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[1985] SLR (CA) 35Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

NYARKO AND OTHERS vs. LUTTERODT [1984-86] 1 GLR 437

22 April 1985 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 35
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OSCOLANYARKO AND OTHERS v LUTTERODT [1984-86] 1 GLR 437 [1985] SLR (CA) 35
APANYARKO AND OTHERS v LUTTERODT [1984-86] 1 GLR 437, [1985] SLR (CA) 35 (Ghana).
BluebookNYARKO AND OTHERS v LUTTERODT [1984-86] 1 GLR 437, [1985] SLR (CA) 35 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for relistment of an appeal struck out for want of prosecution by the Court of Appeal differently constituted. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling delivered by Adade J.S.C.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the applicants.

Nii Amartei for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

Adade J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. Civil motion 14/85 is an application to relist an appeal which was struck out by this court on 7 November 1983. Civil motion 15/85 is an application for a stay of execution of the High Court judgment dated 18 February 1982 from which the appeal was lodged. Both applications are made by the defendant-appellants. The two applications were argued together.

On 7 November 1983 this court (coram Apaloo C.J., Edward Wiredu and Osei-Hwere JJ.A.) struck out, for want of prosecution, an appeal by the defendants against a judgment of the High Court, Accra dated 18 February 1982. None of the three appellants (two defendants and co-defendant) was in court on that day. The second defendant says she had travelled to Nigeria. It seems that the first defendant and the co-defendant are, so to speak, sleeping partners; they are not served

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with process. However, the second defendant claims to have authority from them to act on their behalf.

On the application of the defendants the appeal struck out on 7 November 1983 was relisted by this court on 7 January 1985 in circumstances which clearly showed that the plaintiff was not served with the motion paper. We do not here make any pronouncement on whether service on a respondent is demanded by the rules of court and therefore obligatory. We do know that in practice the court has always tried to ensure that the respondent has notice of the application, for good reason.

On becoming aware of the relistment, the plaintiff moved the court, on notice, to set it aside. This the court did on 5 February 1985. In the process, the striking out order of 7 November 1983 was restored, thus, for the time being at least, putting paid to the appeal.

The defendants have now applied again to relist the appeal, to be heard on the merits. The plaintiff sued the defendants for:

(a) Damages for trespass on to the plaintiff’s land, plot G 131, Dansoman, Accra, and

(b) Perpetual injunction.

(The emphasis is mine.) The suit related to a vacant plot of land. The judgment of the High Court, however, affected not just land, but also a “house then built on it…” The defendants contend that they put up this house. The plaintiff does not deny this, but he says that the defendants are not entitled to sympathy or to any protection at all because of their conduct. In paragraph 4 of the plaintiff ‘s attorney’s affidavit filed on 15 February 1985, he says that:

“…the defendants erected the building in spite of repeated protests and warnings from me, and what is more serious the defendants erected their building in defiance of the court order of interim injunction restraining them from building on the land.”

Accordingly, he says in paragraph 5 that “the defendants built at their own risk.”

These are issues which are relevant and which can properly be canvassed on the hearing of the appeal. We do not have the record of proceedings, and therefore we are in no position to say to what extent these allegations are supported by evidence on record.

The defendant’s conduct following the judgment of the High Court has been reprehensible and provocative in the extreme, bordering on contempt of the court, and even of the judicial system itself. These matters were commented upon and justifiably taken into account by this court in its ruling of 5 February 1985. The impression, however, should on no account be created that the defendants are being short

[p.439] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 437

shrifted and denied a hearing on the merits simply because they had indulged in ill-advised extra-judicial methods to attain their objectives. True, there must be an end to litigation. But it is equally important that these courts do not, in the process, sacrifice the need to give all parties a fair hearing on the merits—from which it emerges that so long as his opponent can be adequately compensated in costs, an applicant must in fairness be let in to be heard on the merits of his case. It will not be fair, however, if the respondent stands to suffer irreparable damage from the grant of the application.

It is pertinent to observe that rule 23 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) (under which an application to relist may be made) prescribes no time limits, unlike rule 25 which regulates the setting aside of an ex parte judgment. We do not think that this omission is accidental. It was deliberate, and the law makers must have taken the view that no matter how late an application to relist may be brought, the court must, so to speak, bend over backwards to accommodate an errant appellant, if it is at all possible, except in the extreme situation where the respondent may as a result, be damnified irreparably. In every case the terms upon which an appellant is let in for a second time will take account of the inconvenience to the respondent and even to the court, the conduct of the appellant before and since the striking out, the delay in bringing the application, and all other relevant factors.

In this case we do not see what irretrievable damage the plaintiff will suffer if the appeal is relisted and heard on the merits. He will definitely suffer financial loss and some inconvenience as a result of the long delay. But these can be made good by the award of reasonable costs. The plaintiff does not claim that he is being prevented from doing anything on the land, or that he has been turned out of a house he once occupied. The house was put up by the defendants, who have at all times occupied it, and are still occupying it.

Besides, the record of appeal is ready. The court would have heard the appeal on 7 November 1983, but for the absence of the defendant-appellants. It would seem therefore that if the appeal is restored to the list, its hearing will depend entirely on the convenience of the court, and such indulgences as the court may choose, in its discretion, to dispense.

We are convinced that the best way to bring this litigation to a speedy conclusion is to relist the appeal and hear it quickly. Any other course will be bound to generate one interlocutory application after another (as the history of the case has shown so far), and possibly appeals against interlocutory orders made by the court.

Already, apart from the application to relist, there is pending, as earlier observed, an application for a stay of execution.

In all the circumstances, we deem it prudent that the appeal be relisted, and heard as early as possible, say within two weeks, and we

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so order. Meanwhile we shall adjourn the application for a stay sine die.

The defendants will pay the costs of this application which, given their conduct and the long delay, we fix at ¢4000 in any event, i.e. whether the appeal fails or succeeds.

In consultation with counsel for the parties, we fix the appeal for hearing on 6 May 1985.

DECISION

Application granted.

M.C.N-N.

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