NANA KWASI AGYEMAN VII AND OTHERS vs. NANA HIMA DEKYI XIII AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 453
15 December 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 17 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 26Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Jones v. S.R. Anthracite Collieries Ltd. (1920) 90 L.J.K.B. 13151. 124 LT., 462; 13 B.W.C.C. 346, C.A.
(2) Gardner v. Jay (1885) 29 Ch.D. 50; 54 L.J.Ch. 762; 52 L.T. 395; 33 W.R. 470, C.A. (3) Wilson v. Church (No.2) (1879) 12 Ch.D 454; 41 L.T. 296; 28 W.R 284, C.A.
(4) Eboe v. Eboe [1961] G.L.R. 432 (5) Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R 387, S.C.
(6) Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R 33.
(7) Abudulai v. Agyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 185.
(8) Ofori v. Danso and Amoako, Court of Appeal, 27 January 1969, unreported; digested in (1969)
C.C. 49.
(9) Tormekpe v. Ahiable, Court of Appeal, 27 January, 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 44. (10) Attorney-General v. Emerson (1890) 24 Q.B.D 56; 59 L.J.Q.B 192; 62 1t. 21; 38 W.R 102, C.A. (11) Merry v. Nickalls (1873) 8 L.R. Ch. App. 205; 42 L.J.Ch. 479; 28 L.T. 296; 21 W.R. 305. (12) Morgan v. Elford (1876) 4 Ch.d. 352; 25 W.R 136, C.A.
[p.456] of [1982-83] GLR 453 (13) Barker v. Lavery (1885) 14 QBD 769; 54 L.J.Q.B 241; 33 W.R 770 C.A.
(14) Saunders v. Awudu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 427.
(15) Levandowsky v. Attorney-General (No. 2) [1971] 1 G.L.R 49, C.A.
(16) Ababio v. Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A 253.
(17) Brantuo v. Poku (1938) 4 W.A.C.A 210.
(18) Okadjakrom Stool v. Atonkor Stool (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 162. W.A.C.A.
(19) Agyei II v. Abudulai [1977] 1 G.L.R. 453 C.A.
(20) Konda (Togbe) v. Dompre V (Togbe) [1978] 1 G.L.R. 354. C.A.
(21) Kuma v. Kuma (1936) 5 W.A.C.A. 4.
(22) Panyin v. Asani II [1961] G.L.R. 305.
(23) Asseh v. Anto [1961] G.L.R 103, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for a stay of execution pending appeal against the decision of the trial court in an action for title to a piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
B. Kwaw-Swanzy for the applicants.
James Mercer for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
The first plaintiff in this case is the occupant of the paramount stool of Lower Dixcove and the second and third plaintiffs are his sub-chiefs. The first defendant is the occupant of the paramount stool of Upper Dixcove. There has been a prodigious and exacting land litigation between the occupants of these two paramount stools over the years. The latest facet of this protracted land litigation came before my learned and noble brother Andoh J. (as he then was) and terminated in favour of the first defendant who was then declared owner of the land, the subject-matter of the suit.
An unpleasant repercussion of the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful claim to the disputed land was an order that the plaintiffs and their subjects attorn tenant to the occupant of the stool of Upper Dixcove as the overlord of the whole span of land inhabited by Lower Dixcove. Presently, an appeal filed by the plaintiffs is pending before the Court of Appeal and they now supplicate for an order to stay execution.
Under the rules of court for the time being in force, a victorious party may as of right go into execution of the judgment or order unless the defeated party acts timeously in praying the court for an order to stay execution pending the result of an appeal and the court accedes to the application. Rule 27 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002), r. 2, states: “An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed from except where the Court below or the Court otherwise
[p.457] of [1982-83] GLR 453 orders”.
The court before which an application for a stay of execution is made is called upon to exercise a discretion of considerable consequence. For the court it is a very difficult and delicate exercise of discretionary power, largely because the enactment does not give any guidelines or conditions for the exercise of the discretion. But, as Scrutton L.J. observed in Jones v. S.R. Anthracite Collieries Ltd. (1920) 90 L.J.K.B 1315 at p. 1317 “the whole duty of this court, and of every court should be to do justice between the parties.” Again in Gardner v. Jay (1885) 29 Ch.D. 50. at p. 58, C.A. Bowen L.J. laid down a guiding rule that:
“[When] a tribunal is invested by Act of Parliament or by Rules [of court] with a discretion, without any indication in the Act or Rules of the grounds upon which the discretion is to be exercised, it is a mistake to lay down any rules with a view of indicating the particular grooves in which the discretion should run…”.
For my part, I would concur in the view that the guiding principle in exercising any discretion should be to do justice and I would add that the court should also be guided by commonsense, fair-play and equity. In this regard each case should be treated strictly according to its particular facts and circumstances. Despite their avowal to refrain from laying down guiding principles which would inure to fetter the exercise of discretion of court dealing with a motion for stay of execution, there is an avalanche of cases where the superior courts have, consciously or unconsciously, laid down guidelines for the exercise of the discretion of a court and these principles have often invariably been applied in many cases, because they have been found consistent with justice, commonsense, fair-play and equity.
The first case I would like to deal with is Wilson v. Church (No. 2) (1879) 12 Ch.D. 454, C.A. In this case an appeal was filed against an order that certain large sums of money be paid out to certain bondholders most of whom resided abroad. The court granted an application by the defeated party to stay execution. Cotton L.J. said at p. 458:
“I am of opinion that we ought not to allow this fund to be parted with by the trustees, for this reason: it is to be distributed among a great number of persons, and it is obvious that there would be very great difficulty in getting back the money.”
[p.458] of [1982-83] GLR 453
Earlier in his judgment Cotton L.J. had said at the same page:
“I am of opinion that we ought to take care that if the House of Lords should reverse our decision (and we must recognise that it may be reversed), the appeal ought not to be rendered nugatory.”
His lordship, however, made the following observation at the same page:
“If there had been any case… that this appeal was not bona fide, that it was for some indirect purpose and not for the purpose of trying whether the judgment of this court was right, the case would have stood in a different position.”
In my opinion it is the duty of a court before which an application for a stay of execution is brought to ascertain from the affidavit in support of the motion or other facts in the proceedings that the appeal is being pursued to achieve no collateral purpose but for the purpose of testing the rightness or wrongness of the judgment or decision appealed from.
The soundness of the principles enunciated by the court in Wilson v. Church (supra), namely that in an application for a stay of execution a court must not only prevent the appeal from being nugatory if successful, but also, even more importantly, that the applicant must satisfy the court that the appeal is bona fide have in a few cases been applied lop-sidedly in favour of the “nugatory test” with the result that the requirement that the appeal must be seen manifestly to have been brought bona fide is in danger of losing its applicability.
Some of the few cases are: Eboe v. Eboe [1961] G.L.R. 432; Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.; Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33 and Abudulai v. Agyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 185. It is not being suggested, however, that these decisions wrongly applied Wilson v. Church (supra). Far from that. All that is being pointed here is that the “nugatory test” has been overly stressed as if that was the only principle laid down in Wilson v. Church (supra). Almost all the cases decided on the nugatory principle involved the question of money payment and the courts had been called upon to consider whether the victorious party to whom money was paid would be able to refund it in the event of the appeal succeeding.
It seems that judicial attitude toward the nugatory principle is fast waning. For example in Ofori v. Danso and Amoako, Court of Appeal, Accra, 27 January 1969, unreported: digested in (1969) C.C. 49, the Court of Appeal rejected submissions by counsel that the appeal if successful would be nugatory because the victorious party would be unable to refund the money paid to him in execution of the judgment. The court said:
“We think it sufficient to say that the impecuniousity of a victorious party is not a good ground for a stay of execution and thereby depriving him of the fruits of his victory.”
Little wonder that recent cases decided by the Court of Appeal departed from Wilson v. Church (supra) in so far as its nugatory principle is concerned. For example in Tormekpe v. Ahiable, Court of Appeal, Accra, 27 January 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C.
[p.459] of [1982-83] GLR 453
44, the Court of Appeal did not advert to the principles laid down in Wilson v. Church (supra). In lieu of those principles the court introduced two essential guidelines.
The first is whether the grounds of appeal are completely devoid of any merit and that the appeal has no chance of succeeding. The second guideline requires the court to consider whether greater hardship would be caused to the applicant by refusing the application than by granting it. If the court below entertains any doubt about either of these two matters it ought to refuse the application. It follows in my view that where the court is satisfied that there is no merit whatsoever in the grounds of appeal and that therefore the appeal has no chance of succeeding, it ought to grant the victorious party leave to go into execution.
Where the court is satisfied that an appeal filed is not frivolous it will almost invariably order a stay of execution with the only condition that costs awarded to the victorious party be paid pending the determination of the appeal: see Attorney-General v. Emerson (1890) 24 Q.B.D 65, Merry v. Nickalls (1873) 8 L.R. Ch. A.P.P. 205; (1876) 4 Ch. D. 388 and Barkes v. Lovery [1885] 14 Q.B.D 769, C.A. If we proceed on the basis that the court below is invested with the discretion to pronounce upon the probable success or failure of an appeal from its decision, it follows that that court can in effect act upon the view it holds about the rightness or wrongness of its judgment.
Therefore the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Joseph v. Jebeile (supra) that in considering an application for a stay of execution it is wholly immaterial what view the trial judge takes of the correctness of his own judgment must be jettisoned as being no longer good law. In Saunders v. Awudu [1962] 1 G.L.R. 472, Apaloo J. (as he then was) refrained from making comments about the grounds of appeal then before him in an application for a stay of execution because counsel reminded him it was not for him to say whether the grounds contained any substance or not. It is respectfully submitted that this view of the law which prevailed in the early sixties is no longer valid.
After this brief excursus into decided cases it is my view that in an application for a stay of execution by a defeated party the following considerations must be taken into account in arriving at a just and equitable conclusion:
“(a) that if the court is satisfied upon any affidavit or facts proved of the conduct of the defeated party that he is bringing the appeal not bona fide to test the rightness of the judgment but for some collateral purpose the application for stay ought to be refused;
(b) that a court should not stay execution unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting a stay because it is well
[p.460] of [1982-83] GLR 453 established that a successful litigant should not be deprived of the fruits of his victory;
(c) that where the court is satisfied that the appeal is frivolous because the grounds of appeal contain no merit and therefore there is no chance of its succeeding it ought to refuse an application for a stay: see
Levandowsky v. Attorney-General (No.2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 49 at p. 50, C.A.; and
(d) whether the grant or refusal of the application will work greater hardship on either party.”
Depending on the circumstances of each case the court is entitled to arrive at a just and equitable conclusion on any one or two or more of these considerations.
I propose in this judgment to answer the question of whether the appeal has any chance of success. In the original grounds of appeal filed on 19 October 1980 the applicants say that the judgment was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial. But at the trial nobody gave evidence. There was only legal argument under Order 25, r. 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and the only question was whether the issue between the parties was res judicata. So one would expect that any ground of appeal would attack the judgment on a question of law. I am afraid this ground has no merit. I have doubts about it.
The next ground of appeal is that the issue between the parties was essentially a stool boundary dispute which properly fell outside the jurisdiction of the court and inasmuch as this court assumed jurisdiction over the matter it contravened the mandatory injunction of section 4 of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (NRCD 172). The relevant section is reproduced hereunder:
“4. (1) The Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto.
(2) Where on or after the commencement of this Decree any proceedings are pending or are brought in any court and in either case it appears to the Court that the situation of any stool land boundary is the real issue in dispute before the Court, the Court shall decline jurisdiction over the determination of that issue; but where it appears to the Court that the situation of the said boundary is only incidental to the determination of the real issue, the Court shall order a stay of those proceedings until the boundary shall have been finally determined as provided in the Decree and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as the Court may deem just.”
[p.461] of [1982-83] GLR 453
The settlement of stool lands boundaries has always been the concern of the executive and the obvious official policy is to ensure the identity of the lands attached to each stool. This is important for the administration of lands since the stools of the country form the very basis of land tenure system in the country. Thus under section 3 of the Stool Lands Settlement Ordinance, Cap. 139 (1951 Rev.), the Governor had power whenever he thought fit to appoint a commissioner to determine the boundaries of the lands of any stools and whenever such orders were made the courts were precluded under section 4 of the Ordinance from entertaining any case affecting the lands. Section 4 of Cap. 139 is in the same terms as section 4 of NRCD 172.
But it seems to me to bear emphasis that all enactments on stool lands boundaries settlement have and continue to proceed on one fundamental assumption that each of the two or more stools whose boundaries are to be settled own in their own right lands contiguous to each other. The settlement commissioner comes in only when there is a dispute as to whether one stool has trespassed upon another stool’s land.
In ordinary land disputes the plaintiff and the defendant may agree that each of them has a land in a particular area contiguous to each other but that the defendant has trespassed onto the plaintiffs land. In other cases the plaintiff and the defendant may not agree that both have lands in the vicinity. The plaintiff or the defendant may claim that his opponent has no land in the vicinity at all. The former case would be a purely boundary dispute but the latter would not be, because the court would have to determine whether one of the parties has land in the area. If the former case arises between two stools the proper forum for adjudication is the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission, but where the latter case is between two stools the ordinary court has the requisite jurisdiction.
This is exactly what the courts have decided in the following cases: Ababio v. Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 253, boundary dispute between two divisional stools; Brantuo v. Poku (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 210, boundary dispute between Bekwai stool land and Adansi stool land; Okadjakrom Stool v. Atonkor Stool (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 162, W.A.C.A. and the recent cases of Agyei I v. Abudulai [1977] 1 G.L.R. 453, C.A. boundary dispute between the Nanumba skin and those of the Atwode stool and Togbe Konda v. Togbe Dompre V [1978] 1 G.L.R. 354, C.A. In none of the foregoing cases did any dispute arise as to whether one of the stools owned all the lands occupied by the the other stool.
But in the instant case, the latter issue arose from the pleadings. In their amended statement of claim filed on 21 March, 1975 the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants ¢20,000 damages for trespass to a certain piece of land alleged to be part of Lower Dixcove stool lands and an injunction restraining the defendants and their licensees from continuing the said trespass. The
[p.462] of [1982-83] GLR 453 defendants for their part averred in their statement of defence that all lands inhabited by the chiefs and people of Lower Dixcove were owned by the defendants and that the defendants granted licence to the plaintiffs to occupy those lands.
They counterclaimed against the plaintiffs for an order for forfeiture and recovery of possession of all lands occupied by the plaintiffs and their subjects and licensees, etc. and without prejudice and in the alternative to an order for forfeiture, an order that the plaintiffs and their subjects attorn tenant to the defendants or face instant ejectment and evictment. The whole case had taken a dramatic turn.
The issues had been magnified and the tension between the parties escalated. It was no longer a simple issue of whether the defendants had trespassed upon the plaintiff’s land where one can talk of the boundary between the two stools, because the plaintiffs in their reply to the statement of defence and also in their defence to the defendants’ counterclaim denied the purported overlordship of the defendants’ stool over the lands occupied by Lower Dixcove and the alleged licence granted them. From the pleadings the issue that came uppermost for determination was whether the plaintiffs and their subjects, etc. were licensees to the defendants in respect of lands inhabited by them in Lower Dixcove.
The court came to the conclusion, rightly in my view, that it ought to determine that issue because if that issue terminated in favour of forfeiture the legal effect would be automatic extinction of the plaintiffs’ right to the possession of the land which they were seeking to protect by an action in trespass against the defendants or any other person, for that matter.
In paragraph (2) of their reply to the defendants’ statement of defence and counterclaim the plaintiff’s stated the following:
“The defendants further aver that even if, and it is not admitted, the defendants allowed the plaintiffs to live on the land the defendants have no right to invade the lawful possession of the plaintiff’s.”
It is settled law that the owner of land who makes a grant of the whole or part of his land to another person has no right to interfere with the right of the grantee to possession of the land but this rule is enforceable only when the grantee recognises the grantor as the owner of the land. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated the customary law much more clearly in Kuma v. Kuma (1936) 5 W.A.C.A 4 at pp. 8-9 thus:
“It appears, therefore, that among the natives, occupation of land is frequently allowed for the purpose of cultivation but without the ownership of the land being parted with. The owner of the land being willing to allow such occupation so long as no adverse claim is made by the occupier; the occupier knowing that
[p.463] of [1982-83] GLR 453 he can use the land as long as he likes provided he recognises the title of the owner.”
See also Panyin v. Asani II [1961] 1 G.L.R. 305; Asseh v. Anto [1961] 1 G.L.R. 103, S.C., dictum by van Lare J.S.C (as he then was).
It is precisely for this reason that this court in its wisdom felt called upon to determine the issue of whether the plaintiffs were, in fact, licensees to the defendants. This issue was fundamental and if the court had referred the matter to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner it would have made a laughing stock of itself for having put the cart before the horse. It would, in my opinion, be counsel of prudence, first to settle the issue of overlordship of the lands inhabited by Lower Dixcove in a court of law before any question of boundary between the two stools comes in.
In my view, section 4 of the NRCD 172 is totally premature and inapplicable. I do not see any merit in the plaintiffs’ ground of appeal attacking the jurisdiction of this court. In my view, incalculable injustice would be done to the defendants of Upper Dixcove if the issue as to the overlordship of Lower Dixcove lands is blurred by talks about the boundary between the lands occupied by the two stools because the result would be a complete sell-out of the customary rights of the party who is the overlord of the lands.
There is also ample evidence that this appeal is not being pursued in good faith for the purpose of testing the correctness of the judgment. The applicants acutely know that they have no leg to stand on when it comes to the merits of the case. They themselves have conceded this fact through their solicitor, Alhaji Kwaw-Swanzy. They have also been privies to the numerous judgments given against them including a judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, dated 19 October 1954.
In the face of all these judgments it is extremely difficult to interpret the conduct of the applicants otherwise than I have just stated. The appeal is in my view being pursued as a face-saving device. The paramount chief of Lower Dixcove has shown clearly that he has no intention of recognising Upper Dixcove as owners of the lands embracing Lower Dixcove. So he makes desperate and foolhardy efforts to avoid the evil day. There are profound reasons why I should refuse the application. The defendants are awarded ¢3,500 costs.
DECISION
Application dismissed
D. R. K. S.
