NYANTAKYIWA ALIAS KISSI vs. KISSI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 480
21 December 1981 · CHARLES CRABBE JSC · ≈ 14 min read
[1981] SLR (SC) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Nye v. Nye [1964] G.L.R. 95, S.C.
(2) Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court) [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION before the Supreme Court for, inter alia, a waiver by the court of non-compliance by the applicant with the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), rr. 7 (1) and 8 (1) and an extension of time within which to appeal against the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. The facts are fully stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
B. J. da Rocha for the plaintiff-applicant.
J. K. Agyemang for the defendants-respondents.
JUDGMENT OF CRABBE J.S.C.
The plaintiff-applicant hereinafter referred to as the applicant sued the defendant-respondents hereinafter referred to as the respondents at the Kwahu Traditional Council for a declaration that she, the applicant, was the queenmother of Mpraeso and that the purported election of Abena Kumiwaa, known also as Abena Kwabena or as Comfort Aboagye, as queenmother of Mpraeso on 5 April 1976, was contrary to custom and thus not valid. She also asked
[p.583] of [1982-83] GLR 480 for an injunction to restrain Abena Kumiwaa in particular and others, being the defendants in that suit, “from declaring and presenting herself anywhere and in whatever circumstances as the queenmother of Mpraeso or acting in that behalf…”
According to the plaintiff-applicant, “. . . judgment was given against [her] predecessor who thereupon appealed to the judicial committee of the Eastern Region House of Chiefs . . . [which] set aside the decision of the Kwahu Traditional Council and ordered a retrial of the suit on its merits . . . [T]he defendant-respondents appealed against [that] ruling to the National House of Chiefs . . . [which] in a judgment delivered on 8 April 1981 reversed the decision of the Eastern Region House of Chiefs and affirmed the decision of the Kwahu Traditional Council . . .”
In January 1981, however, the original plaintiff had died. She was buried on 9 April 1981 some three or four months after her death. The applicant was appointed her successor on 16 April 1981. She made an application for substitution on 1 May 1981. It was not processed until 11 May 1981. That application was granted on 5 June 1981. She was pregnant “and not in very good health and . . . was not at Mpraeso.” She could not swear to the required affidavit until 30 April 1981. She admits that she is, “out of time not only to apply for leave to appeal, but also to appeal against the judgment of the chieftaincy tribunal of the National House of Chiefs.” Hence the application before this court seeking:
“(a) a waiver by the court of non-compliance with rules 7 (1) and 8 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13);
(b) leave to appeal against the judgment of the chieftaincy tribunal of the National House of Chiefs; and (c) an extension of time within which to appeal.”
Counsel for the respondents raised a two-pronged preliminary objection to the application. The first, that, this court had no jurisdiction to waive compliance with rules 7 and 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) under the provisions of rule 66. Secondly, this court had no jurisdiction to grant the extension sought. In support of the first objection, counsel argued that there was no action pending before the Supreme Court. The word “action” meant proceedings commenced by writ or other originating rule of practice prescribed by the court. An application for an extension of time was not an action before the court. The word “action” was not defined in C.I. 13. There was guidance from the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 1. There must be an original suit before this court.
[p.584] of [1982-83] GLR 480
When a party did not comply with the rules then he might ask for a waiver in respect of the non-compliance. Rule 66 did not authorise the applicant in the circumstances of this case to apply for a waiver.
On the second objection, counsel submitted that this court had no jurisdiction to grant the leave sought. The Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), ss. 22 and 35 governed the matter. Under section 22 one needed leave. Under section 35, there must be an application before the lower court before the matter was taken before the higher court. There was exhibited an application for leave to appeal filed in the court below by the applicant. That application was still pending before that court. Where the matter was before the lower court, this court could not have the authority to grant the application. The application before the court below was an application for leave to appeal. Therefore there was no question of a refusal. It was an application merely for leave to appeal. If that leave is refused then they could come to this court.
The judgment was given on 8 April 1981. The applicant had up to 22 April 1981 or even up to 26 April or the end of April 1981. When the application was filed there was an affidavit in opposition which drew the attention of the applicant that she was out of time. She should have gone to the court below and not having done so this court could neither have the authority nor the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
Counsel for the applicant observed that he had not been served with a copy of the notice of the objection. Nonetheless, he would deal with the second objection. In the light of the provisions of article 179 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, the relevant provisions of Act 370 relied on were not applicable. The constitutional provisions superseded Act 370. It was open to an applicant to go to the Supreme Court or to the National House of Chiefs and if the house refused, an applicant could come to the Supreme Court.
Counsel admitted that the applicant had been out of time before the court below. The circumstances which occasioned that had been stated in the affidavit of the applicant. Good faith was a matter for the court. When the application was made before the lower court, the applicant was already out of time. The matter was drawn to his attention. At that time the National House of Chiefs had no power to order a waiver. As soon as the motion was set on, it was C.I. 13 which applied and not the rules of the house of chiefs. The fact that the motion had not been withdrawn did not make any difference. Leave could be granted only by this court.
On the first objection, he argued that C.I. 13 did not define “action.” The court should not be bound by the definition in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954. This court had both original and appellate functions. If one took the narrow definition it meant that
[p.585] of [1982-83] GLR 480 rule 66 could not be invoked. The application was properly before the court and the only thing which this court had to consider was whether the applicant had been wilful in the non-compliance and whether it was in the interests of justice to waive non-compliance. The facts were submitted in detail in the affidavit.
He argued further that the whole purpose of rule 66 was to ensure that a party with an arguable case which he could possibly win was not driven away from the judgment seat because of some procedural lapse. He conceded that, that was not a licence for lassitude or reckless disregard of the rules and that in applying the rule every case should be considered on its own peculiar circumstances. He would submit that the applicant could not be accused of wilfulness. There had been a certain measure of clumsiness.
The instructions were given rather late. But steps were taken immediately when instructions were given. The complaint had some merit. It was arguable. Matters of great weight which would enable this court to make some pronouncement of great importance as a guide. There was no inconvenience which could not be compensated for in money.
Counsel for the respondents observed that, the right to grant extension was a statutory one. That had not been shown: see Nye v. Nye [1964] G.L.R. 95, S.C. If the argument was about section 35 of Act 370 being unconstitutional then this court as constituted could not deal with the matter, he concluded.
Many, many years ago, lawyers were wont to say, ubi remedium ubi jus – if you had a remedy, then you had a right to enforce that remedy. If there was no remedy then there was no right. In time it was realised that, that system of issuing writs was working a lot of hardship. And so, characteristically, the expression became ubi jus ubi remedium—if one had a right then there should be a remedy for his benefit. And so Bracton (1.3, c.l) would say, Actio nihil aliud est quam jus prosequendi in judicio quod alicui debetur—An action is nothing else than the right of suing in a court of justice for that which is due to someone. An action is thus the first step in the due process of law to enforce one’s right. And so Maine in Early Law and Custom p. 389 said, “So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.”
Actions are civil or criminal. Criminal actions were properly called prosecutions. Perhaps this was in recognition of the fact that in penal actions one recovered some penalty. On the civil side one discerns firstly, personal actions. Here a plaintiff sought to recover a debt or damages. Secondly, real actions, in which a plaintiff sought to
[p.586] of [1982-83] GLR 480 establish title to land or other hereditaments. Thirdly, mixed actions, in which a plaintiff sought to establish the right to possession of land.
With the abolition of all forms of actions, we still have action in personam, brought against individuals. Actions in rem, brought to determine questions of title. Possessory actions, which decide the right to physical control of property. As Maitland observed in The Forms of Action at Common Law at p. 1: “The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.” I believe we still live under the spell of Maitland’s prophecy.
The definition of action in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954, is based upon section 225 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49) and the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. The term “action” is applied then to:
“all proceedings in the Supreme Court which have been commenced by writ to the superior courts of common law . . . and all suits formerly commenced by bill or information in the Court of Chancery or by a cause in the Court of Admiralty or in the Court of Probate.”
We do not in our courts, this day, draw the distinction which was formerly drawn before the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of 1873-75 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77). We have become used to the expression “cause or matter,” “criminal matters,” “civil matters.” Indeed, in relation to civil appeals CI 13, use the expression “civil cause or matter” in rule 6 (1). In respect of criminal appeals the expression is “criminal cause or matter”—rule 31 (1). But under the spell cast by Maitland, the word “action” appears in rule 66 of C.I. 13. The rule states that:
“66. (1) Where a party to an action before the Court fails to comply with the provisions of these Rules .
. . the failure to so comply shall be a bar to the further prosecution of the action unless the Court considers that the non-compliance was not wilful and in the interests of justice that the non-compliance should be waived.”
As rightly pointed out by counsel for the applicant, the Supreme Court exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction. In my view, therefore, the word “action” in rule 66 has to be looked at in the light of the particular jurisdiction which is invoked. Where the jurisdiction is an appellate one then the appellate rules would apply. Where the jurisdiction is an original one then the relevant rules and directives would apply.
In the instant application, it would be the civil appellate jurisdiction that is sought to be invoked. In that regard, rule 30 of C.I. 13 would become operative. And the “Rules relating to civil appeals
[p.587] of [1982-83] GLR 480 shall, with such modifications as the Court may determine, apply . . .” That being the case there must be “a civil cause or matter” before the Supreme Court. The words of rule 66 admit of no ambiguity. They are quite clear.
Is there then a civil cause or matter before this court in respect of which rule 66 can be invoked? The answer is No! An action before the Supreme Court in relation to civil appeals means that notice of appeal under rule 6 shall have been filed, not, be it noted, with the registrar of the Supreme Court, but “with the Registrar of the court below.” In the absence of any notice of appeal filed with the registrar of the court below, in this case the National House of Chiefs, there is no “action”—no “cause” or “matter”—before the Supreme Court.
Since there is no action before the Supreme Court, compliance with C.I. 13, does not arise. And since there is no issue of non-compliance that arises, then no question arises as to the operation of rule 66 of C.I. 13.
But rule 7 of CI 13, allows a party to a cause or matter the right to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The present case, being a chieftaincy matter, would be governed, as already indicated, by rule 30. So there is the need for an application to be made to the National House of Chiefs. Again, rule 7 (1) requires that there “shall be [a] motion on notice . . . which shall be filed with the registrar of the court below within fourteen days of the date of the decision against which leave to appeal is sought.” If there is no such motion filed within fourteen days then there would be no action before the Supreme Court. If there were such a motion and leave is refused then an application could be brought to this court.
The court, in its Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court) of 15 June 1981: (see [1981] G.L.R. 1 at p. 2), has made it quite clear that:
“It is also to be noted that where a cause or matter can be determined by a superior court, other than the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court shall first be invoked. The Supreme Court may dismiss any such cause or matter, with punitive costs to be paid personally by counsel or by the party responsible for bringing such cause or matter to the Supreme Court in the first instance.”
I intend to honour my obligation under that direction.
What is the reason for the delay in not complying with the law? It is that the performance of “customary rites and also the prevalence of the present dispute” delayed the burial of the original plaintiff. That in turn delayed the appointment of the successor, the present applicant.
[p.588] of [1982-83] GLR 480
That in turn delayed the necessary application. Pregnancy and ill-health have been thrown in. The reasons do not appear at all convincing.
Where a party to an action before these courts or any other adjudicating authority chooses to live with the dead rather than with the living, that is his absolute privilege. Where he ignores the presence of the procedural law in favour of his traditional and customary rites, again that is his absolute privilege. But I do not think that it is reasonable for him to expect all else to stand still and wait for his or her pleasure.
Death is the one certainty after birth. It is an every day occurrence. It occurs in every home, cottage and hut. Kings and captains depart. So do all other mortals. “Man goeth to his long home”—Ecclesiastics 12:5. And while “the mourners go about the streets” the business of the courts and of parties before the courts would go on. I do not think it can be seriously contended that while the applicant and her family waited to perform their customary rites, the respondents should forego their legal rights. That, also, is their absolute privilege.
What custom in Ghana lays down the law that when a person dies in January he or she should be buried in April? Some three or four months after! I have searched; and searched in vain. There is no such custom that demands that a person who dies shall not be buried until after about three or four months. Indeed, none has been proved in argument and in the documents that support the application before this court. It seems hard, in my view, on a party to an action before a court of law that the determination of his rights shall hang on what his opponent does with that opponent’s dead relative.
That is not in the interests of justice as contemplated under rule 66 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970. The rule in my view, demands an objective test. The competing and conflicting rights of both parties need to be considered. But in the light of an higher ideal. That consideration does not depend upon personal equation of either of the parties. It depends upon standards devoid of personal conveniences. It is quite clear from the affidavit of the applicant that the non-compliance was wilful. The delay in the burial was not accidental. They deliberately waited to perform the customary rites before pursuing their business before the National House of Chiefs. It was a wilful delay. It does not serve the interests of justice to encourage parties who come before our courts to delay, unduly, the prosecution of their own interests—and I may add, those of others.
In the result, I come to the conclusion that there is no action before the Supreme Court upon which an application could be founded and that no adequate reasons have been advanced for the exercise of the discretion in favour of the applicant. I uphold the
[p.589] of [1982-83] GLR 480 objections raised. I would dismiss the application. I would also award costs against the applicant.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
