INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL vs. INTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA [1984-86] 1 GLR 529
25 April 1985 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 11 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 25Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) London Association for Protection of Trade v GreenLands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15, HL.
(2) Gray v Pearson (1870) LR 5 CP 568; 23 LT 416.
(3) Evans v Hooper (1875) 1 QBD 45, CA.
(4) Belgian Economic Mission v A. P. & E Singer Ltd [1950] WN 418; 94 SJ 579, CA.
(5) Etablissement Baudelot v Graham (RS) & Co, Ltd [1953] 2 QB 271; [1953] 2 WLR 180; [1953] 1 All ER 149, CA.
(6) Campbell v Thompson [1953] 1 QB 445; [1953] 2 WLR 656; [1953] 1 All ER 831.
(7) Mussey v Darko [1977] 1 GLR 150.
(8) Ghana Muslims Representative Council v Salifu [1975] 2 GLR 246, CA.
[p.531] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 529
(9) Smith v Cardiff Corporation [1954] 1 QB 210; [1953] 3 WLR 994; [1954] 2 All ER 1373. (10) Banahene v Hima [1963] 1 GLR 323.
(11) Dodds v Amalgamated Marine Workers’ Union (1923) 93 LJ Ch 65; [1924] 1 Ch 116. (12) Woodford v Smith [1970] 1 WLR 806; [1970] 1 ALL ER 109.
(13) Bailey (Malta) Ltd v Bailey 107 SJ 458; [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 595, CA; affirming [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 479.
(14) Attorney-General v Stockton-on-Tees Corporation (1927) 91 JP 172.
(15) Heywood v BDC Properties Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 975; [1963] 2 All ER 1063, CA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against an interlocutory decision of the High Court, Koforidua granting nearly all the reliefs sought in a substantive suit. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois JSC.
COUNSEL
Ata for the appellants.
No appearance for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS JSC
By a writ dated 30 January 1984 a body styling itself the “Interim Executive Committee of the Apostolic Church of Ghana” instituted proceedings against the appellants for the reliefs set down below, namely:
“(a) A declaration that the purported revocation or dissolution or both of the interim executive committee is null and void and of no effect.
(b) A declaration that the convening of the emergency delegates’ conference at Takrowase on 7 August 1982 was unauthorised, illegal, unconstitutional and at variance with the provisions of the resolution passed and adopted at the emergency delegates’ conference held at Takrowase on 19 April 1980 and is null and void and of no effect.
(c) A declaration that the resolution passed at the said emergency delegates’ conference by the defendants had no authority, jurisdiction or mandate of the interim executive committee then the ruling church council and is null and void and of no effect.
(d) An order prohibiting the defendants from exercising any powers, functions, deeds, acts or authority of whatsoever kind conferred on the interim executive committee by the emergency delegates’ conference of 19 April 1980.
[p.532] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 529 (e) An order removing the defendants from office for grave and serious violation of the constituted authority of the church to wit, the interim executive committee.
(f) An order to declare null and void and of no effect any acts,deeds, letters, appointments, transfers and removals that the defendants had carried out since usurping the power of the plaintiffs’ committee.
(g) Any further order or orders or other reliefs.”
By notice of motion dated 23 February 1984 an injunction was sought to restrain the appellants:
“from carrying out any functions or undertaking or both to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church and or usurping the rights and functions of the plaintiffs’ committee, the supreme governing body of the Apostolic Divine Church.”
It was the case of the respondents that they had been duly elected by an emergency delegates conference of the Apostolic Divine Church on 19 April 1980 to discharge the duties and functions previously carried out by the church’s officers while a controversy within the church was being resolved.
The facts as can be gathered from the pleadings and affidavits filed suggest a deep rift between two sections of the church, each vying with the other to control the church. The internal dissensions had even made it impossible for members to agree on the current rules and constitution of the church.
There is no doubt that the church on 19 April 1980 elected certain officials to run its affairs. That body was designated “The Interim Executive Committee of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana.” The appellants say that body is not the respondents. Since the respondents themselves plead that a number of their committee members have defected (at least five), this has provided fodder for the appellants to challenge the capacity of the respondents and urge the incompetency of the writ in its failure to disclose the names of members of the committee, or those on whose behalf the writ is issued.
Matters came to a head when some members of the church held a conference on 7 August 1982 and voted into power the first appellant as the supreme interim governing body of the church. If the decision of the meeting of 7 August had legitimacy it would mean the automatic dissolution of the respondents’ committee. It was natural therefore to expect the respondents to defend their position with a legal suit.
Meanwhile the erosion of the respondents’ erstwhile powers continued apace and an injunction was consequently sought to preserve
[p.533] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 529
the status quo ante. The learned judge of the High Court, Koforidua to whom the application was brought, acceded to the respondents’ prayers, granting nearly all the reliefs sought, hence this appeal. Two main questions arise for determination: (1) whether the respondents had legal capacity to issue the writ; and (2) whether the interim injunction granted by the High Court offended legal rules when it in effect granted all the reliefs sought in the substantive action.
As to issue (1) on legal identity, paragraphs 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the statement of defence set out the appellants’ position as follows:
“2. In further answer to paragraph 1 the defendants say that at the delegates’ conference held at Takrowase on 19 April 1980 the delegates elected an interim executive committee but not a church council and that the interim executive committee elected at the said delegates’ conference is not the plaintiffs in this case.
3. Alternatively the defendants say that the plaintiff has no legal personality and therefore lacks capacity to bring this action and will contend that the plaintiff has no locus standi …
8. In further answer to paragraph 3 of the statement of claim the defendants say that the defendants did
not remove the plaintiff from office and that the plaintiff does not and has never existed …
13. (a) In further answer to paragraph 5 the defendants say that at a delegates’ conference held at Takrowase on 19 April 1980 an interim executive committee, which is not the plaintiff in this case, was elected to administer the affairs of the church.
13. (b) The said interim executive committee elected on 19 April 1980 was removed from office on 7
August 1982 by a properly constituted delegates’ conference of the church,”
In the pleadings one can hardly fail to notice that the issue of legal capacity was a hard and real controversial nut. Indeed, the defendants made it an issue for trial in this formulation: “Whether or not the plaintiff lacks legal personality and therefore has no capacity to bring this action as pleaded in paragraph 3 of the statement of defence.”
It is to this issue of jurisdictional persona that I consequently first turn. The church is a club, society or voluntary association of fellow Christians. As far as the respondents’ committee is concerned, it does not seem to have been incorporated. The law is explicit that an unincorporated members’ club not being a partnership or legal entity, cannot sue or be sued in the club name: see London Association for
[p.534] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 529
Protection of Trade v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15, HL and Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed) Vol 5, 275.
Even if there is debate as to a church society being a club the law is equally firmly rooted that an unregistered society cannot sue or be sued in its own name nor can the secretary or any other officers of the society sue or be sued on behalf of the society, even if the rules purport to give him power to sue and provide for his being sued: see Gray v Pearson (1870) LR 5 CP 568 and Evans v Hooper (1875) 1 QBD 45, CA.
The respondents are not trustees in whom property has been vested who in such circumstances may sue or be sued in respect of that property: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed), Vol 18, 115.
One recognises immediately the difficulties that bristle when a court is asked to preserve the status quo by an application for an injunction, when that application in substance repeats the whole plaint and seeks the same reliefs, at a time when the plaintiffs status and legal capacity has been challenged and that issue remains unresolved.
The learned judge of the court below held that the respondents did not lack legal capacity and proceeded to give them the reliefs they sought. On the issue of capacity the judge fell into error. It was however a decision which fell to be made in the agony of the moment and experience has shown that such decisions are fraught with a wholly disproportionate risk of error. But had he decided otherwise, he still could have preserved the action by giving leave to the respondents to amend the title of the suit to disclose its representative character. The test has always been whether the writ was issued by a legal persona or by a non-existent person like a dead man; in the latter case that writ could not be revived or rehabilitated by any legal recourse.
The executive committee was a body created by the church itself, consequently it had a persona: see Belgian Economic Mission v A P & Singer Ltd (1950) WN 418. If the body had an existence, then a. misdescription which is a mere misnomer can be readily cured by the court granting an amendment to enable the merits of the action to be determined. The question should be what was asked in Etablissement Baudelot v Graham (RS) & Co [1953] 1 All ER 149, CA, ie whether the writ was issued “in circumstances comparable to those where the plaintiff is a dead man?” If the question yielded an affirmative response then the writ was incurably bad. Applying this principle, the inquiry must ascertain whether the respondents’ committee represents something existing. If it does, then amendments could be granted to cure the misnomer: see Campbell v Thompson [1953] 1 QB 445 and Mussey v Darko [1977] 1 GLR 150 at 154-155.
[p.535] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 529 The case of Ghana Muslims Representative Council v Salifu [1975] 2 GLR 246, CA illustrates the above proposition. It was a case similar to the present in many respects. There, a voluntary association of Muslims elected a body to constitute a national executive committee of their association. Following disagreement among various shades of muslims in the association, this executive body was declared dissolved by another body constituting itself as a new executive committee. The first body sued to prevent what it termed the usurpation of its office. The suit was in their own names to enforce the rights of members of the association but they failed to indorse such a representative capacity in their writ and claim. This was the issue that was finally settled in the Court of Appeal’s declaration at 259 of the report as follows:
“Where it appears at the trial in a representative action that the plaintiff has failed to state the representative capacity of the parties, the court will give leave to amend either the writ or subsequent pleadings by adding a statement that the plaintiff is suing on behalf of himself and all others of a defined class.”
If the respondents had appeared in court, I have no doubt this court would have acceded to an application to amend the title of the suit or directed the court below to do so, exactly as was done in the Ghana Muslims case. Since, however, the action will continue in the normal way in the court below, no disability attaches to the respondents to seek an amendment later to disclose their true identity, competently. Unfortunately till the issue of capacity is rectified, no orders can be made in favour of the respondents. It would only be like hanging presents on a non-existing Christmas tree.
The Ghana Muslims case (supra) at 256-257 is also invaluable for its definition of a voluntary association as the:
“sum of individuals, without any collective capacity to sue or be sued as such. But all the members may join to sue as plaintiffs, and this is permissible under order 16, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).”
Order 16, r 9 of LN 140A provides for a representative action. In Smith v Cardiff Corporation [1954] 1 QB 210, it was held that to bring a representative action it must be shown that all the members of the class have a common interest; that they all share a common grievance and the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to them all: see also Banahene v Hima [1963] 1 GLR 323, SC.
Having concluded that the present writ of the respondents has disabling defect, it would appear that disposes of the appeal but the second question earlier posed relating to repetitive reliefs in the substantive action and interim applications, requires an answer.
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Counsel for the appellants has argued with force that a court should not grant interim reliefs which the substantive action also seeks. Counsel found himself on Dodds v Amalgamated Marine Workers’ Union (1923) 93 LJCh 65, CA where it was held that it was not general practice to grant an interlocutory injunction which in effect granted the sole relief sought. But counsel’s sheet-anchor has long been swept away by subsequent waves and billows of authoritative decisions. These cases have been beautifully summarised in Woodford v Smith [1970] 1 WLR 806 by Megarry J. The learned judge in that case, at 817, concludes: “I do not think that there is anything to prevent the court in a proper case from granting on motion substantially all the reliefs claimed in the action.” ln Bailey (Malta) Ltd v Bailey [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 595 at 598, CA, Harman LJ had described the rule as a theory which had “long been exploded”; and Lord Denning had denied flatly the existence of any such rule basing himself on Sargant LJ’s “reasoned demolition” of the rule in Attorney-General v Stockton-on-Tees Corporation (1927) 91 JP 172 at 174. See also Heywood v B D C Properties Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 975, CA. Megarry J concludes at 818 of Woodford v Smith (supra), that the passage in The Supreme Court Practice 1970 which cites Dodds v Marine Workers’ Union (supra) as authority for the proposition needs “the firm touch of a revising hand.”
In my view, if the matter had rested purely on this second limb, the appeal would have been unarguable. But it is clear the respondents have to put their house in order as indicated above to be able to proceed with the action. In the circumstances, I think the appeal succeeds and the injunction order must be vacated. The substantive trial must be before a different judge.
There must be no spoils of war to be captured to exacerbate existing wounds. Fortunately counsel for the appellants has given a solemn undertaking that matters would remain in status quo till the trial of the substantive action and this augurs well for the Apostolic Church.
To promote reconciliation I would award no costs.
JUDGMENT OF MENSAH BOISON JA I agree.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA I also agree.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
J A A
