant’s wife did in fact dry cassava and did fry garri upstairs in the plaintiff’s premises, but that that nuisance was abated or stopped by the defendant’s wife immediately the plaintiff asked her to put a stop to it. In fact, I have not found any piece of evidence which states or supports the view that the defendant’s wife stopped those acts of nuisance as soon as the defendant’s wife was asked to stop. The learned magistrate also found that, “Of late (i.e. since the last year) the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant had been very strained and bitter indeed.”
The trial magistrate also appears to have found that the premises occupied by the defendant was in a bad state of disrepair and that perhaps that state of affairs had led to further deterioration of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. He also made a finding that the premises needed renovation and that the plaintiff must be given the chance to carry out the necessary renovation. I think it was at this stage that the trial magistrate got confused. He appeared to have tended to concentrate more on the need for repair or renovation than the plaintiff’s complaint against nuisance. The court clearly failed to make a finding that the defendant’s wife was cooking on the verandah upstairs, as clearly admitted by the defendant even in writing. It is my view that it was clear on the evidence before the court that the defendant’s wife was guilty of nuisance and the defendant was therefore caught by section 17 (1) (c) of Act 220. But, as I have already stated, the trial magistrate’s view was obviously clouded by the consideration of a relief which the plaintiff had not sought, namely an order for possession for the purpose of renovation.
It is my view that in view of the evidence on record and the findings made thereon, the trial magistrate obviously fell in error when he held that the defendant could not be ejected on the ground
[p.789] of [1981] GLR 784 of nuisance, but rather on the ground that the premises were needed for repair. It is my view that though the reasons for the order of ejectment were misplaced, there being evidence which demanded an order for ejectment based on proof of nuisance, the order for ejectment should not be disturbed if the correct basis for the order could be substituted for the erroneous one. I am here mindful of the principle that the hearing of an appeal is in itself a re-hearing of the matter.
I think the other grounds of appeal that the learned trial magistrate erred in basing his judgment on extraneous matters and that the judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial, must both fail since I am satisfied that the order made for ejectment was right as it is supported by evidence on record. There is evidence that the premises needed renovation or repair, but since the plaintiff did not ask for ejectment for repair or renovation, the court was expected only to make the order which was sought if there was evidence to support same, and not rather an order not asked for. An appeal being a re-hearing, the appellate court can in the circumstances of the case make the necessary correction.
I am at a loss to understand why having held that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant had become so strained that it was likely that trouble would occur in the house should they continue, as it were, to live together in the house, the same magistrate would make an order that the defendant should return to the house if he so desires, after renovation. This is what the learned magistrate stated in his judgment:
“However, the present strife between the plaintiff and the defendant and his people invites attention in order to avoid trouble likely to be frequent in the house in the future. Could one hope that time could heal this wound? The present bitter position leaves me wondering.”
Is this not a clear finding that the relationship between the parties herein along with the defendant’s wife and his daughter, was such that it would not be reasonable to expect them to live together under one roof, in the plaintiff’s premises, peacefully and happily? My answer is Yes! And since the defendant or his wife has been proved to have been guilty of nuisance, the trial court ought to have ordered ejectment of the defendant under section 17 (1) (c) of Act 220. I would therefore for the reasons given above dismiss this appeal. The order for the reservation of the right to [p.790] of [1981] GLR 784 return to the plaintiff’s house after completion of the necessary repair work is hereby struck out as being incompatible with an order under Act 220, s. 1 (c).
The plaintiff’s costs are assessed at ¢500. Court below to carry out.
DECISION Appeal dismissed.
Order for ejectment upheld on other grounds.
J. K. E. E.
