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[1982] SLR (CA) 14Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

MANU AND ANOTHER vs. YEBOAH [1982-83] GLR 34

11 May 1982 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 19 min read

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OSCOLAMANU AND ANOTHER v YEBOAH [1982-83] GLR 34 [1982] SLR (CA) 14
APAMANU AND ANOTHER v YEBOAH [1982-83] GLR 34, [1982] SLR (CA) 14 (Ghana).
BluebookMANU AND ANOTHER v YEBOAH [1982-83] GLR 34, [1982] SLR (CA) 14 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

(2) Marfo v. Adusei [1964] G.L.R. 365, S.C.

(3) Republic v. Circuit Court Registrar; Ex parte Arthur [1980] G.L.R. 309, C.A.

(4) Kwabena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

(5) Addai v. Donkor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 209, C.A.

(6) Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

(7) Badu v. Atta Kwadwo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 346.

(8) Mensah v. Bimpeh, [1980] G.L.R. 141.

(9) Madjoub v. John Holt Bartholomew & Co., Ltd. [1967] G.L.R. 554.

(10) Abbam v. Appiah (1929) Div.Ct. `26-’29, 175.

(11) Amoa v. Obil (1885) Sar.F.L.R. 39.

(12) Nettey v. Nassar (1943) D.C. (Land) 138-’47, 106.

(13) United Simpson & Ayitey Co. v. Jeffrey (Jeffrey-Claimant) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 279. (14) Ghassoub v. Dizengoff (W.A.) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C.

(15) Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellants against the decision of the High Court upholding the validity of the 1962 auction sale of their house wherein the appellant contended, inter alia, that the 1962 auction sale was illegal as being in contravention of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).

COUNSEL

Kofi Oppong (for Obeng Manu) for the appellants.

W. Y. Oppong for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A

On 22 September 1962, a house at Sunyani, numbered SNT. 75, previously owned by the second appellant was offered for salt at a public auction to satisfy the judgment debt and costs incurred by her in a land suit. The sale, which was at the instance of the deputy sheriff, ended in the respondent being declared the highest bidder. He consequently claimed the immunity of an innocent purchaser for value in a suit he initiated in the court below to establish his title to the property.

The facts disclose that after entering into possession, an agreement was struck between the respondent and the appellants which enabled the latter to remain in the house, no longer as owners, but as rent-paying tenants. At no time did the dispossessed second appellant disclose to her new landlord that the validity of the sale was in doubt. Indeed, the subsistence of the landlord and tenant relationship for over seventeen years could only have created a conviction in any inquiring

[p.38] of [1982-83] GLR 34 mind of the due regularity of the sale, as the one most affected by it made no protest and appeared to have acquiesced in all that had transpired.

The tenancy continued undisturbed till 1979, when through military intervention, described variously as coercion or an appeal, the respondent relinquished his title to the house, and signified the release of his title in a formal document.

When the political climate seemed opportune, the respondent sought the court’s assistance to rescind the agreement on grounds of duress and for the reinstatement of his title to the house.

The issue of duress was not seriously challenged in the court below; and on appeal, the coercive nature of the intervention was openly acknowledged. The lower court had no difficulty in sustaining the plea of non est factum; and it not being seriously challenged in this appeal, that holding must be upheld.

The only serious question concerns the validity of the auction sale that took place some seventeen years ago. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the sale was illegal and therefore could not effect any transfer of property. The species of illegality urged as rendering the sale null and void was the breach of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).

The second appellant contends that the sheriff ordered the sale of her immovable property without making a nulla bona return on the sufficiency of her movable property to satisfy the judgment debt. This illegality, the appellant maintains, is incurable. Time therefore cannot run against her redemptive efforts. For, an aggrieved party seeking relief ex debito justitiae is protected from the race of time. The appellant relies for support on the well-known case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

The resolution of the matter in issue involves an investigation into the conduct of the auction sale and the legal consequences flowing therefrom. Three situations are possible: the sale could be categorised as regular, irregular or illegal. If the sale was regularly conducted, the respondent’s title to the property could not be impeached. A similar result would even follow an irregular sale if a timeous application to avoid it or set it aside were not made, and no substantial injury was sustained. But of an entirely different complexion is the situation where the sale is void ab initio and time is no bar. The law on this area of jurisprudence seems well enough settled.

Marfo v. Adusei [1964] G.L.R. 365, S.C. is authority for the proposition that where the sale is irregular, it is voidable at the instance of a debtor who proves that she has sustained substantial injury from the irregularity. See also Republic v. Circuit Court Registrar; Ex

[p.39] of [1982-83] GLR 34 parte Arthur [1980] G.L.R. 309, C.A. But where the sale is illegal, the sale is void ab initio and no title passes. Kwabena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.r. 299, S.C. and Addai v. Donkor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 209 at p. 218, C.A. reaffirm the law as stated above.

Though the law is settled and not in doubt, the real difficulty lies in its application to the instant facts. A problem which immediately faces an investigator into the conduct of the 1962 sale, is the loss of the docket relating to the auction. After the lapse of seventeen years, this cannot be considered an extraordinary happening. It, however, brings into operation the rule as to the regularity of official acts. When juxtaposed against the second appellant’s admission that she never once uttered a word of complaint regarding the viability of her landlord’s title, but continued with her daughter, the first appellant, to live in their erstwhile home as rent-paying tenants, a challenge so late in the day loses any force it may once have possessed. Since no attempt was made to seek judicial relief in any legal forum, a more compelling instance for the application of the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, cannot be readily conceived.

The rule relating to execution of a judgment debt which has created all the difficulty must now be examined, since it is only on the ground of illegality that the appellants can have any hope of success. Order 42, r. 46 of LN 140A reads:

“46. If the judgment debtor has sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division in which the judgment was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his movable property shall not be levied upon; but if he has not sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his movable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the movable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within the Gold Coast, before having recourse to his immovable property.”

Although the peremptory language employed in the rule cannot be overlooked, the very important qualifications clamped on to it whittle its absolute force. There can therefore be no violation of the rule unless it is established that sufficient movable property was available within the judicial division which was cavalierly ignored by the sheriff.

It seems to me that the policy rationale behind the rule is to avoid any high-handed arbitrariness or even perverseness in the sheriff’s conduct of a public duty which deprives a person of his property. It is to obviate the situation where out of sheer mischief or malice, a

[p.40] of [1982-83] GLR 34 sheriff capriciously sells immovable property when the debtor’s personal property is glaringly sufficient to satisfy the debt. It seems to me, further, that the rule lays a burden on the judgment debtor who seeks to impugn the sheriff’s instructions, to prove that movable property sufficient to satisfy the debt in the judicial division had been ignored. It is only commonsense that unless the personal property is clearly visible, it is only the owner with his peculiar knowledge of his assets who can best assert and identify his possessions.

In this case, the judgment debtor boasts of a tin trunk in her daughter’s room. No attempt has ever been made to disclose what it contained. The second appellant herself was not around to identify any personal property at the time of the sale. If the trunk contained precious jewellery, there would not have been the need for any execution to take place. The facts indeed show that after the sale, a fairly substantial part of the judgment debt and costs still remained unsatisfied. This, in my view, is a factual rejection of the argument that there was movable property within the jurisdiction, sufficient to meet the debt.

A view, contrary to what has been expressed above is contained in Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247. There, the learned judge of the High Court postulated that there is no duty on a judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment creditor that he has sufficient movable property to meet a judgment debt; and that the duty was rather on the judgment creditor. But the learned judge’s subsequent qualification of this pronouncement by adding that each particular case depended on its merits, showed that his earlier formulation was not a categorical stance: see particularly p. 249.

At the same time, one cannot quarrel with the view that knowledge of the existence of movable property must be imputed in obvious cases. To sell a well-stocked shop or well-furnished home instead of the contents for a mere bagatelle of a debt, demonstrates an immediate breach of Order 42. In that sense, there is no real conflict with Badu v. Atta Kwadwo [1971] 2 G.L.R. 346 which postulates that there must be proof that the judgment creditor knew of the existence and whereabouts of the debtor’s movables before he could be condemned. I think the logic is faultless. If a breach of Order 42, r. 46 is the subject of complaint, one should expect a formulated complaint.

There must be an assertion and proof of it; that the movables of the debtor openly existed but were by-passed in preference for realty. Obviously, a forum must exist for the averment to be proclaimed and traversed. He who complains of the non-observance of the rule must be its proponent. He must be available to be examined for a proper evaluation of its truth or falsity. It seems unacceptable as a valid judicial practice, to condemn an officer of the court with the “irregular or illegal” conduct of a sale, by a mere

[p.41] of [1982-83] GLR 34 assertion unbuttressed by proof. In my view, it would amount to an anarchical attempt to throw overboard the whole judicial machinery for the ascertainment of facts, if the judgment creditor must shoulder the burden of proving the negative that the debtor did not have sufficient movable property! In my view, this is an area where good sense rather than a hard attempt to construe a statute, must prevail. In this regard, I incline to the view expressed by Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) in Mensah v. Bimpeh [1980] G.L.R. 141.

A similar view was expressed by Annan J. (as he then was) in Madjoub v. John Holt Bartholomew & Co., Ltd. [1967] G.L.R. 554, to which the distinguished judge added this important classification at p. 560:

“Is a breach of rule 46 of Order 42 a case of material irregularity or illegality? I think the case ought properly to be considered as one of irregularity and I think the judgment in the Aninkora case supports this view.”

And so say most of us. If one were4 to proceed by a head count, then the appellants are completely out of time as their complaint must relate to an irregularity they had not challenged in a judicial forum for over seventeen years! I think, however, that it is the formidable reasons given in the majority view expressed in the above cases rather than a count of heads which must command general acceptance.

The tussle on the validity of the sale as envisaged in Order 42, r. 46, is between the judgment creditor and the deputy sheriff on one side, and the aggrieved judgment debtor on the other. It should not be a dispute between the judgment debtor and a purchaser for value. It is consequently, an adjunct to the rule that an auction sale must be set aside by an appropriate court before other reliefs can be considered: see Amoa v. Obil (1885) Sar.F.L.R. 39; Abbam v. Appiah (1929) Div.Ct. ‘26-’29, 175 and Nettey v. Nassar (1943) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 106.

The rule itself and the authoritative decisions derived therefrom, sufficiently cater for stale claims. Otherwise, purely on the grounds of illegality, a debtor may spring a claim hoary with years of neglect, and after the evidence has disappeared, rely on the unconscionable expectation that the purchaser for value may not be able to justify the execution of the judgment debt.

Legislative intervention by section 10 (1) and (6) of the Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54), has also foreclosed the appellants’ claim. Section 10 (1) and (6) bars and extinguishes claims to title on the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person bringing it.

[p.42] of [1982-83] GLR 34 For the above reasons, I would affirm the decision of the court below and dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A

I agree with the able judgment just read by the president of the court both as to its reasons and conclusion and have nothing useful to add.

JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.

This is an appeal by a mother and her daughter against the judgment of Ampiah J. dated 28 July 1980, sitting at the High Court, Sunyani, where he held that the purported attachment and sale of the defendants’ house, No. SNT. 75, Sunyani was not void.

The circumstances which led to the action being instituted by the respondent in the court below were that in 1962, he bought the second appellant’s house, No. SNT. 75, Sunyani, at a public auction for £G500. During the month of September 1979, the respondent was taken to the Liberation Barracks for soldiers in Sunyani and was made to receive ¢1,000 as a refund of the purchase price of the house. The action at the High Court was to set aside the transaction which led to his surrendering the house and its documents to the appellants, an order that the appellants receive back the sum of ¢1,000 paid to the respondent as the refund, and an order for injunction to restrain the appellants or their agents from interfering or otherwise dealing with the house.

The statement of claim filed and the evidence of the respondent clearly showed that he was relying on a certificate of purchase as his sole evidence of title. But a certificate of purchase is only a prima facie evidence of title. Its validity was put in issue by the appellants; the issue being that the judgment creditor had failed to attach first the movable property of the second appellant in execution of the judgment debt in accordance with the provision of Order 42, r. 46 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).

The learned judge of the High Court had before him the evidence of what transpired at the Liberation Barracks culminating in the transfer to the appellants of the house in question. He was satisfied that the respondent was procured under duress or undue influence to receive ¢1,000 as a refund of the purchase price of the house. This finding has not been challenged by the appellants.

But that was not all. The counterclaim of the appellants raised matters of concern which if established, could render the sale of the house No. SNT. 75, Sunyani, illegal. The appellants sought a declaration that the attachment and sale by public auction, in execution, of the appellants’ house No. SNT. 75, was null and void ab initio; and as such, conferred no title on the respondent. The appellants’ argument is founded on the interpretation of Order 42, r. 46 of LN 140A. The rule prescribes:

[p.43] of [1982-83] GLR 34

“46. If the judgment debtor has sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division in which the judgment was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his immovable property shall not be levied upon; but if he has not sufficient movable property within the Judicial Division it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his movable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the movable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within the Gold Coast, before having recourse to his immovable property.”

The procedural requirements of Order 42, r. 46 have been stated clearly in the case of Kwabena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.R. 299 at p. 306, S.C. where Ollennu J.S.C. sitting with Sarkodee-Addo C.J. and Acolatse J.S.C. in the course of their judgment were agreed that:

“At common law, the writ of fi.fa. is issued for the sale of goods and chattels; real property is not seizable under it, but chattels real like leasehold could: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 16, p. 45, para. 67. The writ of elegit applies to realty: Watson v. Murray & Co. [1955] 2 Q.B. 1. Our form of execution came to us from Hong Kong where it permits the attachment of real property under a writ of fi.fa. should there not be enough personalty to satisfy the judgment debt. Again in England, the writ obliges the sheriff to seize such chattels sufficient to satisfy the debt and costs; if what he seizes in one place proves to be insufficient, he may proceed to seize more. See Mather’s Sheriff and Execution Law (3rd ed.), p. 83.

The principle is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 16, p. 40, para. 59 as follows: `Under the writ of fieri facias it is [the Sheriff’s] duty to seize and sell any goods which he has the power to seize, to an amount reasonably sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to satisfy the debt and his own expenses.’ See also Gawler v. Chaplin [(1848) 154 E.R. 590] and Alfred v. Constable [(184) 6 Q.B. 370].”

By the authority thus given him, the sheriff may enter the house of a judgment debtor. He may even enter the house of a third party if the goods of the debtor be actually therein. But in all this, it is the judgment creditor whose responsibility it is to make his inquiry before issuing the necessary writ directed to the sheriff commanding him to take certain compulsory proceedings for the purpose of carrying into effect the judgment of the court: see United Simpson & Ayitey Co. v. Jeffrey (Jeffrey-Claimant) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 279.

On the question of discovery in aid of execution, Order 42, r. 31 of LN 140A, prescribes that a judgment debtor may be examined on

[p.44] of [1982-83] GLR 34 an application to the court, by the party entitled to enforce the judgment for the recovery or payment of money “as to whether any and what debts are owing to the debtor, and whether the debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the judgment or order…”

Surely, the above rule is a necessary precaution against infringing the provision of Order 42, r. 46 of LN 140A and it can be inferred from the rules on the execution process that the sheriff’s duties are threefold: (1) to the judgment creditor, to obey the writ and any lawful instructions that have been given him; (2) to the judgment debtor not to do any act not authorised by the writ; and (3) to the court, to make a return. In a fi.fa., the instruction given to the sheriff by the judgment creditor or his solicitor should, in accordance with Order 42, r. 46, provide that movables shall be attached for sale first before immovables. The rule does not permit a judgment creditor to elect on going into execution immediately on movables or immovables. Where a judgment creditor goes into execution straightaway against immovables of the judgment debtor, then as held in Kwabena v. Aninkora (supra), the sale of the immovable property would be illegal, and therefore void. The purchaser would acquire no property to litigate on.

The second appellant’s evidence on the conduct of the sale as found at p. 33 of the record of proceedings is as follows:

“It is about eighteen years when I litigated with Atta Kwaku. I eventually lost the action against Atta Kwaku.

I was represented in that case by a lawyer known as Jantuah. I instructed counsel to appeal in that case.

Three days after giving the instruction, I left for Kumasi. I was at Kumasi when my daughter, the first defendant, came to inform me that my house No. SNT. 75 had been attached and sold by auction.”

When she was cross-examined on her personal properties, and it was suggested to her that she had no personal effects in Sunyani and that all her personal effects were at Kumasi, she said she had some of her personalties in Sunyani. When the question was repeated, her answer was, “I had one of my trunks at Sunyani and this contained my personal effects.”

When the case for the respondent was concluded, the judge made an order that on the adjourned date, 3 June 1980, the registrar of the court was to make available to the appellants a true copy of the judgment in the case. I do not know the reason for the request of the judge; but I should have thought the proceedings of the execution would have helped resolve the issue before the court. However, without any evidence, the learned judge held that:

[p.45] of [1982-83] GLR 34

“It is now eighteen years since that case was disposed of. The execution creditor himself is not a party to the suit. It is, therefore, impossible to determine whether or not the application was for the issue of a writ against only the movables of the second defendant or both his movables and immovable or only for his movables. It is therefore equally impossible to determine what return the deputy sheriff had made.”

The judge then went on to treat the complaint as one of an irregularity and therefore was saved by Order 70, r. 1 of LN 140A.

Order 42 empowers the court to issue a writ of fieri facias as a common law process. Order 42, r. 46 enables the sheriff by virtue of the common law process to seize the movable properties of the judgment debtor if there is a reasonable amount to meet the judgment debt and his costs, and that he can only resort to the attachment of immovable property as provided by Order 42, r. 46 where the movable property is not enough to satisfy the debt. Order 43, r. 5 prescribes that the attachment of goods, chattels and other property in the possession of the judgment debtor shall be made by actual seizure; but where the property to be attached consists of land, houses or other immovables. Order 43, r. 7 provides that the attachment shall be made by a written order of the sheriff prohibiting the judgment debtor from alienating the property by sale, gift or any other way, and all persons from receiving the same, etc.

It would appear that no precautionary measures provided by the rules were resorted to, and in the application for fi.fa., the judgment creditor requested for the sale of house No. SNT. 75 after discovering that the judgment debtor had such a house. The sheriff, therefore, was placed in a position where he had to act according to the writ. This is not a case of injudicious exercise of discretion by the sheriff. It it had been, the remedy of the defendant would have been an action for trespass based on an irregularity and not an illegality which vitiates the whole transaction; and where the writ of execution is wrongly issued, the judgment creditor or his solicitor is liable and the purchaser acquired no title in the property purchased.

In the case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. it was held that Order 70 applies to such irregularities as do not render void any proceedings based thereon. Therefore, where an irregularity is only voidable, it may be waived; and an application to set it aside must be made within a reasonable time, in this case within 21 days, and the applicant must satisfy the court that he has suffered substantial damage. But where the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have the sale set aside, then there is no time limit within which he may apply to have the sale set aside: see Ghassoub v. Dizengoff

[p.46] of [1982-83] GLR 34

(W.A.) [1962] 2 G.L.R. 133, S.C. and Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214.

There is evidence on record by the second appellant that her house was attached first and her personalties were not considered. The auctioneer who conducted the sale in respect of the house in evidence, said his instructions from the Registrar of the High Court, Sunyani was to conduct a sale of house No. SNT. 75 which had been issued in execution of the judgment in the case of Atta Kwaku v. Konamah and the property was sold on 22 September 1962. He tendered exhibit 1, a letter from the deputy sheriff, dated 19 September 1962 and exhibit 1B being the notice of the property to be sold. The notice of attachment is exhibit 2 in the case.

It is my opinion that by the sale of the appellant’s house No. SNT. 75 without recourse to her personalties first, the judgment creditor in the case infringed the law. Therefore, the respondent acquired no right in the property purchased at the sale of 22 September 1962. The sale was void. I would, therefore, set aside the judgment and enter judgment for the appellants.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

J. K. E. E.

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