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[1978] SLR (HC) 52High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

NKANSAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 184

16 November 1978 · OWUSU-ADDO J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (HC) 52
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OSCOLANKANSAH v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 184 [1978] SLR (HC) 52
APANKANSAH v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 184, [1978] SLR (HC) 52 (Ghana).
BluebookNKANSAH v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 184, [1978] SLR (HC) 52 (Ghana High Ct. 1978).

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[p.185] of [1980] GLR 184

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Dufa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 18.

(2) Asamoah v. The Republic [1973] 1 G.L.R. 186.

(3) R. v. Franks [1950] 2 All E.R. 1172; [1950] W.N. 578. 115 J.P. 21; 95 S.J. 45; 34 Cr.App.R. 222;

49 L.G.R. 101, C.A.

(4) R. v. Fuller & Hanoman Ltd., The Times, 11 November 1958, C.C.A.

(5) Chief Superintendent of Police v. Camara (1956) 2 W.A.L.R.84.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant against her conviction and sentence for selling goods above the controlled price. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Adu-Gyamfi for the appellant.

Bruce, Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF OWUSU-ADDO J.

The appellant was convicted by the Assin Fosu District Court, Grade II on 19 December 1977, of the offence of selling above the controlled price contrary to sections 2 (1) and 3 (1) of the Price Control Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 305). She was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment with hard labour and ordered to refund to the complainant an amount of ¢2.40, being double the illegal profit. Her appeal is against both her conviction and sentence.

Originally two grounds of appeal were filed but at the hearing of the appeal the only serious point raised in the additional ground of appeal was strenuously argued by the appellant’s counsel. It reads, “The charge as stated in the statement of offence did not disclose any triable offence.”

In his submission learned counsel urged that omission of a reference to the contravened executive instrument namely, the Price Control (Maximum Prices) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order, 1975 (E.I. 50 of 1975), in the statement of offence, rendered the statement incurably defective. Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant which flowed from a defective statement of offence was a nullity and ought to be set aside. He placed much reliance on the case of Republic v. Dufa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 18. In short, counsel for the appellant submitted that due to the omission of the offending executive instrument in the statement of offence, the appellant was charged and convicted of a non-existing offence, and accordingly, his conviction on her plea of guilty should be quashed.

In reply, the learned senior state attorney contended that the inclusion of the executive instrument in the statement of offence

[p.186] of [1980] GLR 184 would have been desirable but not essential. He explained that an essential legal requirement is that an accused person should be informed sufficiently of the offence charged in a simple language understood by him, and here, there is evidence that the charge was read and explained to the appellant in Twi language, which is her mother tongue. The omission therefore of reference to the executive instrument in the statement of offence is a mere technical error which has not occasioned any miscarriage of justice. He drew the court’s attention to the decision in the case of Asamoah v. The Republic [1973] 1 G.L.R. 186 which he submitted is supportable in law and ought to be followed in this appeal.

The charge preferred against the appellant described the offence with complete accuracy in the statement of offence which reads:

“STATEMENT OF OFFENCE

Selling above the controlled price: contrary to sections 2 (1) and 3 (1) (a) of N.R.C.D. 305.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE GRACE NKANSAH: petty trader: On 16 December 1977, at Assin Praso in the Central Magisterial District and within the jurisdiction of this court did sell two boxes of matches for ¢1.20 instead of 10 pesewas thus making illegal profit of ¢1.10.”

To this charge the appellant pleaded guilty simpliciter after it had been read and explained to her in Twi. Consequently, upon her own plea she was convicted and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment with hard labour and ordered to refund ¢2.40 being double the illegal profit to the complainant.

Our Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), ensures that an accused person is reasonably informed of any charge that is preferred against him and the relevant provisions are contained in the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 1 which reads:

“1. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) (hereafter in this Act referred to as the principal Act) is hereby amended by the substitution for subsections (1) and (2) of section 112 thereof of the following.- (1) Subject to the special rules as to indictments hereinafter mentioned, every charge, complaint, summons, warrant or other document laid, issued or made for the purpose of or in connection with any proceedings before any Court for an offence shall be sufficient if it contains a statement of the offence with which the accused person is charged

[p.187] of [1980] GLR 184 together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge and notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary it shall not be necessary for it to contain any further particulars than the said particulars.

(2) The statement of the offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence and if the offence is one created by an enactment, may contain a reference to the enactment.”

It must be noted that the charge in the present case conformed to these provisions, save only in one respect, namely, the contravened executive instrument was not mentioned in the statement of the offence. But as provided in the above-mentioned section of the Criminal Procedure Code which rightly governs the contents of charges or complaints laid, a reference to the contravened enactment is merely permissive and not mandatory. What is more, its omission is excusable provided the accused had reasonable information of the offence charged.

In my view the words “necessary for giving reasonable information,” import an objective test, and that being the case, the omission or non-reference to the contravened executive instrument in the appellant’s case, did not make the charge a bad one but simply an imperfect one. For a bad charge would be one disclosing no offence known to our laws, which was not so in this case.

The matter for consideration in this appeal therefore is not that the charge disclosed no known offence but that it described a known offence without reference to the offending executive instrument, which derived its origin or birth from N.R.C.D. 305 under which the appellant was rightly charged.

I have had the opportunity of reading the cases cited by counsel in this appeal and a few English cases on the same issue which have assisted me a great deal.

The first of the English authorities is the case of R. v. Franks [1950] 2 All E.R. 1172, C.A. In that case the indictment charged the accused with being concerned in dealing in goods the import of which was prohibited or restricted contrary to section 186 of the Customs Consolidated Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict., 36), but did not contain, as it should have done, an allegation of intent to defraud or to evade the prohibition or restriction. The Court of Appeal

[p.188] of [1980] GLR 184 therefore quashed the conviction on the ground that the indictment did not disclose any offence.

In a more recent case of R. V, Muller & Hanoman Ltd., reported in the 11 November 1958 issue of The Times a different decision was reached. The statement of offence was defective in that it alleged that the accused “knowingly concerned in attempting to evade a prohibition on the export of goods contrary to section 50 (2) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 44)” instead of being knowingly concerned in the exportation of goods with intent to evade the prohibition imposed by the Act. The offence was, however, accurately described in the particulars. At the trial an objection was taken to the statement of offence as it was worded, but the objection was overruled. On appeal it was contended that the indictment disclosed no offence, and the conviction should therefore be quashed. But seeing that the particulars accurately described the offence, and the accused was not prejudiced or embarrassed at all, the Court of Criminal Appeal having held that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction.

In the local case of Chief Superintendent of Police v. Camara (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 84, the facts as stated in the headnote read:

“The appellant was convicted of stealing cattle . .,. [It was held that] although the charge was defective in that it did not expressly disclose an offence yet, as it stood, it contained particulars sufficient to give the accused reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. Failure to refer to the section creating the offence of theft was an ‘omission’ within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 312, and as, on the facts, this omission did not occasion a miscarriage of justice, no grounds existed for an interference with the conviction or sentence.”

In this case the section under which he was charged merely laid down a punishment and did not create an offence. The offence was created by section 252 and the appellant should have been charged under that section.

As I have already mentioned, learned counsel for the appellant placed much reliance on the decision in the case of Republic v. Dufa (supra). In that case the learned High Court judge concluded that failure to refer to the contravened executive instrument or order, resulted in absence of reasonable information given to the appellant of the charge preferred against her. With the greatest respect to the learned judge, I hold a contrary view and I am unable to follow his decision in that case.

[p.189] of [1980] GLR 184

This appellant is not saying she was not reasonably informed about the charge upon which she was convicted. She is not saying she did not understand the charge read to her, but her only complaint is that no reference was made of the executive instrument she offended against, in the statement of offence read to her in court. Wherein lies the injustice resulting from her conviction and sentence? I find none.

In my view this is clearly not a case where the omission to refer to the contravened executive instrument in the charge has resulted in a misapprehension of the nature of the offence charged. On the contrary, I find that the appellant was given sufficient information as to the nature of the offence she was called upon to plead.

Neither could it be said to have prejudiced the appellant’s case nor occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Her appeal against conviction and sentence is therefore dismissed. Since she was granted bail pending the determination of her appeal the remainder of her sentence which is two months, will run from today.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D.R.K.S.

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