AKOTO II AND OTHERS vs. KAVEGE AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
25 April 1985 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 26 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Ansah-Addo v Addo; Ansah-Addo v Asante (Consolidated) [1972] 2 GLR 400, CA.
(2) Banahene v Hima [1963] 1 GLR 323, SC.
(3) Smith v Cardiff Corporation [1954] 1 QB 210; [1953] 2 All ER 1373; 118 JP 33,CA. (4) Ababio IV v Quartey (1916) PC ‘74-’28, 40.
(5) Yartey and Oko v Construction and Furniture (WA) Ltd [1962] 1 GLR 86, SC. (6) Ghana Muslims Representative Council v Salifu [1975] 2 GLR 246, CA.
[p.368] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 (7) Akoto III v Agyiman,- Dua III v Agyiman I (Consolidated) n [1962] 1 GLR 524, SC, (8) Sobanjo v Oke (1954) 14 WACA 593.
(9) Bedu v Agbi [1972] 2 GLR 238, CA.
(10) Anane v Donkor, Kwarteng v Donkor (Consolidated) [1965] GLR 188, SC.
(11) Yoguo v Agyekum [1966] GLR 482, SC.
(12) Egyin v Aye [1962] 2 GLR 187. SC.
(13) Abakam Effiana Family v Mbibado Effiana Family [1959] GLR 362, CA.
(14) Akyem v Adu (Consolidated) [1976] 2 GLR 63, CA.
(15) Fori v Ayirebi [1966] GLR 627, SC.
(16) Nyan v Amihere [1964] GLR 162, SC.
(17) Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 [1973] 2 WLR 683; [1973] 2 All ER 39, HL.
(18) Kponuglo v Kodadja (1933) 2 WACA 24.
(19) Akpandja v Egblomesse (1939) 5 WACA 10.
(20) Akramah II (Nii) v Robertson (Consolidated) [1975] 2 GLR 301, CA (full bench). (21) Frempong II v Effah [1961] GLR 205, PC.
(22) Etablissement Baudelot v Graham (RS) & Co Ltd [1953] 2 QB 271; [1953] 1 All ER 149,CA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the defendant from the decision of the High Court in favour of the plaintiffs in an action for declaration of title to a tract of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Fransois JSC.
COUNSEL
B J da Rocha (with him Djikunu) for the defendant-appellant.
E D Kom (with him Badohu) for the plaintiff-respondents.
JUDGMENT FRANCOIS JSC.
The contest between the parties is over a tract of land described by the plaintiffs as stretching:
“from where Kenemutu stream enters into River Dain and thence eastward to the point where the Dibale stream meets River Dain and then northwards to Kegu and known as Kadubatukator and Dadadukatu lands.”
Each party seeks a declaration of his title. It must be observed that the plaintiffs’ description of the area in dispute does not show a completely enclosed parcel of land but rather sets out a demarcating line with the River Dain, as the dividing physical feature. I shall return to this aspect of the plaint later in this judgment.
The suit was instituted by 151 named plaintiffs, and though the writ was not couched as a representative action, the first two paragraphs
[p.369] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 of the statement of claim assert its representative character. Those paragraphs were expressed as follows:
“(1) The first plaintiff is the Mankrado of Akpafu-Adorkor and sues for himself and on behalf of 150 others whose names appear on the list hereto attached.
(2) That the plaintiffs are all subjects of the Akpafu-Adorkor stool.”
It was the view of the trial judge that the suit was instituted by the first plaintiff, Adu Kavege, in a “representative capacity and as the leader of subjects who together claimed with him.” But in the same breath, the learned judge acknowledged “that each individual owns his land in the area.” Indeed the principal spokesman for the plaintiffs, the eighth plaintiff, testified categorically as follows: “In my area, there is no stool land. The land is ancestral and belongs only to the head of family, as trustee for members of the family.” The eighth plaintiff asserted later in his evidence that “the land which the plaintiffs are claiming is not a stool property but property belonging to individuals. 60 families have interest in this property in dispute.”
It is clear then that the plaintiffs are committed to representation by family heads and not stool holders. The assertion of the eighth plaintiff is diametrically opposed to the pleas in the statement of claim reproduced above and the judge’s conclusion on the representative capacity of the first plaintiff must consequently be held with respect to be erroneous. Since 60 families apparently own the land, their family heads should have initiated action for the family members. Yet not a single head of family entered the fray. The ambivalence shrouding the status of the plaintiffs and their capacity to sue, has led to a challenge by the defendant on the propriety of the form of action.
Representative actions are not unknown in this country. There are the usual syndicate cases where groups of farmers band together and acquire land under a leader. These groups sometimes described as “amorphous” or “heterogeneous”, act by their leaders: see Ansah-Addo v Addo [1972] 2 GLR 400, CA. Even though the land is shared among members of the group whose aliquot shares become theirs absolutely with powers of alienation and transmission, the syndicate as a body fights any legal battles affecting the land under their elected leader. Chiefs and ebusuapanyin also form a distinct category of persons who represent their stools and families respectively in protecting family stools and lands. Persons suing in a representative capacity must establish that status.
It is however the novel form in which the present writ is couched, that has provoked complaint. For though the mankrado, the first
[p.370] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 plaintiff, as stool occupant, may have a constitutional relationship with the people of Akpafu-Adorkor as pleaded, it is a purely socio-political arrangement and has no relevance to the ownership of the land in dispute. The pleading is further at odds with the eighth plaintiff’s evidence. A question then is raised, whether the several plaintiffs have been shown to have a common interest to permit a common action, seeing that each individual plot which together make up the area in dispute would have its separate identify and its unique history of acquisition. The list of 150 names filed as additional plaintiffs provokes the conclusion that the plaintiffs sought also to sue in their own right and consequently should stand or fall by the evidence they can individually muster.
A joint action is appropriate where the plaintiffs share a common interest and are concerned about a common result. That is what Order 16, r 9 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A) declares. The case of Banahene v Hima [1963] 1 GLR 323, SC provides a very useful guide to the interpretation of Order 16, r 9 of LN 140A. In that case the Oman of Kwamang by its town management committee purported to sue on behalf of the farmers of Kwamang for reliefs peculiar to the farmers. The incongruity of such a representative action was expressed in the judgment of Akufo-Addo JSC (as he then was) in the following passage at 329:
“I am unable to see how an action in which the relief sought is beneficial to the farmers of Kwamang only can be properly brought on behalf of the Oman of Kwamang and the farmers of Kwamang, since the Oman of Kwamang as such are not interested in the subject-matter of the action nor can the Oman be said to be aggrieved by the incidents that gave rise to this action.”
A similar situation arises here. I cannot see how the stool of Akpafu-Adorkor can have a common interest or grievance with the Akpafu farmers, qua farmers. In my view Banahene v Hima (supra) is clear authority on the point that the dichotomy which the pleadings and evidence project, renders the action incompetent as a representative action: see also Smith v Cardiff Corporation [1954] 1 QB 210, CA.
I have, however, considered very carefully the admonition given in the Privy Council case of Ababio v Quartey (1916) PC ‘74-’28, 40 at 42 that:
“If there was any capacity disclosed in the course of the action which would have enabled the plaintiff to have maintained his suit, he ought not to have been non-suited, but the Court ought to have allowed all the necessary amendments that were required for
[p.371] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 the purpose of enabling the use of evidence that had been obtained for the purpose of settling the real controversy between the parties.”
I have noted also that this dictum was approved by the Supreme Court in Yartey and Oko v Construction and Furniture (WA) Ltd [1962] 1 GLR 86 at 90, SC and applied in Ghana Muslims Representative Council v Salifu [1975] 2 GLR 246, CA. I shall consequently defer a verdict on this issue till the merits of the suit have been examined.
But before turning to the merits, it must be observed that the 151 plaintiffs purport to have authorised the initiation of the suit in their names by what was described as a “Note of Authority” (exhibit B). In this note twenty persons have “deceased” written against their names. Exhibit B then records that as many as fourteen per cent of the alleged plaintiffs had predeceased the action. No attempt was ever made to have these plaintiffs substituted. There is considerable doubt that the 151 persons had authorised the institution of the action and the defendant consequently challenges the propriety of the institution of an action with deceased persons as the plaintiffs and questions further a judgment that without discrimination grants relief to the living as well as the dead.
Now to the merits. The suit being one for a declaration of title, the plaintiffs have an onerous burden to discharge. This is trite law and would have necessitated no further comment but for the procedure adopted by the plaintiffs of throwing this burden to the winds. No root of title was disclosed. Neither the tradition of acquisition of an inherited estate nor the incidents of purchase, if acquired by sale, were divulged. No clear and positive acts of unchallenged and sustained possession or of substantial user emerged from the evidence. The boundaries of the land were not established. No boundary neighbours were called to testify to the ownership of the adjoining lands. Such evidence invariably being essential as was said in Nana Akoto III v Nana Agyiman I; Dua III v Agyeman I (Consolidated) [1962] 1 GLR 524 at 532, SC, “The evidence of adjoining land owners is very important in deciding ownership of land.” The failure to prove boundaries even of only one side is fatal: see Sobanjo v Adesina Oke (1954) 14 WACA 593; Bedu v Agbi [1972] 2 GLR 238, CA and Anane v Donkor; Kwarteng v Donkor (Consolidated) [1965] GLR 188, SC. The fact that the defendant-appellant has counterclaimed does not lessen this burden. Relevant and apposite is the statement of the law in Yoguo v Agyekum [1966] GLR 482 at 486, SC reproduced hereunder:
[p.372] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
“The claim being one for a declaration of title, the plaintiffs can only succeed upon the strength of their case and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants for a declaration of title did not in any way lighten the might of the burden upon the plaintiffs to prove their title by preponderance of admissible evidence. Even in a suit for trespass where the plaintiff can succeed just upon proof of possession, a defence which denies his title and a counterclaim for title by the defence places upon the plaintiff a burden to prove his title satisfactorily or else he must fail: see Nkyi Xl v. Kumah [1959] G.L.R. 281, C.A. and Nelson v. Ammah (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 134.”
For some obscure reason the plaintiffs chose to prove their case through a single principal witness, the eighth plaintiff. Save for evidence of the surveyor who testified about the plan ordered by the court, and another witness with pretensions to a wide German scholarship testifying about a Grunner map and the adduction of evidence relating to the background of the note of authority (exhibit B) referred to above, no other evidence was given. It is this bewildering attitude adopted by the plaintiffs in the prosecution of their case that has necessitated a restatement of the rather elementary requisites of proof in a suit for title.
The plaintiffs’ nonchalance may be demonstrated by one example. On the serious submission that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their boundaries and not called a single adjoining land owner, the plaintiffs retorted that the issue was, in fact, a boundary dispute which did not require evidence of boundaries. This was a posture that was totally at odds with and subversive of the plaint indorsed on the writ for declaration of title. But even if the matter in issue had been a mere boundary dispute, sufficient proof of the respective areas owned is still necessary to indicate the true line of boundary. Thus in Egyin v Aye [1962] 2 GLR 187 at 191, SC van Lare JSC answered a similar point in the Supreme Court as follows:
“It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the issue in the 1920 consolidated actions related to boundary only and that title was not involved. The submission is ingenious but misconceived as a boundary dispute between owners or occupiers of adjoining lands necessarily raises title to the section of land enclosed between the two conflicting boundaries asserted by the opposing parties.”
Again in Abakam Effiana Family v Mbibado Effiana Family [1959] GLR 362 at 363-364, CA it was held:
[p.373] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
“We think that this can be regarded as being in the nature of a boundary dispute between two adjoining land owners, and the burden therefore rested upon the plaintiffs to establish with particularity the extent of the land which they claimed and the boundaries of it.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
As previously observed, the plaintiffs led no satisfactory evidence relating to the acquisition of their individual farms. No history or tradition of acquisition is known of any of the alleged 151 farms. Since the defendant’s predecessors had litigated extensively over the land, as the pleadings demonstrate, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to establish their roots to avoid or negate the force of any pleas of res judicata which may be pressed as binding on their forebears.
In answering the claim, the defendant sought to prove that his stool’s ownership of the area in dispute had been confirmed by several court decisions. Some of which were held out as effective and binding judgments on the plaintiffs. An examination of these judgments and their force as res judicata is called for. I shall turn to them presently.
The delineation of the land in dispute in the plaintiffs’ claim was by natural or physical features. The defendant locates the area positively by stating that the land “forms boundary with the Tetemans and the Baikas on the west, on another side by Bala and Likpe Kukurantumi, on the same side by Dzolu-Buem and on the north with Ayoma land.” The defendant further claims that River Dayi (Dain) marks the boundary between Dzolu and Likpe Bala and Kukurantumi. The Ayaketu stream is on the western boundary. The part of the land bounded by Baika land is said to extend to a stream called Lekorkor. This stream joins the Owidi (Owoede) stream which runs through Ayoma land to enter the Dayi (Dain) stream. The onus probandi on the defendant who counterclaimed to demonstrate his boundaries was partly attempted by the production of judgments decided in his favour. I shall accordingly turn to these judgments.
For half a century or more the defendant and his predecessors had been fighting to preserve the integrity of their land. Nana Akoto appears to have prized his stool lands jealously and sued at the least threat of a diminution of his domain; most often successfully. One such suit was against Nana Adibo, the Paramount Chief of the Akpafus. Apparently, Nana Adibo had interfered with Nana Akoto’s alienation of land in “Sekoko”, “Odi”, “Ayakenku” and “Katakpentu” at New Ayoma. In effect a challenge to the latter’s right to alienate. Nana Akoto won his suit but the decision was set aside on a technicality. Nana Akoto recommenced the suit and won again; this time against
[p.374] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
Nana Adibo’s successor, Nana Adjesam. The judgments were exhibited as exhibits 2 and 3.
It is however the suit mounted by Nana Akoto against Nana Adjesam and seventeen Akpafu farmers in 1954 (exhibit 10) that is of immediate interest. In that suit title was confirmed in Nana Akoto against the Akpafus farming on his land. The Akpafus admitted Nana Akoto’s title (see exhibit 10). That area in dispute was covered by “Owordin”, “Lakoko”, “Ayadinko” and “Katakpentu” lands.
These areas are delineated on the plan ordered by the court, exhibit A, and appear at the north-western portion of the land. That block in my view was adjudged to belong to the defendant’s predecessor. On appeal, a consent judgment (exhibit 4) was substituted for the judgment. That consent judgment did nothing to whittle the defendant’s title. It ordered the seventeen Akpafu trespassers to enter into terms with Nana Akoto, the defendant’s predecessor, to enable them to continue cultivation of the farms. Exhibit D is the plan of the area prepared by surveyor Ziddah showing the apportionment in terms of exhibit 4. In my view the Akpafus cannot under any guise or pretensions of a legal right, attempt to relitigate title over this area again.
In the suit evidenced by exhibit 10 and culminating in the consent judgment, exhibit 4, the Akpafus are described as from Akpafu-Todzi. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs therefore contends that the judgment in the case affected only persons hailing from Akpafu-Todzi and not Akpafu-Adorkor, the plaintiff herein.
This is a curious submission, as the Akpafus as a whole cultivated land on a communal basis and shifted their cultivation to any arable land. They themselves plead in paragraph 3 of their claim to have first settled at Todzi.
Among the seventeen persons sued in exhibit 10 as Akpafu-Todzi farmers number many who are listed among the 151 plaintiffs in the present suit and who technically would be described as Akpafu-Adorkor citizens. To make the point clearer I shall mention the following names which stick out like sore thumbs in exhibit 10. The name Charles Ebro, the seventh defendant in exhibit 10, has a familiar ring with C I Obro, No 23 on the list of plaintiffs in this action. Abraham Sraku, the ninth plaintiff, appears to be the tenth defendant in exhibit 10; N K Adibo, the nineteenth plaintiff herein, was the eleventh defendant in exhibit 10. James Asimedu, the thirty-fifth plaintiff was the ninth defendant in exhibit 10; Raphael Akoeh or Acquaye, the fourth plaintiff in this suit, was the sixth defendant in exhibit 10; and Maxwell Gblede, the thirty-sixth plaintiff, appears to be the seventeenth defendant in exhibit 10.
[p.375] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
Moreover Marcus Tetteh (Nana Ntiamoa Bediako), chief of Adorkor in the Akpafu Division, that is the chief of the plaintiffs, gave evidence in a consolidated suit initiated by the defendant’s predecessor to which I shall later return. But the evidence of Nana Bediako (exhibit 5) shows that many of the Akpafu-Adorkors were farming on the defendant’s land and had to attorn tenant to the defendant in the tenor of the consent judgment (exhibit 4). It is for this reason that no real distinction can be maintained between Akpafu-Adorkor and Akpafu- Todzi farmers in this area. It is brazen effrontery for any of these persons mentioned to permit his name to be used to mount an action as plaintiff against the defendant.
In the consolidated suit, Nana Akoto III v Nana Agyiman I (supra) as previously observed, Nana Ntiamoa Bediako was invited by the defendant’s predecessor to give evidence on his behalf. The testimony (exhibit 5) confirms that the plaintiffs (the Akpafus) have no lands extending to the River Owoede that the Akpafu lands are not within the boundaries set by the Owoede and Dayi (Dain) rivers but are rather located outside these rivers on the northern side of the River Owoede. That the true boundary with the defendant (Ayomas) was to the west of the River Owoede towards the grasslands. It is significant that in the Akoto v Agyiman case (supra), the defendant’s predecessor’s title was declared in respect of land west of the River Danyi (Dain) and east of the River Owoede: see p 530 of the report.
In view of the preponderant material marshalled in support of the defendant’s counterclaim, especially the impregnable effect of previous decisions, one is bewildered by the learned judge’s categorical rejection of it.
I shall consequently attempt a short analysis of the High Court decision to ascertain whether the preference for the plaintiffs’ claim was justified. First, it must be observed that the reliance the learned trial judge placed on the surveyor’s evidence in proof of the plaintiffs’ case was unwarranted.
It is well settled that apart from evidence attesting to the work actually performed on the site and what he saw, testimony of a surveyor of what he has learnt from others is pure hearsay and must be supported by cogent, admissible evidence: see Akyem v Adu (Consolidated) [1976] 2 GLR 63 at 79, CA.
Two of the judgments pleaded by the defendant in assertion of his title are (a) the consolidated, suit Akoto III v Agyiman I (supra) (exhibit 7) and (b) Akoto v Adjesam a suit, against seventeen Akpafus (exhibits 10 and 4). Reference has been made to them previously. These judgments appear to have been glossed over by the learned judge. In my view the judge’s failure to give adequate consideration to these
[p.376] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 judgments disabled him from forming a rational view of the plea of res judicata raised.
Though the learned judge posed the rhetorical conundrum, “The question which therefore arises is whether the plaintiffs are on the land by permission of the defendant?”, with respect he hardly attempted an answer. That issue indeed admits of one answer only, and that is that the question had been finally settled against the plaintiffs in exhibits 10 and 4 and as far as the north-western portion of the land in dispute was concerned should not have been reagitated. It was eloquently stated in Fori v Ayirebi [1966] GLR 627 at 647, SC, that “There cannot be a more open, positive or effective exercise of acts of possession of land than by placing a purchaser, tenant or a licensee on it.” In my view the consent judgment is as positive a declaration and acknowledgment of the defendant’s title, as any that proof can establish. The learned judge having found as a fact that “the plaintiffs’ claim includes the area which was the consent judgment” should have avoided the error of allowing that area to be relitigated upon.
The importance of the consolidated suit, exhibit 7, is two fold: First, the area covers the present suit and even if it is held not to be res judicata it is a material fact to be taken into account in the assessment of the defendant’s proof of his counterclaim: see Akoto III v Nana Agyiman I (supra). Secondly, that suit contained the declaration of the Akpafu chief against the interest of the Akpafus which we have mentioned. On the first issue, could the plaintiffs be heard to say what the trial judge attributed to them “that they were not interested in the consolidated suit because their land did not form part of the land the subject-matter of the consolidated suit?” If indeed they said so, then they were echoing what their chief Bediako had said, namely that their land did not lie between the Dayi (Dain) River and Owoede River. Yet the learned judge made them victors over the very land they had so unequivocally disclaimed.
I cannot accept any protestations of ignorance of the consolidated suit. It was a fierce three-cornered fight to establish the boundaries of the Ayomas, the stool of Likpe Kukurantumi and the stool of Old Baika. It was a notorious fight culminating in the decision of the Supreme Court in favour of the defendant’s predecessor, Nana Akoto, and his allies. Chief Ntiamoa Bediako, the Akpafu-Adorkor chief, as already observed, participated in those proceedings. Any plea of ignorance from the plaintiffs of the course of the consolidated suit consequently sounds very ill from their mouths and must be likened to the behaviour of the proverbial ostrich who escaped the pressures of the moment by burying his head in the sands.
The area of the consolidated suit was superimposed on the court plan, exhibit A. It was not done with any degree of competency.
[p.377] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
However, the physical description of the area in the consolidated suit is clearly discernible on exhibit A. It is quite clear that the area falls neatly into the area of the present controversy and the judge was in duty bound to have found against the plaintiffs especially having regard to their chief’s evidence in exhibit 5 before mentioned.
This leads me to a consideration of the second issue, namely the effect of that evidence. Nana Ntiamoa Bediako’s evidence, in my view, ruled the plaintiffs completely out of court. The learned judge’s attention does not appear to have been directed to the case of Nyan v Amihere [1964] GLR 162, SC. In that case where a similar situation arose, Adumua-Bossman JSC stated the legal effect of such a deposition against interest. At 166-167 of the report he said:
“The disclosures that (1) there had been an earlier action about the same land between Adjasa and Twenani stools in which judgment had been given for Adjasa stool; and (2) that, at any rate in the second action from the judgment of which the above citation is made, the caretaker for the time being of the Awhaka stool gave evidence for the defendant (Twenani stool) but even so admitted or acknowledged the boundary claimed by Adjasa stool, are significant. They are significant, because they amount to, or constitute, conduct on the part of the caretaker and accredited representative of the Awhaka stool, which, if estoppel had been pleaded, would have enabled the plea to be sustained. That appears to be so, because when, to the knowledge of the said caretaker of the Awhaka stool, the Adjasa stool claimed as against Twenani land . . . and the said caretaker of the Ahwaka stool must have known of it because he was a witness in the case who testified about that boundary and took part in the inspection of the land, according to the judgment he was bound to apply to be joined as a party in order not only to oppose the Adjasa stool’s claim to that portion of land, but also to endeavour to establish the alleged ownership of his own the Awhaka, stool. As he did not do that, but on the contrary, gave evidence for the Twenani stool, and even then admitted the boundary claimed by the Adjasa stool, it seems to me that if estoppel by the judgment obtained against the Twenani stool had been pleaded, the said caretaker and accredited representative of the Awhaka stool, or rather the stool which he represented, would have been estopped.”
In the present case, estoppel was pleaded, and in my view that plea should have been sustained. As was stated in Fori v Ayirebi (supra) at 636:
… although in equity estoppel must be mutual, a stranger to a former suit may successfully plead in a later suit to which he is a
[p.378] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 party that his opponent is bound by an admission against interest which he had made in the previous suit”
The learned judge seems also without good reason to have rejected the defence evidence given by Nana Akpandja, the supreme overlord of the two parties, and who would in effect be giving neutral evidence of the highest order. There was nothing to suggest that he was biased in favour of the defendant. His failure to talk about a Grunner plan which had been discredited in some proceedings should not have provoked the doubts which the learned judge cast on his testimony.
His omission to refer to a map which, to use the words of Lord Wilberforce in Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1973] 2 All ER 39 at 53, HL “had long been recognised to be nothing but the refuge of the desperate”, should not have imperilled his credibility. In my view neutral evidence which is not tainted by the twin evils of bias and inaccuracy must be accorded the highest respect. The respect usually reserved for honest umpires. For such a witness plays a part no different from that of an honest broker. Curiously also none of the witnesses of the defendant who described the defendant’s land, its boundaries, acquisition and user were considered even cursorily in the learned judge’s judgment.
It is my view that the judge placed undue and unnecessary reliance on the Grunner map (exhibit C). This map was alleged to show the boundary between the Akpafus (the plaintiffs) and the Ayomas (the defendant’s stool). When the judgments in exhibits 10 and 4 were delivered this Grunner plan was in existence and available but the plaintiffs did not reply on it. The compromise, evidenced by the consent judgment, exhibit 4, over areas presently in dispute, is the plaintiffs’ own positive rejection of the Grunner plan. As pointed out earlier, the plaintiffs’ Chief Bediako effectually rejected the plan since his description of the plaintiffs’ land is at variance with what the Grunner plan is purported to declare. If the plaintiffs and their chief in exhibits 4 and 5 in essence doubt the viability of the Grunner map they cannot be allowed to resile from that commitment now. The fortunes of the plaintiffs and their Chief Bediako should march in harness.
The courts of this country have not given the Grunner plan unreserved approval. As the learned judge rightly stated, Kponuglo v Kodadja (1933) 2 WACA 24 held that the Grunner map “only enjoys a presumption of correctness which may be rebutted by other evidence.” That Privy Council judgment also held at 27 of the report “that it would not be safe to draw an inference from it regarding the tribal boundaries now in dispute.” This condemnation stemmed from the map’s inaccuracies. The map was rejected as unreliable also in Akpandja v Egblomesse (1939) 5 WACA 10.
[p.379] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
It seems from the review above, that the Grunner plan is vulnerable to the serious criticism of unreliability. It should not have been the basis of a decision. With the Grunner map and the surveyor’s evidence shorn of any evidential value, the plaintiffs were denuded of material to sustain their claim.
I finally turn to the review decision of the full bench of the Court of Appeal in Nii Akramah II v Robertson (Consolidated) [1975] 2 GLR 301 which was a source of inspiration to the learned trial judge. In that case the Nikoi Olai family sued in four actions for trespass to lands at Mukose and Abeka. The suits were consolidated and the Asere Mantse principally defended the suits as overlord of the lands in the area. The Nikoi Olai family pleaded that the Privy Council in an earlier suit had upheld the family’s title against the Asere Mantse and declared them owners in possession of an area edged green in that suit which was the subject of further contest. The Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) held that in two of the consolidated suits, the area in dispute fell largely within the green area confirmed by the Privy Council judgment to belong to the Nikoi Olai family, and in respect of the other two suits which fell outside the green area, on the principle of juridical identity, res judicata applied. Accordingly the family was adjudged successful in all the four consolidated suits.
A study of the review decision of the full bench makes patent that the decision of the ordinary bench was confirmed in two suits with a slight variation which affected the quantum of damages only. This was on the basis that the area of trespass had slightly overshot the green area awarded by the Privy Council judgment. In respect, however, of the other two suits, the matter was remitted for retrial on the premise that Mukose and Abeka lands were not precisely delineated for their extent to be known and that the court of first instance having failed to make any findings on this, it was not open to the Court of Appeal to make a determination thereon.
The review bench therefore restricted the Nikoi Olai family to the green area and expressed its doubts about proof over a wider area by ordering the retrial. In relation to the green area, the principal judgment of the full bench stated at 319 as follows:
“When one looks at the plan exhibit A it is obvious that all the grants in the ten deeds of gift exhibits D1 to D10 lie in the area edged green. As the applicants are estopped by the Privy Council decision, then their grantees, who are privies, are also estopped.
So far as these ten grants are concerned, the respondent need not adduce any further evidence to establish trespass to the areas affected by these grants.”
[p.380] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365
Clearly the plea of res judicata to the specified area edged green was upheld. Similarly the area in the present suit evidenced by exhibits 10 and 4 which affected the Akpafus cannot be discounted with any degree of legitimacy.
As to the wider area of claim in the Nii Akramah II v Robertson (supra) suit, the full bench decision seems to promote doubts on the principle of juridical identity which was so eloquently restated in Frempong II v Effah [1961] GLR 205, PC. While not questioning the force of the review decision, some observations must be made.
Since the green area in the Nii Akramah II v Robertson (supra) suit was the area of trespass by Mousbah Captan and the Nikoi Olai family was claiming an area not restricted to this green area but extending much wider and including this area, to interpret the Privy Council judgment so as to restrict the Nikoi Olai family only to the green plot, the subject of Captan’s trespass, seems puzzling to the extreme. Put differently, if X claims to own Blackacre and sues Y over a parcel of land within Blackacre, measuring 100 feet by 90 feet, as the area of trespass, it is odd if upon being adjudged owner of the trespassed land he is limited to that area of 100 by 90 feet only. And this albatross must hang on his neck forever. How, it may be asked, was X’s ownership proved in the first place? What boundaries did he establish to be adjudged owner of a definite area of 100 by 90 feet within his claim? Perhaps the full bench decision rests on the fact that the trial court failed to make a finding whether the Nikoi Olai family had demonstrated ownership of Mukose and Abeka lands, and so long as that was uncertain res judicata could not apply. Be that as it may, as related to the present case, the trial judge’s inspiration seems to have dried up since he failed to appreciate that upon a proper application of the Robertson case he should have confirmed the defendant’s title to the area in exhibits 10 and 4, at the very least.
In conclusion, it is obvious the plaintiffs made no real effort to discharge the onus of proof that lay on them to sustain title. The very format of the claim and writ upon which the joint or common claim of a number of plaintiffs was to receive its structural viability was defective, and incurably so: see Etablissement Baudelot v Graham (RS) and Co Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 149, CA. On the other hand there was no answer to the defendant’s proof of ownership evidenced by testimony of boundary neighbours and previous judicial decisions. Moreover the testimony against interest of the Akpafu chief, Ntiamoa Bediako, was so formidable a hurdle that no real attempt to leap it was made.
The preponderance of proof in the defendant’s favour in my view renders the contrary decision of the High Court perverse and I have no hesitation in advocating its immediate vacation. I would allow the
[p.381] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 365 appeal and enter judgment for the defendant on the claim and on his counterclaim with costs.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON JA
I fully concur with the judgment delivered by the president and I have nothing to add.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN JA
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal allowed
M C N – N
