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[1981] SLR (SC) 7Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

KWAKYE vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 944

10 November 1981 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 233 min read

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OSCOLAKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 944 [1981] SLR (SC) 7
APAKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 944, [1981] SLR (SC) 7 (Ghana).
BluebookKWAKYE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1981] GLR 944, [1981] SLR (SC) 7 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;

[1969] 1 All E.R. 208; 113 S.J. 55, H.L.

(2) R. v. Turner (1816) 5 M. & S. 206; 105 E.R. 1026.

(3) Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 664, S.C.

(4) Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736; [1979] Q.B. 56;

[1979] 1 All E.R. 356; (1978) 38 P. & C.R. 136; [1978] J.P.L. 829, C.A.

(5) Republic v. Judicial Secretary; Ex parte Torto [1979] G.L.R. 444, C.A.

(6) Joseph v. Joseph [1966] 3 All E.R. 486; [1967] Ch. 78 [1966] 3 W.L.R. 631; 110 S.J. 673 C.A. (7) Vexatious Actions Act, 1896; In re Boaler [1915] 1 K.B. 21; 83 L.J.K.B. 1629; 111 L.T. 497; 30 T.L.R. 580; 58 S.J. 634; 24 Cox C.C. 335, C.A.

(8) Goldsack v. Shore [1950] 1 All E.R. 276; [1950] 1 K.B. 708; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 636; 94 S.J. 192, C.A.

(9) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A.

(10) Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Armaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227.

[p.950] of [1981] GLR 944 (11) Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1976] 2 G.L.R. 5, C.A.

(12) Republic v. Keta District Magistrate; Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459.

(13) Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Forson [1980] G.L.R. 529.

(14) South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn. Bhd. v. Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union [1980] 2 All E.R. 689; [1980] 3 W.L.R. 318; 124 S.J. 496.

(15) Racal Communications Ltd., Re [1980] 2 All E.R. 634; [1980] 3 W.L.R. 181; 124 S.J. 495, H.L. reversing sub. nom. Re A Company [1980] 2 W.L.R. 241; [1979] 123 S.J. 584; [1979] 1 All E.R.

284, C.A.

(16) Bradlaugh; Ex parte (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509; 47 L.J.M.C. 105; 38 L.T. 680; 42 J.P. 583; 26 W.R. 758. (17) Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 417; 43 L.J.P.C. 39; 30 L.T. 237; 22 W.R.

516.

(18) R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) 1 Q.B. 466; 1 Gal. & Day. 167; 10 L.J.M.C. 99; 5 Jur.

867.

(19) Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society, Ltd. v. Parkinson [1892] 1 Q.B. 431;

[1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 429; 61 L.J.Q.B. 409; 66 L.T. 513; 56 J.P. 404; 40 W.R. 450; 8 T.L.R.

352, C.A.

(20) Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. Page [1911] 2 K.B. 946; 80 L.J.K.B. 1346; 105 L.T.

827; 75 J.P. 548, D.C.

(21) R. v. London County Council; Ex parte The Entertainments Protection Association, Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215; 100 L.J.K.B. 760; 144 L T. 464; 95 J.P. 89; 47 T.L.R. 227; 75 S.J. 138; 29 L.G.R. 252, C.A.

(22) Donkor v. The Republic of Ghana [1971] 1 G.L.R. 30, S.C.

(23) Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C.

(24) R. v. Marsham [1892] 1 Q.B. 371; 61 L.J.M.C. 52; 65 L.T. 778; 56 J.P. 164; 40 W.R. 84; 8 T.L.R.

3; 36 S.J. 11, C.A.

(25) R. v. Wood (1855) 119 E.R. 400.

(26) Karletse-Panin v. Nuro [1979] G.L.R. 194, C.A.

(27) Republic v. Anlo Traditional Council; Ex parte Hor II [1979] G.L.R. 234, C.A. (28) Dredd Scott v. Sandford (1857) 19 Howard 393; 15 L.Ed. 691.

(29) National Circles v. Minister of Police (1970) 24 P.D. (2) 141.

[p.951] of [1981] GLR 944 (30) Orthodox Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police (1971) 25 P.D. (1) 225. (31) Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hammed Khan P.L.D. 1965, S.C. 671.

(32) R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board; Ex parte Kitchener Food Market, Ltd. [1966] 1 O.R. 482. (33) Powell v. McCormack (1969) 395 U.S. 486; 23 L.Ed. 2d 491; 89 S.Ct. 1944.

(34) Northern Rivers Rutile Pty. Ltd.; Ex parte Re Claye [1965] N.S.W.R. 135.

(35) Nwankwere v. Adewumi (1962) W.N.L.R. 298.

(36) Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592, C.A.

(37) R. v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859; 80 L.J.K.B. 185; 74 J.P. 361; affirmed [1910] 2 K.B. 809; 80 L.J.K.B. 191; 103 L.T. 262; 74 J.P. 365; 26 T.L.R. 663; 8 L.G.R. 774.

(38) Taylor v. National Assistance Board [1956] P. 470; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 290; 100 S.J. 473; [1956] 2 All E.R. 455.

(39) Pyx Granite Co., Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 Q.B. 554; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 371; 122 J.P. 182; 102 S.J. 175; [1958] 1 All E.R. 625.

(40) Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 935; 127 J.P. 295; 107 S.J. 313; [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; 234 L.T. 423, H.L.

(41) Fenwick v. Croydon Union Rural Sanitary Authority [1891] 2 Q.B. 216; 60 L.J.M.C. 161; 65 L.T.

645; 55 J.P. 470; 40 W.R. 124; 7 T.L.R. 594.

(42) Attorney-General v. Hanwell Urban Council [1900] 1 Ch. 377; 69 L.J.Ch. 426; 82 L.T. 778; 48 W.R. 690; 16 T.L.R. 452; 44 S.J. 572, C.A.

(43) Madbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L.Ed. 60.

(44) Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186; 7 L.Ed. 2d. 663; 82 S.Ct. 691.

(45) Tanoh alias Obeng v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 482.

(46) Marhaba v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 90.

(47) Slim v. Croucher (1860) 1 De. G.F. & J. 518; 29 L.J.Ch, 273; 2 L.T. 103; 6 Jur. N.S. 437; 8 W.R.

347.

(48) Plessy P. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537; 16 S.Ct. 1138; 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).

(49) Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Topeka 347 U.S. 483; 98 L.Ed. 873; 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the plaintiff for a declaration that his purported trial and conviction in absentia by the special court established

[p.952] of [1981] GLR 944 under A.F.R.C.D. 3 was null and void. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Anin J.S.C.

COUNSEL

B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy (Thompson with him) for the plaintiff.

Hon. E. L. Djabatey, Attorney-General (C. H. A. Tettey, Solicitor-General, Odoi, Mrs. Orleans, Mrs. Adusa Amankwa and Ava with him) for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

The plaintiff was until 4 June 1979, the Inspector-General of Police. On that day, the Government of the Supreme Military Council of which he was a member, was overthrown in a coup d”etat. He was then arrested and kept in custody. The evidence shows that while there, he complained of illness. He was then sent to the 37 Military Hospital for treatment. A military guard was mounted on him on 10 June 1979, he disappeared with his escort and still apparently out of the country.

One of the reasons given by the government which overthrew the Supreme Military Council was “to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the military and to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces . . .” This new military government christened itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (honourably called the A.F.R.C.). In pursuance of this policy, it established by Decree, namely, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), a special court and conferred on it jurisdiction to try persons accused mainly of economic crimes and kindred trade offences.

The Decree (i.e. A.F.R.C.D. 3) lays down a medium of procedure for trials in praesenti. It provided no procedural guidelines for trials in absentia which were apparently not then envisaged. It, however, enjoined the special courts to observe the principles of natural justice. That would suggest that persons accused of these crimes should not be condemned unheard and the hearing was ordinarily to be in their presence. Some of the persons accused of the “economic crimes” were outside this country and beyond the reach of the courts. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s customary method of demanding their presence was to summon them by radio. Some of the persons who were out of the country returned to answer the accusations; others did not. Apparently, to ensure that those who were absent did not escape justice, A.F.R.C.D. 3 was amended to enable the tribunal to try such persons in their absence, a procedure hitherto unknown to our criminal law.

[p.953] of [1981] GLR 944 The evidence suggests that a number of persons were allegedly tried in absentia in pursuance of that Decree. On 21 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. announced on the radio that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special court. It promised to release the details of these later. On 13 October 1979, the national newspapers published these details. It gave the names of 51 persons who were said to have been tried in absentia. The plaintiff was listed as one of twenty-five persons who was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. A warrant of “commitment to undergo sentence” exhibited in these proceedings was issued to enforce this punishment.

The plaintiff is apparently still out of the country. An affidavit which he filed in connection with this case suggests that he is in Lome, in the Republic of Togo. He sought to vacate the sentence by this action in which he claimed:

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by the special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and that the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed on the plaintiff . . . was void and of no effect.”

When this case first came before us on 9 February 1981, the Attorney-General sought to have this suit dismissed in limine on two grounds of law: One of those grounds is irrelevant for our present purposes. The second ground prayed in aid section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. It was urged that those provisions forbade us from exercising jurisdiction in a case like the present.

Section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions reads:

“(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

We were not satisfied that there was a factual basis for the application of this proviso as the Attorney-General did not, in conformity with rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), file a statement of his case or otherwise provided any evidence. In the unanimous ruling of this court dated 22 March 1981 (see [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C.), we said, inter alia:

[p.954] of [1981] GLR 944

“ . . . the defendant who claims that this court’s jurisdiction is ousted by this provision must provide a factual basis for it. We think the defendant must produce facts which show that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or purported to have taken judicial action against the plaintiff.”

The Attorney-General has since filed a statement of his case and produced both oral and documentary evidence with a view to showing that judicial action or purported judicial action within the true intendment of section 15 (2) has been taken against the plaintiff and that this court is constitutionally enjoined to decline jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court’s task is to decide whether such a factual basis exists for the application of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions or whether the plaintiff has made out his entitlement to the reliefs he seeks without requiring us to do what the Constitution, 1979, forbids.

It is to be noted that our ruling quoted above did not eliminate the legal burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish his case on a balance of probabilities. The fact that his averment is a negative one only means, as put in the plaintiff’s case, that: “the law does not hold him to strict proof of such negative . . .” Strict proof is certainly not required but proof there must be. Phipson on Evidence (8th ed.) at p. 27 states the law thus: “The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation, whether affirmative or negative, forms an essential part of a party’s case, the proof of such allegation rests on him.”

There seems to be some school of thought that where the subject-matter of a party’s allegation, whether affirmative or negative, is peculiarly within the knowledge of his opponent, it lies upon the latter to rebut the allegation. So it may be argued in this case that whether the plaintiff was tried or not is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant and the burden is on him to prove it although it is the plaintiff who makes the averment. But according to Phipson on Evidence (supra) at p. 34, the cases in which that principle was applied turned largely on construction of legislation. As the learned author put it:

“These cases, however, have been considered to rest partly upon the construction of the Acts; and in the absence of statutory provision, the better opinion now seems to be that, in general, some prima facie evidence must be given by the complainant in order to cast the burden on his adversary. The difficulty of proving a fact peculiarly known to an opponent, may . . . affect the quantum of evidence demanded in the first instance, but does not change the rule of law . . .”

[p.955] of [1981] GLR 944

That indeed is the plaintiff’s own conception of the law because, as I said, he pleaded “‘that the law does not hold him to strict proof of such negative . . .” This is an admission that he knew he ought to offer some proof of his negative averment. If he had considered that his mere allegation placed the burden on the defendant to disprove his negative allegation, he would not have so pleaded. I think the plaintiff conceived the law on this issue correctly although he did not offer a scrap of evidence in proof or attempted proof of his allegation.

The plaintiff’s averment that he was not tried, convicted or sentenced can be established by circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff may lead evidence from which a prima facie inference can be drawn that he could not have been so tried or if tried, could not have been convicted or sentenced. He may show by evidence that persons who would normally know of the trial did not know of it or that the special court did not, in fact, sit or that those who constituted the court were imposters. That done, on well-known principles of the law of evidence, the defendant would assume the burden of showing that a trial took place. The fact that the plaintiff was absent from the jurisdiction could not by itself show that no judicial action was taken or purported to have been taken against him especially when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 19), makes provision for trial in absentia.

Our earlier ruling therefore cannot mean that the plaintiff in such a case simply folds his arms and demands all the proof from the defendant. As is often said, judicial dicta take their colour from the context. At the time we gave our earlier ruling, the defendant did not file a statement of his case as required by rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), nor provide any factual basis for a plea under section 15 (2). The only material before the court was the plaintiff’s statement of case. Yet at that time, the defendant was seeking the shield of that section. We said he could not do so then. We proceeded to give each party an opportunity to lead evidence. The plaintiff did not avail himself of this. He chose, as it were, to rely on his case as contained in the papers filed and to rely on the insufficiency of the defendant’s evidence as far as the invocation of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions is concerned.

In paragraph 6 of the plaintiff’s affidavit, he swore that:

“I am advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that my purported trial and conviction in absentia by the A.F.R.C. is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.”

[p.956] of [1981] GLR 944

(The emphasis is mine.) He does not seem to be contesting that a purported trial and conviction in absentia by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was an adequate summation of the events in respect of which he is seeking redress. His writ also significantly seeks to nullify “the purported sentence of 25 years imposed on the plaintiff.” Again paragraph 3 of the plaintiff’s own statement of case reads:

“On 21 September 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council announced on the radio (and the announcement was published in the national papers on 22 September 1979) that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the Special Court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3) . . .”

The plaintiff thus appears to be saying that there was what seems to be a purported judicial action affecting him, but that it was somehow invalid. He does not call any evidence on his part to show that invalidity he alleges, and thus discharge or attempt to discharge the legal burden of proof he assumed by his negative averment.

A plaintiff who asserts but makes no attempt to establish what he asserts, cannot succeed in a declaratory action especially where he seeks to challenge the type of official action in which the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta applies, that is, everything is presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown. In relation to judicial actions in particular, Broom’s Legal Maxims (9th ed.) at p. 612 states the principle as follows:

“. . . that the decisions of a court of competent jurisdiction are well founded, and their judgments regular; and that facts, without proof of which the verdict could not have been found were proved at the trial.”

These are often legal fictions but as every lawyer knows, legal fictions are convenient aides in the administration of justice.

Of course, the plaintiff may elicit in proof of his own case, evidence from the defendant’s own testimony in cross-examination. But nothing emerged in the cross-examination of the three witnesses called by the defendant which could properly be said to aid the plaintiff’s case. On this question, it is a fair conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish what he alleges and that entitles the defendant to a verdict.

[p.957] of [1981] GLR 944

As I said, the defendant led viva voce evidence and produced two documents in an attempt to provide a factual basis for the application of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions. Of the oral testimony, the most direct was given by Squadron Leader A. A. Segbefia. He was certain that the plaintiff was tried in his presence. He had a particular reason for recalling this because he ordered the plaintiff to be sent to hospital when he complained of illness and as he put it “nearly had trouble” for it.

According to this witness, the charges were read by the prosecutor apparently from a file which contained the dossier. The plaintiff was of course not present to plead. The witness then swore that the court of five members conferred for about twenty to thirty minutes and thereafter handed down a verdict of guilty against the plaintiff. He was then sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. Squadron Leader Segbefia said the court then said it would communicate its decision to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council “for approval.” This is a requirement of section 2 (2) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3).

According to the witness’ testimony, the proceedings were recorded and would normally have been forwarded to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council—the convening authority. Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings also testified before us. He recalled that the council dealt with the plaintiff’s case. He said the “Armed Forces Revolutionary Council reviewed and confirmed the sentences passed by the special court.” Although he could not be specific on details, he said if the plaintiff’s name appeared on an official list issued by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s Press Secretary, then the plaintiff must have been tried. He said this would be authenticated by the signature of Capt. Mfojoh. The latter also gave evidence before us. He was the Press Secretary to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and, was among other things, responsible for issuing press releases. The normally obtained his information from “many sources including the council.” He then produced the press release. In it, the plaintiff’s name appears with a sentence of 25 years. As we have stated earlier, there is also exhibited, a warrant of commitment to prison.

On the evidence, is it reasonable to conclude that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or purported to take judicial action against the plaintiff? That immediately requires the correct interpretation of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions which we have already quoted. That section contains what lawyers call an ouster clause, ousting the normal jurisdiction of the courts.

[p.958] of [1981] GLR 944

This particular ouster clause does not arise from an ordinary statute but is a constitutional provision. Moreover, article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, gives the transitional provisions effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution.

In the exercise of the interpretative jurisdiction of this court, it is obvious that we should go beyond statutory interpretation since we are concerned with the most fundamental issues of our jurisdiction. We must have regard to the terms of our particular Constitution whose specific reference points are largely unique to our national history. In this area, more than others, judicial pronouncements in other jurisdictions on the particular facts of their experience are not likely to be of much assistance; the range of judicial wisdom embodied in them will, of course, influence our judicial reflections. I think originality is required of us in the exercise of our original jurisdiction if we are to attend to the letter and spirit of the Constitution as the basic law of our land. That originality must, of course, be judicial and must not do damage to the plain and obvious meaning of the words used nor is it the province of this court to be astute to find some reason or other for depriving the constitutional provision of an effect clearly intended.

The word “purported” if we refer to our dictionaries, plainly extends to shield even things that may not satisfy the detailed regulations of particular laws. One dictionary defines “purport” as to profess or claim, often falsely.” According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (latest unabridged ed.), the meaning of “purport” is given as “meaning conveyed, professed or implied.” And “a purport” is explained as “meaning conveyed, professed or implied.” And a purported action is precisely one whose claim to regularity is not accurate even though its intention is clear.

The ouster provision here is as total as can be. What guidance can be obtained from the wisdom of the House of Lords in its landmark decision on ouster clauses and the legal significance of the word “purport” in legislation? The case of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L. clearly indicates that the word “purported” adds a further dimension to an ouster provision. In that case, counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the relevant statute had ousted the court’s jurisdiction only in respect of the “determination” by the commission but not merely a “purported” determination. The court held that determination meant plainly determination and not a “purported determination.” If the statute had provided an ouster in relation to “purported” determination as well, that would have made a world of difference.

[p.959] of [1981] GLR 944

In our own constitutional provision, the constitutional shield extends not only to the judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council but to its “purported” judicial action as well.

Where the special court hears evidence or has evidence placed before it in the form of a dossier as is customary in civil law jurisprudence, and if after consideration, the court adjudges guilt and proceeds to pass sentence, it should not be difficult to hold that at the very least, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council purported to take judicial action; especially if that sentence was confirmed by it. The policy objective of this ouster provision of the Constitution seems plain, namely, to shield from future scrutiny by the ordinary courts, trials or professed trials conducted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Special Courts.

Indeed, even failure to comply with its statutory “mode of trial” is not a legitimate ground of attack because section 15 (3) provides a shield against even that. It enacts that:

“(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to . . . was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

The particular force of section 15 (3) of the transitional provisions is to prevent non-compliance with the “procedure prescribed by any law” being used as a necessary precondition for the operation of the ouster clause. In other words, irregularities in the mode of the trial do not prevent the ouster clause from having its intended effect. Squadron Leader Segbefia testified that two members of the special court were writing in his presence at the trial and that “the record would have been disclosed to the convening authority—in this case the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” but no records of the trial were produced before us.

The question is: does the absence of such records disable a finding on the evidence that there was a judicial or purported judicial action? Even if we were to take the requirement of a record as a procedure prescribed by law for judicial proceedings, section 1 5 (3) makes it clear that even if non-compliance can be established, section 15 (2) would still have effect. That Armed Forces Revolutionary Council itself did not make any provision requiring the recording of such trials. The provision it made for the mode of trial in section 5 of A.F.R.C.D. 3 laid down some modicum of rules designed for the situation when an accused is present at his trial. When A.F.R.C.D. 19 was passed allowing for trial in absentia, it was not specified which of these earlier provisions could be dispensed with though a number of them, would, in the nature of

[p.960] of [1981] GLR 944 things, be incapable of application or were likely to be impractical. But whatever the required mode, section 15 (3) categorically disables a finding that section 15 (2) does not apply because the action or purported action did not comply, for instance, with the procedure of calling witnesses spelt out in subsection (6) of section 5 of A.F.R.C.D. 3. All the court seems to need to establish an ouster of jurisdiction, is a purported judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

Although Squadron Leader Segbefia produced no records of the trial, the former gave direct evidence of an actual trial held in his presence whatever its procedural weaknesses; and in the case of Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, of a process of review and confirmation which resulted in the press release which Capt. Mfojoh tendered in evidence (exhibit SC. A). The evidence of this press release is farther supported by the existence of a warrant of commitment to prison relating to the plaintiff.

The press release recited that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had reviewed the sentence of the 54 persons. The 25-year imprisonment imposed on the plaintiff was affirmed. With regard to the fourteen persons named at p. 3 of that exhibit, their sentence appeared to have been set aside and their cases were remitted to the special tribunal established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree. 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23), apparently for hearing afresh. The last sentence of the release stated that: “A Decree giving effect to the sentences will be published soon.”

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council left office the next day and the Decree envisaged in that release does not appear to have been made. But this is of no legal consequence. The only legal requirement for the validity of the decision of the special court was that “it shall be subject to review and confirmation by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.” The evidence shows that that has been done and the decision was, accordingly final and not subject to appeal or liable to be questioned by any of the prerogative writs: see section 2 (4) and (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3. Therefore, the promulgation of a Decree only to give effect to the confirmed or reviewed sentences or both would be legally otiose. At all events, if such a Decree had been passed, it would have been a legislative not judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

The oral and documentary evidence led by the defendant was not contradicted by any evidence produced by the plaintiff. There is nothing intrinsically improbable about that evidence. No one who saw these three officers give evidence, can in justice conclude

[p.961] of [1981] GLR 944 that their testimony was fabricated. Indeed no such suggestion was put to any of the witnesses. Nor can it be suggested that the documents produced in evidence were, so to speak, got-up to bolster a trumped-up case. At least they were shown to be in existence long before the plaintiff sued. In those circumstances, the proper conclusion should be that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council purported to take judicial action against the plaintiff.

That being so, section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions, ousts any judicial organ from jurisdiction to “make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.” It follows that the declaration sought by the plaintiff cannot lawfully be granted. It ought to be refused. I would dismiss this action and enter judgment for the defendant with costs.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.

The plaintiff to this action was the Inspector-General of Police and a member of the Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) government immediately before the events which led to the overthrow of that government. Those events were that during the early hours of the morning of 4 June 1979, there was an uprising of the junior officers and other ranks of the Ghana Armed Forces. The Supreme Military Council and the senior officers in the Ghana Armed Forces were unable to contain the mutiny which eventually metamorphosed into a coup d’etat.

The successful mutineers established a government under the name of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. By the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Decree (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, the council set out to administer the country according to its philosophy and to rule by Decrees; where any of its Decrees was in conflict with any existing law, the latter would be deemed to be amended to the extent of the conflict or repeal.

In furtherance of the powers contained in the Proclamation, it created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), outside the traditional judicial system. The Decree regulated the composition of the special courts, its jurisdiction and procedure in the trial of offences.

Members of the S.M.C. together with other senior officers and civilians were arrested after the coup and incarcerated. The plaintiff was arrested on 10 June 1979. It is alleged that after his arrest he complained of illness and was sent to the hospital from where he escaped.

During the early period of the new regime, the degree of violence and barbarity exhibited by it and some members of the Armed Forces were such that persons apprehensive of danger to their lives fled the country. Amongst those who fled were persons wanted

[p.962] of [1981] GLR 944 by the council. It decided therefore to arm the special court with jurisdiction to try persons in absentia. Accordingly, A.F.R.C.D. 3 was amended by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts)

(Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 19), to give effect to it.

There was no provision for arraignment of accused persons before the court. A great number of persons were apprehended in their homes and taken to court. The other mode of enforcing presence in the court was by announcement of names of persons wanted on the radio and television requesting them to report at Burma Camp “with immediate effect.”

The plaintiff was amongst those persons whose presence was demanded by the council for trial. He failed to appear and was tried in absentia. convicted and sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment on 20 September 1979.

The plaintiff, by his writ, is challenging the conviction and sentence and claiming a declaration to that effect. He has led no evidence in support of any averments in his writ or statement of his case.

The defence asserted in its statement of defence that the plaintiff was tried in absentia, convicted and sentenced and further, that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim having regard to the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979.

Our inquiry therefore covers two areas in controversy: Firstly, whether or not the plaintiff was tried, convicted and sentenced by a special court and secondly, whether this court’s jurisdiction is ousted by reason of the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution.

On the state of the pleadings of statements, I am of the view that the burden of proof on both issues rests with the defence. I am of course aware of the general principles of evidence that he who avers must prove notwithstanding the manner his pleadings has been couched. It is to the substance of the claim that must be adverted, not the form. In short, the burden of proof lies on the party who will lose on the pleadings if he fails to adduce adequate evidence which satisfies the court. There are of course exceptions to this general proposition; some of these exceptions are classified under the heading of presumptions.

One of the mainsprings of our laws is the common law; indeed, since independence, the common law has been enshrined in each of the Constitutions which have been promulgated as part of the laws of the country. It cannot be disputed that one of its golden principles is that a man should be left alone to pursue his legitimate

[p.963] of [1981] GLR 944 business so long as he does not infringe the rights of others or breach the laws of the land. His right to be free from arbitrary arrest and molestation is guaranteed.

During certain periods in our history, this right was tinkered with or at times abrogated; nevertheless, as soon as the country regains its poise and freedom from tyranny and oppression, it is restored. It is from these golden rules that the prerogative writs have their being. The more pertinent writ herein would have been the writ of habeas corpus if the plaintiff had been arrested. Any person or authority who claims that this human right of another person has been abridged or curtailed must justify that claim. The party affected is entitled to rely on the presumption of innocence.

The substance of plaintiff’s claim is that he heard on the radio on 21 September 1979 that he was amongst the persons tried in absentia and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. He denies any such trial and asserts that the purported sentence was an infringement on his human rights. He raises a presumption in his favour which must be rebutted.

But I would also add that the matters being agitated are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defence and would adopt the dictum of Bayley J. in R. v. Turner (1816) 5 M. & S. 206 at p. 211. (See also Cross on Evidence (2nd ed.) at p. 81):

“If a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the other, the party within whose knowledge it lies and who asserts the affirmative is to prove it, and not he who asserts the negative.”

In rebutting the presumption, the Attorney-General led evidence. He produced the warrant of commitment of the plaintiff which evidenced the offences preferred against him, his conviction and sentence. The issue of warrant is a mandatory function of any criminal court after conviction and sentence of a person to a term of imprisonment: see section 315 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1960 (Act 30). If the plaintiff had been within the jurisdiction, he would have been apprehended and sent to prison. It is, so to speak, a passport to prison. Whether the production of the warrant per se would be sufficient to displace the presumption, does not now arise and I would express no opinion. The evidence of Squadron Leader Abraham Armstrong Segbefia is specific on the question of whether there was a trial. He states, inter alia:

“I was informed he was due to appear before the court that day. I was asked to tell the court what I knew about him since his arrest. I know Kwakye was tried. I was present. The

[p.964] of [1981] GLR 944 trial was held at Burma Camp. I am not sure but I think it was held before noon. The plaintiff’s file was brought and the charges preferred against him were read. I cannot remember from memory the charges. The court conferred among itself and after twenty-five to thirty minutes a verdict of guilty was returned. The charges were read by the prosecutor. I don’t know his name. He was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. They said it would be communicated to the A.F.R.C. for approval.

The plaintiff’s case was not the only case I witnessed. There were others tried in absentia. The court was composed of more than five. There were also stand-by members. They did not confer with other members. I am under oath of secrecy not to reveal the composition of the court.”

Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings confirmed that the files of all the persons tried in absentia on 20 September 1979 were placed before the council which reviewed or confirmed their convictions and sentences. Finally, the evidence of Capt. George Kofi Mfojoh to whom the list was handed over for publication, concluded the case of the defence.

As already observed, the plaintiff led no evidence. In my view, the defendant established the fact in issue that there had been a trial. The other issue whether the trial was in accordance with the relevant provisions is a question of law. Section 5 of A.F.R.C.D. 3 regulates the procedure of the special court. Subsections (6), (7) and (8) provides:

“(6) The evidence of any witness for the prosecution or the accused shall be given on oath [or] affirmation.

(7) The Court shall receive all relevant evidence in proof or disproof of a charge against the accused.

(8) The evidence of the prosecution shall be presented to the Court.”

Squadron Leader Segbefia’s evidence quite clearly showed that no witnesses were called and no evidence was led or presented to the court.

It may be argued that the tribunal short-circuited the proceedings because the accused was absent and that there was no point in going through the ritual of leading evidence when no one was present to cross-examine. That may well be so, but the A.F.R.C.D. 3 has prescribed the procedure to be followed. The amending Decree, i.e. A.F.R.C.D. 19 extends the jurisdiction of the special court to try, in addition, persons in absentia. The procedure laid

[p.965] of [1981] GLR 944 down was neither amended nor altered in the trial of persons in absentia. A.F.R.C.D. 19 gave no power to the court to abridge its procedures or to proceed in accordance with any other law unknown to our criminal jurisprudence.

I am not unmindful of the A.F.R.C.D. 3 (5) which gives statutory power to the special court to be guided in its procedures and decisions by the rules of natural justice. It is difficult, however, to comprehend how a court can be guided by the rules when it received no evidence before arriving at its decision. In my view, natural justice in the circumstance can only mean that the tribunal must do its best to act justly and to reach a fair decision after receiving evidence. In my view, the trial was defective and the tribunal violated the procedural rule in a manner which went to the root of its jurisdiction. If this was the end of the matter, the course open to me is clear. The trial, conviction and sentence are a nullity.

But the defence argues as a matter of law that, whether the trial was defective or even a nullity, it was intended to be a judicial act within the meaning of section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions and that the court’s jurisdiction is ousted by those provisions. The relevant sections are so important that it will not be amiss to reproduce it:

“(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

These provisions are entrenched by article 217 of the Constitution.

A review of the facts in this case leads me to only one conclusion that the proceedings were intended to be judicial proceedings. Its object was to try the accused and if found innocent, to acquit or if found guilty, to convict. The object of all proceedings constituting criminal trials is to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty. Even though I consider the trial, conviction and sentence of the plaintiff were a nullity because the trial itself did not match

[p.966] of [1981] GLR 944 up to the criteria set by A.F.R.C.D. 3, s. 5, nonetheless. I hold the view that it was a purported trial, a fortiori, a “purported judicial action.” The word “purported” is not a term of art. Its ordinary meaning includes “the specious appearance of being, intending, claiming”: see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Chambers’s Twentieth Century Dictionary puts it more bluntly—”outward appearance, guise, as conveying an impression.” The decision of the special court on the evidence before us was confirmed by the A.F.R.C. and became conclusive and final.

I do not wish to express any views on the policies or the rationale behind the relevant transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. It is sufficient to observe that there might be a number of innocent persons languishing in jail who by reason of this decision, will never have the opportunity of vindicating their innocence. It is a sad reflection on our infant democracy. I can only hope that a way will be found to clear the innocent.

It is for these latter reasons that I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim stands dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.S.C.

On 24 September 1979, the people of Ghana adopted, enacted and gave to themselves a new Constitution, referred to these days as the Third Republican Constitution. By article 114 (1) and (5) of the Constitution, the judicial power of the State was vested in the judiciary comprising the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which constitute one Superior Court of Judicature and such other inferior courts and traditional courts as Parliament may by law establish.

Under article 11 8 (1), the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.

(a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of [the] Constitution; and

(b) where a question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under [the] Constitution.

And article 1 (2) provides:

“1. (2) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.”

Then article 2 (1) states that:

[p.967] of [1981] GLR 944

“2. (1) A person who alleges— (a) that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment, or (b) that any act or omission of any person, is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

Article 21 (1) (a) also provides:

“21. (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except as may be authorised by any law in any of the following cases, that is to say, (a) in execution of the sentence or order of a Court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted.”

By virtue of these constitutional provisions, the plaintiff, Benjamin Samuel Kofi Kwakye, invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and sought a declaration in the following language:

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979. (A.F.,R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff as published in the national press on 13 October 1979 is an infringement of the plaintiff’s fundamental human rights, inconsistent with Chapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, void and of no effect.”

To substantiate his case, the plaintiff filed a statement of his case in which he deposed that until 5 June 1979, he was the Inspector-General of the Ghana Police. He ceased to hold that post when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took over the reins of government in this country. On 4 June 1979, he was involved in a very serious motor accident in Accra and, as he had been removed as the Inspector-General of Police, he found it embarrassing to go to the Police Hospital or the 37 Military Hospital for treatment. Instead, he travelled to Togo for treatment.

He stated further that on 21 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. announced on the radio that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and, sentenced by the special court established under A.F.R.C.D.

[p.968] of [1981] GLR 944

3 and that the details of the trials would be published later. The radio announcement was published by the newspapers the next day. The plaintiff was listed as one of the persons tried in absentia. No details of the trials were published until 13 October 1979 when the press published a list of 51 persons who were said to have been sentenced by the special court indicating the sentence of each convict. The plaintiff had been sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.

The plaintiff maintained further that he was not given any prior notice of his trial or of the charges preferred against him. The plaintiff is still out of the country because he is a wanted convict. Briefly, he is not free to return to Ghana. He therefore seeks the declaration already mentioned.

The defendant, the Attorney-General, in an earlier objection filed relied on the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), which required a plaintiff to give the State one month’s written notice of his intention to commence the action. This court overruled the objection and ordered the defendant to file a statement of his case: see [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C. The gist of that statement was that the plaintiff was tried in absentia after he had failed to report to the A.F.R.C. as demanded by radio announcement and press release. All members of the then Supreme Military Council (known as S.M.C. II) were particularly requested to report to the A.F.R.C. The plaintiff was a member of S.M.C. II. Subsequently, the A.F.R.C. decided to try in absentia all those who had failed to report.

Furthermore, the defendant maintained that the actions of the A.F.R.C. took place before the Constitution, 1979, came into force and therefore the provisions of the Constitution cannot be given retrospective effect and invoked to govern matters that transpired before the Constitution came into force. The defendant then relied on sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution and maintained that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s action.

The task before this court is simply what is the meaning of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions?

Section 15 states:

“ 15. (1) It shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any action or take any decision or order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings instituted against the Government of Ghana or any person acting under the authority of the

[p.969] of [1981] GLR 944

Government of Ghana whether before or after the coming into force of this Constitution or against any person or persons acting in concert or individually to assist or bring about the change in government which took place on the twenty-fourth day of February, 1966, on the thirteenth day of January, 1972 and on the fourth day of June, 1979 in respect of any act or omission relating to or consequent upon, (a) the overthrow of the government in power before the formation of the National Liberation Council, the National Redemption Council and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; or (b) the suspension of the Constitution which came into force on the twenty-second day of

August, 1969, or any part thereof or the abrogation thereof; or

(c) the establishment of the National Liberation Council, or the National Redemption Council or the Supreme Military Council which took office on the ninth day of October, 1975, the Supreme Military Council established on the fifth day of July, 1978 or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; or

(d) the exercise referred to in section 16 of this Schedule; or

(e) the establishment of this Constitution.

(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and accordingly, it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to. make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.

(4) It shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to entertain any action instituted in respect of any act or omission against any person acting or omitting to act, on the instructions or authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or any member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and alleged to be in contravention of any law, whether substantive or procedural, in existence before or during the administration of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”

[p.970] of [1981] GLR 944

It seems to me that the only pertinent clauses of section 15 that require interpretation are 15 (1) (d), (2) and (3).

Now what is the exercise that is referred to in section 16? The marginal note reads “Preservation of Confiscations and Penalties imposed by A.F.R.C. in relation to purging exercise.” That section reads:

“16. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property, and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under any Decree made by that Council in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the Military and to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.”

The crucial words in this section are “any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under any Decree made by the Council . . . shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.” This means that the confiscation or the penalty imposed is final and no authority under the Constitution is at liberty to interfere with the confiscation or the penalty imposed. “No authority under the Constitution“ would mean not only the three arms of government, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary but also any other institution or office created or established by the Constitution and vested with powers to do anything under the Constitution. Section 16 has been classified as a transitional provision. Perhaps it would have been better if it had been inserted under a sub-title—”The eternal and perpetual provisions.” Briefly, it reminds one of the well-known dictum—Roma locuta, causa finita—Rome has spoken and the matter is finished.

But the Constitution itself has provided that it is the Supreme Court that speaks. It is the Supreme Court that interprets and enforces the Constitution. That is why the plaintiff has come to the Supreme Court. It is therefore incumbent on the Supreme Court in interpreting and applying section 16, to ensure that the grievance or complaint before it was done by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Furthermore, the court had to ensure that there was a Decree governing the action complained of, because section 16 emphatically refers to [p.971] of [1981] GLR 944

“under any Decree made by that Council.” It follows that, if the confiscation of property or the penalty was not done under a Decree made by the council, then the confiscation or penalty can be reversed by any competent authority. Therefore the existence of a Decree governing the complaint is a sine qua non for ousting the jurisdiction of any constitutional authority.

Now what is the Decree relied on by the defendant? The. relevant Decree in this case was A.F.R.C.D. 3 made on 4 June 1979 and was deemed to have come into force on the same day 4 June 1979. It was given retrospective or retroactive effect and was made applicable to offences committed during the preceding thirteen years, that is, since 24 February 1966. It is entitled Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979, and has three clauses in its preamble, namely:

“WHEREAS the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council is committed to a house-cleaning policy within the Armed Forces:

AND WHEREAS in the said house-cleaning it is necessary to institute criminal proceedings against persons who have committed certain fraudulent acts against the State; and also persons who have generally contributed to economic hardships and disorder in the country:

AND WHEREAS it is necessary to set up special courts to deal expeditiously with any such cases . . .”

The composition of a special court was made up of a President and four other members appointed by the council. A special court was to have a judge-advocate with the duties and functions of a judge-advocate sitting at a General Court Martial. The Decree required the decision of the special court to be either unanimous or by a majority of four to one. Every decision was subject to review and confirmation by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Fourteen offences, some of which hitherto unknown in this country, were made triable by the special court. The penalty for any of the specified offences was (a) death by firing squad or imprisonment for not less than three years and (b) the confiscation of assets found by the court to have been illegally or dishonestly acquired by the accused. Under A.F.R.C.D. 3, the trial should be conducted in the presence of the accused. Subsequently, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.19), empowered the court to try the accused in absentia—a procedure completely alien to the established procedure in criminal jurisprudence in this country. A.F.R.C.D. 3, s. 5 also laid down the procedure to be followed:

[p.972] of [1981] GLR 944

“(a) the charge or charges shall be read to the accused by a prosecutor who shall however not make any submissions;

(b) the accused shall plead to the charge or charges;

(c) the court shall call such witnesses as the accused may request to be called, whose attendance can, having regard to the exigencies of the times, reasonably be procured;

(d) the evidence of any witness for the prosecution or the accused shall be given on oath or affirmation;

(e) the court shall receive all relevant evidence in proof or disproof of a charge against the accused;

(f) the evidence of the prosecution shall be presented to the court;

(g) the court shall permit the accused to cross-examine any prosecution witness; and (h) the prosecution and the accused shall have a right to address the court before the decision of the court.”

And finally, inter alia, the court shall in its procedures and decisions, be guided by the rules of natural justice. I must remark that the draftsman or the draftsmen must have overlooked one fundamental rule of natural justice when trial in absentia was introduced by A.F.R.C.D. 19, namely, the audi alteram partem rule—the other party must be heard. How can the rules of natural justice be observed when the accused is not to be heard?

The plaintiff was out of the country and could not be present at the trial. He did not know the charges preferred against him and could not tell who composed the court and what procedure was followed. What he subsequently knew was what was announced on the radio and published in the national newspapers. He had no means of ascertaining what happened but his stand has been that he was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court. The defendant in his statement filed, indicated that he would call three witnesses to prove that the plaintiff was tried, convicted and sentenced by a special court and that the penalty was reviewed and confirmed by the A.F.R.C. as required by A.F.R.C.D. 3. The first witness was the former Chairman, Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings who stated that he was not present at the trial but he had so many documents to sign and if the name of the plaintiff appeared on the list of persons sent to him for his signature, then the plaintiff must have been tried. His case was reviewed and confirmed. The second witness was Captain Mfojoh who testified that he was the Press Secretary to the A.F.R.C. and he was the officer who signed the press release in connection with the various sentences imposed.

[p.973] of [1981] GLR 944

He was certain that he got the information published from the former chairman. The third witness, Squadron Leader Segbefia, revealed that when the plaintiff was confined in cells at Burma Camp, he complained of illness and so he arranged for his admission the Military Hospital. Later the plaintiff vanished with his military escort and have not since been found. As a result of the plaintiff’s escape, he was ordered to appear before a special court at Burma Camp to explain the absence of the plaintiff at the trial. Briefly, this is his narrative of what took place at the trial.

“The trial was held at Burma Camp. I am not sure but I think it was held before noon. The plaintiff’s file was brought and the charges preferred against him were read. I cannot remember from memory the charges. The court conferred among itself. After twenty-five to thirty minutes a verdict of guilty was returned . . . The charges were read by the prosecutor. I don’t know his name. He was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. They said it would be communicated to the A.F.R.C. for approval . . . The court was composed of more than five. There were also stand-by members. They did not confer with other members. I am under oath of secrecy not to reveal the composition of the court.”

Thus in answer to questions by the court he stated that:

“The panel read the file. It contains a dossier. They read from it and then conferred. It is correct that the trial was not open to the public . . . All the S.M.C. members were tried in June but plaintiff was not considered, so I cannot tell precisely when it took place. About two or three were writing. Since this case I have not seen any document on the trial. The record would have been disclosed to the convening authority—in this case it is the A.F.R.C.”

I must confess that this is the first time that I have come across criminal conviction based on a mere perusal of the prosecution’s case without reliance on any sworn evidence. Squadron Leader Segbefia is the only witness who has testified that he was present at the plaintiff’s trial in absentia. He was candid enough to say that he has not seen any record of proceedings in respect of the trial and if there was any record, it should have been or might have been transmitted to the convening authority. So far no record of the proceedings has been tendered in evidence in this court.

Three pieces of documentary evidence were tendered: exhibit A, a warrant of commitment to undergo sentence; exhibit B, a

[p.974] of [1981] GLR 944 letter dated 12 November 1979 listing 51 persons convicted in absentia by the special court and exhibit C a letter dated 5 December 1979 signed by the chairman of the special tribunal requesting the Inspector-General of Police to cause the names of the 51 convicted persons to be published, in the Police Gazette. I have no hesitation in describing exhibits B and C as totally inconclusive pieces of evidence which do not establish any trial, conviction or sentence. What about exhibit A? The signature of the judicial officer is undecipherable and the signatory was not called to give evidence to establish that the warrant was issued as a result of a written order or judgment of the special court. Exhibit A does not prove a trial, a conviction or a sentence. It is an authority issued to the prison officer to receive a convicted person in a named prison where the sentence is to be carried into execution according to law. If the convicted person challenges the legal basis of the warrant, I think it is the duty of those who issued the warrant to adduce written evidence of the trial, conviction and sentence, otherwise the warrant would have been issued without lawful authority.

It seems that in the absence of the written order of the special court and the final written confirmation by the A.F.R.C., it would be unsafe to rely on exhibits A, B and C only. Why do I think that a record of the verdict, conviction, sentence and confirmation is necessary? In Ghana, it is only in customary arbitration that the arbitrators are at liberty to testify orally in court as to how the arbitration was conducted and as to what was the award which should bind the parties. In all other cases, judgments whether in civil or criminal cases, have been evidenced by the production of a certified true copy of the order or judgment. It is not open to a spectator in court, or a witness in the case to come to court and testify as to the trial and the judgment. Our system of jurisprudence is a developed and civilised one. In proceedings where the life of a human being or the liberty of a human being is involved, the courts have always insisted on strict proof that a man has been deprived of his life or liberty according to law. By strict proof, I mean the production of written documents from a court of law establishing the lawfulness of that deprivation of life or liberty.

Furthermore, in criminal jurisprudence, there is a special plea called “autrefois convict.” This plea is open to an accused who maintains that he has been previously convicted of the offence with which he is charged and the test is whether the prisoner has been convicted of an offence which is the same or practically the same offence as that with which he is charged. I shall attempt to demonstrate why I think the production of a written record of the

[p.975] of [1981] GLR 944 charges, the verdict, the conviction, the sentence and the confirmation would have been conclusive. On the warrant, exhibit A, the following offences are stated:

(a) the acquisition or obtaining of any loan., property, material, promise, favour, or advantage whatsoever or by any person who uses, abuses or exploits his official position in any public service;

(b) illegal or dishonest acquisition of property by a public officer, citizen of Ghana or other person resident in Ghana;

(c) intentional or reckless misapplication of or cause of loss or damage to public property;

(e) intentional or reckless dissipation of public property; and

(h) doing any act with intent to sabotage the economy of Ghana.

Some of these offences are unique and cannot be found in the criminal code. But take the office “dishonest acquisition of property or reckless dissipation of public property.” Each is an offence under our criminal statutes. An A.F.R.C. convict who has been tried in absentia and sentenced cannot verify the particulars of the offence because there is no record of it. If he is subsequently charged under the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), with stealing the same property for which he was convicted by the special court in absentia, he is. at liberty to plead autrefois convict. But how does he satisfy the test laid down when he relies on this plea? Is he to call for the prosecution’s dossier at the special court to verify the particulars before he can plead autrefoils, convict? If the. dossier is not available and the record of proceedings cannot also be traced, he is at the mercy of the court. He will be tried again for the same offence and punished for the second time—an action that clearly will be contrary to our highly developed system. of criminal jurisprudence. Nevertheless, I am compelled to accept the evidence of the three witnesses. Their evidence was not challenged or contradicted. I have no reason to disbelieve them and I am not at liberty to say that I take their evidence cum grano salis. I cannot reject their evidence without giving reasons.

The defendant has drawn the attention of the court to the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, especially sections 15 and 16 to which I have already referred. The thrust of his argument can be found in the words of section 15 (2) and (3) of the provisions. I shall deal first with section 15 (3) which I quote again:

“(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to

[p.976] of [1981] GLR 944 in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

I must make it clear now that as the record of proceedings in the special court is not before this court, no temptation has come my way to find out whether the procedure laid down in A.F.R.C.D. 3 and A.F.R.C.D. 19 have been followed. Even if the temptation had offered itself, I would have resisted it because the words of the subsection are clear—procedural matters in the special court should not be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever and no court is at liberty to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of procedural irregularities. I do not therefore consider myself competent to ascertain whether the procedure laid down in A.F.R.C.D. 3 and A.F.R.C.D. 19 were followed. I am debarred from considering such matters and I hereby refuse to consider this aspect of the matter.

Section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions provides:

“(2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

The operative words in the section are “no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. . . shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever.” The plaintiff in this case is not complaining about any executive action or legislative action. He maintains simply that he was not tried, convicted and sentenced by the special court. If that is the case, then the A.F.R.C. confirmed nothing. In other words, no judicial action was taken before sentencing him to 25 years.

In my view, section 15 (2) does not say that a person aggrieved by any executive, legislative or judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C. shall not file any papers in court. It does not say that the registrar should not accept the papers. It does not say that the court should not look at the papers. It does not say that the court should not hear counsel. The true meaning of section 15 (2) appears to be that whenever the court is satisfied that the A.F.R.C. took or purported to take an executive, legislative or judicial action, then that court shall not question the validity, the correctness, the fairness or the justice of that decision or action. Simply, the court should not [p.977] of [1981] GLR 944 interfere. The court should leave alone the decision or action as taken by the A.F.R.C. That is what the section means.

But it seems to me it is imperative that the court should satisfy itself that the action was taken by the A.F.R.C. If it was not taken by the A.F.R.C. then the court has jurisdiction to question that decision. I shall give an example. Suppose on 4 or 5 June 1979, two or three soldiers forcibly seized the car of a motorist on the Dodowa road and immediately afterwards changed not only the colour of the paint work of the body, but proceeded to register the car under new registration letters and numbers. After 24 September 1979, the motorist with the assistance of the police found the car by its chassis and engine numbers and retrieved the car from one of the soldiers who took part in the raid. Would it be open to this soldier to plead section 15 (1) and (2) of the transitional provisions? Surely, he must be asked to satisfy the court that when he and his colleagues seized the car they were acting under the instructions of the A.F.R.C. The court would insist on satisfactory proof of these instructions. When the court demands proof of the instructions, the court is not thereby questioning the legality or the lawfulness of the seizure; the court merely wants to satisfy itself that the seizure was the executive action of the A.F.R.C.

I shall give another example: In the recent case of Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 664, S.C. this court took evidence on the publication or otherwise of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42) and held that the original Decree signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. was valid but what was published was not what the chairman signed. A date of commencement had been inserted after the Constitution, 1979, came into force by a person who had no legislative power to do so. The original signed by the chairman had no date of commencement. The court held the original to be the legislative action of the A.F.R.C. and did not question its contents or validity. What the court (by a majority) did was to hold the original Decree (although without a date of commencement) to be valid and to declare the Decree published several weeks after the Constitution came into force to be void and of no effect because someone had tampered with the original.

In the present case, the documentary evidence and oral evidence taken so far have been necessary in order to satisfy the court that a judicial action has been taken by the A.F.R.C. and as such the court should not question that action. As I said earlier, this court is not at liberty to deal with procedural irregularities committed by the special court in view of the express prohibition contained

[p.978] of [1981] GLR 944 in section 15 (3). I have also pointed out how judgments and court orders are proved in this country. The defendant has not tendered either the court proceedings, the court orders or the order of confirmation of the conviction and sentence to enable this court to decide that there has been a judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C. Accordingly, one could argue that section 15 cannot debar the court from questioning the conviction and the decision. The irresistible temptation that comes the way of any reasonable fair-minded person in such a situation is to hold that there has been no proof of any judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C. against the plaintiff.

But then the verb “taken” is not the only word used in the section. There follows it the words “or purported to have been taken,” in other words, a purported judicial action. In his written representations, the defendant stressed that the word “purported.” was deliberately inserted in section 15 (2) for a purpose. In his own words:

“No doubt the framers of the Constitution must have anticipated that after the dust has settled down after the A.F.R.C. rule, persons adversely affected by the acts of the A.F.R.C. may question the validity of such acts, hence the insertion of the word ‘purported’ to forestall any such challenges.”

I must point out that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate such a thing. Before the A.F.R.C. seized power the framers of the Constitution had already presented their final draft. One of my brothers here with me on the bench this morning was the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and he anticipated no such thing. I think it would be fair and more accurate to say that the A.F.R.C. and their political mentors and legal advisers anticipated such a thing. It was the A.F.R.C. that promulgated the Constitution by the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 24.) Indeed one of the clauses in the preamble to that Decree reads:

“AND WHEREAS the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council considers it expedient to promulgate the Constitution submitted by the Constituent Assembly subject to such changes as it deems necessary in the public interest . . .”

The A.F.R.C. anticipated challenges and decided to forestall them. Anyone who reads the final draft submitted by the Constituent Assembly will not see some of the clauses now in section 15 and in fact will not see the whole of section 16. When the final draft was submitted to the then Supreme Military Council, nobody’s

[p.979] of [1981] GLR 944 assets had been confiscated by the special court and nobody had been tried by special courts either in his presence or in his absence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. There was no question of preserving anything—confiscation of property or penalties.

Section 16 is a unique section. It was not in the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969, because the military and police regime of the National Liberation Council did not find it necessary to purge either themselves or to undertake any house-cleaning exercise before handing over to a civilian government. On the other hand the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, by the promulgation of A.F.R.C.D. 3, announced to the whole world that it was committed to a house-cleaning policy within the Armed Forces and that it had become necessary to institute criminal proceedings against persons who had committed certain fraudulent acts against the State and persons who had generally contributed to the economic hardships and disorder in the country. As such the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had found it necessary to set up special courts to deal expeditiously with such cases.

These special courts functioned under A.F.R.C.D. 3 and A.F.R.C.D. 19 before the Constitution, 1979, came into force but it appears to me that the intention throughout had been to prevent the ordinary courts of the land from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the proceedings and decisions of the special courts. A.F.R.C.D. 3, s. 2 (4) and (5) provided:

“(4) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Special Court that has been reviewed and confirmed or otherwise varied by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

(5) It shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any act or proceedings whatsoever for the purpose of questioning any decision, judgment, findings, order or proceedings of any Special Court convened under section 1 of this Decree; and for the removal of doubts, it shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any application for an order or writ in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or quo warranto and declaration in respect of any decision, judgment, findings, order or proceedings of any such court.”

In effect, the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts was expressly ousted by A.F.R.C.D. 3. s. 2 (4) and (5). Section 16 of the transitional provisions is clearly a follow-up of section 2 (4) and (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3, and contains a mandatory injunction addressed to any authority under the Constitution, 1979, to refrain from reversing any confiscation or penalties imposed by the A.F.R.C. under a Decree.

Nevertheless, as the judicial power of the State

[p.980] of [1981] GLR 944 is vested in the judiciary with powers to supervise the activities of all inferior or subordinate courts, the political and legal advisers of the A.F.R.C. must have found it absolutely necessary to single out the ordinary courts of the land for special treatment in section 15 (2) and (3) because they and the council must have anticipated a plethora of court proceedings questioning or challenging the legality and the validity of these confiscations and penalties. Their strategy was simply to debar the ordinary courts from interfering, and their trump-card was article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, which reads:

“217. The transitional provisions specified in the First Schedule to this Constitution shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution.”

Sections 15 and 16 are contained in the transitional provisions and effect must be given to them. How were the ordinary courts singled out for special treatment? Section 15 (2) not only prevented the courts from questioning any judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C. but also any judicial action purported to have been taken by the council. Judicial action will include regular and irregular action because section 15 (3) prevents the ordinary courts from questioning procedural irregularities. However, the legal advisers and draftsmen must have realised that not only are the ordinary courts capable of springing surprises in accordance with legal principles but also, that the lawyers are capable of utilising their ingenuity to such an extent that the unpredictable becomes predictable; and I suspect that the case of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L. was not overlooked by the draftsmen. In that case a “purported determination” by the commission was declared null and void on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The learned law lords were divided three to two in favour of the appellant and upheld the decision of Browne J. in the High Court. I have had the opportunity of reading the House of Lords decision which runs into 110 pages but I do not think that that case, although a monumental decision, is relevant in the present case before this court. In that case, the House of Lords was dealing with the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court when an Act of Parliament contained an “ouster clause,” to the effect that “the determination by the commission of any application made to them under that Act shall not be called in question, in any Court of Law.” The word “purported,” was variously used in some of the judgments but nowhere was the word “purported” legally defined.

[p.981] of [1981] GLR 944

The plaintiff in the present case has invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and not the supervisory jurisdiction of the court. Both parties rely on this court to interpret and enforce the Constitution. The plaintiff wants his fundamental human rights of freedom under the Constitution to be enforced. The defendant wants sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provision, to be enforced. I have therefore not found it necessary to consider how the word “purported” has been used in other contexts. I shall confine myself to the context in which it has been used in section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions. The word purported is no magic wand, no incantation, no juju. It is an ordinary English word. When one says “what is the purport of his speech or action?” We understand the sentence to be “what is the meaning or sense of his speech? or what did he intend his action to be?” That is all. The former chairman of the A.F.R.C. and Squadron Leader Segbefia testified emphatically before this court that the persons listed in exhibit B were tried by the special court and sentenced. The procedure followed by the court was narrated briefly by Segbefia. What did that special court intend to do, and, in fact, did in the presence of Segbefia while the plaintiff was absent? The answer is that they intended to try the plaintiff in absentia by relying on his file under A.F.R.C.D. 3 as amended by A.F.R.C.D. 19. Whether or not the special court followed strictly the procedure laid down by A.F.R.C.D. 3, it is not open to any court in this land to question what they did. It seems to me therefore that there is evidence of a judicial action purported to have been taken against the plaintiff by the A.F.R.C. under A.F.R.C.D. 3 as amended by A.F.R.C.D. 19. Considerations of want of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, errors of law or fact on the face of the record have been rendered totally irrelevant by sections 15 (2) and (3) and 16 of the transitional provisions. The effect of these sections can best be ascertained by taking into account the political antecedents of the present Constitution. Our political leaders had to negotiate with those who had seized power in connection with their handing over to a civilian government and the reinstatement of our liberties. These political facts are so notorious that they should not be judicially overlooked. The courts have been prevented from conducting any transillumination into the affairs of the A.F.R.C. And I think the matter should rest there.

It should be noted that all the offences with which the plaintiff was charged are within the jurisdiction of the special court under section 3 (1) of A.F.R.C.D. 3—the specified offences triable by the special court. The court was also at liberty to try the plaintiff in absentia. Segbefia testified that no oral evidence was adduced

[p.982] of [1981] GLR 944 by any witness but the court read the file or the dossier in respect of the plaintiff and after conferring for about twenty-five to thirty minutes, the court pronounced its verdict. No doubt in this country, such a procedure in a criminal trial appears to be unorthodox, unprecedented and unconventional; but it seems to me that where a preamble has enjoined a special court to try cases expeditiously in the midst of oaths of secrecy, considerations of orthodoxy, precedence and convention would inevitably be discarded. An independent observer may not approve of what took place but then the Constitution itself, through its transitional provisions, has given its blessing to such purported judicial actions and has debarred the ordinary courts from questioning any judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. In my view, the Constitution does not say that with the mention of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions, every judicial knees shall bend; the Constitution only says that where there is evidence of judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. then every court in the land from the highest to the lowest shall keep its mouth shut, close its eyes and refuse to hear. Nevertheless, the ordinary courts can derive comfort and consolation from the dictum that quiescence is not necessarily acquiescence.

I would therefore hold that although there is no clear and conclusive evidence of a regular judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C., yet there is unchallenged and uncontradicted evidence of a judicial action purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. against the plaintiff. Accordingly, this court is not at liberty to question the proceedings in the special court that tried and sentenced the plaintiff in absentia. Under section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions, it is also not lawful for this court to grant the declaration sought by the plaintiff. The intention behind sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions is to make the executive, legislative and judicial actions taken or purported to have been taken by the former A.F.R.C. judicial appeal-proof, judicial review-proof and judicial interference-proof till eternity. The Constitution 1979, itself through the transitional provisions have exculpated these special courts from all irregularities and illegalities allegedly perpetrated by them and the judiciary has been rendered powerless. Whether this is one of the prices the people of Ghana had to pay in order to regain civilian rule I do not know. Perhaps, those who negotiated with the soldiers would be in a better position to answer that question. It is not my business to dabble in politics and I propose to clip the hand of reticence over my lips.

Since no temporal laws prevail in perpetuity but these laws are subject to mutability and have no pretensions to immortality, [p.983] of [1981] GLR 944 perhaps, some day, a just solution would be found outside the courtroom to this heart-rendering and seemingly intractable constitutional dissonance. For it is clearly incongruous to proclaim in grandiloquent and sonorous style in a written constitution that the judicial power of the State is vested in the judiciary and that no organ or agency of the executive or legislature shall be given any final judicial power, and then in the same document to enact, in defiant and revolutionary parlance, without any sense of compunction, that for the avoidance of doubt certain judicial actions which might infringe fundamental human rights under the Constitution should be regarded as final outside the constitutional framework of the judiciary. Is doubt being avoided or generated in the mind of the ordinary man in the street who is under the impression that the judiciary is his protector under the Constitution? Surely, such a man is bound to be stupefied by such constitutional catachresis; but who is to bear the blame? Is it the judiciary or somebody else? I need not answer the question, When a written constitution is cluttered up with contradictions and inconsistencies under the aegis of the perjorative word “notwithstanding,” one begins to wonder whether the court can truly interpret and enforce the Constitution in only one spirit of the Constitution. As matters stand now, it appears that the Constitution has not only one spirit but a duality or plurarity of spirits simply because judicial finality in certain matters does repose in two separate diametrically opposed spheres. Here, the draftsman is not at fault because he acts on instructions. Constitutional idealism is a goal we must constantly pursue but so long as it continues to elude us, we must be prepared to live with constitutional imperfections; afterall the Constitution was made by man who is not omniscent or infallible.

Finally, it is my duty to uphold the Constitution. 1979, as I see it and in the circumstances of the present case, I can only discharge that duty by dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.S.C.

The plaintiff was the Inspector-General of Police on the eve of the 4 June 1979 coup d’etat which toppled the Government of S.M.C. II and replaced it with that of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.). By his writ in this action, he invoked the original jurisdiction of this court and sought:

“a declaration that he was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree. 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years,

[p.984] of [1981] GLR 944 imprisonment imposed upon him as published in the national press on 13 October 1979 is an infringement of his fundamental human rights, inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana void and of no effect.”

The accompanying statement of the plaintiff’s case contained a narrative of events prompting the institution of his action. On 21 and 22 September 1979, the mass media carried an A.F.R..C. report that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3 and that details of the trial would be published later. The plaintiff was listed as one of the persons so tried and sentenced in absentia. The promised details of the said trial in absentia were not published and by the time the A.F.R.C. left office on 24 September 1979 no details of the trial had been published. The plaintiff’s statement of case continued:

“5. On 13 October 1979, the national newspapers published what was described as ‘a press release issued yesterday by the erstwhile A.F.R.C.’ The said press release contained a list of 51 persons who were said to have been sentenced by the special court of the A.F.R.C.

6. By the said press release (of 12 October 1979), the plaintiff was listed as one of 25 persons who had been sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment.

7. The plaintiff says that the A.F.R.C. had ceased to exist as from 24 September 1979, and could not have been in a position to issue a press release in October 1979.

8. The plaintiff says further that the A.F.R.C. had ceased to exist on 24 September 1979 with the coming into force of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council special court was in no position to try the plaintiff or sentence him in October 1979.

9. The plaintiff also says that, even if it were claimed that he was sentenced prior to 24 September 1979, which is denied, the plaintiff says he was not given any prior notice of any charges pending against him before the special court; nor was the plaintiff warned to appear before the special court to stand his trial on any particular day at any particular time.

10. The plaintiff will contend at the trial of this action that the purported trial of the plaintiff on a date sub

[p.985] of [1981] GLR 944 sequent to 24 September 1979, is an infringement of the plaintiff’s fundamental human rights, contrary to natural justice, inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 6, art. 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979 void and of no effect.”

In his answer (or statement of the defendant’s case) the defendant stated, inter alia, that it was in pursuance of the aims and purposes of the A.F.R.C. revolution—to be found in the preamble to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3)—that several persons both in military and civilian life including members of the S.M.C. II were tried and convicted under the said Decree (A.F.R.C.D. 3). Those who failed to respond to the public invitation carried in the media to appear for their trials were tried in absentia under powers conferred on the special court by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 19). The plaintiff, having failed to give himself up, was arrested but he complained that he was sick. He was therefore admitted at the 37 Military Hospital under armed escort. However, “on 10 June 1979, the plaintiff escaped from the hospital together with the armed escort and they have not been seen again in Ghana. In paragraphs 11-13., the defendant gave the following particulars of the plaintiff’s alleged trial and committal. I will set these para graphs out in extenso:

“11. The plaintiff, among others was so tried (i.e. in absentia) and a warrant of commitment to undergo sentence, No. A.F.R.C. 4 dated 20 September 1979, was issued for him to be lodged in the Nsawam Prison, to serve his sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour; copy of the warrant is attached as exhibit A.

12. A letter Ref. No. ST 15 dated 12 November 1979 from the office of the special tribunal established by the A.F.R.C. under A.F.R.C.D. 23 transmitted the warrant of commitment, among others, to the Inspector-General of Police, requesting him to execute the warrant as soon as the plaintiff is arrested or returns to the country; a copy of the letter is attached as exhibit B.

13. In a subsequent letter Ref. No. ST 15 dated 5 December 1979, the chairman of the special tribunal wrote to the Inspector-General of Police following up the earlier letter (exhibit B) to publish the names of the persons tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia and in doing so to follow the list given in exhibit B. The plaintiff is

[p.986] of [1981] GLR 944 included in the list-copy of this letter attached as exhibit C.”

In two later paragraphs—17 and 18—the defendant contended that “the plaintiff is barred from instituting this action and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain same by virtue of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution;” and that “the plaintiff has no right of action under the provisions of the Constitution and that the action is misconceived.”

From the above summary of the pleadings, the following principal issues stand out for determination:

(i) whether or not the plaintiff was tried in absentia, convicted and sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment by the A.F.R.C. special court;

(ii) whether in terms of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979—any “judicial action” has been taken or “purported to have been taken” by the A.F.R.C. or its agents against the plaintiff;

(iii) whether the ouster clauses in section 15 (2)-(4) of the transitional provisions are applicable to this case;

(iv) whether section 16 of the transitional provisions is also applicable to this case.

I propose to deal with these principal issues in turn and also to cover other subsidiary issues along the way. I turn first to the main factual question whether or not the plaintiff was tried in absentia, convicted and sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment by the A.F.R.C. Special Court.

The first issue for trial.

The plaintiff, who has been out of the country at all material times, denies having ever been tried in absentia or convicted or sentenced, as is otherwise alleged by the defendant, the principal legal adviser of the government. From the respective positions adopted by the parties in their pleadings, the defendant bore the burden of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue of a trial in absentia having been held resulting in the conviction and sentence of the plaintiff to that term of 25 years’ imprisonment as positively alleged by him, but strenuously denied by his adversary. The existence of a trial in absentia, conviction and sentence involving the plaintiff is essential to the defence being relied upon by the defendant in this case. Section 14 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323) states:

“14. Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each

[p.987] of [1981] GLR 944 fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.”

Additionally, the burden of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a finding against him on this factual issue of a trial in absentia having been held in respect of the fugitive plaintiff leading to his conviction and sentence also rests on the defendant. Section 17 of N.R.C.D. 323 which deals with the allocation of burden of producing evidence, enacts:

“17. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof.

(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to that fact.”

In the situation in which the parties find themselves in this case, with the plaintiff having sought safety in flight in the wake of a coup d’etat and therefore not being physically present to face his alleged trial, while the defendant, virtute officio, is constitutionally responsible for the initiation and conduct of all prosecutions of criminal offences and is the principal legal adviser to the government and has access to all confidential official documents, .it is perhaps fair, just and expedient that the defendant should be saddled with the obligation of producing evidence of the alleged trial, conviction and sentence on which his defence rests, and has been challenged by plaintiff.

What evidence of the plaintiff’s alleged trial, conviction and sentence has been produced in this case? I ask. The defendant in the discharge of his burden of producing evidence called three witnesses in all—Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Chairman of the erstwhile A.F.R.C., Captain George Kofi Mfojoh, who was the Press Secretary to the A.F.R.C., and Squadron Leader Abraham Armstrong Segbefia, who described himself as “the administrative officer in charge of complaints during the A.F.R.C. regime.”

Having been sworn on the cross, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings explained that during the administration of the A.F.R.C., of which he was chairman, special courts were established to try certain offences under A.F.R.C.D. 3. He continued, “I cannot give you the specifics; but I know they were tried. The trial of the S.M.C. members executed was incomplete.” When cross-examined by the Solicitor-General, as to whether he knew whether Benjamin Samuel Kofi Kwakye was tried, he replied “If his name is on the final list, then he was tried.” Capt. G. Mfojoh was Public Relations Offi

[p.988] of [1981] GLR 944 cer of A.F.R.C. and he had signed the press releases containing the final list.

After an unproductive interlude; during which the Solicitor-General failed to put in Mfojoh’s alleged press release in evidence through Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, the latter, continued his evidence in-chief thus:

“I am not personally aware that there has been a trial in the case of B. S. K. Kwakye. (The emphasis is mine.)

If the document comes from an A.F.R.C. source, then it must be authentic. The names and sentences would be contained in document sent to me for review and confirmation. I accepted the names and sentences submitted to me for confirmation. The A.F.R.C. reviewed and confirmed sentences passed by the special courts. This applied to both those who were tried in person and in absentia.”

In answer to this court’s question whether he was aware that the plaintiff was tried or somebody mentioned it to him, the witness replied that there were documents from the special court on the trial. The documents contained names of convicts, their offences and sentences. “If there was something else,” he added, “I cannot recollect.”

Under cross-examination, it was suggested to Flt.-Lt. Rawlings that the trial of Kwakye never went beyond the pre-trial team (Pit.) and he replied that “you get the truth on the issue if you go to the proper place—the Jail Break Commission.” When pressed for his reason for saying that the plaintiff was tried, the witness replied in his inimitable manner, “Beautiful, you want me to throw my mind back. When the record says that it was dealt with and part of it was the press release.”

In answer to the court’s question whether he could give specific details about Kwakye’s case without reference to the documents, the witness replied, “No, I cannot.” Finally, he explained that when he stated in his evidence-in-chief that the trial of those S.M.C. members who were executed ‘was incomplete, he meant that they had not completed investigations into their assets.

The next witness called by the defendant was Capt. George Kofi Mfojoh, the former Press Secretary to the A.F.R.C. He was responsible, as he explained in his testimony, for issuing press releases and organising press interviews. “I usually got my information from various sources including the A.F.R.C.”—he added. On being shown a press release dated 23 September 1979, he identified his signature thereon and admitted his authorship of that particular press release, which was then tendered in evidence accep-

[p.989] of [1981] GLR 944 ted and marked exhibit SC. 3. Incidentally, this turned out to be the only document tendered in evidence at this trial. He claims to have obtained his information for this press release (exhibit SC. 3) from the Chairman of the A.F.R.C., Flt.-Lt. Rawlings himself. The last sentence of this release stated that “a Decree giving effect to the sentence will be published soon.” The A.F.R.C. incidentally handed over the reins of government to the in-coming civilian administration of Dr. Limann the very next day; that is a notorious fact not subject to reasonable dispute and of which I take judicial notice.

The last witness of the defendant was Squadron Leader Abraham Armstrong Segbefia, the administrative officer in charge of complaints during A.F.R.C. regime. In that capacity, he received complaints from both civilian and military persons. If found genuine, the complainants were sorted out into various cells. In the course of his work, he claims to have handled matters involving the plaintiff. He instructed that the plaintiff be taken to the 37 Military Hospital after complaining of illness upon arrest. On later discovering his disappearance from the hospital, he reported to the A.F.R.C. He continued his evidence, “I was not a member of the special court. I was invited by the special court in relation to the plaintiff’s escape.”

He duly explained the steps taken to arrest the plaintiff, his hospitalisation and subsequent escape. The next portion of his evidence-in-chief deserves reproduction:

“I know the plaintiff was tried. I was present at his trial. The trial was held at Burma Camp. It was before noon. I cannot remember the date of the trial. His file was brought and charges were read from investigations carried out by special people. I cannot remember the charges read. The court deliberated upon the issue and then passed sentence. They consulted each other for about twenty-five minutes and announced sentence. The charges were read by a prosecutor. I do not know him. He was found guilty and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour, subject to review and confirmation by the A.F.R.C.—to be communicated to A.F.R.C. for approval. The only people present there were the court members and the prosecutor. There were more than five people. The stand-by members did not take part in the trial.”

Under cross-examination. this witness could not be exact about how many people took part in the trial. “Not more than four or five” he disclosed. Asked about the witnesses called at the trial, he replied:

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“there was no witness before the special court under the first charge. There was a file on him (i.e. absent plaintiff) and the court gave verdict on the strength of the file . . . to my knowledge those who sat on the case were not responsible for the preparation of the file on the plaintiff. It was a secret trial because the public were not admitted to it.”

Finally, under cross-examination, he stated that he did not know about the documents of the trial. The record would be disclosed to the convening authority, i.e. the A.F.R.C.

The question must now be asked whether the defendant’s evidence taken in its entirety amounted to proof of either “a judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. or its agents” against the plaintiff? Proof is defined by the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), as “the establishment by evidence of a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.” (The emphasis is mine.) Speaking for myself, I hold that the entire evidence in this case does not amount to proof of any judicial action taken or purported to have been taken against the plaintiff. In the first place, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. was not personally aware that there had been a trial in the case of the plaintiff. He could not give us the “specifics.” He relied completely on documents on the matter which to his knowledge exist but which were unfortunately not tendered in evidence. He was candid enough to divulge in evidence—without any prompting whatsoever—that in the case of the S.M.C. members who were executed their trial was incomplete, the investigation into their assets not having been completed. If it is realised that “the acquisition or obtaining of any loan, property, material . . . favour or advantage whatsoever by any person who uses, abuses or exploits his official position in any public services” constitutes an offence under section 3 (1) (a) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 triable by the special court, then the assets of an accused person become a vital matter for investigation; and unless such an indispensable inquiry is completed, then the erstwhile chairman is obviously right in his observation about the premature execution of those S.M.C. members he mentioned. Be that as it may, the plaintiff, though an S.M.C. member, is alive and fighting his case in this the highest court of law of the land. Here we are guided by the law of evidence.

Once we are told by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. himself that documents exist on the plaintiff’s trial; then the best evidence rule of the common law enacted in section 165 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C. D. 323), requires the production of the relevant

[p.991] of [1981] GLR 944 original writing to prove the content of the writing and secondary evidence is inadmissible, save of course in certain exceptional cases which will be shown to be inapplicable to this suit.

Section 165 of N.R.C.D. 323 enacts, “Except as otherwise provided by this Decree or any other enactment, no evidence other than an original writing is admissible to prove the content of a writing.” An “original” of a writing is defined by section 163 (1) as, “the writing itself or any copy intended to have the same effect by the person or persons executing or issuing it.”

The rationale underlying the best evidence rule is that human recollection and oral description is sufficiently subject to error to make men place more trust in written material than in recollection or oral description of that writing. By this rule the law declares its preference in favour of the original writing over other evidence where the original is available. In many circumstances, convenience will require relief against this cautious rule, and so exceptions are made for lost materials and other writings which are in practice unavailable. In other circumstances, copies are so likely to be accurate that they themselves can be relied on and so “duplicates and copies of official records are excepted.” See Commentary on the Evidence. Decree, 1979, p. 124 under section 165.

It was not the case of the defendant that all the original documents in the plaintiff’s case were lost or had been destroyed or were judicially unavailable. Had that been the case and the loss or destruction not been procured by the fraudulent act of the proponent of the evidence, then evidence other than the original writing or record of proceedings of plaintiff’s alleged trial would have been admissible: see section 167 of the Evidence Decree, 1975. In support of Flt.-Lt. Rawlings’ contention that there were documents on the plaintiff’s case, Squadron Leader Segbefia also testified that he observed the panel members writing as the alleged trial proceeded and that at the end, a written report was submitted to the A.F.R.C.

Furthermore, the defendant with all the facilities and resources of the State at his command, could have produced copies of official records of the “trial” duly certified to be correct by the custodian or other person authorised to make and authenticate the certificate; or else copies testified to be correct by a witness who had compared them with the original could have been tendered in evidence: see section 175 of the Evidence Decree, 1975.

This was not a case where the contents of the original writing had been admitted by the defendant’s adversary whether in writing or by testimony in the action. The plaintiff’s alleged trial was a bone of controversy between the parties; and the plaintiff made

[p.992] of [1981] GLR 944 no admissions with respect to any original writing tending to prove it. Hence, the exception dealing with admission by the opponent introduced by section 173 of N.R.C.D. 323 to the best evidence rule is inapplicable.

On the whole of his evidence, I find that Flt.-Lt. Rawlings himself had no personal knowledge of the alleged trial of the plaintiff and he could not vouch for such a trial having taken place, speaking from his own memory and apart from the relevant records which were not produced in court. He was honest and truthful when he testified-in-chief that he was not personally aware that there had been a trial in the case of B. S. K. Kwakye.

Turning to the second witness, I hold that his evidence was not admissible to establish the plaintiff’s trial: his press release merely retailed hearsay information gleaned from unspecified sources and does not prove the truth of the matters stated therein. In so far as he relied on the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. for his information, his release was not a reliable or trustworthy first-hand account of any trial witnessed by him; and since the chairman was also dependent on undisclosed records which were not tendered in evidence, the second witness’ press release constitutes hearsay upon hearsay and is therefore inadmissible to prove the truth of the alleged trial in this court of law.

Even though Squadron Leader Segbefia claimed to have witnessed the trial in absentia of the plaintiff, the evidence he adduced did not in my judgment prove a trial or any judicial action taken or purported to have been taken. His belief or opinion that such a trial actually took place is in law irrelevant since that is the very issue for the court’s objective ascertainment; it being a question of mixed fact and law. A panel of “four or five” is alleged to have read from a file prepared by persons unknown. Whether in fact the said file dealt with Kwakye’s case or not I cannot tell since the file was not tendered in evidence and its contents remain a mystery. What guarantee is there that the said file had anything to do with the plaintiff’s case? None whatsoever! Furthermore, this witness heard no evidence being adduced; yet section 5 (7) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 requires in mandatory terms that the “Court shall receive all relevant evidence in proof or disproof of a charge against the accused;” while section 5 (8) stipulates that “the evidence of the prosecution shall be presented to the Court.” Under section 5 (11) “where at the close of the case for the prosecution there is no evidence to support the charge against the accused he shall be acquitted.” Clearly, on Squadron Leader Segbefia’s own showing, no evidence was adduced against the absent plaintiff and the court was legally bound to acquit him. A file which had not been tendered

[p.993] of [1981] GLR 944 is no evidence for the purpose of this trial; and in the absence of any other piece of admissible evidence, I hold that the prosecution’s case was not presented before the special court.

If, as recounted by Squadron Leader Segbefia, the panel that conducted the alleged trial “was four or five,” then it lacked jurisdiction if in fact only four sat; since by-law a special court shall comprise a president and four other members: see section 1 (2 of A.F.R.C.D. 3. If indeed only four sat, then the court acted without jurisdiction ab initio and its acts are null and void. It is not a mere procedural irregularity saved by section 15 (3) of the transitional provisions. In any event, the evidence that the court sat “four or five” raises a serious doubt as to its competency. If it sat four, it acted without jurisdiction and its decision is a nullity in law.

For reasons already stated, I hold that Squadron Leader Segbefia’s evidence about the alleged trial is inadmissible; it offends against the best evidence rule enshrined in section 165 of the Evidence Decree, 1975; “no evidence other than an original writing is admissible to prove the contents of a writing”—in this case, the extant but untendered record of proceedings and the related file covering the alleged trial cannot in law be replaced with Segbefia’s oral evidence.

In sum, I hold that the evidence adduced by the defendant in its entirety does not amount to proof of the trial in absentia of the plaintiff. It fails completely to induce in my mind any credence in the alleged trial of the plaintiff; and I reject it as inherent incredible; and inadmissible for offending the hearsay and best evidence rules. In the event, I hold that there has been no proof of any judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. or its agents.

In the absence of a trial, it follows in my judgment that there was no conviction or sentence of the plaintiff in absentia. Even though the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. swore that there were documents dealing with these matters, yet the defendant in this trial failed to produce them in evidence or account for their non-production or being himself within any of the well-known exceptions to the best evidence rule. Pleadings, unless admitted, are no substitute for the proof of controverted issues of fact. It was no discharge of the defendant’s burden of producing evidence to allude simpliciter to some documents and even exhibit one document, in his pleading. Since the plaintiff did not admit in writing or evidence, the attached but untendered exhibit A, it forms no part of the admissible evidence in this case and is of no probative value.

[p.994] of [1981] GLR 944

Treating the said exhibit A purely as an unadmitted pleading, I would comment that as a document, it carries no guarantee of its genuineness or accuracy of its contents. Not having been put in evidence, its accuracy or truth has not been tested by cross-examination. Since the contents of the document are in issue, the plaintiff having denied ever being convicted or sentenced by an A.F.R.C. special court, it behoved the defendant to have called either its author or the official responsible for its custody to testify that it is kept in proper custody and to certify to the correctness of the copy: see section 175 of the Evidence Decree, 1975. In the event, no admissible proof of the alleged conviction and sentence of the plaintiff has been adduced in evidence.

The general rule of evidence is that where the proof of judgments and convictions is not covered by express statutory provision, it is necessary to produce the actual record of the court that is alleged to have convicted a person and to call evidence identifying the relevant parties: see Cross on Evidence (3rd ed.), p. 540; Phipson on Evidence (11th ed.), para. 1734, p. 772-773 and section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), on the mode of proof of previous convictions or acquittals in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. As Phipson states in the passage quoted, “conviction cannot, however, where the record is in existence, be proved orally by a witness who merely heard it pronounced.” In this case we have the testimony of Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and Squadron Leader Segbefia that there is in existence a record of proceedings and a related file on the plaintiff’s alleged trial, conviction and sentence. Those documents were the best evidence required to sustain proof in this court of law of the challenged facts of trial, conviction and sentence—unless the defendant was able to bring himself within the well-known exceptions to the general rule already alluded to. This he failed miserably to do.

In his written address, the defendant invokes the rebuttable presumption that all official acts are deemed to have been regularly performed and relies on the untendered warrant of commitment (pleaded as exhibit A) to bolster up his allegation of the plaintiff’s trial, conviction and sentence. I am frankly not impressed. The state of the pleadings in this case, with one party (the defendant) alleging the positive averments of trial, conviction and sentence and with the other denying and challenging them, meant that strict proof of these allegations was called for by the proponent of those facts. The presumption expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta is rebuttable and might reasonably be drawn when the intention to do some formal act is established, when the evidence is consistent with that intention having been carried into effect

[p.995] of [1981] GLR 944 in a proper way; and when the actual observance of all due formalities can only be inferred as a matter of probability: see the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Republic v. Judicial Secretary; Ex parte Torto [1979] G.L.R. 444 at pp. 451-452; and the authorities cited thereunder. In the face of the negative, unsatisfactory and nebulous evidence called by the defendant which shows that things were not done as they should have been done, e.g. no sworn evidence being presented by the prosecution for the plaintiff’s trial, it would be an affront to commonsense and a miscarriage of justice to hold that presumably all things were done properly and with due formalities. The evidence—such as it was—points clearly to the contrary thereby rebutting the presumption of regularity.

Another invitation extended to us to take judicial notice of matters which ought to have been established by admissible evidence, will be firmly but politely rejected by me. Even though I recognise the utility of taking judicial notice where appropriate, the facts being so generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or so capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, judicial notice should not be taken of facts which are subject to reasonable dispute: see section 9 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323). It would be wrong in the light of these controverted issues of trial, conviction and sentence, to take judicial notice of these very contested matters.

Much reliance has been placed—wrongly in my view—in this case on media reports and press releases. While the press releases and media reports are presumed to be authentic and are admissible, yet in law they do not prove the truth of their contents. As I understand it, the correct legal position is that the existence, or otherwise, of media reports is as much a fact as the state of a man’s digestion; but when these media reports are resorted to in a trial for the purpose of proving the disputed facts of a trial or conviction or sentence of a person then they are hearsay and they carry no guarantee of their truth. Section 116 (c) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323) defines hearsay evidence as, “evidence of a statement, other than a statement made by a witness while testifying in the action at the trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (The emphasis is mine.) The fact pleaded by the plaintiff that he had notice of these media reports about his alleged trial, conviction and sentence in his foreign place of abode, does not render these media reports truthful. Neither did the plaintiff admit them to be accurate or truthful; otherwise he would not have instituted the present action. Once issue is joined on these disputed reports, their veracity or accuracy becomes vital issues for this court to

[p.996] of [1981] GLR 944 determine, applying the relevant rules of evidence. As far as the second witness’ press release (exhibit SC. 3) is concerned, he did not claim to have personal first-hand knowledge of the facts contained therein. He relied on other sources for his compilation and he could not personally vouch for the truth of the release. It is noteworthy that the last sentence of exhibit SC. 3 cautioned that “a Decree giving effect to the sentence will be published soon.” Alas, time did not permit this to be done; as the A.F.R.C. left office the next day.

The second issue

Before leaving the facts of the case, I would briefly attempt a definition of the phrase “judicial action taken or purported to have been taken” by the A.F.R.C., etc. occurring in section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions. It was contended in the defendant’s written address that the trial, conviction and sentence of the plaintiff by the A.F.R.C. special court amounted to a judicial action or a purported judicial action of the A.F.R.C. Reliance is placed on the definition in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed.), of “purport” to mean “to be intended to seem.” It follows therefore, it is contended, “that whether or not the laid down procedures were adopted with regards to the trials, they should still be deemed to be judicial acts of the A.F.R.C. and therefore cannot be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever.” Learned counsel surmised that the word “purported” was inserted for the purpose of forestalling any challenges by persons adversely affected by the acts of the A.F.R.C. There are, in my considered view, several objections to this line of argument.

In the first place, the relevant passage has been misquoted by the learned Solicitor-General. The correct quotation is in section 13 (2): “no . . . judicial action taken or purported to have been taken” and not as erroneously stated by learned counsel as “judicial action or a purported judicial action.” The word purported qualifies “to have been taken” and not “judicial action.” The phrase may be comprehensively stated thus: “no judicial action either taken or purported to have been taken.” In my view, there must first be a “judicial action, which is either taken or purported to have been taken.”

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1944 ed.) defines “to purport” as “to convey to the mind;” “to mean;” “to imply;” “to profess or claim by its tenor;” while it defines the noun “purport” as “tenor;” “import;” “effect;” “meaning” “sense;” “outward bearing.” Aided by these alternative dictionary definitions, I would put the following construction on the words under consideration:

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“no judicial action which is either taken or has the effect of having been taken.”

I received some persuasive judicial support for my construction from the interpretation placed on the word “purports” in Joseph v. Joseph [1966] 3 W.L.R. 631, C.A. by Lord Denning M.R. at p. 637 and by Russell L.J. at p. 642. The enactment under consideration was section 38 (1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954 (2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 56), which provides that any agreement relating to a tenancy under part II of the Act (business, professional and other tenants) shall be void in so far as it “purports” to preclude the tenant from making an application or request under the Act. Lord Denning M.R. held at p. 642:

“The word ‘purports’ as used in subsections (1) and (2) of this section does not mean ‘professes.’ It means ‘has the effect of.’ The agreement to surrender is void, therefore, in so far as it has the effect of precluding the tenant from applying for a new lease.”

Russell L.J. at p. 642 confined his construction of the word “purports to” to the context of the case and arrived at the meaning “to have as its effect.” He preferred this meaning since the statement was avoiding an agreement and therefore is presumably aimed at its effect.

In the instant case, the word “purported” occurs in an ouster clause which seeks to protect, inter alia, judicial actions of the A.F.R.C. or its agents, whether completely taken or appearing to have been so taken. Provided the facts disclose a judicial action, it is protected from being assailed as a general rule, no matter the stage reached in its execution on the commencement date of the transitional provisions, i.e. 24 September 1979.

For a definition of the word “action” I turn to a useful and comprehensive one given in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 1 at p. 2:

“An ‘action,’ according to the legal meaning of the term, is a proceeding by which one party seeks in a court of justice to enforce some right against, or to restrain the commission of some wrong by, another party. More concisely it may be said to be “the legal demand of a right,’ or ‘the mode of pursuing a right to judgment.” It implies the existence of parties, of an alleged right, of an alleged infringement thereof (either actual or threatened), and of a court having power to enforce such a right.

In its wider meaning the term includes both civil and criminal proceedings . . . It is, however, generally used in a more restricted

[p.998] of [1981] GLR 944 or popular sense as denoting a civil action commenced by writ or plaint.”

Having regard to the conclusions already reached by me on the facts in dispute in this case, perhaps, the proper construction to be placed on the word “purported” is not crucial since in my finding there was no proof of a judicial action properly so-called—on account of the absence of any evidence presented by the prosecution at the alleged trial and due to the failure of the defendant to put in evidence at the trial in this court the vital documents, e.g. charges, and the confirming order he relied on for his defence. Consequently, the argument about “purported” becomes of a lessened importance and is of little or no practical consequence in this case.

The third issue

The third principal issue concerns the ouster clauses in section 15 (2)-(4) of the transitional provisions and their applicability to this case. I here reproduce them in full:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.

(4) It shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to entertain any action instituted in respect of any act, or omission against any person acting or omitting to act, on the instructions or authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or any member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and alleged to be in contravention of any law, whether substantive or procedural, in existence before or during the administration of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”

The defendant contended that the above sections operated as an effective and complete ouster of the plaintiff’s action and therefore it must be dismissed in limine. Full legal argument was heard on the issue and in an unanimous, reserverd ruling dated 2 March

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1981, we held that we had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. While admitting that section 15 (2) is very widely couched, we nevertheless held that as the plaintiff sought relief which this court is prima facie entitled to grant, the defendant who claims that this court’s jurisdiction is ousted by the enactment must provide a factual basis for it. “We held that, the defendant must produce facts which show that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or purported to have taken action against the plaintiff”: see [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C.

In view of the length of this judgment and my findings on the facts, I propose to comment only briefly on this third issue of the ouster clauses. For the sake of clarity, I will summarise my views on the ouster clauses in the ensuing ten paragraphs:

(i) Section 15 (2)-(4) as well as section 16 and section 15 (1) (d) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, are not the handiwork of the Constituent Assembly which was entrusted with the task of drafting a Constitution under the Constituent Assembly Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 203).

The Constitution drafted and submitted by them to the government of the day did not contain the above-mentioned provisions. These enactments were added by A.F.R.C. and their advisers. This is not to be interpreted to mean that these later additions are illegitimate. They are constitutionally valid; since A.F.R.C., the then government, considered it “expedient to promulgate the Constitution submitted by the Constituent Assembly subject to such changes as it deems necessary in the public interest”: see the fourth preamble to the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 24).

(ii) The Constitution of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 8), s. 2, after tracing the recent history of Constitution making in Ghana, enacted that the Constitution submitted by the Constituent Assembly, subject to the right of A.F.R.C. to introduce amendments, as set out in the schedule to the Decree shall be the Constitution by which Ghana shall be governed. This A.F.R.C.D. 8 was issued on 14 June 1979 and given a commencement date of 1 October 1979.

(iii) A later Decree—A.F.R.C.D. 14, Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Commencement)

Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 14), however, brought the said commencement date forward to 24 September 1979 which was stipulated to be the commencement date for the Constitution, set out in the Schedule to A,F.R.C,D. 8.

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(iv) A still later Decree—(A.F.R.C.D. 24)—the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979—enacted that the Constitution shall come into force on 24 September 1979 (section 2); and by section 5, A.F.R.C.D. 24 was made to replace A.F.R.C.D. 8: “The provisions of this Decree (A.F.R.C.D. 24) shall replace all the provisions of the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 8), and accordingly, the said Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 8), shall cease to have effect.”

(v) A comparison of the Schedule to A.F.R.C.D. 8 with the Schedule to A.F.R.C.D. 24 discloses that the latter schedule embodying the present Constitution, 1979, introduced, inter alia, important new provisions—sections 15 (1) (d), (2)-(4), 16 and 17 of the transitional provisions to mention but a few instances of variations and innovations, for which the A.F.R.C. and their advisers are solely responsible.

(vi) Clauses (2)-(4) of section 15 of the transitional pro- visions constitute ouster clauses tagged on to an indemnity section which otherwise virtually reproduces the indemnity section of the Constitution, 1969—section 13 (3) of the transitional provisions.

(vii) The underlying policy and rationale behind the said new constitutional additions made by the A.F.R.C. in sections 15 (2)-(4), (1) (d), 16 and 17 in particular, is to ensure the finality and non-reversal of actions taken or commenced by that revolutionary government in its house-cleaning exercise and campaign to purge the Armed Forces, their accomplices and the nation at large of corruption and other malpractices detrimental to the national economy and to the public interest: see in particular section 16 of the transitional provisions.

(viii) As can be seen in the preamble to the Constitution, 1979, drafted by the representatives of all sections of the community, the Constitution is intended to secure for the present and future generations of Ghanaians, “the blessings of liberty and prosperity;” and is firmly buttressed on “Freedom and Justice” (our National Motto); sovereign will of the people being the mainspring of all powers of government; the principle of universal adult sufferage; the rule of law; and the protection and preservation of fundamental human rights, unity and stability of our nation. Chapter 6—dealing with the fundamental human rights—and chapter 4—enshrining the directive principles of state policy are of particular importance in this connection.

[p.1001] of [1981] GLR 944 (ix) The canon of construction of ouster clauses in enactments at common law is that, “The right of the subject to have access to the courts may be taken away or restricted by statute, but the language of any such statute will be jealously watched by the courts and will not be extended beyond its least onerous meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension”: see per Scrutton J. in Re Vexatious Actions Act, 1896; In re Boaler [1915] 1 K.B. 21 at p. 36, C.A. cited in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 9 at p. 353, para. 825 entitled “ouster of jurisdiction.” To the same effect is the dictum of Evershed M.R. in Goldsack v. Shore [1950] 1 All E.R. 276 at p. 277 where he said, “the jurisdiction of the King’s Courts must not be taken to be excluded unless there is clear language in the statute which is alleged to have that effect.” A leading text-writer describes the attitude of the courts to protective and preclusive or ouster clauses thus: Professor Wade in his Administrative Law (4th ed.), at pp. 566-567 said:

“Many statutes provide that some decision shall be final. The courts have made it a rule that such provisions cannot hamper the operation of judicial control . . . There is a firm judicial policy against allowing the rule of law to be undermined by weakening the powers of the court. Statutory restrictions on judicial remedies are given the narrowest possible construction, sometimes even against the plain meaning of the words. This is a sound policy, since otherwise administrative authorities and tribunals would be given uncontrollable power and could violate the law at will. ‘Finality is a good thing but justice is better’.”

Another constitutional expert, the late Prof. de Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed.), pp. 364-365 makes a similar point:

“A prominent characteristic of English public law has been the restrictive interpretation given by the superior courts to statutory formulae which, read literally, would have deprived them of their supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals and administrative bodies, a jurisdiction exercised principally by the award of certiorari to quash.”

(x) If it is conceded that the law-makers are acquainted with the state of the law and of the practice of the courts generally and that words employed by them in an enactment are

[p.1002] of [1981] GLR 944 intended to bear the familiar meaning usually accorded to them by the courts unless the context suggests otherwise, then I would begin our interpretation of the said ouster clauses, i.e. section 15 (2)-(4)—with the existing precedents on ouster clauses in decided cases, making due allowance for the actual words used, the general context of the enactments and the general underlying policy objectives and social goals.

The leading modern case law precedent in the commonwealth is undoubtedly Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, a decision of the House of Lords, which is of course not binding on us but is of the highest persuasive force. The commission was a judicial body responsible for distributing funds supplied by foreign governments to the British Government for the expropriation of British property abroad. It rejected a claim for some £4 million in respect of a manganese mine in the Sinai peninsula after the Suez hostilities of 1956. The reason was that the claimants had sold their undertaking in the United Arab Republic before the date of the treaty of 1959 under which the compensation fund was established, and that they did not therefore comply with a provision of the Order-in-Council, duly made under the Act, requiring that claimants and their successors in title should be British nationals at that date. But it was held that the commission were misled by “unfortunate telescopic drafting, and that the requirements about the nationality of successors in title did not apply where the original owner was claimant. This meant that the commission had entered into matters which it had no jurisdiction to consider and had imposed a condition which it had no jurisdiction to impose.

Consequently, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and the ouster clause was no impediment to the intervention by the court. The said ouster clause read, “The determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law.” Yet the determination of the commission was called in question for five years before three successive courts—before Browne J. at the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords; and in the end, the House of Lords granted a declaration that it was ultra vires and a nullity. All the five law lords unanimously held that the ouster clause did not protect a determination which was outside jurisdiction: while a majority of three to two held that the misconstruction of the Order-in-Council which the commission had to apply involved an excess of jurisdiction, since they based their decision “on a ground which they had no right to take into account”: see Lord Reid at p. 175, and

[p.1003] of [1981] GLR 944 sought “to impose another condition, not warranted by the order”: see Lord Wilberforce at p. 214.

Some dicta of Lord Reid on the unanimous holding that the ouster clause in question did not protect a determination which is outside jurisdiction and a nullity, are instructive and bear recall. He said: see [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at p. 170:

“Statutory provisions which seek to limit the ordinary jurisdiction of the court have a long history. No case has been cited—[at least 24 cases were cited]—in which any other form of words limiting the jurisdiction of the court has been held to protect a nullity. If the draftsman or Parliament had intended to introduce a new kind of ouster clause so as to prevent any inquiry even as to whether the document relied on was a forgery, I would have expected to find something much more specific than the bald statement that a determination shall not be called in question in any court of law. Undoubtedly such a provision protects every determination which is not a nullity. But I do not think that it is necessary or even reasonable to construe the word ‘determination’ as including everything which purports to be a determination—[note, incidentally, the phrase ‘purports to be’]—but which is in fact no determination at all. And there are no degrees of nullity. There are a number of reasons why the law will hold a purported decision to be a nullity. I do not see how it could be said that such a provision protects some kinds of nullity but not others: if that were intended it would be easy to say so.”

Lord Pearson in expressing his agreement added at p. 215, “I agree with them also that . . . ‘the ouster provision’ in section 3 (4) of the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, does not exclude the court’s intervention in a case where there is a merely purported determination given in excess of jurisdiction.”

This Anisminic decision has been subsequently followed in other cases by all our superior courts: see. e.g. Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133 C.A.; Republic v. Military Tribunal; Ex parte Ofosu-Amaah [1973] 2 G.L.R. 227 and on appeal [1976] 2 G.L.R. 5, C.A.; Republic v. Keta District Magistrate,. Ex parte Hedo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 459 and Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Forson [1980] G.L.R. 529 to name but a few.

In more recent cases, however, one notices a trend on the part of the highest English courts to give full rein to an ouster clause where the adjudicating body was acting within jurisdiction and had committed only an error of law within jurisdiction. It is diffe-

[p.1004] of [1981] GLR 944 rent if it has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice; or the decision has been procured by fraud in which cases the courts will intervene to uphold the rule of law and declare the inferior court’s decision a nullity notwithstanding the ouster clause: see for example South East Asia Fire Bricks v. Non-Metallic Union [1980] 2 All E.R. 689, P.C., where a Malaysian enactment that “no award of the Industrial Court of Malaysia shall . . . be quashed or called into question in any court of law” was upheld. Their lordships in that case ruled that in determining whether certiorari was still available to correct an error on the face of the record notwithstanding the ouster clause, a distinction was to be drawn between an error of law which affected jurisdiction and one which did not. Having regard, in particular to the fact that the Malaysian enactment in question had clearly intended to exclude certiorari by making the opinion of the Attorney-General on a question of law referred to him by the industrial court binding on the court, awards of the industrial court were not subject to review merely on the ground of error of law on the face of the record. Since the award was within the jurisdiction of the industrial court it followed that if it contained any errors of law on its face, the enactment effectively ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash the award by certiorari proceedings. Their Lordships rejected the suggestion of Denning M.R. in Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1979] 1 All E.R. 365 at p. 372, C.A. that the distinction between an error of law which affected jurisdiction and one which did not should be discarded; and were of the view that the dissenting opinion of Geoffery Lane L.J. (the present Chief Justice) stated the law correctly at p. 375 to wit, “ . . . the only circumstances in which this court can correct what is to my mind the error of the county court judge is if he was acting in excess of his jurisdiction as opposed to merely making an error of law in his judgment by misinterpreting the meaning of ‘structural alteration . . . or addition’.”

Reference may also be made to Re Racal Communications Ltd. [1980] 2 All E.R. 634, where the House of Lords explained the Anisminic decision and disapproved the decision in Pearlman case. A few other instances of nullity not saved by ouster clauses because the court or adjudicating body had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the case law at common law may be noted briefly, e.g. Ex parte Bradlaugh (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509, where a magistrate had to be satisfied with two named conditions before issuing a warrant of search but overlooked one of the said conditions and held the second condition precedent not having been examined, the magistrates order based on the first condition only was null and

[p.1005] of [1981] GLR 944 void for lack of jurisdiction despite the ouster clause; “no information, conviction or other proceeding before the magistrate shall be quashed or set aside adjudged void or insufficient for want of form or be removed by certiorari . . .” “The order now before us is defective in that it omits an essential element of jurisdiction . . .”: see (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 509 at p. 512 per Lord Cockbum C.J. Again in Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 417 at pp. 442-443, it was held that, despite an ouster clause taking away the certiorari remedy, either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or manifest fraud in the party procuring it entitles the court to intervene. It was there stated that objections on the ground of defect of jurisdiction may be founded on the character and constitution of the inferior court; the nature of the subject-matter of the inquiry or the absence of some preliminary proceedings which was necessary to give jurisdiction to the inferior court. And R. v. Cheltenham Commissioners [1841] 1 Q.B. 466 is an early authority for the proposition that an ouster clause has no application when the lower tribunal was not duly constituted; for it then acts without jurisdiction.

Applying the relevant case law on ouster clauses to the sections 15 (2)-(4) and 16 of the transitional provisions, I would accordingly hold that:

(a) These transitional provisions, do not constitute a complete ouster of the superior courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals enshrined under article 35 (High Court’s power to protect fundamental human rights by issuing appropriate prerogative writs and orders in cases of any contravention of articles 19 to 34 inclusive) and in articles 2 and 119 (the Supreme Court’s power to entertain declaration suits for the enforcement of provisions of the Constitution and its supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and adjudicating authorities respectively).

(b) In particular, where the alleged judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. or its agents is on its true construction, in fact a nullity, because of want or excess of jurisdiction of the adjudicating body, the jurisdiction of the superior courts is not taken away despite the said ouster clauses. Thus, if for instance a special court sat with four or fewer members in breach of the mandatory enactment fixing its lawful composition as comprising a president and four other members under section 1 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3, it would have acted without jurisdiction and taken no judicial

[p.1006] of [1981] GLR 944 action in law and its decisions would be a nullity in law and not protected by section 15 (2). These decisions would moreover not be saved by section 15 (3); because it is only when such a special court is lawfully constituted but has erred in procedure while acting within jurisdiction that its actions and decisions would be saved by section 15 (3) and (4). Another analogous example of jurisdictional defect would be any breaches of section 1 (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 prescribing the qualifications for membership of the special court as follows:

“(5) Every member of the Special Court shall— (a) be a Ghanaian;

(b) be an adult; and (c) be able to speak and read the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to enable him take an active part in the proceedings of the Court.”

Any proven disqualification under any of the three heads would suffice to disqualify the member and thereby reduce the mandatory quorum of five and render the special court’s actions and decisions null and void. Likewise, a decision of the special court which is reached by a majority of three to two or which is not subsequently reviewed and confirmed by the A.F.R.C. in breach of section 2 (1) and (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 respectively, would be null and void and not protected by the said ouster clauses. In either case an essential element of jurisdiction would be missing.

(c) Furthermore, where the alleged judicial action of the A.F.R.C. or its agents is really no judicial action at all, it is not protected by the said ouster clauses. In this connection, the test is not whether the alleged “judicial action has been taken or purported to have been taken;” for it must be only a “judicial action,” as defined supra. I am not here considering executive or legislative action, of course. Thus, if the alleged matter is in fact and law not a “judicial action” at all, then it does not come within the purview of the said clause 15 (2); for example, if no evidence was taken in an alleged trial before a special court then the mandatory provisions of section 5 (6), (7), (8) and (11) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 would have been violated and the resulting charade would not come under the rubric of “judicial action.”

(d) Again, fraud or collusion or a violation of the well-known rules of natural justice, if established, would suffice to take the case out of the ambit of the said ouster clauses in 15

[p.1007] of [1981] GLR 944

(2)-(4) in accordance with the common law just enunciated. In this connection, it would be recalled that section 5 (13) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 enjoins that the special court established “shall in its procedures and decision be guided by the rules of natural justice.”

(e) In this connection, forgery, if established, would suffice to render an alleged judicial action of the A.F.R.C. not in fact a judicial action of the A.F.R.C. at all. The situation here is analogous to that in cases of fraud. As an example, I would posit an alleged judicial action which on close examination of the available records turns out to be a forgery; either because it is proved not to be the “action” of the A.F.R.C. or its agents or else because it took place after the A.F.R.C. had left office on 24 September 1979 but the relevant records have been forged or misrepresented to make it appear that the action was taken by them between 4 June and 24 September 1979 during their tenure of office.

Fraud vitiates such bogus transactions and makes them a nullity in law.

(f) In short see in this connection this court’s decision in Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs on any valid ground that the law holds an action or proceedings to be a nullity, a “judicial action” would also be invalidated and the said ouster clauses would be of no avail.

(g) Finally, as the Supreme Court’s earlier unanimous ruling in the case dated 2 March 1981 demonstrates, we have jurisdiction notwithstanding these ouster clauses to investigate the factual basis of any contest as to whether the court’s jurisdiction is ousted by the said provisions and to determine the case on the merits—as indeed we have done in this very case without dissent.

The fourth issue

Section 16 of the transitional provisions presupposes the holding of a trial and a finding of guilt which is subsequently reviewed and confirmed by the A.F.R.C. by Decree. It is only when any confiscation of property and any other penalties have been imposed by the A.F.R.C. “under any Decree,” that section 16 of the transitional provisions comes into play. If, therefore, for example the A.F.R.C. did not pass such a Decree enforcing the confiscation of any specified property or imposing prescribed penalties before leaving office on 24 September 1979, section 16 is inapplicable. Here again, the jurisdiction of the court to entertain any action to determine whether any confiscation or imposition of penalties

[p.1008] of [1981] GLR 944 under an A.F.R.C. Decree was actually made or else is genuine and not vitiated by fraud or forgery is preserved notwithstanding the said enactments.

In conclusion, from the foregoing reasons I would answer the four stated issues for trial as follows:

1. No proof has been established in my judgment in this court of the alleged trial in absentia of the plaintiff or his conviction or sentence.

2. No proof has in my judgment been established of any judicial action either taken or purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. or its agents against the plaintiff. Neither has any evidence been adduced of any executive or legislative action against him at the material time, i.e. during their tenure of office.

3. The ouster clauses in clauses (2) to (4) inclusive of section 15 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, are inapplicable to this case; and the plaintiff’s action is accordingly not ousted by the said clauses.

4. Section 16 of the transitional provisions is likewise not applicable to the plaintiff’s case.

I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s case has been made out: that he was never tried or convicted or sentenced by any special court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3 as amended by A.F.R.C.D. 19; and that the alleged sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour allegedly imposed on him as published in the national press on 13 October 1979 has not been proved and is in law a nullity and an infringement of his fundamental human rights and inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution, 1979. I would so declare accordingly and grant the relief prayed in the writ.

Addendum The case law on ouster clauses contains several instances of defect or excess or want of jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal caused other than by defect in the composition of the tribunal, e.g. non-performance of a condition precedent going to jurisdiction, fraud, collusion, breaches of natural justice, forgery, etc. as has been set out already. Since writing my judgment, I have discovered that A.F.R.C.D. 19 was enacted to save any defect in the composition of the special court from rendering the special court’s action from being a nullity. I would accordingly delete all references, made by me in my judgment, to instances of defect in the composition of the special court as amounting to a nullity in view of A.F.R.C.D. 19, which has amended the common law in this regard.

[p.1009] of [1981] GLR 944

The saving made however, I stand by my general thesis on the ouster clauses and by the remaining examples of nullity given in my judgment.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.

The plaintiff, is seeking a declaration that he:

“was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon [him] as published in the national press on 13 October 1979, is an infringement on [his] fundamental human rights, inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979 [is] void and of no effect.”

The plaintiff was the Inspector-General of Police. On 5 June 1979, his appointment was terminated by the newly established Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. That council had successfully overthrown the Supreme Military Council in a coup d’etat. He claims that by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, the new government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, pledged to rule the people of Ghana in accordance with law and justice.

On 21 September 1979, the council announced on the radio, and the announcement was published in the national press on 22 September 1979 that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and that details of the trials would be published later. The plaintiff was alleged to be one of the persons so tried and sentenced in absentia.

The plaintiff claims that the details were not published as promised. On 24 September 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had left office. No details of the trials had been published by that date. On 13 October 1979, the national newspapers published what was described as “a press release issued yesterday by the erstwhile A.F.R.C.” The press release contained a list of 51 persons who were said to have been sentenced by the special court. The press release of 12 October 1979, listed the plaintiff as one of 25 persons who had each been sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment.

[p.1010] of [1981] GLR 944

The plaintiff contends that, with the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979:

(a) the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had ceased to exist as from 24 September 1979 and could not have been in a position to issue a press release in October 1979;

(b) the special court was in no position to try the plaintiff or sentence him in October 1979;

(c) even if it were claimed that he was sentenced prior to 24 September 1979 which is denied, he was not given any prior notice of any charges pending against him before the special court; nor was he warned to appear before the special court to stand his trial on any particular day [or] at any particular time; and

(d) his purported trial on a date subsequent to 24 September 1979 was an infringement of his fundamental human rights, contrary to natural justice, inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 6, article 26 of the Constitution, void, and of no effect.

The case for the defendant is that on 4 June 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council became the effective Government of the Republic of Ghana until it handed over power to a civilian administration on 24 September 1979. The aims and purposes of the revolution of 4 June 1979 and the taking over of power and the reins of government by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council were stated in the preamble to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3). In pursuance of those aims and purposes, several persons both in military and civilian life, including members of the government that had been overthrown—the Supreme Military Council—were tried and convicted under that Decree.

The defendant states that:

“4. The manner of invitation to face the trials was by radio announcements and press releases.

5. In particular, members of the Supreme Military Council Government were so invited to report to the A.F.R.C.

6. The plaintiff failed to respond to the call to report and was consequently arrested.

7. The plaintiff upon his arrest complained that he was sick and was accordingly admitted at the 37 Military Hospital under armed escort.

8. On 10 June 1979, the plaintiff escaped from the hospital together with the armed escort who was guarding him

[p.1011] of [1981] GLR 944 and he (as well as the escort) have not again been seen in Ghana.

9. The A.F.R.C. decided to try those who failed to report in absentia and announced this on radio and in the press.

10. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.

19), was made to give effect to the decision to try persons in absentia.

11. The plaintiff, among others, was so tried and a warrant of commitment to undergo sentence, No A.F.R.C. 4, dated 20 September 1979, was issued for him to be lodged in the Nsawam Prison to serve his sentence of 25 years . . .

12. A letter Ref. No ST. 15 dated 12 November 1979 from the office of the special tribunal established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 23), transmitted the warrant of commitment, among others, to the Inspector-General of Police requesting him to execute the warrant as soon as the plaintiff is arrested or returns to the country . . .

13. In a subsequent letter Ref. No. ST 15 dated 5 December 1979, the chairman of the special tribunal wrote to the Inspector-General of Police following up the earlier letter . . . to publish the names of the persons tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia and in doing so to follow the list given . . .”

The defendant contends that the essential matters complained of by the plaintiff were matters which occurred during the regime of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, and therefore cannot be said to be inconsistent with, or in contravention of, a provision of the Constitution which was not then in being nor in existence. And in all other respects, the defendant relies on the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979.

Section 15 (1) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, contains, in my view, the elements for its own interpretation. It sets out five conditions primarily regarding which it is operative. Any cause or matter falling outside the purview of those five conditions would not invoke that section. The five conditions, as stated in section 15 (1) (a)-(e) are:

“(a) the overthrow of the government in power before the formation of the National Liberation Council, the National

[p.1012] of [1981] GLR 944

Redemption Council and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; or (b) the suspension of the Constitution which came into force on the twenty-second day of August 1969 or any part thereof or the abrogation thereof ; or (c) the establishment of the National Liberation Council or the National Redemption Council or the Supreme Military Council which took office on the ninth day of October 1975, the Supreme Military Council established on the fifth day of July 1978 or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; or (d) the exercise referred to in section 16 of this Schedule; or (e) the establishment of this Constitution.”

Once any of these conditions are operative, the section can be called in aid. To invoke that section, an act or omission must relate to or be consequent upon any of those facts. When that is established, then and only then, can it be asserted as laid down by section 15 (1) that..

“15. (1) It shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any action or take any decision or order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings instituted against the Government of Ghana or any person acting under the authority of the Government of Ghana whether before or after the coming into force of this Constitution or against any person or persons acting in concert or individually to assist or bring about the change in government which took place on the twenty-fourth day of February, 1966, on the thirteenth day of January, 1972 and on the fourth day of June, 1979 . . .”

The mere flutter of the provisions would not do. That assertion, that calling in aid of section 15 (1) is dependent also upon other factors. These factors as set out in section 15 (2) are that the acts or omission complained of are each an: “executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council . . .” Section 15 (2) is not merely a definition or an explanatory provision; it embodies substantive provisions designed to reinforce the provisions of section 15 (1). For, it is only a government that, through its respective organs of State takes executive, legislative or judicial action. No individual as such individual, by himself, can clothe himself with authority to take an executive, legislative or judicial action.

The machinery of government involves its three respective branches—the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. And

[p.1013] of [1981] GLR 944 the use of the words “executive, legislative or judicial” in section 15 (2) clearly contemplates such governmental actions. Section 15 (1) uses the expression, “It shall not be lawful for any Court . . .” while section 15 (2) provides that any such act or omission:

“ . . . shall [not] be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

The use of the expression “shall not be questioned in any proceedings” in conjunction with the words “to make any order or grant any remedy or relief” to me is significant. It seems to me that it gives jurisdiction to this court. Reading section 15 (2) as a whole, I gather the impression that it must be established that the act or omission complained of must be an: “executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of the Council . . .” For, a court of law can only make an order or grant a remedy or relief when the facts of a particular case have been established. No court of law makes an order or grants any remedy or relief out of the blues. There must be evidence before a court, whether documentary or otherwise, upon which it makes an order or grants a remedy or relief.

This view is reinforced, I think, by the provisions of section 15 (3) which states that:

“(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

This means that defects in procedure should be disregarded. That means that the procedure has been followed but that there are defects in following the procedure as prescribed by law. The phrase “in accordance with” in section 15 (3) in the context in which the expression has been used would amount to this, that you have tried to follow the procedure but you have not done so in harmony or in agreement with what the procedure prescribed. That is the ordinary dictionary meaning of “in accordance with “ i.e. in harmony with, or in agreement with: see the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (5th ed.). “In accordance with” as used in section 15 (3), does not and cannot mean mere non-compliance. If that were so, quite a different language would have been used that would make it clear that non-compliance was intended.

[p.1014] of [1981] GLR 944

Section 15 (4) also states that;

“15. (4) It shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to entertain any action instituted in respect of any act or omission against any person acting or omitting to act, on the instructions or authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or any member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and alleged to be in contravention of any law, whether substantive or procedural, in existence before or during the administration of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”

The words “on the instructions or authority” in section 15 (4) are, again, significant: They mean, and can only mean in the context in which they have been used, that there must be proof that the act or omission occurred or was perpetuated as the result of an instruction given by or on the authority of, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or any member of that council. They mean and can only mean that, if the act or omission complained of was not on the instructions of that council or of a member of that council, section 15 (4) could not be invoked. They mean, and can only mean that, if there were instructions or there was an authority but not that of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or of a member of that council, the subsection would be of no avail. That again, demands proof of the authority of, or the instruction given by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or a member of that council.

All these are not in isolation. Section 15 must be read as a whole. When that is done it is clear that subsections (2) and (3) must be read together with subsection (1) and that subsection (4) would appear to stand on its own. But each of these subsections sets out the conditions which demand its assistance. The effect is that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not ousted but that a defence is provided. A defence which can be successfully raised.

Section 16 of the transitional provisions states:

“16. Notwithstanding anything [to the contrary] contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under any Decree made by that Council in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the Military and to

[p.1015] of [1981] GLR 944 deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.”

This section clearly implies that the confiscation or the penalty must have been ordered or imposed under a Decree made by the council. The Decree itself shall have been made in pursuance of the exercise to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft. The confiscation or the penalties must have been ordered as part of the exercise to purge the Armed Forces. It also implies that there are guilty members of the Armed Forces and also that persons who are not members of the Armed Forces shall have been guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both. Section 15 (1) (d) refers to the exercise referred to in section 16. The exercise referred to in section 16 is:

“ . . . the exercise undertaken by the Council to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and [the exercise] to restore the image of the Military and [the exercise] to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both . . .”

It must be shown then, that a plaintiff before this court:

(a) is an accomplice per se;

(b) that he is the accomplice of a guilty member of the Armed Forces;

(c) that, that guilty member of the Armed Forces is guilty of corruption or graft;

(d) that he is guilty of a malpractice;

(e) that, that malpractice operated to the detriment of,

(i) the economy of Ghana; or

(ii) the public interest; or

(iii) both the economy of Ghana and the public interest.

This is the law as I understand it.

Now what of the facts? Counsel for the defendant claims that the averments contained in paragraphs (3), (5) and (6) of the plaintiff’s statement of case are a sufficient proof that the acts or omissions complained of, constitute a judicial action which invokes the provisions of section 15, particularly subsection (2). Counsel for the defendant provided the answer to his own assertion. On the second day of the hearing of this suit, that is 9 February 1981, counsel for the defendant called the attention of the court to the day’s issue of one of our national papers dated “TUE., FEB. 10,

[p.1016] of [1981] GLR 944

1981 No. 9420.” There was a streamer headline, “NO COURT CAN HEAR APPEALS . . . Filed by A.F.R.C. Convicts—Djabatey.” He told the court that he had never said such a thing the previous day. There was also a picture with a caption bearing his name. That was not his picture. If such a thing could happen to counsel for the defendant, could it not have happened to any other citizen of Ghana? By that showing of counsel for the defendant, things are not what they seem to be. The moral of that lesson, so forcefully and graphically presented to this court, is that we must not accept as gospel truth or as the facts what the newspapers say. It also points to the dangers of placing so much reliance on newspaper publications and alleged radio announcements.

This is what the plaintiff stated by paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of his statement of case:

“3. On 21 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. announced on the radio (and the announcement was published in the national press on 23 September 1979) that 68 persons had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special courts established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts)

Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and that details of the trials would be published later. The plaintiff was listed as one of the persons tried and sentenced in absentia . . .

5. On 13 October 1979, the national newspapers published what was described as ‘a press release issued yesterday by the A.F.R.C.’ The said press release contained a list of 51 persons who were said to have been sentenced by the special court of the A.F.R.C.

6. By the said press release (of 12 October 1979) the plaintiff was listed as one of 25 persons who had been sentenced to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment.”

The first announcement mentions 68 persons who had been tried in absentia and sentenced by the special court. The second announcement deals with 51 persons who had been sentenced. There is a discrepancy. Again, one needs to have the facts established. And what about the details promised if one accepts that announcement or publication as the fact of the matter?

But then these allegations are relied on to establish the judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. I do not think that a court of law, such as the Supreme Court of this country, should be dazzled by such an assertion. I think I am permitted to take judicial notice of the fact that on 24 September 1979 the present Constitution came into force. The effect is that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had ceased from that date

[p.1017] of [1981] GLR 944 to be the government in this country. It had become functus officio. It had ceased to exist.

By virtue of the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, an Executive President was in office by that date. The Parliament of Ghana was also in being by that date. Could a body which had ceased to exist by that date issue a press release on 12 October 1979 as is alleged as if it were the government of this country? Some nineteen days after its demise?

Is it really being suggested that after 24 September 1979, there were two governments of, and within this country? Does the Constitution which came into being on that day contemplate such a situation? Did it provide for such a situation? Does it allow it? And since it did not so allow it are not those acts illegal? Or does the transitional provisions allow the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to carry on the administration of this country after that date?

Then there is the averment in the statement of the plaintiff’s case that:

“9. The plaintiff also says that, even if it were claimed that he was sentenced prior to 24 September 1979, which is denied, the plaintiff says he was not given any prior notice of any charges pending against him before the special court; nor was the plaintiff warned to appear before the special court to stand his trial on any particular day at any particular time.”

If one accepts what have been stated in paragraphs 5 and 6, should not what is stated in paragraph 9 be also accepted? What is the basis, what is the rationale for accepting the one and rejecting the other? If paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 imply that there was a judicial action, paragraph 9 is saying that there was no judicial action. So there is an issue to be determined whether there has been a judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council such as would invoke the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution.

This is a very important case. It is obvious that all the available facts and particulars, documentary and otherwise, the arguments of counsel and the law relied on, both statutory and otherwise, shall be made available to this court. The reason is not far to seek: The Supreme Court is the final arbiter in these matters as far as the administration of justice is concerned.

Every available information is thus required to be placed before this court. The law, no less than the arguments. The facts, no less

[p.1018] of [1981] GLR 944 than the particulars. It is absolutely essential that in an important case, such as this one, the facts and all the particulars of the facts are placed before us to enable us “enrich our knowledge and enlarge our understanding.” For it seems to me that there is the need to bring the law into conformity with the test of conscience in an important case such as this one. The vagaries of this test should strengthen our hands in resolving questions which in other spheres would be settled by means other than legal. There is the need to create a status—venerable if we like—which would reveal not merely the power of the government and of the governed—and the judiciary is a unit of government—but also an expression of an authority superior to all of us here today—the idea and the ideal of justice and the supremacy of the Constitution.

I do not by this presume to deny the existence of certain circumstances of our day and age. But I do recognise an essential continuity of the law based upon the basic principles of justice. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council came into being on a key-note of correcting the injustices in our society. At least so they proclaimed. The cornerstone of their faith was not lawlessness and brigandage. The council did not come into being to perpetuate injustice. The excesses of a legitimate action can be understood as such. But is lawlessness an excess of a legitimate action?

Once the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council became the effective government of the day, its actions became legitimate. As Sir John Harrington once said in of Treason (Bk. IV No. 5) at p. 76: “Treason doth never prosper . . . For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.” The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, is quite explicit on the need for lawfulness. The chairman and the thirteen other members of the council who signed that Proclamation, thereby pledged their faith in the rule of law and adhered—to me, irrevocably—to the expediency that: “. . . due provision should be made by law for the proper administration of Ghana and for the maintenance of law and order.” These are their words, not mine. These words ring a bell. And one is reminded of a similar sentiment in the United States Constitution, “. . . in order to establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility.” And the significance of such sentiments in a fundamental law.

“Law and order” are no mere words in a document such as that Proclamation. For when the council suspended the Constitution, 1969, and issued that Proclamation, that Proclamation had taken the place of the Constitution, 1969—but for the time being. That Proclamation thus became the grundnorm—the standard of values—if not the Constitution—by which the council would

[p.1019] of [1981] GLR 944 go on about its business of holding the reins of government which it had assumed on 4 June 1979.

The expression “due provision should be made by law” in the recital to the Proclamation implies that the Proclamation became the fundamental law of the country. That Proclamation was law. The basic law. The foundation upon which the superstructure of the edifice of government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council would be established.

Law and order and the maintenance thereof, are no mere sentiments. Even though these words reflect, in their context, a revolutionary fervour of the time, the Proclamation can rightly be regarded as the ultimate source of the political authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The basic principles for the protection of liberty of the individual are there, especially the status of the judiciary as exemplified in section 4 of the Proclamation. Indeed, the Proclamation as a whole demonstrated the lustre of the supremacy of the law.

For, lest we forget, law is the basis of ordered society. Chaos and confusion are apt to follow a revolution such as we witnessed in this country in early June 1979. There must therefore, be some mechanism for the maintenance of peace and stability. The scope and characteristics of the law provide that need. They are not only the product of custom and tradition. They stem also from legislative action. Hence section 3 of the Proclamation which lays down how legislative action of the council shall be dealt with and determined. To me, the whole of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, demonstrate an attempt—serious perhaps—to balance individual liberty with the needs of our society as a whole in the wake of the events that fell before our eyes in June 1979.

What then is the evidence in this case? For the 45 minutes and more that the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was in the witness-box, the substance of his evidence is that if the documents say that the plaintiff was tried in absentia, then the plaintiff was tried in absentia. This is what he said, as I was able to record:

. . . I know that certain persons were tried under the Decree [Armed Forces Revolutionary (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3)] by the special court. I cannot give the specifics but 1 know that certain people were tried . . . If the name of the plaintiff is on the final list then he must have faced the special court. The former I.G.P. was tried. What I am saying is that I do not know most of these people. I check the signature.

I am expecting the paper to be a responsible paper and if

[p.1020] of [1981] GLR 944 the names appear there then they have been tried . . . On oath I would say I was not personally aware that the former I.G.P. was tried. When the matter comes from the special court, that is the authority on which we act. We had these documents, that is, from the special court. We had to have faith in the officials to whom we handed those matters . . . We had documents from the special court containing the names of the persons and their sentences. We accepted what we were told. . .”

The Liaison and Press Officer for the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Special Court, informed the court that he was responsible for the issuing of press releases and arranging conferences. He usually got his information from various sources including the council itself. He put into evidence, as exhibit A, a press release in respect of sentences that were reviewed, before the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council handed over. He got that particular information from the council. The information was given to him by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. In answer to a question from the court, he said that he did not know whether a Decree was issued. The question arose out of the statement in exhibit A, that a Decree would be issued.

The administrative officer in charge of complaints “during the reign of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” also gave evidence. He said, among other things, that:

“. . . During the course of my work, I handled a matter concerning the former I.G.P. When the former I.G.P. was arrested he told those on guard that he was sick. The guards rang me about it. I requested that he should be sent to hospital. He was taken to the military hospital. When I went there to see him I did not see him; nor did I see the guard. I reported to the council. The guard was a military personnel . . . I was not a member of the special court. I was invited by the special court in connection with the escape of the former I.G.P., Kwakye. When I appeared before the special court . . . I was informed by the court that he was due to appear before them that day and I should narrate what I knew about him since his arrest. I told the court what I had just said. I know he was tried. I was present at the trial.

The trial was held at Burma Camp. I cannot be precise about the time of the trial but it was before noon. I cannot remember the date of the trial. The trial took this form: his file was brought and the charges were read. I cannot remember the charges off hand . . . After the charges were read the court

[p.1021] of [1981] GLR 944 deliberated on them and then passed sentence. They consulted each other and then they told me “your man has been found guilty.” It took about 25 to 30 minutes, the deliberation. It was the prosecutor who read the charges. He was not sitting with the panel. I remember he was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment subject to review and confirmation. I heard the words ‘subject to review and confirmation’ to be communicated to the council for approval. That was not the only case I witnessed. Others were tried in absentia. They took the same pattern, that is, the charges were read and sentence passed. . .”

It emerged from cross-examination that there were no witnesses who testified against the plaintiff—and in support of the charges read. The trial was a secret trial. It was not open to the public. The members of the panel took down notes. “The President [of the Court] was writing. Two or three [other members] were writing.” Since the trial, the witness had not seen the documents of the trial. “The records would be disclosed to the convening authority, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” he concluded.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), was the Decree under which the special courts were established. It was one such court that is alleged to have tried the plaintiff or did not try the plaintiff. The decisions of such a court were required to be “unanimous or by a majority of four to one.” This means that five would compose a court: the President of the court and four other members.

By an amendment to the parent Decree: see Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 19), provision was made by section 5 (2) whereby:

“ . . . the trial of any person charged with an offence under this Decree shall be conducted in his presence or where he is outside Ghana or it is otherwise impossible for him to be made to be present the trial may be conducted in his absence.”

The offences within the jurisdiction of the special court are stated, inter alia, in section 3 of the Decree as being:

“(a) the acquisition or obtaining of any loan, property, material, promise, favour or advantage whatsoever by any person who uses, abuses or exploits his official position in any public service;

(b) illegal or dishonest acquisition of property by a public officer, citizen of Ghana or other person resident in Ghana;

(c) intentional or reckless misapplication of, or cause of loss or damage to public property;

[p.1022] of [1981] GLR 944

(d) gross negligence or dishonesty in applying public property;

(e) intentional or reckless dissipation of public property;

(f) connivance at the exaction of exorbitant price for property purchased or services contracted for by any person or body of persons supplying property or services to the State;

(g) improper demand or acceptance of compensation, consideration or personal advantage in respect of the performance of any public duty;

(h) doing any act with intent to sabotage the economy of Ghana . . .”

In my view, the mere recital of any of these offences would not do. It would be a mere count in an indictment. What would be required, for the purposes of a trial under the Decree, would be a brief statement of the ingredients of the offence—what in criminal cases we describe as particulars of offence. Hence the significance of the use of the word “offences” in section 3 and the use of the words “charge or charges,” in section 5 (3), which is or are required to “be read to the accused.” But all that the warrant of commitment states are a mere recital of some of these offences. And the administrative officer could not remember the charges read in order to tell the court what those charges were.

Section 5 then sets out the mode of trial, inter alia:

“5. (1) Where a person does any act which constitutes an offence under this Decree as well as under any other enactment the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council may direct in writing that he shall be proceeded against and tried under this Decree instead, and the right of the Civil Courts to try any such offence shall be subject to a decision of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under this subsection . . .

(3) The charge or charges shall be read to the accused by a prosecutor who shall however not make any submissions.

(4) The accused shall plead to the charge or charges.

(5) The Court shall call such witnesses as the accused may request to be called, whose attendance can, having regard to the exigencies of the times, reasonably be procured.

(6) The evidence of any witness for the prosecution or the accused shall be given on oath [or] affirmation.

(7) The Court shall receive all relevant evidence in proof or disproof of a charge against the accused.

[p.1023] of [1981] GLR 944

(8) The evidence of the prosecution shall be presented to the Court.

(9) The Court shall permit the accused to cross-examine any prosecution witness.

(10) The prosecution and the accused shall have a right to address the Court before the decision of the Court.

(11) Where at the close of the case for the prosecution there is no evidence to support the charge against the accused he shall be acquitted and discharged, and where a case has been made against him he shall be called upon to answer.

(12) The Court may dismiss a charge brought against any person at any stage of the trial where in its opinion the charge is frivolous or vexatious.

(13) The Court shall, in its procedures and decision, be guided by the rules of natural justice.

(14) The Court may subject to the directions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in relation thereto hold its sittings in public or in camera in all the regions of Ghana.”

That is the standard set by the Decree by which a special court was required to do its work. That is the measure of the test that is intended to be applied to ascertain whether or not there has been a trial legally under the Decree or in accordance with the Decree. A special court would be failing in its duty if it did not obey the mandatory requirements of the law from which it derived its authority to act. A special court would be acting illegally if it did not do as the law under which it derived its authority had postulated it should do. The provisions of section 5 of the Decree are a demand on a special court to act according to the dictates of the Decree. This includes the court being “guided by the rules of natural justice.” The provisions of section 5 of the Decree constitute the prerequisites the sine qua non—for the legality, and if I may emphasise, the validity of any decision of a special court.

Without even the provisions of section 5 of the Decree, I would have thought that a special court, given jurisdiction to try the offences enumerated in section 3, would be under an obligation to act with fairness. The very nature of its assignment imposes an obligation to be fair and candid. Its actions must be devoid of arbitrariness and capriciousness. More so, then, when the law lays down the mode of trial.

A trial in absentia is a procedure formerly unknown to us in the administration of justice in this country. When, therefore, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council amended A.F.R.C.D. 3 by A.F.R.C.D. 19, one would have thought that the procedure

[p.1024] of [1981] GLR 944 to be followed would also be specified. No such thing was done. We are thus left with the procedure already outlined in section 5 of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3). That procedure would thus govern a trial in praesenti as well as a trial in absentia. For, as the maxim of interpretation goes expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another. So if the Decree expressly mentions a particular procedure without more then all other procedures are excluded.

The same idea is more forcefully stated by yet another maxim: expressum tacit cessare tacitum—When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. If it was the intention of the law-makers that the procedure already set out should not govern trials in absentia, they would have said so when the Decree was subsequently amended making it possible for trials to be conducted in absentia. These are the hard, cold facts of the matter. It is impossible for me to suppose otherwise. And I am thus obliged to consider the trial of the plaintiff in the light of the procedure set out in section 5 of the Decree. That is the law which governs the matter.

Under Soviet law, trial procedure which follows closely the French model, the judges are instructed to establish their intimate conviction of guilt. They thus go beyond evidence presented by the prosecution and the defence, if any. The court might call witnesses, call its own expert evidence, examine material evidence and, where necessary, visit places connected with the crime. The judges do most of the interrogation in the court room. And this, in countries where trial in absentia is known. Trial in absentia means that a person is tried in his absence. But his absence notwithstanding, there is a trial all the same. In other words, the relevant evidence to establish guilt is given and received by the court all the same. And in our peculiar circumstance, how else could a special court “dismiss, a charge brought against any person” tried in absentia where in the opinion of the court, “the charge is frivolous or vexatious” as provided for by section 5 (12) of A.F.R.C.D. 3?

But in the instant case, apart from the possible proof of the plaintiff having escaped from the hospital, there was no evidence adduced before the special court in support of any of the charges read. The administrative officer who was present at the trial could not even remember any of the charges he heard. The only evidence before this court is the alleged warrant of commitment to undergo sentence. All that the warrant states is a mere repetition of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e), and (h) of section 3 of the Decree. But what are the particulars of the offences? Beyond the mere recital of these

[p.1025] of [1981] GLR 944 paragraphs, we do not know what the plaintiff is alleged to have done to have been charged with those offences.

What of paragraph (d) of section 15 (1) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution? It relates directly to section 16. I have already demonstrated the conditions which would attract the operation of the paragraph and section. There is no evidence before this court to show that the plaintiff was an accomplice as such; that he was the accomplice of a guilty member of the Armed Forces; that the guilty member was guilty of corruption or graft; that the plaintiff was guilty of a malpractice; that that malpractice operated to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both the economy of Ghana and the public interest.

What of the relevance of Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L.? The statute, i.e. section 4 (4) of the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950 (14 Geo. 6, c. 12), under which that case became famous provided that: “The determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law.” The Foreign Compensation Commission, set up under the Act had rejected a claim by the Anisminic company that they were entitled to participate in a compensation fund. The company brought the action for a determination that the claim was good. The tribunal raised a preliminary point that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. It was held by the English Court of Appeal: see [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382 coram Sellers, Diplock and Russell L.JJ. that: the commission alone was empowered to determine whether the plaintiffs were persons entitled to participate in the compensation fund, and section 4 (4) of the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, clearly stated that their determination could not be questioned in any court of law. It was further held that since the commission had made a determination and it was a necessary incident to that determination that the commission had to construe the Foreign Compensation (Egypt) (Determination and Registration of Claims) Order, 1962, which included consideration of the question whether an Egyptian organisation was the plaintiff’s successor in title, no court could question the determination by substituting its views on the construction of the Order for those of the commission. Accordingly, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ action. The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed by the House of Lords which held that the word “determination” in section 4 (4) of the 1950 Act should not be construed as including anything which purported to be a determination but was not in fact a determination because the commission had misconstrued the provision of the Order defining

[p.1026] of [1981] GLR 944 their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court was not precluded from inquiring whether or not the order of the commission was a nullity. It was held further that the plaintiff were entitled to the declaration sought. In this case, I have already demonstrated that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to deal with the case, and on the basis that the relevant provisions of the traditional provisions to the Constitution, afford a defence which can be successfully raised. Indeed, this court has given a unanimous ruling that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit: see Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C. This we did without even considering the Anisminic case (supra). The question of the Supreme Court’s attitude to what can be described as “ouster clauses” in the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, has thus been settled. And the court has heard evidence in the matter.

At the trial in the Anisminic case (supra), the trial judge found that there was an error by the compensation commission. He was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords restored his judgment. The House of Lords held that the compensation commission (as already explained, with Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest dissenting) had made an error of law in misconstruing the Foreign Compensation (Egypt) (Determination and Registration of Claims) Order, 1962, and that the error was of such a serious nature that the compensation commission went outside its jurisdiction—and, as Lord Denning M.R., put it in his book The Discipline of Law—”so far outside that its determination was a nullity.” And true to his nature Lord Denning added a rider:

“This left open the very difficult question: How do you decide whether an error of law is so serious as to produce a nullity? or is a mere error of law which does not produce that result? No ordinary mortal can be expected to answer that question with any hope of being right. If you count the heads of all who heard the Anisminic case, four holders of high judicial office held that the error of law took the tribunal outside its jurisdiction so far as to produce a nullity (Lords Reid, Pearce and Wilberforce and Browne J.): four equally eminent held that it was an error of law within its jurisdiction and could not be challenged in the Courts (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lords Justices Sellers, Diplock and Russell). One Law Lord held that the tribunal made no error of law at all. He was Lord Pearson—one of the best Judges ever. He had no equal on a matter of this kind.

So we are left with a question which no one can expect to answer rightly. Is it not then time to go back to the starting

[p.1027] of [1981] GLR 944 point? And to ask: were the Courts right in the beginning to draw a distinction between within and without jurisdiction?”

And in Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, Lord Denning M.R., ventured to suggest that whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void, because Parliament only conferred jurisdiction on the tribunal on condition that it decided in accordance with the law.

And so, even if one accepts the second major issue in the Anisminic case—we have already accepted the first issue on the question of jurisdiction—there are certain distinctions which I ought to draw: In the first place, the Anisminic case was dealing with an ordinary law of Parliament. Here we are dealing with a Constitution—the fundamental law of the land. The Constitution, as I shall show presently, accepts the existence of an illegality, or an error or—to use an American term—what have you. And nonetheless forbids the courts by section 15 (2) of its transitional provisions “to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

Secondly, there was a determination in the Anisminic case. In the instant case, we are not dealing with the determination of the plaintiff’s case by the special court. The plaintiff’s contention is that he was never tried under the law which set up the special court. The issue here is an issue which never arose for consideration in the Anisminic case, that is to say, whether the action taken by the special court was, in the words of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions, “taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of the council . . .” In other words we are dealing here with a factual situation—whether or not the plaintiff was tried in accordance with the law and the impact of a constitutional provision upon the answer to that question.

Thirdly, it has never been challenged that the special court was a creation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council; nor had it been challenged that the council had no power to confirm a decision of the special court. And I do not think it can be seriously contended that in dealing with this case we are questioning an executive legislative, or a judicial action of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. What we are seeking to do is to find out whether in fact and in law there has been such an action or a purported action.

Considering the evidence as a whole, it is clear that the procedure laid down by the law has not been followed. I emphasise:

[p.1028] of [1981] GLR 944 the procedure laid down has not been followed. This is the important part of the evidence of the administrative officer:

“The trial took this form: his file was brought and the charges were read . . . After the charges were read, the court deliberated on them and then they told me ‘your man has been found guilty . . .”

This is the evidence of the man who was present at the trial. He was invited, he stated, “in connection with the escape of the former I.G.P. . .” He was not invited to give any evidence touching upon any of the charges that were read. Nor did he say anything about any other evidence being considered by the special court. The file was brought. The charges were read. The special court deliberated on the charges. At best his evidence would prove that the special court could try the plaintiff in his absence. However, the amended section 5 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 requires evidence before the court that an accused “is outside Ghana or it is otherwise impossible for him to be made to be present . . .” So if the administrative officer’s evidence is accepted as proving that the plaintiff “is outside Ghana” then there would be no need for evidence that steps were taken to get him to be present and it was “impossible for him to be made to be present.” That was all. But does that evidence prove that the plaintiff was outside Ghana? I doubt it.

How they deliberated on the charges, it is not clear. There is no evidence before this court that the members of the special court looked through the file and considered the documentary evidence, if any, contained in the file. There is no evidence before this court that there was reference to any matter contained in the file. That they consulted each other is all that we have. That, in my view, is not a trial as demanded by the Decree under which the special court was required to do its work.

There is no evidence before this court that prior notice was given to the plaintiff, whether by radio announcement or a press release, that he should appear before the special court and answer at any particular time, on any particular day, charges preferred against him before the special court. It had been contended and contended seriously, that the method of summoning people before the special court was by radio announcements and press releases. There is no evidence before this court that the special court acted in accordance with the mandatory requirements of section 5 (7) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 under which the special court was obliged to receive relevant evidence-in-proof of the charges against the plaintiff. Nor is there evidence that the prosecution presented any evidence

[p.1029] of [1981] GLR 944 to the special court—again a mandatory requirement of section 5 (8) of A.F.R.C.D. 3.

The provisions of section 2 (2) and (3) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 gave the council power to review and confirm a decision of the special court. It also empowered the council to reduce a penalty awarded by the special court, or “impose in lieu [a] lesser penalty.” The evidence of the Chairman of the Council indicates that the council exercised those powers. I do not however, think that the exercise of any of those powers made legal what, ab initio, was tainted by illegality.

Exhibit A put in evidence by the press officer concludes with the sentence, “A Decree giving effect to the sentences will be published soon.” There is no evidence before this court that such a Decree was issued. Be that as it may, the powers of review and confirmation already referred to would be sufficient, in an appropriate case, to make an action taken consequent upon the proper exercise of that power a judicial action within the contemplation of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution. In my view, therefore, the absence of a Decree as promised by the press officer would not affect the exercise of the power of review or confirmation.

Section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution states that:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

To take subsection (3) first, it is obvious from this subsection that those who were responsible for that provision realised that a lot of actions must have been taken which were not in accordance with the “procedure prescribed by [the] law.” Those responsible for that provision knew fully well that such actions taken, or which might be taken before the Constitution, 1979, came into force not, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, would be null and void. Those responsible for that provision appreciated fully

[p.1030] of [1981] GLR 944 well that there had been, or there could be, a disregard for the procedures which ought to have been followed. Those responsible for that provision were cognisant of the fact that severe damage had been done, or could be done, to the due process of law and yet they provided in section 15 (3) of the transitional provisions that, “notwithstanding that any such action . . . was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law,” such acts, recognised as against the grain of legality “shall have effect” and as stated by section 15 (2) “shall [not] be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever . . .

I say this because I think I am permitted to take judicial notice of the fact that by a Gazette notification of 22 August 1979, that is to say, the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 8), made on 14 June 1979 a Constitution was promulgated for Ghana. That Decree was subsequently repealed by section 5 of the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 24). Section 15 of the First Schedule to that Constitution had no subsections. That section 15 now appears as section 15 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. There are three other subsections. The subsections of section 15 which now form the subject of much controversy were not in the earlier Constitution promulgated by the A.F.R.C. in August 1979. And there was no section 16 as we have it now. The intention then, is clear: To perpetrate an illegality, if an illegality there be, under the guise of constitutionality. To perpetuate an injustice, if an injustice there be, under the colour of the supremacy of the Constitution. The provisions of the transitional provisions, i.e. sections 15 and 16 to the Constitution which are called in question, are not in conformity with the body of the Constitution itself. And certainly not in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution. Nor in conformity with justice.

Nor are the actions called in question in conformity with the laws under which they were done. To use the instrumentality of the Constitution to cloak such actions with the semblance of legality is to do violence to decency and embarrass the Constitution—nay justice herself. It would not make citizens of Ghana see the worth and beauty of justice. But by virtue of the provisions of article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, those provisions “have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in [the] Constitution.” That is the gravamen of our situation. That is the predicament in which we find ourselves today.

Interpretation, generally, arises when there is an ambiguity or an uncertainty or an imprecision about the meaning of a word or words in a statute. That involves the application of the principles

[p.1031] of [1981] GLR 944 of language in which process logic and commonsense play a larger role. Indeed, construction is a better word than interpretation. Construction also arises where a word or words is or are capable of more meanings than one. But simple, clear meaning cannot—indeed should not—be made the subject of interpretation. A Constitution is something more than a mere Act of Parliament. All the organs of government derive their authority and their sustenance from the Constitution. Thus a cardinal principle in the interpretation of a Constitution is to avoid a construction which renders meaningless or inoperative any provision of the Constitution. The same principle applies to the words of the Constitution. Every word must be construed to make it operative and not idle or nugatory. The express intent of the framers—as disclosed by the words used—must be respected. The purpose and intent of the framers—as disclosed by the words used—must be given their true signification. And so, I must reiterate the clear words of article 217. It states clearly that: “The transitional provisions specified in the First Schedule to [the] Constitution shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in [the] Constitution.” Among those provisions contained in the First Schedule which shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution, are sections 15 and 16 of the First Schedule. There is no ambiguity about the words of article 217 of the Constitution. Effect must be given thereto.

The word “purport” was originally used in the sense of purpose. Sheridan’s The Rivals has examples of this kind of usage as exemplified by the manner in which Mrs. Malaprop “murdered”, the English language. That usage is almost nearly obsolete, “as to make its employment inadvisable.” Generally, the word is used as a noun to stand for “ostensible meaning” or “sense” “tenor.” So used, the word is restricted to documents and speeches. When used as a verb, the word “purport” signifies “to have as its meaning”, or “to be intended to seem” or “to be made to appear.”” The Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed.) makes this quite clear.

In the context then, in which purported is used in section 15 (1) (e) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, what is the interpretation to be given to the word? It means simply semblance—”what looks like.”” In other words, an action, be it “executive, legislative or judicial,” which is not an executive action, which is not a legislative action, which is not a judicial action, but which looks like, or has the outward appearance of an executive, legislative or judicial action would divest “any Court or other tribunal [of the power] to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

[p.1032] of [1981] GLR 944

The issue, then, is not whether the trial of the plaintiff had been held in accordance with the law under which the special court sought to exercise its jurisdiction. The issue is whether what was done looks like, or has the outward appearance of, a judicial action or could be considered as intended to seem, or made to appear as a judicial action.

This is why I have sought to reproduce as much as I can both the documentary and the oral evidence. And as much as possible of the relevant law. For, I conceive that I have an obligation to show the profound difference between the unmeanness of the approach of the principles of justice and the high handedness of actions dictated, may be, by good motives, but coercive, harsh, and cruel in its implementation. For, let no mistake be made, the evidence before this court proves, and proves to me conclusively that, the trial of the plaintiff is otherwise irregular and illegal.

I would say, then, that:

(a) the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), as amended by Decree 19;

(b) the sentence of 25 years imposed upon the plaintiff is an infringement of his fundamental human rights because he was not tried in accordance with the law.

But that, having regard to the provisions of section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions to the Constitution, 1979, I cannot make “any order or grant any remedy or relief “ in respect of his purported trial. In that the plaintiff fails. And in that event, I would also dismiss the plaintiff’s action.

I make no order as to costs.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

The basic facts in this case have been sufficiently sketched in the opinions just delivered, and I need not repeat them. They relate to the coup of 4 June 1979, the arrest of the plaintiff, his escape from custody and his continued absence from Ghana ever since. These are not in dispute.

I propose only to add a few sentences of my own on the applicability or otherwise of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, particularly, section 15 (2) thereof.

It has been contended with great fervour that the issue at stake in this case is whether the plaintiff was ever tried by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Special Court. In my view this is the wrong question to pose, and therefore it is not likely to yield the correct answer. The proper question is already formulated for

[p.1033] of [1981] GLR 944 us by section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions. And it is this: Does this case arise out of a “judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council?”

The said section 15 (2) reads:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, . . .”

(The emphasis is mine.) Therefore the question to be answered by this court is:

“Do these proceedings arise out of or are they founded upon, or grounded in any judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council . . . ?” Or to put the same question in different forms: Is the excuse for these proceedings a “Judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council . . . ?”

The answer to this question will determine whether or not the action is caught by section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions; whether or not this court can properly deal with the matter. So we set out on our inquiry.

Was the action complained of a judicial action? I think, Yes! It should be noted that a judicial action need not necessarily be an action by a judge, or by or in a court of law. The countless number of reported cases arising out of the prerogative writs bear testimony to this. In Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society, Ltd. v. Parkinson [1892] 1 Q.B. 431 at p. 452, C.A., Lopes L.J. says:

“The word ‘judicial’ has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justices in court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind—that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration . . .”

And so in Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. Page [1911] 2 K.B. 946 at p. 951, D.C., Lord Alverstone C.J. held that a committee of quarter sessions holding a supplemental meeting to decide how compensation money was to be apportioned between interested parties was acting judicially. They were taking a judicial action. Indeed, any person or body of persons is deemed to be taking [p.1034] of [1981] GLR 944 a judicial action if “it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition . .”: see per Scrutton L.J. in R. v. London County Council,. Ex parte The Entertainments Protection Association, Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 215 at p. 233, C.A. In that case, the London County Council in granting or refusing music and dancing licences was held to be taking a judicial action. So that an administrative or executive action may well be a judicial action.

But where a judicial action results in the conviction and sentencing of a person to a term of imprisonment, such as we have in this case, then I would expect that action to have been taken by a judge or in a court of law. I have emphasised conviction and sentence because it is known that a term of imprisonment need not necessarily be imposed by a judge or a court. We have the experience of the 1960s when under the Preventive Detention Act, 1958 (No. 17 of 1958), as later substituted by the Preventive Detention Act, 1964 (Act 240), the then President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was able, by executive action, without a conviction or sentence, to lawfully (i.e. under the law) imprison some citizens for five years with an option to add a second term of five years if he thought fit—a practice that came to be known as “put on top.”

Section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions present two situations linked by the conjunctive “or” which, as we all know presents an alternative. The two situations are:

(a) a judicial action taken by the A.F.R.C.; and

(b) a judicial action purported to have been taken by the A.F.R.C.

It is clear to me that these two situations could not have been intended to cover the same set of circumstances. The language is different, and they are presented in the alternative. Therefore they must have been tailored to cater for different sets of circumstances. In other words, the makers of the Constitution understood and intended that “a judicial action taken” does not and cannot mean the same thing as “a judicial action purported to have been taken . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) Therefore, following the normal rules of construction each phrase must be assigned a meaning, since the legislature must be deemed to have intended a meaning for each.

What then is the difference? I expect a “judicial action taken” in the context in which it appears to be an action which satisfies all the requirements of the law both substantive and procedural, e.g. as detailed, in part, in paragraph 9 of the plaintiff’s statement of case, and at p. 3 of his written address filed on 31 March 1981,

[p.1035] of [1981] GLR 944 i.e. that charges will be preferred, plaintiff will be arraigned, charges read to him, he will be required to plead to the charges, will be informed of his right to be represented by counsel and evidence will be led, etc., etc.

Or if the trial is to take place, in the absence of the accused, his name will nonetheless be shouted a few times in court, to create the excuse or justification for the trial in absentia; the charges will be read to the hearing of the public; evidence will be led (even if formally), the panel members occasionally playing the role of the devil’s advocate by cross-examining the witnesses to make justice appear to be done, etc., etc.

In other words, a judicial action taken is understood by me to be a judicial action properly and lawfully taken. When one is called upon to look into such a judicial action then the question of a trial properly so-called becomes relevant. Then the plaintiff can legitimately pose as one of the issues for determination whether he was properly tried as a prelude to his being convicted and sentenced.

In my view, the declaration sought by the plaintiff that he was ‘never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court . . .” is a request to the court to declare that no judicial action in the sense

I have sought to define it, was taken by the A.F.R.C. against him.. On the state of the evidence, I am all too prepared to make such a finding, namely, that the events deposed to, particularly by Squadron Leader Segbefia, at the “trial” of the plaintiff do not together constitute a proper trial of the plaintiff.

But as I have indicated earlier, section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions talks not only of “a judicial action taken” but also of “a judicial action purported to have been taken . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) When is an action purported to have been taken? When is something purported to have been done? Happily, the word purport (with its derivatives) is an old friend of the legal profession. We use it very often with a high degree of understanding; we are not normally called upon to define it. It crops up in writs of summons, in pleadings, in addresses of counsel, etc. We see it often in suits arising out of alleged wrongful sales, wrongful dismissals, wrongful seizures, wrongful transfers of title, chieftaincy disputes, etc.

A judgment-creditor causes the farm of a judgment-debtor to be sold by public auction. A member of the judgment-debtor’s family sues to set aside the sale on the ground that the farm is family property; it is not for the judgment-debtor. So he claims

[p.1036] of [1981] GLR 944 that the purported sale is null and void. An employee sues to set aside a dismissal because, he says, certain conditions in the collective agreement binding on all sides were not complied with by the employer. So he asks that the purported dismissal’ is wrongful, null and void. A kingmaker brings an action against an installed chief on the ground that this person is not in the line of succession to the stool at all, so his purported election and installation are acts contrary to custom, and therefore null and void.

Therefore what is a purported act? To my mind it is an act which to the doer is a perfectly good and lawful act, but to the complainant is imperfect and can be faulted on a number of grounds. It is not as complete as the doer thinks it is, or makes it appear to be, or intends or claims it to be. It is the complainant who describes it as purported: to the doer it is not a purported act; it is a complete act—that act itself. Thus in the dismissal case, the employer knows he has dismissed the employee; his act to him is not a purported dismissal; it is a dismissal. But the employee says it is not a dismissal; it is short of a dismissal; it is a defective dismissal; it is a purported dismissal.

This interpretation is amply supported by the dictionary meaning of the word “purport”. The Royal English Dictionary (1933 ed.) defines “purport” as follows: “Purport”—(from old French pur or pour; from Latin pro—for; and root of port, Latin portare—to carry)—to show, to mean, or to intend. The New American Webster’s Handy College Dictionary (1972 ed.) says: “purport”: (vt) “profess; seem to mean;” and The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (3rd ed.), 1974 defines “purport” as “seem to mean” e.g. the statement purports that; claim, e.g. the book purports to be an original work but is really a compilation.

In other words, what a thing purports to be is exactly what to the complainant it is not. This does not of course mean that a purported act can never be proved to be a proper legal or whole act. If it is so proved, it ceases to merely purported; it graduates to the full act. If it is not so proved it stays as a purported act.

Section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions says that the full acts as well as the purported, the inchoate, the incomplete, the defective, the counterfeit ones are all protected within its purview, and are screened from judicial scrutiny.

As I have stated above, the events described by Squadron Leader Segbefia falls short of a proper, lawful judicial action. But do they constitute a purported judicial action? Did the gentlemen who summoned Squadron Leader Segbefia that day purport to take a judicial action against the Plaintiff?

[p.1037] of [1981] GLR 944

To answer this, it is necessary to recap the essential portions of the evidence of Squadron Leader Segbefia. He said he was the administrative officer in charge of complaints during the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regime. He deposed to the arrest and subsequent disappearance of the plaintiff (together with his military guard), from the hospital where he had been sent for treatment, on witness’ instructions. Squadron Leader Segbefia then continued:

“I was invited by the special court concerning the escape of Kwakye (the plaintiff). At the special court I told them exactly what I have just said here. The court told me that he was due to appear before them that day, and that I should narrate what I knew about him since his arrest. I told them . . . I know Kwakye was tried. I was present during the trial. The trial was held at Burma Camp. It was before noon. I can’t remember the date.”

Concerning the constitution of the court, he said, “The court had more than five persons. There were stand-by members who were also present. I don’t know if they were there for the court or not. These did not take part in the deliberations of the court…” Then later, under cross-examination by Mr. Thompson, junior counsel for the plaintiff, the witness said, “Apart from the stand-by members, there were more than five members of the court . . .” When questioned about the form which the trial took, Squadron Leader Segbefia said:

“His file was brought. The charges were read from investigations made by special units. I can’t remember off-hand the charges. The court deliberated over the issue and then they said they found him guilty. The consultation took about 25-30 minutes.

A prosecutor read the charges. He was not sitting with the panel . . . That case was not the only one I witnessed. There were others tried in absentia. They all took the same form as the Kwakye case . . .”

Questioned by the court, witness said:

“No witness was called. But those who conducted the investigations had prepared a file on him. And it was upon these findings that he was convicted . . . To my knowledge the file was not prepared by the members of the court. In my view this was a secret trial. It was not open to the public . . .”

From this evidence, it is clear that a court assembled with the object of trying the plaintiff, among others. That it was the special

[p.1038] of [1981] GLR 944 court which assembled was not disputed by the plaintiff, not even in cross-examination. This court knew it had power to try persons in their absence, but how it was to do this, did not seem quite clear to the members. They however went through certain motions which, to the members, constituted a “trial,” of the plaintiff. At the end of it all, they pronounced a conviction and sentence.

True, certain legal imperatives were ignored, making the trial short of a proper legal trial, even one in absentia, and if section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions, had limited itself to “judicial action taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” only, it would have been difficult for any one to say that what took place in relation to the plaintiff came within the ambit of that section,, since in my opinion “a judicial action taken” connotes a proper judicial action. Even so, it may well be contended that a judicial action does not cease to be a judicial action simply because it is defective.

Be that as it may, section 15 (2) seeks to protect not only perfect judicial actions, but imperfect ones also, such as, in my view, the “trial” described by Squadron Leader Segbefia. It was a purported trial; a judicial action purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Special Court.

Accordingly, section 15 (2) operates to remove the action from the jurisdiction of the court. The action cannot be “questioned in any proceedings whatsoever . . . and it will be unlawful to grant any remedy or relief in respect thereof.” Indeed, having regard to the provisions of article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, it will be unconstitutional to grant any such remedy.

But there are much wider considerations why the plaintiff’s action cannot succeed, and these arise from the true intendment of the said section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions.

In any situation where a provision in an enactment is ambiguous and lends itself to interpretation, it is the duty of the court to try to ascertain the true intention of the law-makers in so far as this can be gathered from the provision, aided by the enactment as a whole, and to give effect to this intention.

Section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions covers all executive, legislative and judicial actions of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. As a government, any action taken by the A.F.R.C. would have fallen into one or other of the categories mentioned. The categories cover the whole range of actions that a government can possibly take. Any action outside this range will not be an

[p.1039] of [1981] GLR 944 official, authorised act of the A.F.R.C. it will be the act of a member or some other person “on a frolic of his own.” The section is all-embracing, and was clearly intended to cover all acts done by or on behalf of the A.F.R.C, or else by persons authorised by them.

An act that occurred within the A.F.R.C. period can be put outside the purview of-section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions only if it can be shown that it was not taken by the A.F.R.C. or otherwise authorised or sanctioned, directly or indirectly by the A.F.R.C. Once an act is admitted or presumed or proved to be that of the A.F.R.C., it would seem to me to be unnecessary, except for purposes of completeness or for the sake of the record, to proceed to find out whether it was an executive or legislative or judicial act, if only because any act of the A.F.R.C., properly so- called, is bound to fall within this range of governmental activity and will automatically be caught by section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions.

Let it be noted that the Constitution, 1979, came into force on 24 September 1979, after the demise of the A.F.R.C. regime. By that time, the acts sought to be protected had already taken place. The Constitution-makers must be presumed to have known of the existence of those acts and their quality, i.e. whether they were taken in full conformity with all existing laws (knowledge of which they should also be presumed to know, since the law-makers are presumed to know the state of the law at the time of the making of any new law), or whether, for any reason those acts, or at least some of them were suspect. Whatever their quality, the Constitution-makers chose to give the A.F.R.C. acts special mention in the Constitution. The language of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions shows that the said acts were mentioned for the only purpose of shielding those acts from judicial scrutiny. The acts are not to be “questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and . . . it shall not be lawful for any court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

Afterall, without this exclusionary provision a person who felt aggrieved by a decision of the A.F.R.C. could either file an appeal or go to the courts by way of the prerogative writs to seek redress. It is plain that the Constitution-makers did not want to see this happen, hence the provision limiting the right of access to the courts.

As if section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions were not enough, section 15 (3) emphasises that section 15 (2) shall have effect “notwithstanding that any such action [of the A.F.R.C.] . . . was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

[p.1040] of [1981] GLR 944

And section 15 (4) makes non-compliance, indeed, “contravention of any law, whether substantive or procedural . . .” immaterial.

The instant proceedings are against the Attorney-General. But it is known that, the Attorney-General is only a nominal defendant in all actions against the government. This action is, in sub- stance, one against the A.F.R.C. Special Court, as is shown by the endorsement on the writ:

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff is void and of no effect.”

In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that this action is one against “a person acting on the authority of the A.F.R.C. within the meaning of section 15 (4) of the transitional provisions. Accordingly, this court is barred also by the said section 15 (4) of the transitional provisions from entertaining the action.

Before I conclude this opinion, I propose to comment very briefly on section 16 of the transitional provisions.

Counsel for the plaintiff has gone to great lengths to persuade the court that section 16 is inapplicable to his client. In his written address, learned counsel submits that “section 16 states clearly the categories of persons whose cases cannot be reversed by any authority under the Constitution“ and that the plaintiff’s case does not come under any of these categories. “Not even the offences listed in exhibit A, the warrant of commitment (whose validity, authenticity and applicability is herein disputed) brings the plaintiff under section 16.” Another reason for this contention is that:

“The plaintiff was not a member of the Armed Forces. Any action taken or purported to have been taken against him could not have been so taken with the aim of purging the Armed Forces of corruption and restoring the image of the military.

Nor does the defence show that the plaintiff was an accomplice of any member of the Armed Forces who was found guilty by the A.F.R.C. Special Court.”

The thrust of this argument is that, to come within section 16 of the transitional provisions, the plaintiff must have been a member of the Armed Forces or else an accomplice of Armed Forces personnel. Outside this group the section does not apply. I differ.

[p.1041] of [1981] GLR 944

The said section 16 of the transitional provisions says:

“16. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under any Decree made by that Council in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the Military and to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.”

I concede that the section is a bit too ponderous. It consists of one long-winding and involved sentence, making interpretation rather difficult. But it can be broken into parts and when so treated its coverage becomes apparent. In this exercise we draw bars at appropriate points to distinguish the various parts, as if scanning a passage in Latin, and we arrive at the following, viz. that:

“16. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/under any Decree made by that in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council/to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft/and to restore the image of the Military/and to deal with the accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces/and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both/shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.”

In effect, section 16 could be re-arranged as:

“(a) Any confiscation of property or any penalty imposed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the council:

(i) to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft; and (ii) to restore the image of the military; and

(iii) to deal with accomplices of guilty members of the Armed Forces; and

(iv) [to deal with] other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both . . .

[p.1042] of [1981] GLR 944

(b) [Any such confiscation or penalty] shall not be reversed by any authority under Constitution’.”

It would be observed that to properly appreciate paragraph (a) (iv) above it has been necessary to interpolate “to deal with” which is first used in (a) (iii) above. Paragraph (a) (iii) relates to “accomplices of guilty members of the Armed Forces.” Therefore the term “other persons” appearing in paragraph (a) (iv) must be persons other than the “accomplices.” They are persons who in their own right, are “guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both.”

Thus paragraphs (a), (i), (ii) and (iii) relate to the Armed Forces and their accomplices; whilst paragraph (a) (iv) is not army-related in any way whatsoever.

Thus removing the “army” portions from section 16, we shall arrive at a completely “civilian” version of the said section 16 as follows:

“16. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council . . . in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council to deal with persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the Republic or both shall not be reversed by any authority under the Constitution.”

Cast in this form, the contention that the section applies only to army personnel and their accomplices becomes hollow. The section has a much wider coverage than that, and the plaintiff, a civilian, may well be within its ambit, in which case section 15 (1) (d) of the transitional provisions may be prayed in aid in determining the jurisdiction of this court, namely, that:

“15. (1) It shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any action . . . instituted against the Government of Ghana . . . whether before or after the coming into force of this Constitution . .

. in respect of any act . . . relating to, or consequent upon; . . .

(d) The exercise referred to in section 16 of this Schedule . . .”

That exercise being, as we have seen, “the exercise undertaken by the Council to deal with persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the economy of Ghana or the public interest or both.”

[p.1043] of [1981] GLR 944

In my view, however, of the conclusions I have come to relating to the applicability of section 15 (2), I deem it unnecessary to proceed to construe and interpret the abridged section 16 with a view to determining whether a person in the position of the plaintiff is indeed caught by it. It is an inquiry that can wait.

In the result, I agree with the learned Chief Justice in the opinion he has formed of this case, and I am also of the opinion that this action fails, and should be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

Until 4 June 1979 the plaintiff herein, Mr. B. S. K. Kwakye, was the Inspector-General of Police and Head of the Police Force. Following the revolutionary events of that date which ousted the Supreme Military Council and ushered in the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (hereinafter referred to as A.F.R.C.), he was forced out of office and he subsequently left the country. He swore to facts which were not challenged giving his reasons for leaving the country. He deposed:

“On 4 June 1979, I was involved in a very serious motor accident at Abeka, Accra, in which I sustained injuries which needed urgent treatment. The general situation in the country at the time was not conducive to my having immediate treatment for my injuries. The nurses of the public hospitals were on strike. It was most embarrassing for me to go to the 37 Military Hospital or Police Hospital since I had on that day been removed from my post as the Inspector-General of Police.”

In his absence, announcements were made on 21 September 1979 on radio and on 22 September 1979 in the local papers that he had been tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia, and that the details of the said trial would be published later. These details were not published before the A.F.R.C. left office on 24 September 1979 and they have not been published since then; although on 13 October 1979, the national newspapers carried a press release said to be issued by the A.F.R.C. on 12 October 1979 which contained the names of 51 persons said to have been sentenced by the special court of the A.F.R.C. In that list the plaintiff was listed as one of 25 persons sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. No other details were contained in the said release. At no time was the plaintiff warned in any way whatsoever to appear before the special court to stand his trial nor was he also ever informed in any way whether by radio, press release or any other form of communication of any charges pending against him before the special court. These are the facts which the plaintiff gave us in his statement of case verified by affidavit. All the

[p.1044] of [1981] GLR 944 facts I have so far set down herein have not been controverted in this action which was instituted by the plaintiff before us against the defendant, the Government of Ghana represented by the Attorney-General for:

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by the special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff as published in the national press on 13 October 1979 is an infringement of the plaintiff’s fundamental human rights, inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, void and of no effect.”

I must remark here that this is all that the plaintiff has asked us to do. A declaration in the above terms formulated on his behalf by his counsel. His constitutional right for asking this of the Supreme Court is article 2 (1) (b) of the Constitution, 1979, which provides:

“2. (1) A person who alleges . . . that any act or omission of any person, is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The plaintiff’s writ and statement of case were filed on 5 December 1979 and the Government of Ghana represented by the Attorney-General as the defendant was duly served. Instead of complying with the provisions of Order 48 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13.), the Attorney-General as the defendant representing the government, responded by filing a motion supported by affidavits dated 11 January 1980 and 4 February 1981 respectively asking the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on three grounds, namely:

(1) That by virtue of the provisions of section 1 (2) of the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), the action is not properly before the court in that one month’s written notice of intention to commence the action herein has not been served on the Attorney-General as is required by the said section 1 (2) of the above-mentioned Decree.

(2) That by virtue of the provisions of rule 46 sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), the action is not properly before the court in that the statement of the plaintiff’s case is not verified by an affidavit as is required by the said rule.

[p.1045] of [1981] GLR 944

(3) That by virtue of Sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, the action is misconceived and should be struck out.

On 9 February 1981, five days after the last affidavit of the Attorney-General was filed, we commenced the hearing of arguments on the said three preliminary objections of the Attorney-General. Full legal arguments were orally made before us for two days. The Deputy Attorney-General citing the case of Donkor v. The Republic of Ghana [1971] 1 G.L.R. 30, S.C. submitted, inter alia, that we have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter in view of that case and sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. He said the action is incompetent and misconceived and urged us to decline to entertain it. After Mr. Kwaw-Swanzy, counsel for the plaintiff had replied, the Deputy Attorney-General made a further reply. In my judgment, the case of Donkor v. The Republic of Ghana (supra) is clearly distinguishable and it is so irrelevant that when we gave our ruling on these preliminary objections on 22 March 1981: (see [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C.), we did not even think it fit to mention it.

In our well-considered ruling after giving ourselves three weeks to deliberate on the matter, we unanimously overruled all the preliminary objections. We dealt in particular, inter alia, with the submissions of the transitional provisions and we arrived at our decision after prolonged and careful consideration. Indeed, even the language of our ruling was a matter we attended to with meticalous care. In the end, Apaloo C.J. whom we had authorised to read our joint ruling for us—a unanimous court made up of the full complement of the Supreme Court said:

“But the Deputy Attorney-General says . . . the court is . . . precluded by the provisions of . . . section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions from entertaining this suit.

Section 15 (2) reads:

‘For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.’ This subsection is very widely couched but it seems to us that as the plaintiff sought relief which this court is prima facie entitled to grant, the defendant who claims that the court’s

[p.1046] of [1981] GLR 944 jurisdiction is ousted by this provision must provide a factual basis for it. We think the defendant must produce facts which show that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took or purported to have taken judicial action against the plaintiff.

As the Attorney-General omitted to comply with rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules (C.I. 13), he placed no facts before us on which we can judge the applicability or otherwise of the ouster provision. But he says the plaintiff by his writ and statement of case provided such material and in particular, he invited us to consider the averment in paragraph 3 of the statement of the plaintiff’s case which in his submissions, suffices to attract the ouster provision.”

We have looked at this paragraph and indeed all the paragraphs of the case with care and have given this submission prolonged consideration. Apart from what the plaintiff averred he heard on the radio, there is no independent evidence of it. He seems to have heard that 68 persons were tried in absentia but when the alleged press release was published, the number of persons allegedly tried in that manner was given as 51. And this official version of the number of convicted persons was given long after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had left office. In the writ itself, the plaintiff sought to have it declared that he was never tried and denies the validity of the purported sentences. The one person who by reason of his office is peculiarly fitted to have a reliable knowledge of this matter is the defendant. Yet he elected to file no answer to the plaintiff’s case. In the end, we have come to the conclusion that the pleading by the plaintiff provides an unreliable basis for invoking sections 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions.

In our judgment, the only course open to us and which we think will meet the ends of justice, is to order that the Attorney-General to file, within seven days a statement of his case. If he had done this and in addition thereto pleaded the issues of law he raised before us, this course would have been unnecessary.”

I must remark that the idea that any statutory institution, authority or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction is outside the control of the judiciary is surely incompatible with the essence and regime of a democratic system; it undermines the rule of law; it is subversive of orderly government and is an erosion of the people’s liberties. In all cases, the very fact that it is a creature of statute which gives it limited powers, means that it is ipso facto not outside the control of the superior courts. If this court is to propagate the idea of uncontrollable institutions, the basis for it must be found in an unequivocal constitutional provision so clear as to be

[p.1047] of [1981] GLR 944 capable of no other meaning than the creation of an uncontrollable, institution. If the A.F.R.C. special court is uncontrollable, what was the need for elaborate provisions setting it up? Who is to ensure that its statutory terms are complied with? On 22 March 1981, we did consider this aspect of the matter.

In this respect, it seems to me that it is necessary to appreciate very firmly the nature of the decision which the Supreme Court unanimously handed down on 22 March 1981. I shall consider only the salient features:

(1) We decided that the issue as to whether the A.F.R.C. or its lawful agent, the special tribunal, took or purported to take the judicial action of trying, convicting and sentencing Mr. Kwakye to 25 years’ imprisonment, is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the Attorney-General, the defendant in these proceedings. Consequently, we decided that the onus or burden of proof, that is to say, the responsibility of producing evidence to show that such judicial or purported judicial action was taken and that it was taken by the A.F.R.C. or its agent rests with the defendant.

(2) We decided that the uncontroverted facts which Mr. Kwakye gave to us (already adverted to at the commencement of this judgment), are an unreliable basis for invoking section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions—that is to say, the ouster provision does not and cannot operate if the facts are as we have been given so far. In other words, in the absence of further facts, there was as at 22 March 1981 no facts before us to show that the special tribunal took or purported to take any judicial action against Mr. Kwakye.

(3) We decided in sum that the ouster clause does not oust our jurisdiction to consider the action and satisfy ourselves that facts adduced bring in or do not bring in the said ouster clause.

In view of the well-considered unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, it is necessary to advert to the issues which call for determination after 22 March 1981. In my humble opinion, on the authority of the said Kwakye v. Attorney-General decided on 22 March 1981: (see [1981] G.L.R. 9, S.C.), our task was to examine the facts contained in the statements of case of the defendant. the Attorney-General, together with any further evidence which he might produce aliunde to decide whether or not there was a trial or purported trial as would oust the jurisdiction of the court by

[p.1048] of [1981] GLR 944 virtue of the transitional provisions. That is all. We had no other duty to perform.

In this respect, since we have unequivocally and unanimously decided that the plaintiff’s statement of case is an unreliable basis for invoking the ouster clause, we only have to consider what facts the defendant adduced to change the character of the facts we had at 22 March 1981 to facts which can be said to be a reliable basis for invoking the ouster clause.

What are the further facts which the defendant brought? My colleague and brother, Anin J.S.C. has, in a most able manner examined the defendant’s evidence meticulously. I shall not belabour this judgment by canvassing the same ground since his excellent analysis gives a clear picture of the defendant’s case; I will only lay emphasis on aspects of the evidence crucial to the case. The defendant’s statement of case was challenged very vehemently by the plaintiff. He therefore has the responsibility of establishing the facts beyond reasonable doubt. He called three witnesses: Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, the former Chairman of the A.F.R.C.; Capt. George Kofi Mfojoh, the liaison officer between the press and the A.F.R.C. and Squadron Leader Abraham Armstrong Segbefia. Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings said he had no personal knowledge as to whether or not the plaintiff was tried. He said under cross-examination, “you can get the truth on the issue if you go to the proper place—the Jail Break Commission.”

These statement show quite clearly that Flt.-Lt. Rawlings’ evidence is utterly worthless as evidence of a trial whether actual or purported. The defendant who offered him as a witness, did not pursue the matter further and did not call any person from the Jail Break Commission as suggested by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings to tell us the truth. Capt. Mfojoh was merely a liaison officer and all he did really was to tender the only exhibit in the case of a press release which he obtained from Flt.-Lt. Rawlings. As the evidence of Flt.-Lt. Rawlings himself is worthless, that of Capt. Mfojoh is doubly worthless. It is hearsay upon hearsay and it is a useless document if offered as evidence of a trial. It, however, contained a very important sentence which is not hearsay coming as it does from the defendant, the Government of Ghana, as a statement of the A.F.R.C. It stated “a Decree giving effect to the sentence will be published soon” in other words, the A.F.R.C. would give effect to the sentence of Kwakye in a Decree, that is to say they would confirm the sentence by a Decree. It is significant that as from the date of the press release to the present time, no such Decree has been passed or published and the witness indicated that to his knowledge no such Decree has been passed. The witness [p.1049] of [1981] GLR 944

Squadron Leader Segbefia, is the only eye-witness of the trial. He is the person who can give evidence of a purported or actual trial. His evidence however is amazing. It does incalculable harm to the integrity of the men alleged to have sentenced Mr. Kwakye. It is an affront to the rule of law and a blatant disgrace and slur on our legal system. The substance of his evidence is that he was present at Burma Camp when the plaintiff was tried. He told us the form this so-called trial took. He cannot give us any idea of the charges but in his presence it was read by the prosecutor. He cannot remember the date of the trial. Before this so-called trial, he took an oath of secrecy not to reveal the form of the trial and the membership of the court. He said it was a secret trial, because the public were not admitted to it. He said a file was brought from which the charges were read. After that, the members of the court deliberated for twenty-five to thirty minutes and they then passed sentence of 25 years. He said that the only people present in the court were the prosecutor and the members of the court. The panel members were either four or five and there were stand-by members, who together with the panel members, were more than five persons. The stand-by members did not take part in the trial. Those present in the court were therefore the panel members who were four or five, the stand-by members, the prosecutor and the witness Segbefia. That is all. He said that during this so-called trial two or three of the panel members including the president were writing. There is therefore a record of the said proceedings, but, he said that although the record of the said proceedings was not to be disclosed to others it was to be disclosed to the A.F.R.C. We were not told whether the alleged record was forwarded to the A.F.R.C. and there was no explanation from the Attorney-General as to whether such a document exists and if so why the document was not made available to the Supreme Court. I cannot understand how a party who is to satisfy a court beyond reasonable doubt can hope to succeed in a criminal case with evidence so shabby as to fall short of the standard of proof even in a civil case. To a trained lawyer, this proof of a trial and conviction is totally unacceptable. In the (3rd ed.) at p. 540 of his book on Evidence, the late Professor Cross indicated the manner in which a conviction is established in a court of law if it is called in question. He stated:

“If the proof of judgments and convictions were not exhaustively covered by statutory provisions, it would be necessary to produce the actual record of the court and to call evidence identifying the relevant parties with the person mentioned in the record.”

[p.1050] of [1981] GLR 944

Phipson and most writers on evidence have expressed similar views. The departure from this mode of proving a “conviction” which is inherent in the majority decisions cannot be justified on any legal ground. I have no doubt that all the other courts in our hierarchy from the Court of Appeal to the lay magistrates will reject off-hand this cavalier proof of a trial and conviction in the Kwakye case. Why the Attorney-General’s Office put such evidence before the highest court of the land must be regrettable indeed. This chilling evidence does show that:

(1) There was a secret trial before a body or a court in which the only non-member present took an oath not to disclose the names of the members of the body or the form the trial took.

(2) There is no evidence whatsoever as to whether the members of the court were Ghanaians or whether they qualified to be members of the special court in terms of A.F.R.C.D. 3. Clearly, the so-called trial is not before the special court under A.F.R.C.D. 3.

(3) There is no evidence that a judge advocate was present at the trial.

(4) There is no evidence of the particulars of offence or offences, the subject-matter of the trial. The result is that we do not know the date of the offences, the person or persons who committed the offence, the place or places of the offence, the victim of the offence, the sum of money or property, if any, involved. In fact, we have no knowledge of any sort about the offences.

(5) There is no evidence that Mr. Kwakye was informed or that any attempt was made to inform him in any way whatsoever that he was to appear before a court to face charges on the date and at the place where the alleged trial took place.

(6) There is an alleged record of proceedings which is not to be disclosed to us and was presumably for that reason, not disclosed to us.

(7) There is no evidence whatsoever that the panel members and the stand-by members were appointed by the A.F.R.C. or any body authorised by the A.F.R.C.

(8) There is no evidence as to whether the verdict of the so-called court was by a majority of four to one, five to zero or three to two.

(9) The A.F.R.C. decided to give effect to the decision of the so-called court by publishing a Decree to that effect but

[p.1051] of [1981] GLR 944 no such Decree was published before or after they left office.

(10) No evidence of any type touching any charge was led before the court.

(11) By law, the court had no legal material whatsoever which would enable it to convict.

The eleven matters I have adverted to above, were what was supplied by the defendant in proof of a trial or purported trial, conviction and sentence of Kwakye before the A.F.R.C. Special Court established by A.F.R.C.D. 3. The question is: Do these facts cumulatively show that the A.F.R.C. Special Court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3 tried or purported to try Kwakye?

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Court Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), is a respectable Decree. It set down in comprehensive terms, dignified conditions under which an accused is to be tried. It infused into the criminal system, adequate safeguards to protect persons accused under it. To say as the majority would seem to say that these elaborate safeguards can be capriciously ignored with impunity, is to denigrate the Government of the A.F.R.C. and create the impression that a government which gave the indication that it wanted justice for the people of Ghana was deliberately subverting justice. Let us examine A.F.R.C.D. 3.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3), has seven sections. The first five sections are substantial and substantive provisions and the sixth and seventh sections deal respectfully with the commencement dates of the offences and the Decree. I shall consider each section.

Section 1 established the A.F.R.C. Special Court to comprise of a president and four other members all of whom were to be appointed by the A.F.R.C. or other body authorised by the council. There was also to be a judge advocate who was to have status, duties and function of a judge advocate sitting at a General Courts Martial. There was no evidence that the body before whom Squadron Leader Segbefia appeared was a body appointed by the A.F.R.C. or a body authorised by the A.F.R.C. Since Mr. Kwakye denies that he was tried by the A.F.R.C. Special Court, and since in our decision of 22 March 1981, we had categorically demanded that the Attorney-General “must produce facts which show that the A.F.R.C. took or purported to have taken judicial action against Mr. Kwakye,” it was essential to prove that the body which is alleged to have sat was the A.F.R.C. or an appointee of the A.F.R.C. or its authorised agent. As this was not done, it follows logically that we have no evidence that the A,F,R.C. special court tried Mr.

[p.1052] of [1981] GLR 944

Kwakye. If the court that tried Mr. Kwakye claims to be an A.F.R.C. Special Court, then it has failed to satisfy the provisions of section 1 of the Decree which established such a court. The evidence was clear for instance that there was no judge advocate, a mandatory statutory condition for the composition of such a court. This is not a defect in composition. This is a case of no composition at all and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 19) which saves defective composition, is therefore inapplicable.

Under section 2 of the Decree (a) the decision of the special court appointed under the Decree shall either be unanimous or by a majority of four to one; and (b) the decision shall be subject to review and confirmation by the A.F.R.C. and a decision reviewed and confirmed or otherwise varied was not subject to appeal. In the Kwakye case, we do not have evidence as to whether the decision was unanimous or four to one or three to two. If it is three to two, then it fails to satisfy the requirement of section 2. Furthermore, the decision was subject to be confirmed by the A.F.R.C. In the Kwakye case, the A.F.R.C. decided that it would give effect to it, in other words, confirm it by a Decree. This condition has not been satisfied and so the decision, even if it was pronounced by a duly constituted special court would as of now be of no effect. In this respect, the absence of a Decree confirming it is very relevant. It may be that the A.F.R.C. discovered that the body which pretended to have taken the decision was not a proper body and so it refrained from confirming it. Be that as it may, the provisions of section 2 was also not satisfied.

Section 3 contains fourteen offences triable by the special court. Under our law, an accused person is entitled to be tried upon a charge sheet containing the particulars of his offence, showing the nature of the offence, the date it was committed, the place at which it was committed and particulars which give reasonable information of the charge. In the Kwakye case, we do not have the particulars of the charge. The witness present at the so-called trial does not know the charge. We have operated a civilised court system for over 100 years. A trial, conviction and sentence have always been proved before our courts by the production of the record of proceedings. This is the first trial in the history of this country that a court has been asked to assume that there has been a trial without the production of any record at all. This is the first time in over 100 years, since the establishment of statutory courts in Ghana, where the highest court in the land is called upon to acquiesce in incarcerating the citizen without being told or given information as to the offence the said person has committed. How

[p.1053] of [1981] GLR 944 any court in the responsible discharge of its duty to protect the citizen from illegal acts that invade his liberty and property can entertain such an application is in my view difficult to understand. I shall later deal with the rule of law which is said to justify this outrageous application. It is clear, however, that the provisions of section 3 have not been complied with.

Section 4 provides that a person found guilty by a special court of any of the offences in section 3 shall be liable on conviction to suffer death by firing squad or to imprisonment with hard labour for not less than three years with a consequential confiscation of assets illegally or dishonestly acquired. Since it is clear that the body that sat on Mr. Kwakye’s case is not a special court in terms of section 1, it is obvious that it has no power to sentence in terms of section 4. The purported sentence is therefore a nullity. Once again, the provisions of section 4 have not been complied with.

Section 5 deals with the mode of trial. It provides, inter alia, in mandatory terms that the evidence of the prosecution shall be presented to the court and that the court shall receive all relevant evidence on oath or affirmation in proof or disproof of the charges against an accused. It gives in mandatory terms, a right of cross-examination of witnesses to the accused and provides that the prosecution and the accused shall have a right to address the court before the decision of the court; and furthermore, it provides that the court shall on its procedure and decision, be guided by the rules of natural justice. In this case, Mr. Kwakye was not informed of the charges and of the time and place of trial. Even if he could not attend because of his injuries, he could still instruct counsel to appear for him to take advantage of the rights given to him under the Decree. Failure to give any notice whatsoever to Mr. Kwakye is a clear breach of the rules of natural justice. The evidence, even of the defendant’s witnesses, shows that no evidence was led at all in proof of any of the charges. No one gave testimony on any offence before the said court; consequently, the members had no evidence at all upon which they could make findings and convict and sentence. They did not even purport to try the plaintiff. They only proceeded to pass sentence without trial.

What is a trial or what purports to be a trial is adequately shown in section 5 of A.F.R.C.D. 3. In my respectful opinion, section 5 is the decisive provision. The only way a court can try a case is to have evidence either orally or by affidavit or any other way expressly provided by law. In the absence of any of these, there is no trial or appearance of trial or a purported trial. It is not just a procedural requirement, it is a substantive requirement.

[p.1054] of [1981] GLR 944

Evidence is the substance of which a trial is made of; it is not a procedure in a trial. By breaching the evidence provision of section 5, there was no trial or purported trial or anything having the effect of a trial. In fact, by refusing to take evidence, a tribunal empowered to try a case is in effect declining to decide and is abandoning jurisdiction. Whatever it does without evidence is a nullity. Two English cases are respectable authorities for this proposition: see R. v. Marsham [1892] 1 Q.B. 371, C.A. and R. v. Wood (1855) 11 9 E. R. 400. In R. v. Marsham (supra) where a magistrate had refused to hear evidence as the faceless members did in this case, Lord Esher said at p. 378, “he has refused to hear the evidence, even though it would prove that fact; he has therefore, declined jurisdiction.” In the circumstances, the privative or ouster clause was considered inoperative to take away the jurisdiction of the court to reverse the magistrate. It was also similarly decided in R. v. Wood (supra) at p. 403. In my view, there was no trial or purported trial as the provisions of section 5 were blatantly ignored.

Section 6 provided that the Decree covered offences committed since 24 February 1966 and section 7 fixed the commencement date of the Decree as 4 June 1979. These are all the relevant provisions of the Decree.

The subsequent amendment of section 5 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 contained in A.F.R.C.D. 19 is relevant in these proceedings to the extent that it permitted trials in absentia and defects in the composition of a special court. Why did the A.F.R.C. make the amendment in section 5 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 which provided that an accused person under that Decree must be tried in his presence? Without that amendment, any trial in an accused person’s absence will be a nullity even if done by a duly constituted court. The only body to pronounce such a trial a nullity, must be the courts; aware of this, the A.F.R.C. (although in section 2 (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 there is an ouster clause) nevertheless amended section 5 (2) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 by A.F.R.C.D. 19 to permit trials in absentia. In my view, this clearly shows that the jurisdiction of the superior courts was not completely ousted by the ouster clause and the A.F.R.C., the legislature that passed A.F.R.C.D. 3, appreciated it.

A study of the facts the defendant led in evidence before us and a consideration of A.F.R.C.D. 3, shows that every substantial section of the Decree was breached. The prosecution led no evidence and the defence led no evidence. Clearly, there was not even an appearance of a trial. In fact the whole proceeding is a nullity. I find support for this in the view of Sowah J.A. (as he then was) in Karletse-Panin v. Nuro [1979] G.L.R. 194 at p. 208, C.A. This

[p.1055] of [1981] GLR 944 was a case in which contrary to the provisions of Order 35, r. 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II, the district magistrate had given judgment without hearing evidence and Sowah J.A. (as he then was) protested:

“In this instant case, it is my view that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it entered judgment without hearing evidence as prescribed by the rule.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Applying the well-known principle enshrined in Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A. he then said, “the judgment entered by the magistrate is a nullity and ought to be set aside.”

The supposed trial if a trial it must be called, was not therefore a trial under A.F.R.C.D. 3. It was a complete nullity and it is void. Moreover, it was never given effect to by the A.F.R.C. as is provided by law and therefore it has proprio vigore of no effect at all. I do not see how any tribunal bent on doing justice to its citizens can escape the inevitable conclusion that the plaintiff, Mr. Kwakye, was never tried, convicted or sentenced by an A.F.R.C. Special Court and that an A.F.R.C. Special Court did not even sit to try or even to purport to try and sentence him. Those who apparently assembled and proceeded to sentence him, had no lawful or legal right to do so. Their acts are all illegal and unlawful. In fact, every person who sits as a member of a tribunal or a court has an instrument or letter of appointment. This is the first time in the history of the country where an alleged statutory tribunal has sat with no documents of any sort evidencing the appointments of the members thereof. And this is in a case where it is alleged that there was no trial at all before any such tribunal.

Indeed, in all the judgments of the majority members in this case, it was never indicated that the A.F.R.C. appointed some faceless individuals to try Kwakye in secret or in public. In fact, if it had appointed such persons and had instructed that their names should not be disclosed, the appointments would offend against A.F.R.C.D. 3 and it would be null and void.

I must confess that I am scandalised and ashamed that this court system of ours, which is one of the best in black Africa, which has imbibed all the best principles of the British common law tradition and which now has distilled into it by our Constitution, 1979, some of the best elements of the jurisprudence of the enlightened world, can be said to be capable of entertaining the secret trial system which is the hallmark of the worst totalitarian regimes of some countries of the world. It must be a dark day indeed for our people and constitutionalism when we are able to say that this evil

[p.1056] of [1981] GLR 944 machine of tyranny and despotism has a place in our Constitution, 1979. If it is indeed so, then an evil genius must be in control of our destiny—But I think not.

The people of this country have had a distressing past. The Preventive Detention Act of the Nkrumah era was a blot on our law and an affront to justice. The totalitarian regimes which followed military coups in which the people were denied their just rights to govern themselves is a shameful past best forgotten. The “no court” scenario of the Busia regime did no good to justice and constitutionalism in this country. Our people desire and are entitled to justice. And I would have thought the Constitution, 1979, with its excellent human rights provisions, is the culmination of the end of the woes of our citizens. It is a pity if it is not so and our citizens are as yet to continue the struggle again against the monster that injustice is.

In his struggle and search for justice from the only body to give him that, and with no other institution in the land to challenge it, the plaintiff by his writ seeks:

“A declaration that the plaintiff was never tried, convicted or sentenced by any special court established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979, (A.F.R.C.D. 3), and [that] the purported sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff as published in the national press on 13 October 1979 is an infringement on the plaintiff’s fundamental human rights, inconsistent with chapter 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, void and of no effect.”

In our unanimous ruling in this same case delivered on 22 March 1981 we said, speaking through. Apaloo C.J. that:

“The plaintiff claims that he was not tried but that a prison sentence of 25 years was allegedly imposed on him in his absence. He says that act contravenes chapter 6, the human rights provision of the Constitution, and he invites us to so declare.

That the Constitution, 1979, clothes this court with jurisdiction to make the declaration sought by the plaintiff in a fit case is hardly in doubt.”

If this is our decision on 22 March 1981, then why do we not make the declaration which the plaintiff seeks, when it is as plain as a pikestaff that this is ideally a fit and deserving case? With all due respect to my brothers who delivered the majority opinion, I am at a loss to understand why although no facts of a trial were produced by the defendant, yet the court in a majority decision

[p.1057] of [1981] GLR 944 has declined to exercise its jurisdiction to make the only declaration which the law and the facts call for. In my humble opinion, from the facts which the defendant on our orders produced, it is clear that the plaintiff was never tried by any special court of the A.F.R.C. under A.F.R.C.D. 3 as no such court was proved in existence daring his trial. Since there was no such court, there could be no question of the said court even purporting to try him. Clearly, a blatant and outrageous injustice of immense proportion has been perpetrated against Mr. Kwakye, the plaintiff in this case.

I would have thought that under article 114 of the Constitution, 1979, we have no option but to correct it. I am very sad that there can possibly exist a rule of law which welcomes injustice. In spite of the decision of the majority, I would without hesitation say that there is no such rule of law that I know of and I have succeeded in finding none in the majority decision. I think the majority decision is wrong in law. It must surely be a grave concern of both the legislature and the executive; and in my view, they must in the responsible discharge of their duties, seek to ameliorate this injustice by finding a solution to this problem since the Supreme Court has in effect declined to interfere. They must do it because any country that countenances injustice may achieve some temporary respite; but in my humble opinion, such respite is illusory and the nation is without doubt poised on a path that may lead to violence. The peace and tranquility that it needs for orderly progress and development must surely elude it as long as it is capable of tolerating injustice. We must remember that an injustice against a nonentity is indeed an injustice against each and every one of us. It is merely a case of: yesterday it was A, today it is B, and tomorrow it will be you; the Biblical saying “love your neighbour as yourself “ becomes meaningful if we resist injustice perpetrated against our neighbour as we will resist it if it is against us. Jiagge J.A. in Republic v. Anlo Traditional Council; Ex parte Hor II [1979] G.L.R. 234, C.A. at p. 245, reminded us in a poignant warning that “a sense of injustice is a grievous thing.” We must never forget that a man unjustly treated and who has no means of peacefully getting justice may resort to violence and self help and he will be supported in his violence by good men sympathetic to his cause. The painful and bitter experience of the United States of America is a grim reminder of this universal truth. In Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) 19 Howard 393, the United States Supreme Court in March 1857, held that Dred Scott and all men like him, were not citizens of the United States nor ever could be citizens. Chief Justice Taney observed that there was general agreement, presumably among whitemen, that negroes were “. . . beings of an inferior order, and altogether

[p.1058] of [1981] GLR 944 unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no right which the whiteman was bound to respect.” At the time of the decision, there were many enlightened and sensible persons in the United States who were firmly convinced that slavery was legally indefensible, morally wrong and socially degrading and must not be tolerated. The Constitution of the United States could easily be interpreted in a just way to decide that Dred Scott was a citizen, nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court as the highest and final judicial organ of the state was in effect formally laying down the proposition that there was no legal way of righting what to many fine minds was an obvious wrong. The state was obviously poised on a path that must needs lead to violence. And that is what precisely happened; for this infamous decision led a few years later, to the American Civil War and it was upset by marching armies, in a blood bath that cost many lives. It undoubtedly animated the constitutional provision of the 13th Amendment of the United States Constitution which was passed on 18 December 1865:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

After many years, Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court was to observe that after the civil war, the justices of the United States Supreme Court, presumably from a feeling of remorse or shame, never mentioned the Dred Scott case any more than a family in which a son had been hanged, mentioned ropes and scaffolds.

As I understand it, the decision to deny the plaintiff his just demand for a declaration that he was never tried, which indeed is the truth of the matter, is said to be founded on the legal effect of section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions and in particular on the legal meaning of the words “purported” appearing in section 15 (2). The subsections need to be carefully considered. They are as follows:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

[p.1059] of [1981] GLR 944

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

The provision is not new to the common law. It is called a “privative clause” or “ouster provision” or “finality clause” or “ouster clause” and I shall later in this judgment, canvass its legal significance. It is important to read this ouster clause very carefully and to understand its meaning fully. Section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions saved executive, legislative and judicial acts taken or purported to be taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or its lawful agent from being questioned in court. The act of unknown, nameless persons assembling and without hearing evidence and sentencing a man is not a judicial act. It is neither a legislative nor an executive act. The A.F.R.C. did not authorise any such body to act. It is plainly an illegal act and section 15 in no way saves an illegal act taken or purported to be taken. I have already indicated that this illegal act was not taken by the A.F.R.C. and there was before us no evidence that the special court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3 took or purported to take this illegal act.

Clearly, section 15 is not applicable at all to this case. And we are free to call a spade a spade and to declare a clearly illegal act as illegal. I am completely at a loss to understand why in all the judgments of the majority members of this court this plain illegality was apparently conceded but allowed to operate in the Third Republic in spite of the clear wording of section 15 of the transitional provisions which gave no quarters to such illegal acts. In our ruling of 22 March 1981, already referred to, we recognised the relevance and purview of the ouster provision in the said section 15 (2) and (3) when we said:

“As the Attorney-General omitted to comply with rule 48 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), he placed no facts before us on which we can judge the applicability or otherwise of the ouster provision.”

Speaking for myself, I still stand by these views and I would add that since the date of our ruling, the further facts adduced on behalf of the Attorney-General made matters rather worse, because no evidence was led as to who appointed the members of the body that sat on the Kwakye case, or who were appointed to serve and the authority under which such appointments were made. Evidence was also led that the sentence was never confirmed. The warrant of committal, if any, was never tendered in evidence and the officer who signed a photostat warrant attached to the

[p.1060] of [1981] GLR 944 statement of case was never called; and what appears to be a signature, was not even decipherable.

Since the plaintiff maintains that he was never tried by a so-called A.F.R.C. Special Court, one would have expected that the person who signed the warrant, if any, committing him to prison would be called to give evidence and be subject to cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff. The failure to do this must necessarily cause a miscarriage of justice if the document is accepted, as it disabled the plaintiff from exercising his undoubted legal right of testing the genuineness of the document. In any case, since the warrant was never tendered and made available to us, this court cannot rely on it; for if we rely on it, all the courts in the judiciary will be obliged to follow this pernicious precedent of relying on photostat documents not tendered in evidence and which the parties have not agreed to admit in evidence. This will subvert the fair and lawful administration of justice. I have already identified many unsatisfactory features which demonstrate that no special court tried or purported to try the plaintiff. I also wish to associate myself fully with the views of Anin J.S.C. touching the meaning of “purported” in the ouster clause under consideration. I think a “judicial action taken or purported to have been taken” merely means: a judicial action taken or appearing to have been taken, in other words, an action which gives the appearance of being a judicial action. A capricious action or illegal action is not a judicial action and cannot have the effect or appearance of a judicial action. Now assembling unlawfully in secret in a caucus or as a court and without hearing evidence, as is provided by law, to administer unlawful secret oaths and to sentence a person has no resemblance to a judicial action. It rather resembles a capricious act, or an illegal act.

As I have already indicated, the ouster clause is a provision well-known to the common law and to the jurisprudence of many countries. Provisions like an ouster clause purporting to oust the jurisdiction of our courts on a matter touching the fundamental human rights of our people, must be considered to be a deviant phenomenon in our present constitutional arrangements. Such a provision must be frowned upon because such an ouster of jurisdiction, conflicts with the provisions of article 114 of the Constitution, 1979, which vested final judicial power in the courts, and is clearly inconsistent with the rule of law and the principles contained in the preamble which animated the substantive provisions of our Constitution. Its anomalous character is highlighted in those ouster

[p.1061] of [1981] GLR 944 provisions, like the present one, where final judicial power is in effect taken away from the judiciary and given to other institutions of state with inferior jurisdictions. If in exercising the power the institution exceeds it, the apparent absence of judicial control spells the doom of constitutional government and encourages arbitrariness, the erosion of legality and the brutalising of the liberties of the people. As Justice Bernison of the Israel Supreme Court observed in National Circles v. Minister of Police (1970) 24 P.D. (2) 141 at p. 172:

“ . . . courts do not view with satisfaction this limitation on their power. The reason does not lie in their desire to magnify their power and importance. Rather they are motivated by a clear knowledge and deep faith the Courts’ power for judicial review of executive actions is essential for every genuine democratic regime, and he who attempts to undermine it, is likely to ruin one of the central pillars of State’s structural.”

In Orthodox Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police (1971) 25 P.D. (1) 225, Ethiopian Church members deprived the petitioner and the Coptic Church from access to a passage leading to the Holy Sepulchre parvis in Jerusalem which had been held by the Coptic Church since the early nineteenth century. The Ethiopian Church had failed in its legal claim to the passage but its members exploited the Easter procession of the Coptic Church to replace the Coptic passage locks of the Copts with their own locks and they thus barred the Coptic members access to the passage. The petitioners complained that the Minister of Police had refused to allow them to remove the Ethiopian locks to regain possession. In a contention that the court had no jurisdiction, the respondent Minister of Police maintained that matters concerning the Holy Places as the case clearly is, is not justiciable and cited as authority a British mandatory statute still in force in Israel, namely, the Palestine (Holy Places) Order-in-Council, 1924, which provided:

“Article 2. No cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places or religious building or sites in Palestine . .

. shall be heard or determined by any court in Palestine. Article 3. If any question arises whether any cause or matter comes within the preceding Article hereof, such question shall . . . be referred to the High Commissioner, who shall decide the question after making due enquiry into the matter in accordance with such instructions . . . from one of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State. The decision of the High Commissioner shall be final and binding . . .”

[p.1062] of [1981] GLR 944

By an Israeli amending statute, the power of the High Commissioner and Secretaries of State is vested in the Israeli Government, and “Palestine” is read as “Israel.” The Israeli Supreme Court rejected the claim of the Minister of Police that the ouster clause deprived it of jurisdiction and ordered him to help the petitioners to regain possession. In asserting that it has jurisdiction the court pointed out that if it declined jurisdiction it would in effect legitimise a manifestly illegal act and encourage lawlessness by a religious community. The President of the court Agranat P. observed:

“It is the precept of a basic principle of the rule of law that where a case of a “fresh” trespass committed in a Holy Place is presented, the Court should not, only because of the justiciability theory, abstain from intervention to maintain public order . . . Any other conclusion is likely to create turmoil and chaos in the Holy Places; such a situation is unacceptable.”

In Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hammed Khan P.LD 1965, S.C. 671, the Frontier Crimes Regulations in Pakistan provided that no decisions or orders made under certain chapters shall be called in question in any civil or criminal court in Pakistan. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had no difficulty at all in setting aside an unlawful order which was not duly made within the regulations.

In Canada in R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board; Ex parte Kitchener Food Market Ltd. [1966] 1 O. R. 482 the Labour Relations Board empowered by statute to take action in the case of the sale of a business, took action when no sale was found to exist. The statute establishing it provided that its decisions were not to be reviewed in any court and that no injunction, certiorari, etc., was to be granted to question or restrain the board’s actions. Following well-known principles governing the applicability of privative clauses in cases where jurisdiction has been wrongly assumed, the Ontario court quashed the order of the board.

Powell v. McCormack (1969) 395 U.S. 486, is to a great extent an instance of a privative clause in the U.S. Constitution. Its interpretation accords with the common law position that once an institution lacks jurisdiction, privative clauses do not protect its actions.

Privative clauses have been so treated by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Australia in for example Ex parte Northern Rivers Rutile Pty, Ltd.; Re Claye [1965] N.S.W.R. 135 and by the Nigerian courts in Nwankwere v. Adewumi (1962) W.N.L.R. 298.

In England, the position is-quite clear, at least, since the House of Lords decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147. I have myself in an exhaustive judgment

[p.1063] of [1981] GLR 944 in the case of the Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Forson [1980] G.L.R. 529 traced the history of the ouster clause in the common law. In Republic v. Special Tribunal, Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592, C.A. the principle of the ouster clause as is known in the common law was re-stated very clearly and it was held that lack of jurisdiction of inferior tribunals is as a rule not protected by ouster clauses.

My own researches lead me to the conclusion that leaving aside the question of errors of law, which is debatable as long as a burial has limited jurisdiction, no ouster clause will be operative to protect it if it goes outside its jurisdiction to do something which it has no power at all to do. The philosophical basis for this doctrine can be found in the very wise statement of Farewell L.J. in R v Shoreditch Assessment Committee; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B 859 at p. 880, C.A. where he said:

“Subjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it: it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure—such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited . . .”

At p. 322 of the third edition of his famous book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, the late Professor S. A. de Smith who had studied this problem at length quoting Taylor v. National Assistance Board [1956] P. 470; Pyx Granite Co. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 Q.B. 554; Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, H.L.; Fenwick v. Croydon Union Rural Sanitary Authority [1891] 2 Q.B. 216 and Attorney-General v. Hanwell U.D.C. [1900] 1 Ch. 51, C.A. says of the court’s power to grant declarations in the face of ouster or finality clauses:

“It is clear, furthermore, that a finality clause does not affect their power to award a declaration that a decision or order made by a statutory body is invalid. Even such words as ‘final and conclusive’ are ineffective to abridge or attenuate judicial review.”

It seems that in the Kwakye case, the word which is said to be decisive is the word purported in the phrase “judicial action taken or purported to have been taken.” As I understand the argument, A.F.R.C.D. 3 as amended can completely be disregarded. Any group of persons can ostensibly send a Ghanaian to prison

[p.1064] of [1981] GLR 944 between 4 June 1979 and 24 September 1979, and although that person is completely innocent and has done nothing wrong, nevertheless the mere allegation by the State that such a prisoner is an A.F.R.C. detainee, even if the A.F.R.C. or its authorised appointees have not taken any action in his case, brings in the “purported” notion and presto, any court action by the victim fails. I have asked myself over and over again, why did the A.F.R.C. make elaborate legal provisions in A.F.R.C.D. 3 if there is to be no authority to interpret it? What was the necessity for amending it by A.F.R.C.D. 19, if it can be disregarded with impunity? The elaborate provisions made by A.F.R.C.D. 3 to protect Ghanaian citizens is by this argument useless. It was Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court who said in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) (1803) 137 at p. 166, that:

“where a specific duty is assigned by law and individual rights depend on the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort . . . for a remedy.”

This is an extraordinary situation. The Attorney-General representing the executive, the government who are sworn to protect the citizen is in effect urging the judiciary, the authority which is the constitutional and traditional defenders of the rights of the people, to deny any remedy to a person who complains and has overwhelmingly shown that his legal and constitutional rights have been violated. We are to deny the plaintiff any remedy in a case where no factual or legal foundation has been shown for the invasion of his rights. The judiciary and the executive are to speak with one voice and to propagate the notion that in certain cases, our Constitution sanctions outrageous injustice. This joinder of forces by the judiciary and the executive to deny justice to a citizen exudes in my opinion, an odious and intolerable smell of the totalitarianism of the Akoto and Amadu Baba syndrome of the First Republic. Is this curtailment of freedom and justice really necessary? Is it in the interest of state security to deny citizens their just rights? One word “purported” is said to justify this injustice. I do not believe it.

The Constitution, 1979, and the thrust of traditional legal reasoning favours a decision vindicating freedom and justice. These are potent allies which should press us as judges to ride roughshod over the fears and prejudices of the unfortunate segment of our society, undoubtedly a significant but an unenlightened segment, who, because of their economic woes and the collapse of their living standards, will make scapegoats of their fellow

[p.1065] of [1981] GLR 944 citizens whose misconducts have not in any lawful way been exposed for the deterrent benefit of would-be wrongdoers. If I do not know what A has done to be incarcerated, how do I avoid his fate? If we succumb to these prejudices and sanction injustice, whether in the name of state security or interpretation of the Constitution, then our judiciary will suffer severely in prestige in the eyes of our people and the civilised legal community, and we must take the blame for this self-inflicted in jury to our prestige. We are not an elected body and we must remember as Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court said in his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 at p. 267:

“The Court’s authority possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished . . .”

What is the purpose of section 15 of the transitional provisions? It seems to me that for many years now, the executive authorities have not been very happy at the manner in which we dispense justice in our courts. Far too many persons, who by clear evidence led before the courts are obviously guilty, have been led free by artificial notions of justice, which baffle lawyers and laymen alike. I have considered this matter at length when I was at the High Court in Tanoh alias Obeng v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 482 at pp. 491-492 and in Marhaba v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 90 at pp. 104-105. The observation I made in the Tanoh case (supra) at pp. 491-492 are worth repeating here as they suggest a rationale for section 15:

“In considering this appeal, I do not propose to lose sight of the fact that our legislature would seem to be bent on creating for us an indigenous concept of criminal justice not necessarily tied to the jurisprudence of England. There is no doubt that having regard to its history and experience, English criminal jurisprudence favours an accused person to the extent of permitting a guilty person to escape the sanction of criminal justice if the rules fashioned for his protection are ignored by the administrators and interpreters of the criminal law. In Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] A.C. 309 at pp. 323-324, H.L. Viscount Sankey in his usually vivid style stated this English position:

‘If in any case the evidence against a prisoner (other than that which is inadmissible) is very strong and is abundant to justify a jury in convicting, it may well seem unfortunate that a guilty man should go free because some rule of

[p.1066] of [1981] GLR 944 evidence has been infringed by the prosecutor. But it must be remembered that the whole policy of English criminal law has been to see that as against the prisoner every rule in his favour is observed and that no rule is broken so as to prejudice the chance of the jury fairly trying the true issues. The sanction for the observance of the rules of evidence in criminal cases is that, if they are broken in any case, the conviction may be quashed . . . It is often better that one guilty man should escape than that the general rules evolved by the dictates of justice for the conduct of criminal prosecutions should be disregarded and discredited.’ In this country, salutary though this English rule is, it seems to me that our legislature has been engaged for sometime now in the rather difficult and unenviable task of breaking with this English tradition. Our legislature, while conceding that the innocent ought not to be punished, would seem to demand that the guilty should not be permitted to hide behind any facade of technicality and legal formalism to escape his just punishment. The concept of a person clearly guilty escaping punishment seems odious to our traditions and it seems to me that our legislature does not seem to be happy about the concept inherent in the last observation of Viscount Sankey above. When on 30 June 1964 in Akowuah v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 475, S.C. the erstwhile Supreme Court used a highly artificial notion of justice to acquit an appellant whose appeal otherwise would seem to have no merit and repeated the process again on 20 November 1964 in the case of Donkor v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 598, S.C. the legislature peremptorily endeavoured to reverse the process and on 9 January 1965 passed into law the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), which would seem to state in unambiguous language that notwithstanding any rule of law a clearly guilty person should not be acquitted upon such artificial notions of justice as were canvassed by the erstwhile Supreme Court in the two cases above.

It seems to me that it is the duty of the court, having regard of course to the provisions of the Constitution, to assist in moulding rules to give effect to this indigenous philosophy behind Act 261 instead of thwarting the legislative intention by recourse to English notions which ought gradually to disappear to give way to new standards.

[p.1067] of [1981] GLR 944

As I have already pointed out the constitutional provision enjoining fair trial contained in article 20 (1) would seem to indicate that whatever rules are formulated now or hereafter, they must be subject to an overriding requirement, and designed to secure a fair trial.”

I think there is nothing wrong with sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. They are proper and desirable provisions. They merely emphasise in an attenuated form, the indigenous philosophy that the guilty should be punished and must not be shielded by arid and subtle legal arguments; section 15 did not as is now claimed for it, ordain that people should be punished upon no evidence at all.

In section 15, it seems that the executive during the A.F.R.C. regime, was merely reacting in the same way as the executive of the First Republic reacted; a reaction which merely reflected what the nation wanted, namely, that people who are, by evidence clearly guilty, should not be freed by technicalities and artificial reasoning. We have now in the majority decisions misconceived the mood of the Constitution-makers who promulgated section 15 and are now putting forward the pernicious proposition that a conviction with no evidence at all, will satisfy the highest court in the land—a proposition which the High Court has soundly and in the best tradition of the rule of law repudiated in many A.F.R.C. convict cases which came before the High Court for determination.

It is clear in my opinion, that the Government of the A.F.R.C. was bent on punishing criminals, not innocent persons. I have no doubt that if they had been informed that A.F.R.C.D. 3, was completely ignored and that persons against whom there was no semblance even of an iota of evidence pointing to guilt are languishing in jail, they would as a responsible government disassociate themselves from the action of the faceless rascals responsible for that—I cannot believe that they will tolerate injustice. The A. F. R. C. clearly did not intend that evidence can be ignored with impunity and the decision of the majority opinion suggesting that they did intend that evidence can be so disregarded, does disservice to a government that by its own Proclamation sought to govern in accordance with the rule of law and in A.F.R.C.D. 3 made its intention as a responsible government very clear. Now it is suggested that this was a government that by the transitional provisions would want the judiciary and our government to ignore the Charter of the United Nations. This is because under article 11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is provided:

[p.1068] of [1981] GLR 944

“11. Every one charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”

I have, no doubt, that the majority decision of this court is erroneous, if not per incuriam, since it conflicts with the unanimous decision of the same court dated 22 March 1981 in the same case, and because it creates injustice; I believe such a decision cannot survive the ravages of time. The injustice perpetrated in the name of the Constitution is indeed outrageous and if our Constitution and legal system has no remedy, then I agree with the view of Knight Bruce L.J. in Slim v. Croucher (1860) 1 De G.F. & J. 518 at p. 527 where he said; “A country whose administration of justice did not afford redress in a case of the present description would not be in a state of civilization.”

We are only temporarily in control of the judiciary of this country. As our youngmen leave our universities and become aware of the great learning developed by the common law on the operational force of the privative clauses; and as their sense of justice become sharp, those of them who will ascend the bench will without doubt overrule this decision which seeks to deprive many of our people justice. The experience of the United States is a classic reminder of the future course of events and a clear indication that the majority decision is doomed.

In Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the State of Louisiana on 10 July 1890, passed “An Act to promote the comfort of passengers”; the central requirement of the law was to make railroad companies to “ . . . provide equal but separate accommodation for the white and coloured races.” Homer Adolph Plessy, a coloured person who refused to move from an all white coach to a coach earmarked for coloured persons in pursuance of the Act, was arrested and put before the circuit district court for the parish of New Orleans presided over by Judge Ferguson for violating the law. Counsel for Plessy argued that the Louisiana law which Plessy was charged with violating, was null and void because it was in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The relevant provision of the 14th Amendment reads:

“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

[p.1069] of [1981] GLR 944 without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Judge Ferguson ruled that the Louisiana law was valid and not inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, and this extraordinary decision was ultimately upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Justice Brown delivering the decision of the court with Justice Harlan dissenting held, inter alia, at p. 544 that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, “Could not have intended [“to abolish distinction based upon colour, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality’.”]

The lone dissenter in a vigorous opinion demonstrated the hollowness of the majority view when he observed at p. 562:

“The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on the highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal ground.”

He stoutly rejected the argument that the provision of separate accommodation is not a calculated act of discrimination against the coloured man, an act tending to destroy the equality before the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He exclaimed in the best tradition of the common law concept of justice:

“But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our law is colour-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his colour when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved . . . We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically puts the brand or servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before that law. The thin disguise of ‘equal’ accommodation for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for this wrong this day done.”

Years later in Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Chief Justice Earl Warren speaking for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court consigned the “equal but separate” rule of Plessy v. Ferguson a false constitutional doctrine that is to

[p.1070] of [1981] GLR 944 be relegated to the rubbish head of constitutional heresies—the limbo it properly belongs and Plessy v. Ferguson was formally repudiated.

In seeking guidance from the experience of other jurisdictions as I have delineated herein, we only endeavour to elicit the fundamental principles of universal application, which have motivated the peoples of the world ancient and modern in their search for justice. In a judgment which seeks to renounce and repudiate these enduring principles which have shaped modern civilisation, we venture to repeat the errors of our past, we refuse to learn from the comparable experience of others and by our intransigence, we part away with the civilised world and return to our sorrowful past.

In my humble opinion, the function of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution or any statutory document, is not to construe written law merely for the sake of law; it is to construe the written law in a manner that vindicates it as an instrument of justice. If therefore a provision in a written law can be interpreted in one breadth to promote justice and in another to produce in- justice, I think the Supreme Court is bound to select the interpretation that advances the course of justice unless, in fact, the law does not need interpretation at all but rather specifically and in terms provide for injustice. On this premise the only way, I can see the ouster clause in section 15 sustaining the majority decision is if it is for instance worded as follows:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial [capricious or illegal] action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

Even this provision can only operate, if the action is one taken by the A.F.R.C. or by any person in the name of the A.F.R.C.

In the Kwakye case, the trial, conviction and sentence was not shown to have been taken by the A.F.R.C. and what is very significant, no evidence of any sort was laid before us that it was taken by any person in the name of the A.F.R.C. so that even this seemingly strong privative clause is also inapplicable. In any case an action can be a judicial action or a purported judicial action if

[p.1071] of [1981] GLR 944 it is not capricious or illegal; a capricious or illegal action is not a judicial action or a purported judicial action. By a purported judicial action surely the legislature must mean a purported legal judicial action.

For the reasons I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment, I would grant the declaration which the plaintiff asked for and declare that he was never tried, convicted and sentenced by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council special court and that no judicial action was taken or was purported to have been taken in his case under A.F.R.C.D. 3 (as amended by A.F.R.C.D. 19). I would declare that the purported 25 years’ sentence alleged by the press to have been imposed on him is an infringement of his rights as is contained in his prayer and is null and void and of no effect.

I have, however, indicated that the executive of the A.F.R.C era were clearly intent on punishing the criminals who have destroyed the economy. The future security of the State in the enjoyment of a sound economy demands that persons who have wrecked havoc with the economy are not let loose on our society. In trying to get at such persons, however, we must balance the security of the State as against the individual’s constitutional rights and we must in the interest of justice and constitutionalism endeavour to satisfy both. We can satisfy both by proceeding in accordance with our law and the Constitution against all persons who have ravished our economy. If that is so, and Kwakye is one of the desecrators, then clearly his charges will be pending before one of the special courts of the A.F.R.C. presumably appointed under A.F.R.C.D. 3. Such cases will, in the contemplation of law, by virtue of section 17 of the transitional provisions, be now pending before the special tribunal established under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Tribunal and Other Matters) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 23).

Finally, I must remark that section 15 (3) of the transitional provisions is clearly inapplicable as it merely saved procedural defects. Where the defects are of substantive legal requirements, they cannot be considered as procedure prescribed by law.

I will therefore under article 2 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, as well as the inherent powers of the Supreme Court, order that Kwakye be tried properly before the special tribunal established under A.F.R.C.D. 23 on the charges, if any, pending before the special court established under A.F.R.C.D. 3.

I would so declare and order accordingly.

DECISION

Declaration refused.

J. K. E. E.

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