REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; EX PARTE OHENE-DJAN [1979] GLR 396
27 November 1978 · AGYEPONG J · ≈ 28 min read
[1978] SLR (HC) 35Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 473, C.A. (full bench).
(2) African Woods Ltd. v. Administrator of Stool Lands [1962] 2 G.L.R. 24, S.C.
(3) Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A.
(4) Seifah v. Forfie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 274; sub nom. Forfie (Kofi) v. Seifah (Kwabena) [1958] A.C.
59; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 52, [1958] 1 All E.R. 289, P.C.
(5) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(6) Dankwa v. Fuller (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 168, C.A.
(7) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A.
(8) Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374 (9) R. v. Heyes [1951] 1 K.B 29; [1950] 2 All E.R. 587; 114 J.P.451; 94 S.J. 582; 34 Cr.App.R. 161;
48 L.G.R. 565, C.C.A.
(10) R. v. Adade [1959] G.L.R. 365, C.A.
(11) Wring, In re; In re Cook (Practice Note) [1960] 1 W.L.R. 138; [1960] 1 All E.R. 536n; (12) 104 S.J. 170; 44 Cr.App.R.122, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for habeas corpus on the ground that the trial justifying applicant’s imprisonment was ex facie irregular. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Peter Adjetey (with him D. O. Lamptey) for the applicant.
Gyeke-Darko, Director of Public Prosecutions and Kaleo-Bioh, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AGYEPONG J.
The applicant herein was on 8 August 1975, convicted of manslaughter of an unknown man by the High Court, Accra, presided over by Amissah J.A. sitting as an additional High Court judge, and was on 11 August 1975, sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment with hard labour. At the time of the present application, the applicant was serving his sentence at Ussher Fort Prison, Accra.
The applicant contends that his conviction is null and void and of no effect; consequently his sentence of imprisonment and his incarceration at the Ussher Fort are illegal, and he is therefore entitled to be released under the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244).
[p.398] of [1979] GLR 396
In support of his submission that the conviction was a nullity, Mr. Peter Adjetey, learned counsel for the applicant, on 28 June 1978 urged four main grounds: (1) that the applicant did not himself plead guilty to the offence of manslaughter; (2) that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 239 (2) under which the applicant was convicted of manslaughter could not in law be invoked by the applicant at the stage the trial had reached, that is, after the close of the case of the prosecution; (3) the court ought to have acquitted the applicant first of the offence of murder before convicting him of the offence of manslaughter; and (4) once the applicant was put in charge of the jury he could not in law be acquitted or convicted except by the verdict of the jury, which was not taken in this case. Learned counsel concluded his submission by contending that the failure of the learned trial judge to comply with these rules of law or procedure amounted to want of jurisdiction.
The history of the case culminating in the conviction and sentence of the applicant is well known: The applicant, a Sunyani legal practitioner, and one Adu Yeboah, were jointly, charged with the murder of an unknown man at Sunyani. They were, however, tried at the High Court, Accra, and as previously stated, it was presided over by Amissah J.A.
On arraignment on 30 July 1975, both accused persons pleaded not guilty and the jury were empanelled for the trial. The prosecution closed its case on 6 August 1975 after calling nineteen witnesses and the case was adjourned to 7 August 1975 for the defence to open. On that adjourned date, 7 August 1975, counsel for the applicant informed the court that his client, the applicant herein, wanted to avail himself of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), s. 239 (2) by pleading “not guilty” of murder but “guilty” of the lesser offence of manslaughter. Section 239 of Act 30 reads:
“(1) A plea of guilty, when recorded, shall constitute a conviction. (2) Where an accused is arraigned on an indictment for any offence and can lawfully be convicted on the indictment of some other offence not charged in the indictment, he may plead ‘not guilty’ of the offence charged in the indictment but ‘guilty’ of the other offence, and upon the plea of guilty the Court may, with the consent of the prosecution, acquit the accused of the offence with which he is charged and record the plea of guilty to the other offence.”
The learned trial judge accordingly consulted the prosecution, which gave its consent on 8 August 1975, the next adjourned date. Whereupon the charge of the murder of an unknown man was read to the applicant and the applicant pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter of an unknown man. The court then proceeded to convict the applicant of the offence of manslaughter of an unknown man and acquit him of the charge of murder. The court, however, adjourned the case to 11 August 1975, for the usual plea of mitigation and sentence.
On the adjourned date, the co-accused Adu Yeboah, having decided to avail himself also of Act 30, s. 239 (2) the learned trial judge recorded, “Both accused persons acquitted of the charge of murder and convicted
[p.399] of [1979] GLR 396 of manslaughter on their own plea.” After hearing the plea of mitigation, the court sentenced the applicant herein and the co-accused to fifteen years’ and ten years’ imprisonment with hard labour respectively. The Court issued a warrant in accordance with Act 30, s. 315 (1), on the strength of which the applicant was, and is still, incarcerated in prison. He is at the moment, as already stated, incarcerated at Ussher Fort Prison in the custody of the respondent. Act 30, s. 315 (1) provides thus:
“(1) Where a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the Court which sentenced him shall issue a warrant of commitment ordering that the sentence shall be carried out in any prison in Ghana, and the warrant shall be full authority to the police and prison officers to take, convey, and keep that person and to all other persons for carrying into effect the sentence described in the warrant.”
In view of the warrant, exhibit A, filed by the respondent with the return, which, according to section 315 (1) quoted above, is justification for the respondent’s custody of the applicant, I called upon Mr. Peter Adjetey, learned counsel for the applicant, to satisfy the court why the respondent could not rely on the warrant as sufficient justification for his holding the applicant in prison.
But I have to ask myself first if I am entitled in law to examine the conviction of the applicant by the High Court presided over by another High Court judge, or more properly, a justice of appeal sitting as an additional High Court Judge, to see if it is ex facie regular. In my opinion I am entitled, and I am fortified by Asare v. Dzeny [1976] 1 G.L.R. 473, C.A. (full bench) where it was held that a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction has jurisdiction to ascertain whether or not a judgment which is being relied on as estoppel per rem judicatam is ex facie regular or valid in the sense that the same was pronounced when the judge had jurisdiction to pronounce it. In coming to that decision, the full bench applied Concession Enquiry No. 471 (Ashanti); Asukese Forest Reserve Timber Concession; African Woods Ltd. v. Administrator of Stool Lands [1962] 2 G.L.R. 24, S.C. where it was held that although generally incompetent to review as on appeal or otherwise the order of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, Simpson J. was nonetheless bound to ascertain whether or not the order which he was asked to implement was ex facie regular or valid.
Apart from this, there are a lot of other authorities to the effect that any court has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside its order or judgment void for want of jurisdiction and it is immaterial if the court is constituted by a different judge. In Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A., by the former West African (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in Council, 1949, s. 8 the West African Court of Appeal had power, when granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council, to suspend execution or to order that the judgment appealed from be carried into execution. Four days after the West African Court of Appeal had granted the defendants leave to appeal to the Privy Council, the defendants filed an application for a stay of execution pending the determination of the appeal. The court, on hearing the application, made the order sought, but the plaintiffs then moved the court to set aside the order on the ground that it was a nullity for want of jurisdiction. The court, differently constituted, set aside the order on ground that the court had no jurisdiction to order or suspend execution after the court had already granted leave to appeal, as this was in contravention of the West African (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in Council, 1949, s. 8. Coussey P. said at pp. 215-216:
“As we have already held, as set out in the ruling above referred to, that this court may give directions as to execution or otherwise of the judgment appealed from only at the time that final leave to appeal is granted, it follows that the order made herein on October 30, 1956, upon an application filed four days after the grant of leave to appeal was irregularly made. A judgment or order obtained by some step not warranted by the ruIes or capable of being sanctioned is wholly void and may be set aside: Smurthwaite v. Hannay ([1894] A.C.
494). It seems to us that the order complained of is a nullity and that the respondents who are affected by it are entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside.
It is accordingly ordered that the order of this court of October 30, 1956, be and it is hereby set aside.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
In Seifah v. Forfie (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 274. P.C. the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that regardless of the existence or otherwise of a power of review, a court has inherent power to set aside a judgment which it had delivered without jurisdiction. In that case Mr. A. C. Spooner presided over the Chief Commissioner’s Court in Ashanti at a time his appointment had been rescinded by law and delivered a judgment. Realising his lack of jurisdiction, when he had later been legally appointed president over the same court, he reviewed his earlier judgment and set it aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction, and delivered another judgment in identical terms. This later judgment was held valid by the Privy Council, reversing the West African Court of Appeal.
In Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. the High Court, Sunyani, presided over by Mr. Howard Christian, Commissioner of Assize and Civil Pleas, purporting to act under the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1954 (L.N. 140A), Order 47 made an order for the issue of a writ of possession in execution of a judgment of a native court. Order 47 provides:
“2. Where by any judgment or order any person therein named is directed to deliver up possession of any lands to some other person, the person prosecuting such judgment or order shall, without any order for that purpose, be entitled to issue out a writ of possession on filing an affidavit showing due service of such judgment or order and that the same has not been obeyed.
3. Upon any judgment or order for the recovery of any land
[p.401] of [1979] GLR 396 and costs, there may be either one writ or separate writs of execution for the recovery of possession and for the costs at the election of the successful party.”
The High Court had clearly no jurisdiction to order the issue of the writ of possession as the judgment was not that of the High Court, but of a native court. Nevertheless, the High Court, constituted by Azu Crabbe J. refused to set aside the order on the ground that the application to set aside, if it was an appeal, was before the wrong court; if it was a review, was before the wrong judge. An appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of Azu Crabbe J. refusing to set aside Mr. Christian’s order succeeded. Akufo-Addo J.S.C., reading the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court said at p. 342:
“The law, as I have always understood it, is that where a court or a judge gives a judgment or makes an order which it has no jurisdiction to give or make or which is irregular because it is not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure, such a judgment or an order is void, and the court has an inherent jurisdiction, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected, to set aside the judgment or the order.
The law does not limit the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, as it does in the case of a review, to the judge who actually gave the judgment or made the order. The jurisdiction is vested in the court qua court, and may be exercised, but not necessarily, by the judge who gave the judgment or made the order.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
On the other hand, where a court had jurisdiction to give a judgment or make an order but gives an erroneous judgment or makes an erroneous order, another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction cannot set aside the judgment or order; the remedy open to the aggrieved party is an appeal to a higher court, if one exists, or a review. It was held in Dankwa v. Fuller (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 168, C.A. that an order of the High Court enlarging time was an order which that court was competent to make, it being in conformity with the Native Courts (Ashanti) Procedure Rules, 1949, r. 129 (1), and was thus binding on the parties unless and until set aside by the judge on review or by a competent appellate court. It was not within the power of a court of co-equal jurisdiction or of the same court differently constituted to declare such an order invalid because that court thought an extension of time granted by the original court was erroneous in law or fact.
Again in Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133, C.A. the distinction was drawn between the effect of a judgment given by a court without jurisdiction and that given within jurisdiction but erroneous in law or fact: Azu Crabbe J.S.C. at p. 141 observed:
“The cases draw a distinction between an order or judgment which a court is not competent to make, and an order which, even if erroneous in law or fact, is within the court’s competency: where there is no jurisdiction the proceedings are void; but where a court of competent jurisdiction makes an erroneous order, it is appealable.”
[p.402] of [1979] GLR 396
(The emphasis is mine.) The same distinction had previously been made in the case of Timitimi v. Amabebe (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 374 at p. 377. And at p. 376 jurisdiction was defined as:
“Jurisdiction, when used in the context we are considering it, means the power or authority to judge. A court is said to be of competent jurisdiction with regard to a suit or other proceeding when it has power to hear or determine it or exercise any judicial power therein.”
But that case, like Seifah v. Forfie, touched on another aspect of want of jurisdiction, that is to say, improper constitution of the Court itself. Where the Court is improperly constituted, all its judgments and orders are a nullity as given without jurisdiction. The only difference between the two cases is that the Chief Commissioner’s Court was an appellate court and appeals from its judgments lay to the West African Court of Appeal, while the court in Timitimi’s case, a Nigerian case, was a native court of first instance. In Timitimi’s case Coussey J.A. said at p. 376:
“It must be remembered that jurisdiction derives from the Crown and in Nigeria is conferred, so far as affects Native Courts, by ordinances and orders constituting those Courts and giving them powers. Now at the time the Resident ordered a re-hearing of the suit in the Gbaran Native Court he had power, by virtue of section 4 (2) of the Native Courts Ordinance, to appoint from amongst its members a president and a vice-president of the Native Court which under section 4(1) (a) of that Ordinance shall consist of head chiefs or head chief, chiefs or chief and persons (who may include non-natives) or a combination of any such authorities and persons and sitting with or without assessors. In this context non-native does not include an administrative officer . . . “
The Resident’s order, therefore in appointing the assistant district officer Mr. Horne to be president of the Native Court at a time when the power to do so had been expressly revoked by Order No. 13 of 1942, was ultra vires and the Native Court, so composed with Mr. Horne as its president, was not a Native Court established under section 4 of the Native Courts Ordinance. The proceedings and judgment of that body commencing on the 14th February, 1944 and terminating on the 17th June, 1944, were in our opinion Coram non judice.”
After referring to cases where changes in the panel had nullified proceedings, Coussey J.A. said at p. 377:
“The present case is a more striking instance, for Mr. Horne came in without authority to form an irregularly constituted body which had therefore no power to adjudicate. For these reasons we hold that the proceedings and judgment in question are void and a mere nullity . . .”
I have touched on the last aspect of want of jurisdiction because the learned principal state attorney, relying on the affidavit of the applicant that he was lawfully tried by a properly constituted court, appeared to contend that once the High Court that tried the applicant had been
[p.403] of [1979] GLR 396 admitted by the applicant to have been properly constituted, its judgment or order could never be null and void. In the light of Amoabimaa v. Badu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 214, W.A.C.A. and Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. already cited, I wonder whether Mr. Kaleo-Bioh still sticks to his view.
It is obvious from the above authorities that I have jurisdiction to set aside the conviction of the applicant only on the following three grounds: (1) that the court that tried the applicant was improperly constituted; (2) that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case; (3) that the conviction was irregular because it was not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure. Clearly the court was properly constituted, and clearly the court had jurisdiction to try the case. I am therefore left with the last ground—the conviction was irregular because it was not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure.
I now consider the grounds of the application. The first ground, as already stated, is that the applicant did not plead guilty himself of the charge of manslaughter, yet was convicted thereof and sentenced to imprisonment. The learned trial judge recorded in his notes of 8 August 1975 that the charge of murder was read to the applicant, and the applicant pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. The record is, in law, prima facie, a correct statement of what transpired at the trial that day. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, I ordered the tape recorded version of the proceedings on 8 August 1975 to be played back in open court on 31 July 1978, and it was obvious, and admitted by the then counsel on both sides, Mr. Gyeke-Darko, the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent, and Mr. Peter Adjetey, leading counsel and Mr. D. O. Lamptey, junior counsel for the applicant, that the learned trial judge read the charge of murder to the applicant, the applicant was asked for his plea, and he pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. According to section 239 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the plea of guilty of the other offence (in this case manslaughter) was a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the court to convict the applicant of the offence of manslaughter. It follows therefore that if the applicant had actually not pleaded guilty of manslaughter, I would have held that the trial court had no jurisdiction by the provisions of section 239 (2) of the said Act to convict the applicant of the offence of manslaughter, as the conviction would not then be warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure, and I would accordingly have declared the conviction null and void, regardless of the consequences. However, as the applicant pleaded guilty himself this ground fails.
The next ground of the applicant is that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the invocation and application of section 239 (2) at the stage the proceedings had reached, that is, at the close of the prosecution’s case, after nineteen prosecution witnesses had given evidence in the case. Mr. Kaleo-Bioh, principal state attorney who had replaced Mr. Gyeke-Darko, now legal adviser to the Ghana Police Force, as counsel for the respondent, held a contrary view.
[p.404] of [1979] GLR 396
Of course section 239 (2) was invoked by the applicant himself through his counsel at the trial, yet if in law the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the invocation and application of the subsection at the stage the trial had reached, the mere fact that the subsection was invoked by the applicant, through his counsel, would not clothe the court with jurisdiction, for jurisdiction cannot be conferred by parties except when permitted by statute.
There is no indication in section 239 (2) that the subsection can be invoked and applied only on initial arraignment. As long as the charge was re-read to the applicant and he was asked for his plea, and he in fact made his plea, in my opinion, the subsection was complied with by the court. In fact justice would not manifestly have been seen to be done to the applicant if the learned trial judge had disallowed the application by the applicant’s counsel to invoke that subsection, merely on the ground that the trial had passed the stage of arraignment, knowing full well that in all offences lesser than murder, generally an accused is at liberty to change his plea at any stage of his trial; so also in civil cases, a defendant could at any stage of the proceedings plead liable to the plaintiff’s claim or submit to judgment.
I think the court properly allowed the invocation of the subsection after the close of the prosecution’s case, and there was no irregularity about it.
The third ground of the applicant is that he ought to have been acquitted and discharged of the charge of murder before being convicted of the offence of manslaughter. According to the learned judge’s notes, as confirmed by the tape recorded version, the applicant was on 8 August 1975, convicted of the offence of manslaughter before being acquitted of the charge of murder. It would seem, going strictly by the provisions of section 239 (2) of the Act quoted in full earlier in this ruling, that the applicant ought to have been acquitted of the charge of murder before being convicted of the offence of manslaughter.
Mr. Kaleo-Bioh’s answer to this contention of the applicant was that the deviation was not material and did not vitiate the conviction. He submitted that once the applicant was acquitted of murder, he could put up the defence of autrefois acquit if the charge of murder of the same unknown person was preferred against him again.
I agree with Mr. Kaleo-Bioh that the deviation was not material and ought not to vitiate the applicant’s conviction. For this view, I find support from section 16 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), which provides, “Where a form is prescribed or specified by an enactment, deviations from the form not materially affecting the substance or calculated to mislead shall not invalidate the form used.” At the time the applicant’s counsel invoked section 239 (2), the object was to avoid a conviction of the applicant of murder by the substitution therefore of a conviction of manslaughter. That object was achieved. No injustice was done to the applicant. He was not misled in any way.
I have already stated that on 11 August 1975, the learned trial judge recorded the following notes: “Both accused persons acquitted of the
[p.405] of [1979] GLR 396 charge of murder and convicted of manslaughter on their own pleas.” It seems to me that if the applicant’s contention that the learned judge’s conviction of the applicant of manslaughter before acquitting him of murder was a nullity were to be upheld, then the learned judge would not in law be estopped from making the record of 11 August 1975: see Seifah v. Forfie above cited. It must be borne in mind that under section 239 (1) of Act 30, a plea of guilty when recorded shall constitute a conviction. It must also be remembered that notwithstanding the alleged nullity, the applicant was still in court on 11 August 1975 as an accused person.
The applicant contended that section 199 (5) of Act 30 took murder cases out of section 239 (2) of the Act. Section 199 (5) provides, “ The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty in the case of an offence punishable by death.” In the submission of the applicant, once he was facing a murder charge section 239 (2) could never be invoked and applied. The short answer to that is that the applicant did not under section 239 (2)plead guilty of murder, but rather of manslaughter.
By far the most important ground urged by the applicant was that, having been put in charge of the jury, the applicant could not be convicted or discharged except by the verdict of the jury. He contended that either he should have been withdrawn from the charge of the jury during the invocation of section 239 (2), or after the invocation and plea of guilty of manslaughter by him, the learned judge ought to have directed the jury on section 239 (2) and the evidence of the prosecution so far, and left it to the jury to bring their verdict. Obviously the verdict that the jury could have brought in the circumstances was not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter, or they could refuse to return such a verdict, in which case the trial would have continued, but they could never return a verdict of guilty of murder at that stage.
The problem of the jury has arisen because section 239 (2) was not invoked on initial arraignment. If it had been so invoked, and the applicant had pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter, the jury would not then have been empanelled, for it is only when a prisoner has pleaded not guilty to an indictment and he is going to be tried that the jury are empanelled.
The undisputed facts are that the appellant was not withdrawn from the charge of the jury; the learned judge did not direct the jury on section 239 (2) and the evidence then before the court; the verdict of the jury was not taken; and the judge himself acquitted the applicant of murder and convicted him of manslaughter. Were these errors, and if so did they amount to want of jurisdiction on the part of the court so as to vitiate the trial, conviction, acquittal, and sentence of the applicant and render them a nullity? If they amount to want of jurisdiction, the applicant goes free from here, but if they do not amount to want of jurisdiction, the only remedy open to the applicant is an appeal to the Court of Appeal, but unfortunately for him he lost that right by inordinate delay.
Admittedly there is authority for the submission of the applicant that once an accused has been put in charge of the jury, it is only by the verdict
[p.406] of [1979] GLR 396 of the jury that he can be convicted or discharged. In R. v. Heyes [1950] 2 All E.R. 587. C.C.A. the, appellant was charged before the recorder of Bolton on an indictment containing charges of stealing and receiving bicycles. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to all the offences charged. During the opening of the case by counsel for the prosecution the appellant indicated that he wanted legal aid. Whereupon the recorder granted this request and counsel undertook the case. Counsel then indicated that his client desired to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to plead guilty to receiving. By this time, however, he was in charge of the jury. The transcript of the shorthand note of the proceedings did not indicate that the appellant himself was asked to plead. It merely contained a statement that his counsel said that he wished to plead guilty. The court accepted the plea of guilty through counsel and convicted the appellant and sentenced him. It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that both the conviction and sentence were null and void. Lord Goddard C.J. observed at p. 588:
“A prisoner must himself plead. After the jury had heard that the appellant wished to withdraw his plea and admit his guilt, the proper proceeding was to direct them to return a verdict. Apparently, indeed, counsel suggested to the recorder that that was the proper course, but the recorder said it did not matter. It does matter, because once a prisoner is in charge of a jury he can only be either convicted or discharged by the verdict of the jury. As there was no verdict of the jury here, the trial was a nullity, and we could set aside the proceedings and order a re-trial or venire de novo.”
(The emphasis is mine.) However, having regard to the fact that the appellant in that case was a man of good character, there was no previous conviction against him, and he had already been awaiting the appeal for two months, the court simply quashed the conviction without ordering a retrial.
Again in the local case of R. v. Adade [1959] G.L.R. 365, C.A. Korsah C.J., while comparing trial by jury with trial by assessors, noted at p. 366:
“In a trial by a court with a jury, on the other hand, it is the jury who pronounce the verdict of guilty or not guilty, and the Judge is thereafter required by law merely to record the verdict of the jury, and proceed either to convict or acquit as the case may be in accordance with that verdict.”
It seems to me that if the appellant’s trial had travelled to a close with the addresses of counsel and the summing-up of the judge, and the learned trial judge had acquitted the applicant of murder but convicted him of manslaughter, without taking the verdict of the jury, his acquittal or conviction would not have been warranted by sections 280 (1) and 285 of Act 30, and would have been void for want of jurisdiction, for the verdict of the jury is by the enactment a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the judge to acquit or convict the accused. The following are the provisions of the sections:
“280. (1) After the summing-up, the jury shall consider their verdict, and for that purpose may retire.”
“285. (1) When the jury are unanimous in their opinion, the Judge shall give judgment in accordance with that, opinion.
(2) If the accused is found not guilty, the Judge shall record a judgment of acquittal.
(3) If the accused person is found guilty, the Judge shall pass sentence on him according to law.”
Section 271 of Act 30 also provides:
“271. The Judge may consider at the conclusion of the case for the prosecution whether there is any case for submission to the jury, and if the Judge is of opinion that there is no evidence that the accused has committed any offence of which he could be lawfully convicted on the indictment upon which he is being tried, the judge shall forthwith direct the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty and shall acquit the accused.”
Here also the enactment says that the direction of the jury to enter a verdict of not guilty is a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the judge to acquit the accused, so that if the judge acquits the accused without the direction, the acquittal is without jurisdiction and therefore null and void.
I do not however, regard the pronouncements of Lord Goddard C.J. and Korsah C.J. as amounting to an enactment or rule of procedure, such as the procedure in the cases of Amoabimaa and Mosi. I have not been referred to any enactment or rule of procedure which provides that in all cases when a prisoner is put in charge of the jury, he can only be convicted or discharged by the verdict of the jury. There is no such provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). Since I have not been referred to any such enactment or rule of procedure, I cannot hold that in acquitting the applicant of murder and convicting him of manslaughter, the judge took a step not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure, so as to amount to want of jurisdiction. I agree with Mr. Kaleo-Bioh that if the matters urged by the applicant were errors at all, they were errors of law which would be redressed on appeal. I quote again Azu Crabbe J.S.C. in Bakuma’s case [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133 at p. 141:
“The cases draw a distinction between an order or judgment which a court is not competent to make, and an order which, even if erroneous in law or fact, is within the court’s competency: where there is no jurisdiction the proceedings are void; but where a court of competent jurisdiction makes an erroneous order, it is appealable.”
One may ask if the applicant was ever put in charge of the jury in respect of the offence of manslaughter? In R. v. Heyes above cited the prisoner was put in charge of the jury in respect of all the offences, including receiving to which he later pleaded guilty.
[p.408] of [1979] GLR 396
Apart from Dankwah v. Fuller above cited, the very English courts that decided R. v. Heyes [1950] 2 All E.R. 587, have warned applicants for habeas corpus that habeas corpus is not to be regarded as a means of appeal against conviction and sentence: see In re Wring; In re Cook [1960] 1 W.L.R. 138, D.C. In that case the applicants, who were serving sentences of imprisonment, applied to the Divisional Court for writs of habeas corpus. Wring had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment at the Bristol Assizes for shop-breaking, larceny and possessing explosives; Cook to four years’ imprisonment at the Somerset Quarter Sessions for false pretences and receiving. Lord Parker C.J. warned inter alia at p. 138:
“The court would like to take this opportunity of setting out the position in regard to these applications. The Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division has repeatedly stated that habeas corpus is not to be regarded as a means of appeal against conviction or sentence. As the court stated in In re Featherstone ((1953) 37 Cr.App.R. 146, 147): The court does not grant, and cannot grant, writs of habeas corpus to persons who are in execution, that is to say, persons who are serving sentences passed by courts of competent jurisdiction. Probably the only case in which the court would grant habeas corpus would be if it were satisfied that the prisoner was being held after the term of the sentence passed on him has expired.’ Accordingly, a prisoner who wishes to challenge either his conviction or his sentence should apply to the Court of Criminal Appeal or to quarter sessions as the case may be . . . “
(The emphasis is mine.)
In the later stages of his submission, the applicant wanted me to set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground of nullity for various reasons: (1) it appeared political pressure was exerted on the learned trial judge to convict the applicant; (2) Azu Crabbe C.J. openly criticised at a Ghana Bar Association meeting on 25 September 1975, the invocation and application of section 239 (2) of Act 30 to the facts of this case, which criticism, according to the applicant, coming from the Chief Justice at the time, should weigh with me; (3) the facts adduced at the trial in the High Court differed substantially from the facts given by the prosecution at the preliminary investigation in the district court; (4) the prosecution alleged at the preliminary investigation that the applicant had lured one Berchie to the applicant’s house and there killed him whereas at the time of the preliminary investigation and of the trial in the High Court, the said Berchie was alive; (5) though the alleged murder took place at Sunyani, the applicant was whisked to Accra by helicopter under army and police guard and charged at the Cantonments, Accra, with the offence of murder, and whisked back to Sunyani District Court for preliminary investigation and back to Accra District Court for a continuation of the same preliminary investigation; and (6) though there was a High Court at Sunyani, where the offence of murder was alleged to have been committed by the applicant, he was tried at the Accra High Court. I did not call upon the learned principal state attorney to reply to these additional grounds, because in my view these matters did not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court, Accra, to try, convict, or sentence the applicant; besides some were matters that would take the respondent by surprise as they had not been deposed to in the affidavit in support of this application, while others ought to have been exhibited and served on the respondent.
I find that the court acted intra vires in convicting the applicant. I cannot therefore set aside the conviction on the ground that it is ex facie irregular. The conviction, and therefore the warrant, exhibit A are valid: the warrant provides justification for the respondent’s custody of the applicant. The application for habeas corpus fails, and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
J. D.
