OBADZEN II vs. ONANKA II [1982-83] GLR 46
11 May 1982 · FRANCOIS JA · ≈ 19 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200.
(2) Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1.
(3) Kwame Nsoatrehene v. Barnier (Berekumhene) (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 249, C.A.
(4) Foli v. Akesse (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 46, P.C.
(5) Nyame v. Yeboah [1961] 1 G.L.R. 281, S.C.
(6) Kwaku v. Ampofowaa [1961] 1 G.L.R. 277, S.C.
(7) Mensah v. Esah [1976] 1 G.L.R. 424.
(8) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133.
(9) Donkor v. Isifu [1963] 1 G.L.R. 418.
(10) Adjeibi-Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 257.
(11) Azagba v. Negov [1964] G.L.R. 450.
(12) Ackwei v. Totimeh (1898) Ren 149.
(13) Renner v. Fanti Consolidated Mines Ltd. (1919) P.C. ‘74-’28, 53, (14) Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232.
(15) Osei Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418.
(16) Udo Afia v. Akpan (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 216.
(17) Oronsaye v. Edoh (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 595.
(18) Egyin v. Aye [1962] 2 G.L.R. 187.
(19) Effiana v. Effiana [1959] G.L.R. 362.
(20) Seidu v. Nsiah, Court of Appeal, 28 February 1972, unreported.
(21) Republic v. Cape Coast District Magistrate Grade II; Ex parte Amoo [1979] G.L.R. 150. (22) Omane v. Poku [1972] 1 G.L.R. 295.
(23) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(24) Smurthwaite v. Hannay [1894] A.C. 494, H.L.
(25) Craig v. Kanssen [1943] 1 K.B. 256; [1943] 1 All ER 108; [1943] 168 LT 38, C.A. (26) Briggs v. Berembo (1951) 213 W.A.C.A. 26.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the trial judge wherein he gave judgment in a boundary dispute to the respondent. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.A.
[p.49] of [1982-83] GLR 46
COUNSEL
Nater Olaga for the respondent.
Dr. Seth Twum for the appellant.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
This dispute relates to the common boundary of two Teshie families. It is a contest essentially to determine the true boundary between the quarter lands of the Agbawe and Kle Musum families of Teshie. The suit originated in the District Court, Accra, and was transferred to the High Court for trial under the provisions of the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), para. 49 (2). The judge who commenced the trial could not continue and the suit had to be completed by another judge after the earlier proceedings had been adopted by consent. In the chequered course of the case it was inevitable that something would go wrong. It is not surprising, therefore, that the entire pleadings disappeared from the court docket. Unfortunately it was when the judge came to write his judgment that he discovered this loss. He put it this way:
“Apart from the record of events which took place in the district court and which was transmitted to this court under paragraph 49 (2) of the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), no writ or pleadings can be found on the docket. At first, I had wanted to have this procedural irregularity rectified but in view of the stage where the case had reached (the judgment stage) I decided to treat these omissions as technical irregularities which can be saved under Order 70 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) especially so as it has occasioned no injustice.”
But the appellant complains that it caused an injustice. The parties had come to court prepared to fight the suit on pleadings; it would work hardship if their pleadings were ignored and the matter determined without the benefit of their stated respective cases.
Though no criticism is intended of the judge’s reliance on LN 140A, Order 70 to supply the lacuna since Omane v. Poku [1972] 1 G.L.R. 295, permits this course, both on authority and good sense the complaint seems well founded. Suits transferred to the High Court are governed by Order 30. r. 7. Order 30 envisages pleadings after directions have been obtained. Indeed, actions in the High Court are commenced by a writ and pleadings. This confines the parties to the matters in issue and enables a judgment to be given on the real matters in controversy between the parties as raised and fought on their stated cases. If pleadings are discarded, the tram lines, within which the battle must be won or lost, are pushed out of existence and the parties waffle unrestrainedly over wider parameters.
[p.50] of [1982-83] GLR 46
It is my view that a request to counsel to submit copies of their pleadings, would have easily resolved the difficulty and not created the formidable handicap that beset the trial judge. In fact, there was no insuperable difficulty to this course, as the written addresses counsel filed, even relied on the parties’ respective pleadings. Clearly, copies could have been obtained as notice had been given of their existence.
This court, with the consent of the parties, accepted counsel’s copies of the pleadings. It became immediately apparent that an issue of arbitration raised in the action could not be satisfactorily resolved without reference to the pleadings and to hold, as the learned judge did, that the mutual boundary between the disputants was the result of a negotiated settlement, could be an erroneous conclusion if the pleadings were referred to.
Turning then to the pleadings, paragraph 3 of his claim sets out the boundary line of the plaintiff’s family quarter land with the defendant. The paragraph states:
“The boundary between the Agbawe and Kle families of Teshie runs from the Tema road at Teshie town near the Bus Station along the `Ngaa-Nudzo’ (Ngaa Stream) to ‘Abolebu’ (Abole’s well) to the Pantam road, and along the Pantam road to Tema railway line. The said boundary is contained in a deed of declaration made by the plaintiff, dated 12 October 1967 and registered No. 1197/1968 in the Lands Registry, Accra,”
The plaintiff’s Agbawe family claimed to own lands to the west of this boundary while it confined the defendant’s Kle family to the east of it.
The defendant challenged this boundary line and set his own, as declared in his title deed of 25 July 1965, registered as No. 1332/1965. He contended that the plaintiff had extended his eastern boundary into his land.
To this simple boundary dispute was opened a new window by the defendant’s plea of estoppel by virtue of an arbitration award. The plea was raised in paragraph 4 of the defence in the following language:
“4. In answer to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim, the defendant says that the area where the two deceased members of Kle Musum were buried is the quarter mausoleum, and that it has been established at an arbitration held by the Teshie Mantse that that portion of the land is for the Kle Musum quarter.”
The plaintiff did not accept that an arbitration had taken place which bound him and continued in paragraph 2 of his reply:
[p.51] of [1982-83] GLR 46
“2. In further reply the plaintiff states that when this dispute started both parties went to the area to show their boundaries and in the presence of the chief of Teshie, the defendant pointed to some mango trees as their boundary, and the land in dispute fell within the plaintiff’s land after they had shown this boundary.”
Far from admitting that an arbitration had taken place, the plaintiff was asserting that the defendant’s act of publicly identifying his boundary before the Teshie Mantse at a point which did not extend to the land in dispute, bound him by conduct and estopped him from asserting anything different. The battle lines were drawn, not only literally in respect of the common boundary, but also on the issue of arbitration vel non.
The two matters requiring a resolution were therefore (a) the true boundary line between these two Teshie families and the subsidiary issue (b) whether any party was estopped either by arbitration or conduct from asserting a claim to the disputed area. The first issue would be determined by the normal rules relating to proof in land matters and the second by the law as to customary arbitration.
Dealing with the second issue first, I must observe that the evidence of an arbitration was tenuous to the extreme. The prior intention to be bound by an award, which is an essential requirement of an arbitration was completely lacking on the evidence. No drink or monetary consideration in lieu thereof seems to have passed; there is no clear and cogent evidence of an award by the cutting of boundary lines. The trial judge should have declared that an arbitration had not been established and proceeded to other issues, but, handicapped as he was by the absence of pleadings, he fell into error by substituting a negotiated settlement for an arbitration. A negotiated settlement had not been pleaded and had consequently not been made a triable issue. This substitution offends against the well-known rule laid in such cases as Dam v. Addo [1962] 2 G.L.R. 200; Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1; Nsoatrehene Twene Kwame v. Barnier (Berekumhene) (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 249 at p. 251, among others, on the peril of overstepping the bounds of pleadings.
The present state of the law sets conclusions derived from arbitration and those from negotiated settlements poles apart and “never the twain shall meet.” An adjudicator cannot transform his functions as arbitrator into that of conciliator in settling a dispute, even though an amicable resolution by compromise may have everything to commend it. An arbitrator’s duty is to decide who wins or loses in terms of the explicit reference before him. In effect, therefore, a sympathetic view of rival claims leading to an equitable solution of the problem is beyond the scope and in excess of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
[p.52] of [1982-83] GLR 46
A long line of cases has settled this rule, and though it cannot be denied that laws change with the effluxion of time, convoluted circumstances and social needs, the metamorphosis cannot be encompassed by this court which is constitutionally debarred from undermining the principle of stare decisis.
However desirable a change may be, we can only echo the wise words of Kingdom C.J. in R.v. Ajani (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 3 at p. 7:
“But it is for the legislature and not for this court to effect an alteration of the law, and we feel bound to give effect to the law as we find it.”
In Foli v. Akesse (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 46, P.C. the Privy Council held that an arbitrator who from a desire to be fair, proceeded to demarcate a boundary between rival contestants who had not sought that relief, misconceived his duty under that reference and acted ultra fines compromissi. His award consequently was of no effect. This case has been followed in a long line of decisions: notably Nyame v. Yeboah [1961] 1 G.L.R. 281, S.C.; Kwaku v. Ampofowaa [1961] 1 G.L.R. 277 S.C. and Mensah v. Esah [1976] 1 G.L.R. 424 at p. 429.
In Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, a magistrate who from the purest of fairness had sought to set a compromise boundary between two suitors, was held to have usurped jurisdiction when he constituted himself into “a land boundary commissioner.” His determination was accordingly held null and void and of no effect.
The Teshie Mantse clearly admitted that he felt the need to promote harmony in his area; afterall he could not sit by while an internecine strife broke out among his own clan elders. He consequently assumed the mantle of conciliator. But the parties had given him a circumscribed area of inquiry. He had no licence to extend the limits of his mandate unilaterally. Such extension had been hotly disputed as agreed upon. His award was consequently a complete nullity.
In Donkor v. Isifu [1963] 1 G.L.R. 418 at p. 424, it was held that an arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction if he gave a decision not based upon the facts but based entirely “on considerations of what would be a fair division of the disputed area between the parties.”
The essential difference between an arbitral award and a negotiated settlement may be recapitulated. In an arbitration, the adjudication is on the merits; in a negotiated settlement the solution is by way of an accepted compromise. The authorities are clear that it is only an unequivocal acceptance of the proposed settlement that can operate as an estoppel in a negotiated settlement: see Donkor v. Isifu (supra) at p. 425. On the evidence and pleadings, I find neither an arbitration nor a negotiated settlement a viable conclusion. But that is not the end of the matter. The plaintiff’s success must proceed from the strength of
[p.53] of [1982-83] GLR 46 his own endeavours and not the weaknesses of his adversary. Hackneyed though the rule is, its non-observance is a source of constant wonder. The plaintiff sought to establish his case by the following:
(a) The traditional or historical account of his family’s acquisition of the land.
(b) A registered document showing the extent of the land.
(c) User.
The first prong in the area of proof can be easily disposed of. The history of occupation is so uncertain as to provide no firm bulwark for the ascertainment of the plaintiff’s quarter’s title. In fact no real proof of acquisition was attempted. Recourse, therefore, must be had to user and current transactions on the land. As was said in Adjeibi Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 257, where the traditional history is unhelpful, recent acts, established facts and substantial user are the determinants of ownership. See also Azagba v. Negov [1964] G.L.R. 450.
In Ackwei v. Totimeh (1898) Ren. 149, the view was expressed that in considering facts which took place 60 or 70 years ago, the court has to be guided very much by probabilities. It was the innate probability and the greater appearance of truth, that must be operative. The same principle underlines Renner v. Fanti Consolidated Mines Ltd. (1919) P.C. ‘74-’28, 53 at p. 56, where recent acts of user were held to be decisive in the determination of title. There, their lordships of the Privy Council put it thus “Where there is a state of uncertainty as to boundaries… possession is the only safe guide.”
Before we turn to evidence of user and possession, the evidential value of the registered deeds tendered must be discussed. It must be pointed out that the deeds were the result of an invitation by officials of the Deeds Registry to the parties to furnish the registry with evidence of the extent of their quarter lands. They were unilaterally prepared and were not even indorsed by the Teshie stool. It explains why the various quarter lands overlapped and why the Teshie Mantse felt compelled to fix an arbitrary boundary between the parties to ensure harmony. In my view, the documents of each party was self serving and unsupported by any allodial ruler. They provide very little evidential weight in this matter.
On the issue of user, the following figure prominently: (a) the Abolebu well, (b) the actions taken to prevent the defendants burying their elders on the land, (c) previous court actions, and (d) farming activities and property development in the disputed area. On the preponderance of the evidence, distinct quarter lands were of recent creation perhaps some 50-60 years ago in the reign of Akonfra II. Farming was originally communal, thus when each quarter carved its land allegedly in the reign of Akonfra II, strangers to each quarter
[p.54] of [1982-83] GLR 46 continued to farm indiscriminately on each others quarter lands.
There is much to be said for the view that the Abolebu well was a communal effort of the entire Teshie people. Even the second plaintiff witness confesses that part of the well lies within the defendant’s land. The well therefore provides no firm evidence of exclusive user. It rather provides evidential support for the defendant’s case on the principle enunciated in Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232 and Osei Yaw v. Domfeh [1965] G.L.R. 418, among others. As to actions to prevent the defendant’s family from burying its dead on the land, it must be noted that two of such men had already been buried on the land. The third burial provoked the suit and only an injunction prevented the burial from taking place. The evidence consequently is equivocal, and is not decisive in any way. Previous court actions seem to have been initiated by the defendant rather than the plaintiff and so it is the defendant rather than the plaintiff who can derive anything from this aspect of proof.
It has been already observed that the evidence suggests indiscriminate farming by both parties along the common boundary. No real attempt was made to produce property owners to declare the source of their grant for a proper evaluation of title.
In a boundary dispute, the plaintiff must establish his boundary. He loses his claim if he fails to do this: see Udo Afia v. Akpan (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 216 and Orensaye v. Edoh (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 595. In Egyin v. Aye [1962] 2 G.L.R. 187 at p. 191 van Lare J.S.C. said:
“A boundary dispute between owners or occupiers of adjoining lands necessarily raises title to the section of land enclosed between the two conflicting boundaries asserted by the opposing parties. If the parties to the suit are mere occupiers or licensees, they put the title of their respective licensors in issue; and if one only is a licensee, he puts the title of his licensor in issue.”
In Effiana v. Effiana [1959] G.L.R. 362 at pp. 363-364 the Court of Appeal said:
We think that this can be regarded as being in the nature of a boundary dispute between two adjoining land owners, and the burden therefore rested upon the plaintiffs to establish with particularity the extent of the land which they claimed and the boundaries of it.”
It is my view that the plaintiff failed in his quest to establish his boundary and he should fail in this action. The dictum of Annie Jiagge J.A. in Seidu v. Nsiah. Court of Appeal. 28 February 1972, unreported, particularly commends itself to me in its appositeness and I respectfully indorse it:
[p.55] of [1982-83] GLR 46
“A plaintiff who has failed to establish his own boundaries cannot inspire any confidence in his claim, but where coupled with this, he is unable to establish the source of his title and acts of ownership or user, then indeed his claim is without merit.”
On the issue of jurisdiction I would add this short note. The High Court has concurrent original jurisdiction over land matters with district courts and circuit courts though its jurisdiction is superior to both courts. Paragraphs 27 and 56 of NLCD 84 emphasise this point. Therefore, an irregular transfer does not impugn the High Court’s jurisdictional competence to entertain the action: see R. v. Cape Coast District Magistrate Grade II; Ex parte Amoo [1979] G.L.R. 150.
The appeal should be dismissed for the reasons above stated.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
I have had the privilege of reading the judgments of the president and of my brother Coussey J.A. at a somewhat late stage and I am constrained to state my opinion on general principles without the opportunity to look up the authorities on jurisdiction as raised by my brother Coussey J.A. by reason of paragraph 49 (2) of the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84).
The fact appears to be conceded that the value of the land in litigation was above the jurisdiction of the district court, grade 11. By paragraph 49 of NLCD 84, the order of transfer ought to have been made by the High Court, after a reference to it by the district court. By the purported transfer made by the district court, however, the matter got to the High Court all the same. The question is had the error been noted could the matter have been put right? It seems to me the High Court could have at that stage determined the value, and as it would have found the value in excess of the jurisdiction of the district court, it would have made a regular order of transfer to itself.
This would have replaced the void order of transfer, and the trial would have proceeded as it did. Does the omission to regularise the transfer before the trial that took place vitiate the trial? As I see it, the omission does not go to the competency of the High Court to try the action. The omission was in my opinion a mere irregularity in procedure and the trial that followed was not vitiated.
As I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the judgment of the president on the merits, I also concur that the appeal be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.
I would have indorsed the conclusions of my brother Francois J.A. who presided on the appeal under consideration but there were some anomalies in the course of the case, one aspect of which both the trial High Court judge and my brother Francois J.A. have had cause to comment on. That was the absence of pleadings
[p.56] of [1982-83] GLR 46 which was discovered when the judge had to write his judgment. For purposes of clarity, I will reiterate the way the trial judge put it:
“Apart from the record of events which took place in the district court under paragraph 49 (2) of the Courts Decree, 1966 (NLCD 84), no writ or pleadings can be found on the docket. At first I had wanted to have this procedural irregularity rectified but in view of the stage where the case had reached (the judgment stage) I decided to treat these omissions as technical irregularities which can be saved under Order 70 of our rules especially as it has occasioned no injustice.”
I have no complaints on the absence of pleadings being saved by Order 70 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) and I agree with my brother Francois J. A. that the case of Omane V. Poku (1972) 1 G.L.R. 295 permits this course. But I find that where a court has lacked jurisdiction and has heard a case, then on the wealth of authorities such as Mosi V. Bagyina (1963) 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. the proceedings are void. It has been considered that if the step taken was one not warranted by any enactment or rules it is much more than an irregularity within Order 70: see Smurthwaite v. Hannay (1894) A.C. 494. Also a proceeding and order can be described as a nullity if it is something which a person affected by it is entitled to have set aside ex debito justitiae and could be set aside by the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction: see Craig V. Kanssen (1943) 168 L.T. 38.
The action in this appeal started in the district court grade II, and being a land suit that court by NLCD 84, para. 49 (2) had limitation as to its jurisdiction. NLCD 84, para. 49 (2) prescribes that:
“(2) Where there is a dispute as to whether or not the value of the amount claimed, or of the land or property, in any suit or matter, is in excess of the amounts specified in sub-paragraph (1), such dispute shall be determined by the High Court on a reference thereto by the District Court, and its decision shall be final. If the High Court determines that such value is in excess of the said amounts, the High Court shall transfer such suit or matter from the District Court to the High Court or the Circuit Court, as the case may be.”
NLCD 84, para.49 (1) spells out the jurisdiction of district courts grade 1, and NLCD 84, para. 50 enables district courts grade II to exercise the same jurisdiction as district courts grade I with variations in certain cases such as that in suits relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land where the value of the land does not exceed ¢480, the district court grade I shall have jurisdiction,
[p.57] of [1982-83] GLR 46 while the grade II court could hear cases where the value does not exceed ¢360.
It is clear from the provisions referred to in NLCD 84 that there are two stages leading to the High Court being vested with jurisdiction in the type of suit before us. Firstly, there should be a reference by the district court to the High Court to determine the value of the land in dispute, secondly, after having determined the value, if it is in excess of the amounts listed in NLCD 84, paras. 49 (1) (e) and 50 then the High Court shall make an order of transfer to itself or the circuit court as the case may be.
What did happen in this case in short was that his Worship Mr. Twumasi, as he then was, made an order of transfer to the High Court. Thenceforth, the High Court proceeded to hear the case after Order 30,r.7 of LN 140A were complied with, that is pleadings filed.
It is my contention that the order of transfer by the district court was of no effect. The intention of the legislature in the enactment of NLCD 84, paras. 49 (2) and 50 is quite clear and this court cannot, but give it its plain meaning. Therefore, in my opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case which has proceeded on appeal: Briggs V. Berembo (1951) 213 W.A.C.A. 262.
I will therefore declare the trial before the High Court a nullity. It may be better to institute a fresh action before the High Court.
DECISION Appeal dismissed. K. A. A.
